

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H. GRAF, *Graf Nikolai Karlovich*
COMMANDER OF I. R. N. FIRST-OFFICER OF THE DESTROYER „NOVIK“.

THE RUSSIAN NAVY IN WAR AND REVOLUTION

FROM 1914 UP TO 1918

WITH 38 PHOTOGRAPHYS

TRANSLATED FROM RUSSIAN

1923

PRINTED BY R. OLDENBOURG, MUNICH

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P R E F A C E.

With a dull roar the waves of the Gulf of Finland dash against the ancient walls of Cronstadt and the steel walls of the motionless ships. The wind moans plaintively through the steel rigging as if mourning the glorious past of our Navy over its final resting place. Cronstadt, the Neva, far off Bizerte—there the unfortunate, pitiable and helpless remnants have found a shelter—a sad epilogue to proud hopes and aspirations.

My work has two objects: first to show the activity of our Baltic Fleet during the past war. Of course I shall speak only of the events which concerned the operation of my own ship, the destroyer "Novik". I passed nearly all the war in the "Novik", and it is there that 21 chapters of my book were written; the last four I wrote later. The dear name of my ship brings back to me the remembrance of the days so recent and yet so far off of the happy past. . . .

The operations of the Russian Baltic Fleet, on account of different circumstances were not of a very active character in this war. But the navies of all the other Powers, including England, did not show much activity. With the exception of three or four battles they also confined their operations almost exclusively to protecting the sea-communications and struggling against the submarines and the mines.

Besides our Navy was much less numerous than the force opposed to it, and the configuration of our theatre of war was so peculiar, that our task consisted exclusively in protecting and fortifying definite positions and other operations of the same kind. Nevertheless the work of our Navy is of considerable interest and is worth serious attention.

The second object of my book is to state, so far as I know, all that happened in the Navy from the beginning of the February revolution, and to describe the tragedy it lived through during that time up to its complete collapse.

Let the recent pages full of terror and blood be revealed. The names of the martyrs for their native country who fell victims of Anarchy, must

be impressed in the mind of all Russians, as well as those of the men who betrayed the holy traditions of Russia, grovelling before the revolution in all its aspects, even to bolshevism.

All the facts, dates and names stated by me may well serve as historical information. For as the Russian Navy passed through a period of complete decay after the revolution, during which many historical documents were undoubtedly lost, the present work will perhaps explain much to the future historian. The events in which I took no personal part, I have gathered from the documents and recollections kindly supplied to me by men who had been directly connected with them.

H. GRAF.

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Part I.

The Navy and the War.

I.

Mobilisation and declaration of war. Order of the day of the commander in chief of the fleet. Mines laid on the central position. The enemy's first operations.

Events developed with amazing rapidity, and during the summer of 1914, war was no more a fancy only, but a reality. Our small Navy, incommensurably smaller than its adversary, was feverishly preparing to bear all the brunt of the attack of a much stronger foe.

The order to mobilise was given on the 30th of July. Immediately all the ships began speedily to prepare for war in accordance with a plan elaborated beforehand: they took on board ample supplies of munitions, torpedoes, fuel, greasing and consumable material etc. and all wooden structures, curtains, carpets, ornaments from the ward-room and the cabins, surplus supplies of sail—cloth, ropes and other inflammable material—were landed. Everybody worked untiringly.

The mobilisation was carried out rapidly and in an exemplary manner; there were no misunderstandings, hitches or delays and when the time limit expired, the fleet was ready to put out to sea.

The division of mine-layers detailed to carry out the first operations of war was ready, at first call, to lay a huge mine-field on the central position intended to lie across the whole Gulf from Nargen island to Porkallaud.

Our Baltic Fleet consisted then only of four battle ships, ten cruisers, (of which nine were obsolete), thirty six old destroyers, five submarines of the old type, six mine—layers, and the "Novik", the only modern ship. We should have had in addition the battle-ship "Andrei Pervozvanny" but she had run aground a few days before, was in the basin in Cronstadt (docks) and could not join the fleet until a week later. Therefore, at the most critical moment, the fleet was deprived of one of its best ships.

The new battle ships were far from being ready and the two first ones: "Gangut" and "Petrovavlovsk" were to be commissioned only two or three months later.

Our forces were not only insignificant in comparison with the enemy's, but in addition, the coast fortifications on the islands Nargen, Wulf and Renscher, destined for the protection of the mine fields on the central position, were not ready either; and there was only time to place a few guns of small size.

Graf, Novik.

I

Meanwhile, judging by the experience of the Russo-Japanese War, we could be sure that the enemy, whose aim was to fall upon our fleet unexpectedly, would not wait for war to be officially declared. We would not be found unprepared, but all the chances of success would have been on the enemy's side, as we were very few. Therefore, while there was no mine barrage on the central position, all were in a very strained state, expecting every moment to sight hostile ships in our waters.

On account of this, the commander in chief of the Fleet insisted upon obtaining permission to lay mines on the principal position, even before the actual declaration of war. On the 31st of July a division of mine-layers consisting of the "Ladoga", the "Narova", the "Enisei", the "Amur" and the "Volga" under the flag of Rear-admiral Kanin put out to sea to lay the mines; and the battle ships, cruisers and destroyers, in fact nearly the entire fleet, put out to sea to protect them.

The division carried through this operation in an irreproachable manner. The mines were well placed; none floated or sank, and only about ten of them prematurely exploded, most likely on account of some technical defect. That day more than 2200 mines were laid by the division.

When the laying of the mines was ended all felt relieved. It would be more difficult for the enemy to enter the Gulf now, and easier for the fleet to protect its positions. The enemy had not awaited itself of the right moment when comparatively easily, he could have destroyed nearly our whole fleet and have reached Cronstadt itself.

After this operation was ended, all the big ships anchored in the roads of Reval, and the destroyer's patrol was established at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland whose duty was to exercise severe control over all the merchant ships. For this purpose the latter were directed to proceed to Baltic Port, where after being examined, they were allowed to continue their voyage.

On the 1st of August 1914, a wireless-message was received stating, that war had been declared. The enthusiasm of the entire navy was very great, and order of the Commander in chief on the occasion of the declaration of war, was received with acclamation. The order ran as follows.

"To day by the will of the Emperor war has been declared. I congratulate the Baltic Fleet on this great day for which we have lived, which we have expected, and for which we have prepared.

Officers and men!

From this day, each one of us must forget all his private affairs and concentrate all his thoughts and his will on one object—the defence of our country against the enemy's attacks. We must give battle without hesitation, only thinking of inflicting on the foe the heaviest losses in our power. War is settled by battle. Let each one of you bring all his knowledge, experience and skill to the day of battle, to carry destruction and loss into the enemy's forces by aid of our guns and torpedoes.

Our enemy is very strong and possesses great experience; he will profit by every mistake and every weak point; we must try to have few of them. Remember that the only help we must give each other during battle consists in the effort we individually make to attack our enemy so, that we may inflict on him the greatest disaster, and we must use for that purpose all our forces and war material.

Let each one of us do his utmost to perform his duty towards his country — let him defend its inviolability with his life, — and follow the example.

of those, who, two centuries ago, with the Great Emperor, laid by their deeds and blood, the foundation of our Navy in these waters."

Admiral von Essen.

(Order of the day of the Commander in chief of the Baltic Fleet, 1st of August 1914 No. 2.)

All tried to get into the active fleet and envied those who were successful in doing so, for they were persuaded that the war would end rapidly, and were afraid they would not have an opportunity to take part in the operations of the Navy.

The enemy did not appear yet before the Gulf of Finland and the light-house Dagerort alone perceived suspicious columns of smoke on the horizon.

Libau was the first to sight the enemy. Two cruisers appeared before the port on the 1st of August: one with four funnels and one with three. They laid mines at the outport, energetically bombarded the port and the town, and then retired. But as in accordance with the mobilisation plan, the port of the Emperor Alexander III was to be immediately evacuated, operations against it were of no importance whatever to us.

On the 9th of August about 11 p.m., when on the parallel of the Dagerort light house, the destroyer "Novik" unexpectedly discovered in its neighbourhood an enemy four funnelled cruiser. But as both ships were steaming very rapidly and their meeting was very sudden, they almost immediately lost sight of each other without even having time to exchange shots.

Not until the 17th of August, at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland, did the enemy forces appear, composed of several cruisers and some other ships, which appearing on the horizon were only perceptible by the smoke from their funnels. The cruisers also kept all the time at a great distance, and attempted no action for the moment.

It was later ascertained that towards 8 p.m. these enemy forces approached the entrance of the Gulf on the Russare-Odensholm line, and the mine layers which were with them, laid on the 39th square a huge mine field. This was immediately known through the report of the chief of communications division to the Staff; and next morning it was confirmed, for at the place where the mines had been laid, many of them had come up to the surface. Thus it did us no harm, only while ascertaining the limits of the mine field, two of the mine-sweepers: the "Provodnik" and "No. 8" were blown up.

On the 18th of August the enemy's cruisers again appeared in view of the Gulf. It was evident that they wished to entice our ships to come out, and in that way, bring them over their mine field. But as we already knew about it, and also knew through the reports that the battle cruisers "Roon" and "Prince Heinrich" were with enemy forces, our patrol cruisers "Admiral Makaroff" and "Bayan" did not go out to meet them: the fact was, that we could not expect to receive rapid help, as our main forces were in Helsingfors. Therefore shots were exchanged between the two sides, without, however, any damage to either. This was the first time our fleet was in action.

On the 23d of August, the enemy reappeared before Libau, but this time with only one cruiser, and having bombarded the harbour, went away.

II.

Wreck of the "Magdeburg".

After having waited several days for the "Novik" in Helsingfors, I was at last, on the 24th of August, able to present myself on board. I was appointed second Torpedo-officer, but that was not the main thing, — the most important was, that I was in the "Novik". . . .

The day after my arrival, we left for Reval. There I had an opportunity of becoming acquainted quietly with the ship and my new colleagues with whom from henceforth I was to share all the hardships of the war.

In our small navy, the officers are more or less known to each other, either by hearsay or personally, and on joining a new ship one has always some idea beforehand of the new comrades.

The "Novik" was officered by an exceptionally congenial company of high-spirited, unconcerned young men, with Commander P. Paletsky in command.

On the 26th of August the German cruiser "Magdeburg" ran aground the Odensholm Reef in the fog, and as she could not be floated again the crew made an unsuccessful attempt to blow her up. We on the "Novik" were very angry that we had not been immediately ordered to the scene of the disaster, for with our high speed, we might have hoped to overtake and account for the destroyer which accompanied the "Magdeburg".

The news of the "Magdeburg" catastrophe was received from the signal station on Odensholm island, which informed the Chief of communications' division, that voices of men speaking German could be distinctly heard in the direction of the sea, but owing to the thick fog, it was impossible to understand what was the matter. It was supposed that an enemy ship had run on the rocks. This information was immediately transmitted to the Commander in chief who at once decided to despatch the 6th destroyers' flotilla to Odensholm. In addition, the Chief of communications, Captain Nepenine was to proceed to the spot with the torpedo-boats "Lieutenant Bourakoff" and "Riany".

When Nepenine was putting out to sea, he was informed by the staff of C. C. that none of our ships were at sea, and that the 6th destroyers' flotilla would leave a little later. Somehow it happened, that this big mistake was made: it was forgotten that the cruisers "Bogatyr" and "Pallada" were cruising on the meridian of Dagerort. Therefore those on board the "Lieutenant Bourakoff" were persuaded that none of our ships could be met in the vicinity. This nearly resulted in disaster to us.

The fog continued very thick and the torpedo-boats managed only with great difficulty to avoid the mine-fields, but having successfully reached the open sea, they proceeded at full speed.

During the whole time, the signal station on Odensholm kept informing the Chief of communications' division of what was occurring. All the observations confirmed the fact that an enemy-ship had run on the rocks near the island and could not be set afloat again. Further they succeeded in making out that it was a four-funneled cruiser, and that a destroyer had come to her aid.

The sound of guns was soon heard by the "Bourakoff", but quickly ceased. It was later known that the enemy had bombarded the light-house.

The torpedo-boats continued their course, but owing to the fog the island could not be located. Having regard to the time, however, it was considered probable that they had already passed it. They were consequently obliged to turn back and take their course through the straits, between the island and the mainland.

At that moment shells began falling round them. On account of the thick fog, it was impossible to make out the direction from which they came. Our ships soon succeeded in getting out of range, and nearly at the same moment the firing ceased, but speedily recommenced with still greater intensity.

By the sound, it was evident that heavy guns were in action and as it had been reported before that the damaged vessel was a four-funneled one — it was supposed that it was the cruiser "Roon".

Meanwhile, the torpedo-boats turned about and steamed along the east coast of the island. Towards that time the fog began to lift and the first thing which struck the eyes, was an immense flame arising from the burning buildings round the light-house, which, it was later ascertained, had been set on fire during the bombardment by the enemy's cruiser. Then the damaged cruiser became visible. Its forepart had been blown up and torn away from the main part of the ship, and the sight was pitiable. Nevertheless, the crew had not ceased to work her guns.

Then preparations were made on board the "Bourakoff" for a torpedo-attack; but at that moment the dark forms of two big ships appeared across her bows and it was at once decided to attack them and not the wrecked cruiser, which obviously could not escape.

It was impossible to identify the ships on account of the still prevailing fog, but, knowing through the Fleet-Command's report, that none of our own ships were at sea, there was every reason to think them enemy ships. Not wishing to lose a convenient opportunity, a torpedo was fired as soon as the foremost vessel came within range. But the ships quickly turned about and, those on the "Bourakoff" to their horror distinguished the cruisers "Bogatyr" and "Pallada". Happily the "Bogatyr" had seen the coming torpedo and evaded it; but the "Pallada", not making out what the torpedo-boats were, opened fire against them, and one of her 8" shells fell so near to the "Bourakoff" that all standing on deck, were drenched with water from the splash.

Having made out that the cruisers were our own, the torpedo-boats made call signs, and when the "Pallada", after firing two or three times more, ceased fire, they drew near to the "Bogatyr". The Commander of the "Bogatyr" intimated that the enemy had ceased to reply, and ordered the torpedo-boats to approach the cruiser and report. If the enemy opened fire, our cruisers were to reply instantly.

The torpedo-boats came to within about 8 cables length of the cruiser. She had kept her flag flying and all available guns were trained on the torpedo-boats ready for action, but they were not fired.

The Chief of communications ordered the life-boat to be launched and sent Lieutenant M. Hamilton with the signal-man and boats' crew, the latter armed with rifles, to board the disabled cruiser. When they came along-side, Lieutenant Hamilton noticed that the rope-ladder was hanging at the side of the ship, they approached it and so mounted to the deck. As Hamilton passed up the ladder, he read the name of the ship; it turned out to be the light cruiser "Magdeburg". When he came to the level of the deck, he saw

six sailors running towards him, and not yet being sure of their intentions, he pulled out his pistol as he stepped upon deck.

All the sailors were unarmed however and their aspect was not threatening, so the pistol did not come into use.

As Lieutenant Hamilton's knowledge of German was not very extensive, he asked the sailors surrounding him, if any of them could speak another language; the warrant-officer then stepped forward and speaking very good French, he described how their cruiser had run aground on the island in the night during the thick fog. At first they tried to get her afloat again, but without success. Then a destroyer was called to their assistance, but was unable to do anything for them. At that moment the Russian cruisers coming up, the battle began.

Seeing that it was quite hopeless to continue fighting, the destroyer embarked 220 men of the cruiser's company and departed. After that 45 men of those left behind, saved themselves by swimming across to the island, and only 6 men remained on board.

When the warrant-officer had finished his narrative, Lieutenant Hamilton pointed to the flag and explained that he wanted to haul it down and hoist the Russian flag. To this the warrant-officer answered, that the battle was ended and that—it was for the Russians to do what they would.

Then Lieutenant Hamilton with the signal-man and the German sailors went on the poop; there they hauled down the German flag, but could not, by any means, untie it, as the ropes were very wet. Seeing this, one of the Germans ran down on deck and brought a knife with which the ropes were cut, and then the flag of St. Andrew was hoisted.

After that, the German sailors were ordered to the life-boat, but Lt. Hamilton was then informed that the "Magdeburg's" Captain was still on board. Immediately he sent one of the sailors to announce his arrival; he then entered the Captain's cabin, and giving his name, he began speaking French, but the Captain did not understand French or English either. Then Lt. Hamilton, trying his utmost to make himself understood in a polite and comprehensible way, said, in his best German: "Wollen Sie nach Torpedo gehen?" And to make his meaning clear, he pointed at the same time towards the "Bourakoff" which was by this time at anchor. The Captain smiled slightly at the invitation, and answered, that though he did not much like it, he would have to do it; he asked however permission to take some necessities with him, which was willingly granted by Lieutenant Hamilton.

The Captain was very agitated, so much so that, going round the cabin to collect what he wished to take away, he only opened and shut the drawer of his table without removing anything, and then said he was ready. In going out of the cabin he passed where his sword was hanging on the wall, and taking it down, he offered it to Lieutenant Hamilton, but the latter gave it back to him, saying that while the Captain was still on board his own ship, he did not think he had the right to disarm him. The Captain was very touched by Hamilton's courtesy and gave him a warm handshake. The life-boat soon conveyed them all to the "Bourakoff", where the "Magdeburg" was met, at the Captain of the head of the ladder by the Chief of communications himself and also the Commander of the torpedo-boat, and he at once handed his sword to Nepenine.

Meanwhile, the "Riany's" life-boat was bringing over the prisoners from Odensholm island, among whom were two more officers, who were quite drenched and had on only their shirts and trousers. They had tried

to escape by swimming to the island after the surrender of the cruiser. They asked permission to go back to the "Magdeburg" to fetch some things, which was accorded to them. The cruiser that had been so recently a splendid sight was now a sad picture. Through the explosion of the magazine the forepart up to the foremast had been nearly carried away and looked like a heap of scrap. One funnel and the foremast had completely disappeared having also been destroyed by the explosion. Our shells had turn the muzzle from one of the guns, and wrecked the radio antenna, and many splinters of shells were seen in the funnels.

The "Magdeburg" had gone aground up to the fore's bridge, but the stern rested in deep water and was quite undamaged. All the machinery was also unharmed, in fact when the work of floating her began, it was found possible to get up steam without making any repairs, and the water was pumped out with the ship's own pumping machinery. The interior and the main deck were in a chaotic state. They were filled up with cartridge cases, cartridges, machine guns, rifles, hammacks, and sailors' kits and various other oddments. The officers explained that all had been prepared for transshipment to the destroyer, but this had been stopped by our cruisers coming up.

The catastrophe to the "Magdeburg" had happened so suddenly, that plates with remnants of food and an unfinished bottle of beer were still on the table in the officers' mess.

Amongst the articles thrown about on deck, a very important signal book was accidentally found; a second copy of which was discovered later on the body of an officer who was drowned. Evidently in hurrying to board the destroyer, he had fallen into the water and was found by the divers when they were examining the ship's bottom while the work of settling her afloat was going on.

After that all the prisoners were sent to Baltic Port en route for Reval.

It was painful to look at the Captain and the officers who were visibly living out a tragedy. As for the sailor prisoners, they were rather indifferent to what had happened; and the engine-room staff who were so worn out by the continual strain from the beginning of the war, were even glad to rest.

III.

The cruisers at sea. A torpedo-attack of the "Novik". A battle-ship squadron at sea.

On the 1st of September early in the morning, the signal was made: "The reserve division of cruisers, the special half-flotilla of destroyers, and the "Novik" to prepare for the cruise and when ready, to get out of harbour; speed sixteen knots." I was on duty at the time and reported at once to the captain and the first-officer. Orders were given quickly to raise steam and to heat the turbines.

Soon after the above mentioned signal, a second one was made which called upon the Captain of the ships about to sail, to present themselves to the Commander in chief. Our Captain went first on board the "Sibirsky Strelak" from which, together with the chief of the destroyers Force, he passed on the "Rurik". He came back at nine o'clock and gave the order to weigh anchor at once.

When we had gone out of harbour (I was the first to be on watch) the Commander told me that we were going into the enemy's waters. So did my first war operation in the "Novik" begin.

Half an hour later, when my watch was over, I came down on to the poop; the cruisers "Rurik", "Rossia", "Bogatyr" and "Oleg" were just weighing anchor as well as the special half-flotilla to which a special object had been assigned. Entering the mess-room I found there other officers who were in a very excited condition and greatly interested to know whither we were going. This state of suspense did not last long, and our curiosity was soon satisfied by the first-officer who brought the instructions for the operation and it became clear that the object of the expedition was, to destroy the enemy's scouts. With this aim the detachment composed, as described above, was to go as far as the Steinort-Hoborg parallel; should it not come into contact with the enemy before reaching this line, it was to disperse and form a screen, the "Rurik" and "Rossia" remaining as support in the rear and the "Bogatyr", "Oleg" and "Novik" going into Danzig bay. There the "Bogatyr" and "Oleg" were to shell certain points, and the "Novik" was to search the bay itself. The principal aim for all however, was the destruction of the enemy's scouts.

When the whole detachment had weighed anchor and was beyond Nargen island, orders were given to the ships to steam in one line, a head the "Rurik" (flag of C. C.) surrounded by destroyers, being the last one, and trawlers leading the column.

Having successfully got out of the Gulf of Finland the detachment entered the Baltic Sea, and here the C. C. dismissed the trawlers.

At four p. m. nothing was visible on the horizon, the detachment quickly steaming southward. All had been made ready for battle—the rest being left to God. We had little anxiety as to a successful issue for our undertaking, as all conditions seemed so favourable: information was at hand that large enemy forces were concentrating at Kiel, scouts only being at sea.

At dusk the detachment drew itself up in night order, the "Novik" taking the end of the column.

It was eleven thirty p. m. and everything was quiet when suddenly the "Rurik" sighted two columns of smoke on the distant horizon, easily discernible in the bright moon light. Orders were immediately signalled to the "Novik" to overtake and attack the enemy; but the hostile ship having quickly sighted our squadron, turned back and began to retire southwards at full speed. Having received our orders, we left the line at once, increasing our speed likewise, but still we had some difficulty in overtaking the retiring enemy, and the distance between us began to decrease only after we were going at the rate of 32 knots.

During the pursuit the men were called to their battle stations. I was asleep at the moment; but jumping up quickly I rushed to my station on the poop. Final preparations of the destroyer for the fight took but little time: in a few minutes everything was ready, and all stood at their station.

The surrounding picture was admirable. The full moon was shining over the slightly rippling sea, and the "Novik" shuddering all over, rushed forward seemingly clad in silver and foam. One could not help admiring that sight, so beautiful and yet so terrible.

Our state of mind was one of much tension, but on the whole, all of us were calm. The enemy had not yet opened fire, though already now the distance was rapidly decreasing.

In silhouette soon appeared: the form of a three funneled cruiser of the "Augsburg" class, followed by a destroyer. . . The cruiser was steaming at full speed; it was obvious that she wanted to get as far away from our forces as possible. It is probable she did not open fire, in order not to show us where she was.

But at last the "Novik" seemed to have the enemy within range. An agreed upon signal bell sounded from the poop. Four bright flashes of light appeared, and the buzzing torpedoes fell heavily into the water. At the same moment the cruiser abruptly turned upon us and by that manoeuvre avoided the torpedoes. We did likewise. She followed us for a few minutes and then again suddenly altering her course turned southwards; we did the same, but she was soon lost to view in the darkness of the night.

At this moment we noticed the outline of a ship on the left, nearly all the officers who were standing on the poop thought it was one of the enemy's, advised the Captain to attack. But this the Captain dared not do, as the "Bogaty" could also have been in the same direction; as proved later to be the case.

During the remaining part of the night in accordance with the Admiral's orders, we went to Dagerort.

As soon as we had joined the detachment, the Admiral ordered us to approach the "Rurik" and interrogated as through a megaphone about the night expedition, after which we returned to our post.

At 4 p. m. I was on the watch, but an hour later, the "Rurik" demanding an officer to be sent by us, I had to go.

When I came on board the "Rurik" I was asked to go to the Admiral on the after-bridge. There I saw Admiral Essen himself, who quickly seized me by the sleeve and drew me into the deck-cabin where he began to interrogate me about the details of our night attack.

After my report the Admiral and Captain Kolchak began explaining to me the next operation which was to be as follows: the "Rurik", "Rossia" and special destroyer flotilla were to leave the rest of the detachment and go southwards between Gotland and the Swedish coast. Going round Gotland they were then to turn back and go northwards. As for the "Bogaty", "Oleg" and "Novik" they were at once to deploy the screen, then go southwards along the other side of Gotland and turn northwards at dusk. That detachment had as its object not to let the enemy's scouts pass through the screen: should this scheme be successful, the enemy would find himself in the morning between our two detachments.

When I had returned on board the "Novik" and the boat had been swung aboard, we turned southward and at once, together with the "Bogaty" and the "Oleg" we deployed the screen, but we saw nothing on the horizon before dark and so, according to our instructions, we then turned und steamed in a northerly direction.

During the night we were twice deceived in the "Novik" by the smoke coming from the "Bogaty" and the "Oleg" and even attempted to pursue them, but happily we recognised our mistake in time, and everything ended well. Of course our inexperience was to blame, but it was quite comprehensible and excusable, the war having only just begun.

We did not see the enemy during the whole of the night. In the morning a wireless-message was received from the Commander in chief telling us he had turned back without going round Gotland. As was made clear later the detachment, having approached the Swedish coast, met Swedish men-of-war

and merchant ships. As most definite instructions had been given by the Government to avoid a conflict with the Sweden the Admiral thought it inadvisable to proceed further.

In the morning all the ships successfully joined company and returned to Reval.

On the 8th of September we were requested urgently to go from the harbour, as information had been received of the approach of an enemy squadron, composed of four warships of the old "Kaiser"-type, of the battle-cruiser "Blücher", two light cruisers and eleven destroyers.

Our forces were not in time to meet the enemy on that day, as the battle ships and "Rurik" were returning from Helsingfors, where they had been coaling. So we spent the whole day in the roads, only being informed that we should go to sea the next day at 4 a. m.

Exactly at four a. m. the signal was made: "Weigh anchor". The squadron was composed of the "Rurik", of battleships the "Novik", seven destroyers of the second destroyers' flotilla with trawlers, and four destroyers of the first group of the first destroyers' flotilla.

The order in which the ships were formed was as follows: A column at the head of which the "Rurik", screened by destroyers under the flag of C. C.; the squadron was preceded by the second division of destroyers with trawlers. The weather was splendid; there was hardly any motion at all, our destroyers only gently rolling in a light swell. The speed was from 8 to 10 knots.

The enemy was invisible as yet, though according to private information, hostile ships were reported to have entered in the Gulf of Bothnic. About three p. m. the C. C. ordered's to proceed to Alands-Haf, make a reconnaissance; should we discover the enemy, we were to inform him at once, and meanwhile attempt to engage him ourselves.

We developed a speed of 26 knots, and towards the evening were already in view of the Swedish coast, when a column of smoke suddenly appeared on the horizon and the masts, funnels and hull of a ship became gradually visible. It was undoubtedly a man of war, only, alas, not German but a Swedish man of war of coast defence, of the "Odin"-class, accompanied by a torpedoboat of the "Magne"-class. As the Captain had instructions to leave the Swedes along, he did not wish to get too near, and so we turned southwards. Having gone in this direction far enough for the Swedish ships to be lost to view, we turned back once more towards Alandshaf, examined it and at dark returned to the gulf of Finland. To avoid meeting our ships in the darkness, we cruised the whole night round Oleg Bank, joining our main forces about 8 a. m. At 9 a. m. the squadron met the submarine "Akula". The C. C. sent the "Novik" to ascertain whither she was going. Having questioned the "Akula", we resumed our place in the line, and the squadron proceeded further into the gulf of Finland.

On our way through the Gulf we found three floating enemy mines, two of which were at once destroyed by gun-fire, the third we had to sink as it would not explode. The enemy did not seem to possess very satisfactory tackle for anchoring their mines, as many came to the surface as soon as any wind arose.

About 4 p. m. the squadron approached Odensholm, all ships being stopped near the spot where the "Magdeburg" was wrecked. Preparations were now being made to move the wreck and weather permitting, it was intended to take her in a few days to Helsingfors for repairs.

When the squadron had stopped, the destroyer "Kazanetz" approached the "Rurik" and the C. C. passing on to her deck, examined the "Magdeburg". After the Admiral had inspected the cruiser, the squadron proceeded on its way and at 7 p. m. anchored in the Reval bay.

IV.

With cruisers at sea. An enemy demonstration. First operations of German submarines. The loss of "Pallada".

September 10th "Novik" stayed at Reval; on the next day we were sent to Helsingfors, as the Admiral liked us always to be where he was. Nothing was heard about the enemy during these days.

I here was much talk in our midst as to our dreadnoughts to be ready soon, and we hoped that offensive operations were then likely to be undertaken; but so far it was only talk.

On the 13th we were sent to Reval to take part in the manoeuvres of the light cruisers division.

It became known on that day that the enemy had removed the signal station from the Bogscher lighthouse. When the destroyers "Okhotnik" and "Kondratenko" which had been despatched to the spot reached the lighthouse, they found signs that it had been shelled; and traces of fire inside; but all the men and equipment had vanished.

The manoeuvres over, "Novik" went to Reval remaining there until September 8th.

On the 23d of September at 10 a. m. we proceeded, together with "Rurik" (flag of C. C.), "Pallada" and "Bayan" to Ajax Bank and from there went for the night to Lapwick roads.

Reports were at hand that the day before eight enemy destroyers had appeared before the Backhofen lighthouse and attempted a landing, but meeting with machine gun fire from the signalstation they withdrew. On the following day however a whole squadron approached Windau, which consisted of nine battle ships, 8 steamers and 21 destroyers. The reason of their having come so near remained unexplained, for in a short time and without undertaking anything all the ships withdrew.

We were ordered in consequence to proceed to Windau in order to lay mines off there the next morning; but soon this order was withdrawn and we went to sea together with "Rurik", "Pallada", "Bayan" and "Admiral Makaroff". Near the entrance of the Gulf of Finland the squadron met two Danish schooners, and the C. C. ordered us to search them. I went to make the search but found nothing suspicious. Both were proceeding with ballast from Baltic Port to Denmark. In the evening the squadron finished its cruise and entered for the night the Sevastopol roads.

At 6 a. m. we weighed anchor again. The weather was very foggy, the sea calm. To avoid misunderstandings the C. C. had ordered to hoist flags of large size so that they would be easily perceptible at a distance. In the Gulf of Finland the squadron met two merchant ships, one Dutch, the other Danish. We were ordered to search them. It turned out that they had been allowed to proceed by our authorities and were absolutely empty.

We remained at sea until the evening, returning to Lapwick roads for the night.

According to that day's reports the enemy did not appear off Windau any more. To verify the fact orders were however given to the first destroyers' flotilla to proceed along the whole western coast, five miles to the south of the "Pogranichny" light house. When carrying out this order, the flotilla saw on the far horizon, beyond Pogranichny lighthouse, two enemy destroyers, which, seeing that our forces were stronger, quickly withdrew southward.

On September 27th the C. C. with "Rurik" alone went into enemy waters and remained in the Danzig-Bornholm region up to the 30th. He did not, however, come into contact with the enemy, as a terrific storm was blowing.

When "Rurik" came back, "Novik" was ordered to proceed to Helsingfors in order to bring on the next day to Reval the French Naval attaché Captain Gallot.

The enemy's submarines manifested their activity in our waters for the first time on the morning of the 10th. A wireless-message was received from the Captain of "Admiral Makaroff" stating that whilst a Dutch schooner was being searched, he was attacked by a submarine, which fired three torpedoes, two passing under the stern and one under the bow. Suspicious at once arose that there was some connection between the schooner and the submarine; orders were therefore given for all schooners to be returned. It is of course quite possible that the submarine took advantage of the cruiser's motionless position during the search to attack. However it may have been, "Makaroff" was saved from wreck by a pure miracle, for precisely at the moment that the submarine fired the torpedoes, the cruiser had begun to turn.

As soon as this information was received we were sent to sea to find the submarine. But having steamed all over the Gulf we saw nothing suspicious and entered Lache-Pe bay for the night.

Next morning we gave chase to submarines again. When at sea we got a wireless message from the Commander of the first cruiser division ordering us to escort the cruisers "Pallada" and "Bayan" returning from patrolling. When going to meet them, we encountered "Gromoboy" (flagship of the Division-Commander) and "Admiral Makaroff". From "Gromoboy" they began to signal to us the text of the message we had already received as to escorting the ships in question; and this caused considerable delay. Having at last left "Gromoboy" we soon sighted on the horizon the masts and funnels of "Pallada" and "Bayan" which were coming in our direction. Suddenly there was a terrible explosion and a column of water and smoke appeared. All those on the bridge gazed through their glasses trying to make out what had happened and, much to our horror, one of the cruisers had vanished, while the other, increasing her speed, had changed her course and was steaming away. We at once developed our maximum speed and made after her. At the same time the gloomy news was received by wireless that "Pallada" had been blown up by an enemy submarine.

Having approached "Bayan" we informed her that we had been sent to escort her and were ordered to proceed her.

Meanwhile the torpedoboat "Rezvy" and two torpedoboats of the "Cyclone"-class and which swept mines happened to be in the neighbourhood, approached the spot where "Pallada" had disappeared.

Having escorted "Bayan" to the appointed place we returned at full speed to the spot of the disaster. Many small wooden parts of the ship, berths and also safe belts were floating about. It was remarkable that all wooden objects even the small ones, had been almost pulverized — which showed the

terrific force of the explosion. Later an "Ikon" of the Saviour was found which had not been damaged, but neither we nor any of our boats were able to save a single man.

The terrible effects of the explosion produced on us—which was but natural—a very painful impression: in a few seconds a ship of eight thousand tons had been blown to fragments. The supposition is that this appalling result was due to rather the detonation of the powder magazine than the havoc wrought by the explosion even of two torpedoes.

Having several times steamed around the scene of the disaster and found nothing we hurried to Reval in the growing dusk, meeting on our way other destroyers which had also hastened to the spot, where "Pallada" had met her fate.

The next morning we were again sent to give chase to submarines in the Gulf of Finland as far as the meridian of Sebastopol roads, where the cruisers "Rossia" and "Aurora" were anchored. During the cruise one man repeatedly reported seeing periscopes, yet we found nothing in spite of careful searching. Then passing Ajax Bank, we heard the enemy's wireless working; feverishly and on coming back we heard it again. We informed the Staff of the C. C., as it was supposed that submarines were concealed somewhere in the skernes from whence they were sending wireless-messages.

On the same day near Dagerort two enemy cruisers were sighted which seemed to be lying in wait. One of our submarines attempted an attack but failed.

When the night came we returned to Lache-Pe bay as on the next day we were to search the Gulf again, this time beginning with Hangoe. We therefore weighed anchor when it was still dark and waited for the dawn. Having thoroughly searched the whole of the Hangoe roads and found nothing suspicious, we carried on our work in the Gulf until the evening but without any result.

V.

Unsuccessful attempts to lay mines. The English submarines penetrate into the Baltic Sea.

It had proved impossible to save a single officer or man from the "Pallada". Then days later the body of Lt. Gavriloff, tied to a hammock, was thrown out on the beach of one of the rocky islets of the coast of Finland. So in a few seconds about six hundred souls were blotted out from amongst the living.

We presumed that the enemy submarine which had sunk "Pallada" had gone down at the same time, but later on it became known that the submarine was the "U 26", which was heard of later.

On the 16th of October we were ordered to Helsingfors, to receive from the supplyship "Tverdo" fifty mines; we loaded these and afterwards took in an ample supply of oil. On the morning of the fourth, we entered Moonound and there at sea prepared the mines. We were to lay them in company with the special half-flotilla. The "Novik" in particular had to lay mines at the entrance of the Bay of Danzig near Cape Hela. The crew were very pleased with the expected operations and were impatient to begin. However on our arrival in Moonound the news was received from the commander of the

Second destroyer flotilla of the postponement of the operation for an indefinite time and we were ordered to return to Helsingfors. This was a great disappointment, but there was nothing to be done — we had to turn back. Added to all the rest, this order which had been sent by wireless, while we were on our way, was not received by us; thanks to which we did no less than seventy miles quite uselessly. We approached Reval towards dusk and asked permission to pass the night by Nargen island, but were ordered to Reval, and there, after taking oil, we were to await further orders.

¶ On the 18th we were in Reval and about midday of the sixth, the Commander of the Destroyer force sent to ask, had we unloaded our mines. When he heard we had not done this, he ordered us to go immediately to Helsingfors and there unload them. All this in connection with the orders received from the Staff of C. C. on the evening before, seemed rather strange, and we supposed there was some misunderstanding; but nevertheless we had to obey orders.

Near Grohari a thick fog overtook us and we had to anchor; we informed the C. C., and were asked, by whose order had we started. Of course we answered that it was by order of the Commander of the Destroyer force.

In the morning the fog cleared up and we got to Helsingfors. There we went up to the supply-ship "Tverdo" to unload the mines. Just as we were about to do so, the order came from "Rurik": By no means unload the mines. And the Captain was summoned before the Staff.

As was his wont, we were told nothing on his return, and having finished taking the oil, we anchored near a buoy and were ready to go to sea at an hour's notice. Next morning I went on shore, but half an hour later, a sailor was sent after me, and said that "Novik" had received urgent orders to go to sea. Just as I got back to the ship, we put out to sea.

Towards the evening we got to Moonsound and lay there for the night. The weather was very uncertain and likely to turn to fog, and so it happened — next morning we woke up to find ourselves surrounded by a thick fog, and we could do nothing that day.

The following morning the fog cleared up, and at day break we continued our course, having informed the Fleet's Staff about it. The weather became very fine and very suited for mine-laying operations, as the sea had become quite calm. We got quietly to Luserort and there inquired at Steinort and Libau, as had been agreed beforehand, about the state of the weather; the answer was: wind; the sea one ball. We could wish nothing better. The C. C. was informed that the weather was good, and we asked permission to go on; we waited for the answer and were quite persuaded that it would be in the affirmative.

It was already getting dusk; the horizon was clear and the sea calm; we were all anticipating the satisfaction of an interesting operation against the enemy but, alas, the answer ran as follows: "Wait for orders; today inconvenient". This was quite unexpected and very annoying: to have got so far and then suddenly to have to wait. . .

Apart from private considerations, there was a circumstance which made this answer very unpalatable: being all the time in full readiness, we had only a scanty supply of oil, and therefore if we had to wait, we should not have enough for the forthcoming operation. Very reluctantly, we so informed the C. C. at which he was very displeased, and ordered us to return to Helsingfors.

Having entirely lost heart, we returned into Riga gulf; the night was very dark and we were steaming 21 knots. Suddenly, just past us flashed the dark

outline of a schooner quite near to our side. She was sailing without any light, and quickly disappeared in the darkness of the night.

The encounter was very sudden and the ship passed like a vision; had we been half a degree more to the left, we should have cut through the schooner; of course she would have been sunk, but we would also have been badly damaged. What that mysterious vessel was, and whither she was going, we could not ascertain on account of the darkness. We continued our way and anchored about midnight near Werder.

At dawn we started again, passed Moonound, turned into the Gulf of Finland, where the "Magdeburg" was still a melancholy sight, and at sunset we reached Nargen. Just then we received the order to go to Reval instead of Helsingfors, and after a short time we entered the harbour.

Till the 29th we remained in the harbour and it was only in the evening that day we received the order to be ready for an operation at 7.30 a. m.

The wireless had given the news of the first hostile actions by Turkey that same day, which means that our Black Sea Fleet would also have begun to fight; only its position was a little different from ours: the Black Sea Fleet was stronger than that of the enemy, whereas we were considerably weaker.

At the appointed time, in the morning, we left the harbour and went to Moonound. The torpedo-officer from the Staff of Destroyers force went with us. We were going to lay mines in accordance with the previous instructions. The weather was very fine and it was hoped that this time the attempt would be successful. From the conversations with the Staff-officers, we gathered that last time, our operation had been suspended because of the expected arrival of the English submarines which had broken through the enemy's lines. Two of them had arrived safely, but the third went a ground near the Danish coast and was lost.

At midday we were in Moonound and there the Commander of Destroyer force immediately sent for our Captain. During that time the destroyers "General Kondratenko", "Okhotnik" and "Pogranitchnik" took mines 35 each.

When all was ready for the cruise, all the destroyers went to Werder, and next morning at 7 a. m. "Novik", three destroyers of the "Okhotnik"-class, and one group of the 2d destroyers flotilla, went to the Luserort lighthouse. Though the weather was getting bad, there was still no wind, and we could reckon upon success in that respect. From Luserort the whole detachment went along the coast till Backhofen, then turned towards the sea and, having gone far enough to be able to suppose that the mine-fields were passed, took the course 212, making 17 knots.

About 5 p. m. "Novik" separated from the rest of the detachment and increased her speed to 24 knots.

I was to be on watch from 7 to 9 p. m. It was already quite dark, and though a moonlight night, the moon was continually overclouded. The wind was growing stronger and stronger. At 9 o'clock, the speed had to be slackened to 20 knots on account of the heavy sea, and towards ten o'clock the wind and the waves had increased so much, that the question had to be debated, whether it would be possible to lay mines or not. When, after having been relieved from my watch, I was in my cabin, the first-officer came in and said that his opinion was that we ought to return. But having nearly reached the spot, it would have been too bad again not to lay the mines and I answered, that I had not yet lost hope that it was possible to lay them.

The wind was still increasing, "Novik" was creaking and rolling about furiously... From time to time the waves covered her entirely and for a

second, she seemed to be completely under water. . . Soon the Division-officer came into my cabin to debate the question whether it was worth while going on, or better to return; but I still thought that it was possible to succeed in the attempt. The ship was rolling at an angle of 36 degrees with 14 swings a minute. Sometimes she slanted so much, that it seemed as if we were going to turn over. Then the Captain himself sent to ask me whether it was possible to lay mines, and I was obliged to acknowledge, that it would be impossible, and that we ought to turn back.

We turned round with difficulty having diminished our speed to twelve knots. The motions were so strong that the mines were turn off several times, and it was with great pains, and thanks to the untiring and devoted work of the crew, that we succeeded in fixing them. All were drenched through, and walked with difficulty along the heaving deck which seemed to be slipping from under our feet. Even in our cabins we could not very well get warm and dry, for everything was topsy-turvy, and even lying in the hammocks we had to hold on, so as not to be thrown on the deck. Happily, the nearer we got northward, the more the wind fell, and towards 3 p. m. it was quite calm again.

About 6 a. m. we turned towards Backhofen so as to approach the shore between the mine fields. This was a rather anxious moment, for during the whole expedition we had only our own dead reckoning to rely on, and in case of any mistake having been made, in these circumstances, we could easily get among the mines. But we perceived the light house exactly in the right direction, and having got near the shore, we went along the coast, and at 11 a. m. we reached the Michailovsky light-house, where we were already expected by "Sibirsky Strelak" and the group of destroyers belonging to the 2d flotilla. Soon after our arrival the special half-flotilla came in also. They had been luckier than we, for they had laid mines in the region of Memel. Then, we all went to Moonound where we passed the night.

We were sent on the 2d of November to Helsingfors to take oil; near Nargen we overtook the English submarines "E 1" and "E 9", which had entered our waters for the first time, having broken through the German blockade near the Belts.

When we came up, we saluted them with loud "hurrahs".

At 4 o'clock we arrived at Helsingfors and anchored in the harbour.

VI.

The operations of "Novik" with the special half-flotilla: The laying of mines in the Bay of Danzig and near Memel.

On the 14th of November we were ordered to go again to Moonound. During the journey, a wireless-message was received, stating that the torpedo-boats "Kasiastchy" and "Storogevoy", which were on watch at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland, had been attacked by an enemy submarine, but had happily avoided the attack.

At sunset we arrived safely at Moonound, and nearly at the same time, the special destroyers' half-flotilla, carrying the mines, joined us. The Commander immediately convoked a meeting of all the Captain of destroyers who were to take part in the operation. At this meeting it was decided, that the

detachment would put out to sea next morning at 7.30 a. m. if the weather proved suitable.

In accordance with this decision, the detachment, composed of "Novik", Special Destroyers half-flotilla 1st group of the 2d Destroyers Division, put out to sea at the appointed time.

However it freshened up in the Riga Gulf, and the destroyers rolled violently. Then again there was a moment of doubt: would it be possible to lay mines, or should the expedition be put off? But the captain of "Sibirsky Strelak", commander G. O. Gadd, who was the senior, decided to go on to the Michailovsky light-house and there deliberate, whether it was advisable to go any farther.

The Detachment came up to the Michailovsky light-house at 2 p. m. and anchored. The senior captain assembled on his ship all the other captains, and they decided that we should go on, but that we would keep along the coast until we had passed Libau, then put out to sea, there to separate. In case the weather became so rough as to impede operations, it was left to the different captains to themselves decide, according to various indications, the best places to lay mines.

"Novik" in particular had to decide herself, if her mines were to be laid at the cape of Hela, or in the depth of the bay of Danzig near Pillau.

After this decision, the Detachment immediately continued its course along the coast, the "Stereugustchy" leading with the group of the Second flotilla, then came the Special half-flotilla, "Novik" being last. We were keeping all the time a distance of 2 to 3 miles from the coast, but sometimes even nearer, so as to be sure to be safe from the mines. Time was passing rapidly; little by little the darkness came on and the moon rose. Along the coast it was quite calm, and it seemed as if the sea also were less rough.

At that time we were already passing before the port of the Emperor Alexander III, the Navy Club, the cathedral, and other buildings being visible.

At last we passed round the Libau mine fields and it was time to go out to sea. Having turned and borne off from the coast about thirty six miles, the detachment separated: the second flotilla turned back; the special half-flotilla went in the direction of Memel, and we—to Danzig bay.

We had to increase our speed to 24 knots so as to be able to reach the appointed spot in time and we were rapidly outsailing the special half-flotilla. It was still moonlight, the wind was falling and the horizon seemed very wide, but the sea had not calmed down and we were rolled about rather violently—at times at an angle of 28 degrees. I was on watch at that time admiring the surrounding picture, it was wonderfully beautiful. All the destroyers were steaming at full speed, and as the waves were very big, they seemed to sink into the white foam which stood out against the dark background of the sea; and over the whole the moon shed her silvery light. Meanwhile the rolling was augmenting, and the captain began to fear we would not again succeed in laying the mines. It was decided we should go to Pillau, it being a more protected place. The laying of the mines was to begin at 1.55 a. m. For the moment all was going on well, but as we were getting deeper into the bay, we might, at any moment, meet the enemy's ships, and then all our plans would be upset. Now only half an hour's time remained; the tension had reached its limit; all were keeping a feverish look out—but there was nothing suspicious to be seen. The destroyer continued on her course, the turbines droning, and the body of the ship slightly trembling. . . Every man was already at his post—it was our first operation, so no wonder

we were in a rather nervous state. But thank God, some indistinct forms began to loom up in the dark; were it the coast—or the piles? we could not distinguish. We were already at the enemy's very port. In that moment the long waited for telephone bell sounded from the captain's bridge and the order was passed to me: "Begin to lay mines".

The right one, the left one, the right one, the left one—was I commanding, and the mines rolled down regularly over the ship's side. The crew worked to perfection, the men had even to be held back. But finally the last mine splashed into the water and the spray flew round the place where now all had disappeared. We sighed contentedly — a big weight had fallen from our shoulders.

During the laying of mines, our speed had been 18 knots. Thanks to the well chosen course we took, we had scarcely rolled. The operation had begun at 1,55 a. m. and the mines had been dropped at 10 second's distance from each other. In 8 minutes and 20 seconds all was over; the laying of mines had been carried out without a hitch.

Having finished the operation the captain ordered a speed of 24 knots and we turned to the homeward course.

Suddenly at 2,30 a. m. the watchkeeper perceived on his right a kind of silhouette; evidently we had also been remarked, for signals of recognition were made to us with a square white lantern. Not wishing to be recognised, we did not answer, but developed our speed up to 32 knots. Then the enemy immediately directed his searchlight upon us and began to fire. The direction of the firing was right, but we got not hit, the shells fell short and only one fell comparatively near to us. We continued our course without firing. After several volleys the enemy ceased fire and continued only to direct a searchlight on the horizon, but failed to discover us.

Thus we escaped safely thanks to our speed. Most likely we were not very clearly visible so we might hope that no suspicion about our having been laying mines would be raised.

It was difficult to define whom we had met; but in all case they were two ships of medium size. Some of us asserted, that most likely, they were cruisers, or battle-ships of an old type; we could only certify that the shells were not of the big colobre.

In the morning we successfully reached the Bakhofen light-house, turned into the Riga gulf, passed Moonound and just before dusk we anchored before Worms island. The special half-flotilla was already there, having completed its operation which took place as follows. After passing Libau and failing to meet us, they received a wireless message stating that two enemy cruisers were between Memel and Danzig bay. Thus warned, they were especially watchful and cautious.

About midnight the Half-flotilla crossed the Memel parallel and pursued its way to the South. The destroyers had a very bad time: rolling fearfully, as they cut through the waves, which continually overwhelmed them. It was extremely difficult to walk about, as the deck rose and fell to an angle of thirty five degrees. Streams of water formed regular breakers between the mines, and the manipulation of torpedo-tubes or of guns was entirely out of the question. Yet, in spite of these difficulties the destroyers managed to make headway, and little by little approached their destination. Suddenly to the left, two small objets were sighted slowly advancing towards the flotilla and across its course. It was obvious that these were the two enemy cruisers about which the warning had been received. The flotilla was now

on the look out; the decisive moment had come. Should the enemy sight them, it would be impossible to lay mines, and what would be worse: owing to the stormy weather, they would be unable to evade the cruisers; then the end would be sure. It was not easy to escape notice as the eval used gave off much smoke especially when full steam was up. The only hope for the flotilla lay in the darkness which hid them, the enemy ships, on the contrary, being clearly visible against the light part of the horizon.

As time went on the distant silhouettes noticed increased rapidly in size and soon it became possible to see perfectly, with the moon for their background the silhouettes of two enemy cruisers.

At this moment the special flotilla was in the Memel-Great-Belt channel. The Captain of the "Sibirsky Strelak" being the senior, determined to attempt to lay mines at once before being discovered by the enemy.

In order to do this, they had to turn and go before the wind, for although it is easier to lay mines when running against the seas, we would in that case have been nearer the enemy.

In all, the operation lasted about half an hour. Owing to the slippery decks, the terrible rolling and to the darkness, it was very difficult and dangerous. Every moment it was anticipated that they would be seen and those thirty minutes seemed interminable. Suddenly, in the midst of the mine-laying operation, when there still remained many more to be laid, a jingling sound, as of something having struck the hull of the "Sibirsky Strelak" was heard. All waited with bated breath for the expected explosion. But the noise was only the sound made by one of the mines having been thrown down and washed against the boat by the waves. Several seconds elapsed and nothing happened, for, by a happy chance, the cap of the mine had not struck against the vessel.

The remaining part of the operation passed off quietly, the enemy disappearing from view meanwhile, and the special flotilla, its work over, turned northwards and reached Riga gulf safely.

Some time after this expedition, information was received that on the fourth of November the enemy's armoured cruiser "Friedrich Karl" had been wrecked on that very mine-field, and we were therefore rewarded hundredfold for all the difficulties of that dangerous expedition¹⁾.

VII.

Mine-laying near Stolpe Bank. First naval operations in the Black-Sea. Loss of the destroyers "Isopolnitelny" and "Letuchy". End of the "Novik" activities in the first year of war.

On the 9th of October we came to Reval, the C. C. allowing us a few days for repairs to machinery. Meanwhile it was ascertained that the ships which had fired at us were most probably the light-cruisers "Niobe" and "Gazelle".

A severe storm blew on the days which followed, much havoc being caused at sea; in particular the patrol destroyers of the fourth flotilla were greatly damaged.

¹⁾ Later that loss was acknowledged by the German Admiralty. See „Der Krieg zur See 1914—1918“ Band I S. 240.

On the 12th of November it became clear that we would have to go into drydock as we had reason to fear something had happened to our rudder. Divers were sent down and it turned out that the sheathing of the rudder had been torn off and that—one of the cross-beams was broken: this may have been caused by high speed.

We were all much dissatisfied at this state of affairs as naval operations were expected and we were afraid we might miss them. However the repairs had to be done, but to make matters worse, we found all the drydocks occupied, and so we were not able to start for Helsingfors until November 16th.

There we learned that an enemy destroyer had been damaged by our mines in Danzig bay, the stern being torn away; she was however salvaged and reached the harbour. After this the enemy began to sweep the bay very thoroughly.

On November the 18th we were at last able to go into drydock. We were there but one day, and were quite ready on the 19th.

On the same day we were ordered alongside the supply ship "Tverdo" to take from her fifty mines. Having done so, and being then quite ready, we proceeded to Reval.

We stayed there throughout the seventh, the C. C. saying we were to await orders from the Commander of Destroyers' Force. But later we were ordered to start by ourselves and lay the mines as soon as possible.

On account of the windy weather we had to remain at Reval the following day also, and only on the morning of the 22d did the wind go down to such an extent that we were able to proceed to Moonsound. We spent the night at Kuivast and proceeded further at 8,45 a. m. The weather was very fine: almost a complete calm.

Two columns of smoke were suddenly noticed on the horizon about the middle of the Riga Gulf. As, according to our information, none of our ships were at sea, the call to the battle stations was given to be ready for any emergencies. But when we drew nearer we could see that the smoke came from two destroyers of the 4th flotilla: "Moshchny" and "Likhoy", which, we ascertained later, had been sent round the islands Dago and Oesel for reconnaissance purposes and were now returning to Moonsound. Having exchanged signals with them, we proceeded on our way and near Lüsserort again saw smoke but this time it proved to be on the coast.

About five p. m. "Novik" went out to the open sea between the mine fields. At 5,38 p. m. we turned South making directly, at a speed of 24 knots, for the place where the mines were to be laid.

The wind was meanwhile growing stronger at sea but as it was from the SW, mine laying near Stolpe Bank was quite possible, for with such a wind, it was probably quiet there.

At 11 15 p. m. a light was perceived on our left. We were at that moment near the coast and the place where we were to lay the mines; therefore this fire caused us much emotion, for we were afraid that some of the enemy's forces were at hand and we would be prevented from fulfilling our task. It was quite impossible to find out what the light was: some supposed that it came from a steamer, others, that it was a patrol-cruiser, the third—thought it was on shore.

At quarter past 1 p. m. we at last, reached the appointed point and taking a N. Westerly direction, steamed on at 15 knots.

The laying of the mines was accomplished in very difficult circumstances, as, we were often under water astern and, as it was intensely cold, the rails

and the slopes were quite frozen. The work was very hard, the men were cold, their feet continually slipping, and Those who were standing near the slopes had to be tied to their posts. All this hampered the work, but the energy and the orderliness of the crew enabled us to perform our task perfectly.

After the laying of mines was over, we turned northwards making 24 knots. On our way back we saw light twice again, but never discovered what they were. In the morning we reached Bakhofen, getting near the coast, and entered Riga gulf, from whence we let the C. C. know, that we had fulfilled his order. We anchored at Worms, where we passed the night and reached Reval safely next morning.

"Novik" stayed at Reval from the 25th of November to the 6th of December, during which time details of the Black-sea events reached us.

At the time when on all our fronts lively fighting was proceeding, the Black-sea fleet was in a most anomalous position: Turkey had not declared war, Russia owing to political considerations, had not done so either. Since the "Goeben" and the "Breslau" had forced their way to Constantinople, all training and gun-practise of the Fleet had been performed with the idea that these vessels would one day be our adversaries. Time went on, every day the declaration of war was anxiously expected, but no news came. The Supreme Command availed itself of this period of inaction to organize the coast reconnoitring, lay mine-fields, make ships ready for battle and hasten work in the Nicolaeff ship yards, so as to facilitate by making easier terms the finishing of the new destroyers. Special plans of Port defences against a sudden attack by the enemy were elaborated, by which, all the approaches of Sebastopol, Odessa and Batoum were mined, partly by mining companies from the fortresses, partly by the mine-layers: "Dunai" (Odessa), "Pruth" (Sebastopol) and "Beshtaou" (Batoum). The defence of Odessa was assigned to the battle-ship "Sinop", and she proceeded there in the middle of September. The gun-boat "Terets" stayed at Batoum.

During this time the battle-ships: "Evstafy", "Ioann Zlatoust", "Panteleimon", "Tri Sviatitelia", "Rostislav", "Pamiat Merkuria" and "Kagoul" engaged in the battle and guns practice.

In the early days of October the Porte closed the Bosphorus; the communication by sea between Odessa and the Mediterranean accordingly ceasing. Telegrams from Constantinople were more and more alarming. It seemed as if every moment war would break out, and the state of tense expectation was becoming unbearable. About October the 23d the "Sinope" was ordered to proceed urgently to Sebastopol, entrusting her duties as patrol ship at Odessa to the gun-boat "Donets". On October 30th at 6 a. m. the "Goeben" suddenly appeared before Sebastopol and began bombarding the harbour and the town. It was a splendid autumn morning; a perfectly calm sea, transparent blue sky and the warm sun made it seem unthinkable that a new act of the historic drama had commenced.

Far away beyond the mountains in the direction of Enpatoria a few shells were heard. Two or three more fell into the bay but without causing any damage, one shell exploded between the "Sinope" and the Grafskaiapier and the fine and big column of water raised thereby did not produce an impression of frightfulness; on the contrary, the people near the harbour looked at it more with interest and astonishment than with terror. Only the coast batteries replied to the enemy's fire, the battleships remaining silent, it being impossible to fire over the mountains.

Meanwhile intense activity began in the air, wireless messages coming through one after the other. Orders arrived at every moment, and it was clear that the commanders were scared.

During this time the "Goeben" manoeuvred between the mines. Unfortunately the military authorities of the fortress did not dare to make the mines dangerous without the permission of the Commander in Chief of the Fleet; as for the latter, having no direct connection with the coast, he hesitated, to give any orders, as he expected the arrival of the "Pruth" and of the destroyers of the "G" and "Z" types, the former coming from Yalta with mines, and the latter, having spent the night near Sebastopol, could return at any moment.

A wireless-message was soon received in which the "Pruth" reported having been sighted by the "Goeben". And in fact, having seen the returning "Pruth" the "Goeben" ceased bombarding Sebastopol, and proceeded towards her. The very first two shells from the "Goeben" struck the "Pruth" on which fire broke out.

Having on board so dangerous a cargo as mines ready for laying, some of them even charged with high explosives the fate of the ship was sealed: she would blow up in a few moments. Quite conscious of the danger, the torpedo officer lieutenant Raguzsky rushed to open the flood-valves and then, in order to accelerate the sinking of the ship, he ran down to explode the bursting charge which had been prepared beforehand for such an emergency. While part of the crew fought the flames the remainder prepared the life-boats. After the opening of the flood-valves the "Pruth" began to sink rapidly. Within a short time the crew, officers and men, were in the life-boats; Lieutenant Raguzsky, the ship's priest, Father Anthony (who was a monk), and several badly wounded men, were the only missing. At that moment a slight explosion was heard and the "Pruth" began to sink still more swiftly: Raguzsky had blown her up. All eyes were strained towards the deck where he might be expected to appear; little time was left; the "Goeben" was already sending out her boats for the purpose of making the crew prisoners; the water had reached the upper scuttles; but Raguzsky was not seen again and it became certain that he had perished like a hero, having averted the greater loss of part of the crew. Nevertheless the eyes of all remained fixed on the deck, where Father Anthony stood in full priestly vestments, making the sign of the cross over the men in the boats with the Crucifix he held. The seventy years old priest who had been attached to the "Pruth" for ten years and had many memories closely connected with her, had not wished to forsake his ship, nor the mortally wounded men, whom it was impossible to save. Soon the deck commenced to disappear under water, and in a few minutes more, the "Pruth" had ceased to exist. Only the rippling of the water betrayed the spot where she had perished.

The "Goeben" succeeded in capturing only one boat; the others escaped and where taken in tow by the submarines "Karp" and "Karass" and brought to Sebastopol two hours later.

At the same time as the "Goeben" having ceased bombarding Sebastopol turned towards the "Pruth", four torpedo boats under the pendant of Commander Prince Troubetzkoy appeared, coming from Eupatoria. Seeing the hopelessness of the situation, the Commander of the Division decided upon attacking the "Goeben"; but having let them approach her to a distance of 40 cables, the "Goeben" opened a very heavy fire against them; two shells

struck the commander's bridge and the orlop-deck of the leading boat which was the torpedo-boat "Lieutenant Pustchine" and five men were killed, after which the torpedo-boats turned about. The "Goeben" departed without pursuing them. About 9 p. m. the torpedo-boats entered Sebastopol harbour safely.

The following events took place in Odessa. Late in the night of the 29th of October when it was completely dark, two torpedo-boats on which Russian words of command were heard, appeared at the entrance of the port. It did not occur to the Watch on the "Donetz" that anything was wrong, and the torpedo-boats entered the roads and opened fire at the "Donetz" and the merchant-ship that were near her. The first two shells struck the "Donetz" and she began to sink; 30 men of her crew perished.

During that time the "Breslau" bombarded Batoum without causing any damage, only succeeding in alarming the civilian inhabitants.

The „Hamidie" sank two steamers which were lying in the harbour of Novorossisk.

Thus began the naval war operations on the Black-Sea. To be just, it must be admitted, that the Turkish plan was splendidly worked out, but the execution was less good, and gave but poor results.

On that same day, the 31th of October, about 4 p. m. the whole Black-Sea Squadron went out to sea, where it cruised about for three days.

After its return to Sebastopol, it was decided, on account of the difference in type of the battle-ships, to separate two of them—"Rostislav" and "Sinope" from the rest, giving them each a special designation, and to use the "Tri Sviatiteli" only on particular occasions. The "Sinope" was appointed to guard the Sebastopol harbour, and the "Rostislav" was sent to Batoum as support to the right wing of our Caucasian Army.

On the 18th of November, 50 miles from Sebastopol the squadron quite unexpectedly, in a thick fog, met the "Goeben" and "Breslau". An action ensued. The "Breslau" did not take a direct part in the battle, being invisible for most of the time.

According to the instructions, the centre ship of the line (in this case the "Joann Zlataoust"), had to open fire and only after that were the rest of the squadron to join in the action. But the "Zlataoust" opened fire very slowly and her shots fell short; then the "Evstafi", on her own initiative, fired at a range of about 40 cables length and hit the "Goeben".

Then the other ships joined in also, the most accurate firing being that of the "Evstafi"; but on the other hand, she took the lion's share of the "Goeben's" fire and was hit five times. The battle lasted only 7 minutes when the combattants lost sight of each other in the fog.

Our loss was 4 officers and 30 men.

According to information received later, the "Goeben" suffered very much in the battle and lost about 100 men.

On the 7th of December, our Captain received orders to present himself in person to the C. C. at Helsingfors. Next morning he went there on board the "Bore I" and we remained at Reval very curious to know the reason of the summons. At 4 p. m. the mystery was cleared up, for we received a wireless to the effect that the Commander of the Destroyers Force was to give orders for 50 mines to be handed over to the "Novik"; by this we inferred that we were going to make a raid in the enemy's waters.

Next morning the Captain returned and said that we were to be sent on the first fine day to lay mines in Danzig Bay.

To receive the mines, we had to be towed to the minelayer "Ilmen" from which, all the 50 mines were taken-over. All the next day was spent in preparing them, as they were not a very satisfactory lot; but we lost no time as it was too windy to go to sea that day.

On the 11th of December the weather continued fresh; the wind turned to the N.W., it was colder and frost seemed probable, which would be a very unfortunate state of affairs.

On the morning of the 11th the C. C. inquired of our commander, when he intended going out for the operation "tomorrow", answered the Captain "subject to favorable weather conditions". In which the C. C. acquiesced. Nevertheless, at about 6 p. m. a second wireless-message was received ordering us to start for Moonsound at 4 a. m. as the operation had to be completed before the night of the 12th of December. When this order was communicated to the Captain, he answered that in all probability, according to the weather forecast of the observatory, stormy weather was at hand, and therefore he doubted the wisdom of making a start. But answer came, signed by the Chief of Staff with the laconic order: "Weather forecast favourable, start."

As soon as we got out into the gulf, "Novik" began to roll badly and when we turned broadside to the waves, she heeled almost quite over. The top-mast was immediately broken, the radio antenna was torn away, and water streamed over the bridge continuously. It was evident that there was no sense in continuing that day and we turned back to Moonsound where we anchored near Werder; even there our ship rolled heavily.

Having repaired our radio antenna with great difficulty, at 11 p. m. we were able to report to the Staff of the Fleet. At 3 a. m. we received the answer: "Novik, if fit, is to go to Reval".

In the morning we weighed anchor. The weather continued stormy, snow was falling and therefore our Captain after having passed Moonsound decided upon staying for the night at Worms. On arriving there we found several destroyers which had sought shelter from the storm.

The destroyer "Legky" came alongside about 2 p. m. and asked us to take on board a sick sailor and bring him to Reval. We heard later, he was the only survivor from the destroyers "Ispolnitelny" and "Letuchy". The first had been sunk the day before by a submarine near Odensholm, and the second, going broadside on, in an attempt to save the drowning men, herself turned completely over.

These destroyers, together with two others of the same class were going from Helsingfors to Moonsound having each 8 mines on their decks. There was a storm and they rolled heavily; suddenly an explosion was seen under the "Ispolnitelny", and a moment later, she disappeared. only a few men were to be seen swimming here and there. Then the "Letoutchy", which was following, came up to try to save the men, but she also capsized. From the "Legky", which had remained considerably behind, one could only see the red keel of the ship, but whether there had been an explosion or not, none of the eye-witnesses could say with certainty. Only one sailor from the two boats was saved, mainly owing to the intense cold of the water and the heavy sea running. All the officers perished, among them were Commanders Dombrowsky and Sakhnowsky.

Next morning we started for Reval, and safely entered the harbour.

On the 15th of December, after our arrival at Reval, we were ordered to unload the mines, but to be ready ourselves in any case. Not wishing to get up steam, the Captain asked for two tugs the next morning to tow us up to the mine layer "Narova". While they were so doing, "Novik", by inertia, escaping the tugs' control, hit against the "Narova"'s side and her stem was badly twisted. At the same time the senior engineer discovered that the refrigerator pipe was corroded, and thus it became unexpectedly, urgent for us to dock for repairs. A wireless was sent to ask permission to sail to Helsingfors. In general, we seemed to have fatally bad luck: either the weather was unpropitious, or machinery was out of order, or something else happened, and it was very disappointing for us.

We got to Helsingfors only two days later for the drydocks were all occupied, and it was very provoking to lose so much time.

We were in the drydock about a fortnight and then at last all was ready, and we received orders to go immediately to Reval and take mines on board.

On the 1st of January we took mines from the minelayer "Amour" and went to our post quite ready for action. Next morning we were ordered to start for a operation, and we safely reached Werder, where we remained for the night. The weather was propitious, nearly a dead calm.

During the night we received, very unexpectedly, a wireless to the effect that the operation was countermanded; it was a great pity, for it would have been full of interest as we were to go quite up to the enemy's coast and lay mines in the channels.

We were back in Reval on the 3d of January; winter was already beginning: hard frost had set in, the sea was covered with floating thin ice, and navigation was getting impossible for the destroyers.

The activities at sea of the first year of war ended, and we anchored at Reval, where we spent the winter.

And thus, the first phase of the great war ended for the Baltic-Fleet, and all activities had to stop until the spring, on account of the ice which keeps the whole gulf of Finland in fetters.

Looking back on all that had happened during that time in our theatre of war, and considering what our Navy did, one can say that this period served for the crystallisation of the methods waging war on both sides; and at the same time we tried to fathom the enemy's plans and means of action.

On our side scout activity had been shown, but it was proportionate with the size and resources of our little fleet. It chiefly expressed itself in nightraids in the rear of the enemy, the laying of mines, reconnoitring and patrolling.

VIII.

Mine-laying by the "Rossia" near the Arkona light house. Raid of the Special-Half-Flotilla into Danzig bay. The "Rurik" damaged.

However, the activity of our fleet had not yet entirely died away, and just before New Year (Rus. style) an expedition was organised for the purpose of laying mines near Rügen island, close to the Arkona light house—also in another place south of Stolpe Bank.

The detachment which had to carry out this task was composed of the cruisers "Rossia", "Bogatyr" and "Oleg", the command being entrusted to rear-admiral Kanin, who hoisted his flag on the "Rossia". Captain A. V. Kolchak who was the initiator of the expedition accompanied him.

On January 12th the detachment took up the mines in Ute anchorage, and put out to sea early in the morning of the next day. It was true winter weather, quiet and gloomy; the sea looked heavy, like molten lead; it hardly stirred, the air appeared full of a peculiar silence, a suggestion of sadness brooded over all. It was cold, but as the detachment approached the German shores it grew gradually warmer.

The detachment steamed off directly to the south, making 18 knots, and without encountering other vessels, passed Gotland island. Soon afterwards the cruisers "Bogatyr" and "Oleg", who were to lay mines south of Stolpe, parted with the "Rossia", the latter proceeding farther south.

In the evening, on the meridian of Oeland island, on the darkening horizon a steamer was sighted. To meet all emergencies the Admiral gave orders to steer slightly to the left so as to remain unnoticed.

The cruiser went without lights, and tried not to emit sparks from her funnels attract the attention of the enemy. She seemed to glide over the smooth sea-surface like some mysterious shadow a could only have been distinctly seen when approached quite closely.

In the dark the "Rossia" passed quite near Bornholm island on which a whole line of lights was plainly visible, also a light house was brilliantly lit up.

Seeing so many lights, the men thought that the "Rossia" was approaching some enemy town. The sailors most eagerly watched each other so that none should lean over the side with a burning cigarette, as they feared that even so insignificant a light might betray the cruiser's whereabouts.

All the officers wished intensely to proceed as far as possible, near Kiel; therefore though the cruiser was already in the Arkona region those standing on the bridge entreated the Admiral to proceed farther. The Admiral listened to such requests favourably, the more so as A. V. Kolchak warmly supported them. It was only when the "Rossia" was close to the coast, at a distance of from three to four miles, that the Admiral ordered the mine laying to commence. The coast line was discernible even in the dark as was also the darkened light of the light house.

At 1.10 a. m. on January 1st (Rus. style) 1915 the "Rossia" decreased her speed down to eight knots and commenced laying the mines. The laying went on quite smoothly, nothing hindering. It lasted about an hour, after which having dropped the last one, the cruiser turned about, developed full speed and proceeded to our native shores. Every one was delighted and we congratulated each other on the success of the difficult operation, adding to this New Year's wishes.

At dawn when the "Rossia" was passing Bornholm island a steamer bulked largely on the misty horizon, probably a Hydroplane ship, as a hydroplane quickly left her and flew in the direction of the "Rossia". But obviously it either failed to notice our cruiser or thought her a German ship, as, without reaching us, it abruptly turned about.

A little later the "Rossia" was joined by the "Bogatyr" and "Oleg" which had also successfully achieved their object; and the whole detachment pursued its way to the North. Towards night it successfully reached Reval, passing through pack ice, in the Gulf of Finland.

A few days later it became known that the German cruiser "Gazelle" had been damaged by the mines we had laid; she succeeded however in reaching the nearest port. A little later another steamer or trawler was also completely wrecked thereabouts.

Towards the end of January the C. C. received orders to prevent, if possible, enemy troops from being brought by sea to Koenigsberg. This was most important in connection with the operations of our army in East Prussia and it was therefore decided, in spite of the ice which had formed in the Gulf of Finland, to organise an expedition for mine laying on the route followed by ships reaching that port.

Included in the detachment were the cruisers: "Rurik", "Admiral Makaroff", "Oleg" and "Bogatyr", and in addition the destroyer "Novik" and the Special Half Flotilla of destroyers were also to go.

The cruisers "Oleg" and "Bogatyr" were to carry mines, and "Rurik" and "Admiral Makaroff" were to act as support in the event of an encounter with the enemy.

The cruisers and the destroyers were to put out to sea separately, but having passed Gothland island, they were to rejoin and proceed in company until dark, then again separate for the mine laying.

But this plan had to be slightly altered, for it would have entailed the risk of "Novik" being without fuel if, as was possible, on account of the ice, the destroyers had been obliged to remain for the winter in Marienhamn on the Åland islands, as there were no supplies of oil in that port.

On the morning of the twenty ninth of January the Special Half Flotilla under the command of captain A. V. Koltchak left Reval for Baltic Port. There the mines were to be taken from an ice cutter, so as to keep secret the aim of the operation.

It was a real winter's day with a temperature of 8° R below zero, and a light southerly wind which had drifted all the ice to the northern shore of the Gulf.

The destroyers got quite easily to Baltic Port, and entered the anchorage, three quarters of which were clear of ice; there was ice only in the inside part of the harbour and that began suddenly to break up in the day time, big ice fields as long as fifty fathoms floating towards the outlet. As the ice was very thick, about 4" to 6" it became dangerous to the destroyers, and they had to weigh anchor immediately, and manoeuvring all the time let the ice floes pass between them. Nevertheless we did not entirely escape, for "Kon-dratenko" was damaged by an apparently light touch from an ice floe just on the water line, and two cracks appeared: one more than a foot long, and the other about 5". However we succeeded in stopping these up ourselves. The ice continued to break up and to move; sometimes it was so thick and solid that one could pass over it from one ship to another. It was only towards evening that the harbour at last was clear.

Fearing that it would be dangerous, in case we met ice in the night, it was decided that we should not start until morning.

At day break the destroyers went on, and having passed Odensholm island, came into very thick but more broken ice. They had a difficult struggle to get through it, and sometimes the engines had to be stopped. Happily beyond the Daggerort light-house the ice became thinner, and at last the sea was quite clear of it. At 4 o'clock they entered Taggalacht bay which was also free of ice and there they anchored.

Considering the time, it was evident that the destroyers would not arrive at nine o'clock the next morning, which was the time appointed and so the commander of the cruiser division, Admiral Bakhireff, had to be immediately informed.

At 5 a. m. Admiral Bakhireff's answer came saying that an accident had happened to one of his ships and consequently the operation was put off. A little later orders were received from the C. C. for us to return to Reval.

Having overcome so many difficulties and completed the hardest part of the task, and the weather being extraordinarily fine, it was very provoking to have to return; but surrendering to repeated entreaties of captain Koltchak the C. C. at last permitted to continue the cruise.

At 8 a. m., the weather being very propitious, and the frost 1° — 2° , the Special Half Flotilla continued southward. Up to the Windau parallel they encountered ice floes, but afterwards the sea was quite open. The destroyers kept all the time along the coast and only just before reaching on the 57th parallel Windau did they go further out to sea. At one a. m. they reached the place where the mines were to be laid—fifteen miles to the south of the entrance of Danzig bay.

It was a starlight night, and there was no wind. But just as the Special Half Flotilla began to get into position for the laying of the mines, a dense fog suddenly came on. On account of this the destroyers separated, and while the two rearmost laid mines in the specified area, the two in advance went a further distance of ten miles to the north, and made another mine field there in line with the first.

After their work was finished, each pair of destroyers went separately northwards, and only next morning did the whole of the Special Half Flotilla again join company near the Lüserort light-house. Passing the Zerel lighthouse thick broken ice was again encountered which greatly hindered the advance. The night had to be passed in Taggalacht bay so as to avoid a night cruise.

There was again dense fog in the morning, but nevertheless the Special Half Flotilla went on, and got as far as Odensholm light-house; the fog did not lift until later. Thanks to the south wind, which continued blowing, only a few small blocks of ice were encountered. Reval was reached at 10 p. m.

As already mentioned, the sailing of the cruiser division had been postponed on account of an accident which had happened to one of the ships.

It was soon known in Reval, that "Rurik" near Fare Island had touched a sand bank and been seriously damaged. It was even feared that she would not be able to sail on.

The accident happened on the 11th of February at 4 p. m. The cruisers division was emerging from the Sebastopol anchorage, and making for the enemy's coast, with the intention of screening the mine layers while at work. It was very foggy with a fresh wind of 6 to 7. In coming out of the skerries the division met floe ice moving W, and so began to drift. The course was held ten miles East of Fare island, but it was impossible at any time to define

the position, and even soundings could not be taken, owing to the ice. Two lead-lines were broken in the attempt.

About three a. m. the Fare light-house appeared in such close proximity that Admiral Bakhireff was alarmed, and at once gave orders for bearings to be taken in order to determine the position as exactly as possible. Nothing befell the leading ship "Admiral Makaroff", but on "Rurik", following in her wake, violent shocks were felt and the cruiser seemed to lose speed for a few seconds, then the shocks ceased and she continued on her way.

It was evident that "Rurik" had touched bottom on a sand-bank in the shoals of Fare, over which "Makaroff" had passed quite easily on account of her lesser draught (the draught of "Makaroff" being only 19 feet against the 23.4 of "Rurik"); but thanks to the impetus of her nineteen knots speed, "Rurik" cleared the bank instead of grounding on it.

The sheathing was torn off and 230 ribs were crushed; the second and the third boiler-rooms were flooded. The state of the cruiser was critical, and it was expected every moment that the boilers would burst. This catastrophe was averted by the chief mechanics, who did not lose presence of mind, but immediately let off steam. At first it was feared "Rurik" would sink, but after a short survey it was found, that there was no immediate danger of that, and she was even able to proceed.

The squadron turned northward and at a speed of 3—5 knts made for Reval. The weather continued very bad and at times the ships met pack ice. Nevertheless, the "Rurik" succeeded in getting safely to Reval. On arriving there the C. C. Admiral Essen himself came on board and inspected her thoroughly.

When the "Rurik" approached the harbour and was on an even keel, it was found she had made water and was drawing 30—31 feet; the harbour was only about that depth and in some places even shallower so that it was with great difficulty she was towed in, all the time touching bottom. As soon as she was in harbour, divers were sent down and it was then ascertained that the cruiser would have to be docked. The position of things was complicated by the fact that the only suitable dock was in Cronstadt and this could not easily be reached owing to the ice.

After deliberation and consultation with the Captains of the ice-cutters, the C. C. decided to take a risk and try to get the "Rurik" to Cronstadt.

In a week's time after temporary repairs had been effected, the "Rurik" left the harbour under the convoy of the ice-cutters "Ermak" and "Peter the Great".

All went on fairly smoothly as far as Hogland island: the ice-breakers made their way very easily. But when the ice grew thicker, the ships began to encounter blocks of piled ice, which hindered their progress. Though "Peter the Great" was much smaller than the "Ermak" she succeeded much better, as she had a broader underwater part, whilst in difficult places the former, by zig-zagging and getting upon the blocks of ice, managed easily to break them, the "Ermak" often had to stop. The passage lasted five days, but at last the "Rurik" was brought into Cronstadt harbour and placed in the dry-dock. After the water had been pumped out, over forty stones, which the cruiser had torn off the bank, were found between the ribs. If, two or three years earling anyone had said that, in February, in the very midst of winter, our ships would be able to proceed through the ice, from Reval to Cronstadt, most likely no one would have believed it. Even the ice-cutters would not risk breaking through the ice, under such conditions in normaltime. But in

time of war, not only ice-breakers, but even a severely damaged cruiser did necessity compel to such a performance. War induces one to become enterprising and resolute; and what seems unthinkable in peace, is easily realised in war.

Measures were at once taken to repair the damage to the "Rurik", the work proceeding day and night, in spite of the cold and it was anticipated that the cruiser would be able to rejoin the fleet in two and a half months.

IX.

Wreck of the "Medjidien" off Odessa. Again in the Riga gulf. Inspection of Runo island. Mine-laying near Libau. Mine-laying on the Irben passage. Death of Commander in Chief Admiral N. O. Essen. His life and activity.

The three winter months passed away quickly; all the ships having laid up, and repaired and the young crews having been drilled. In April, the fleet was ready to renew the fight at the first opportunity.

On April 6th good news reached us from the Black Sea. On Easter night just off Odessa, the Turkish cruiser "Medjidie" had foundered. Under cover of the fog she attempted to shell Odessa, but ran into a mine field. Fortunately it was found possible to float her and in this way, the Black sea fleet, unexpectedly, secured a most valuable capture.

On April 18th an important change took place in the "Novik" personnel: Commander P. P. Palitsky being replaced by Commander M. A. Behrens. Our new Captain, by his previous activities in peace time as also in the Japanese war, fully deserved such a ship as the "Novik", and we welcomed his appointment with joy. On the same day he came on board the destroyer and took up his command. After April 23d the ice in the Gulf of Finland began to melt quickly, and though floating ice was to be met, the Revel harbour was clear and became possible for the destroyers to move about freely. On the 1st of May, the "Novik" received urgent orders to make ready for a cruise. The order came at midday, but we could not finish our preparations before the evening, as under our standing orders we were relying on twenty four hours' notice. The C. C. notified us by wireless at 5 p. m. to take in fifty mines; so we immediately began to receive them from the supply-ship "Fert". At 7 p. m. all was completed and "Novik" was ready to put out to sea.

The motive of this extreme urgency was that enemy destroyers appeared in the Riga Gulf where they had bombarded the light-houses Svalfefort and Runo and taken all those who were there prisoner.

This had taken place on Friday and on the following Monday the enemy reentered the Gulf. We were rather slow in acting and sent the submarine "Akula" with the second group of the Second Destroyers' Flotilla only on Sunday, the "Novik", the Special Half Flotilla with mines, and the first group of the Second Destroyers' Flotilla were to start on the Monday. However in the evening it was decided that our departure would be put off until next morning.

The weather was beautiful in the morning and quite spring like. As was agreed, we left the harbour at 3.30 a. m.; determined the deviations of com-

passes and proceeded to Moonsound. With us was the "Pogranitchnik" which had been detained by taking the C. C. who had fallen ill, from Helsingfors to Reval.

We were at Kuivast at 11 a. m. where the destroyers of the Special Half Flotilla and the Second Flotilla were already anchored, having arrived some time earlier. Immediately a meeting was summoned at the instance of the second commander to work out a definite plan for the forthcoming mine laying in Irben. During the deliberations, the alarming news was received that the outermost observationpost of the Irben Strait had sighted the enemy. However, not entirely trusting this source of information, the Zerel light-house was asked by telephone whether anything suspicious was to be seen; the answer came, that the horizon was quite clear and there was not a single ship in sight.

Soon the whole detachment went into the Irben Strait to lay mines.

Going through the Riga Gulf, we suddenly sighted a submarine on the horizon. All the destroyers with mines on them were immediately ordered, as a precautionary measure, to turn and the "Donskoy Kazak" was sent to reconnoitre, as it was possible for our own submarine "Akula" to be in this region, and so it proved and we therefore continued our journey.

About 8,30 p. m. the detachment reached the appointed place and the ships formed in line a head and began laying mines.

The mines were placed in a line whilst we steered N. in the following order: the "Pogranitchnik", "Ohotnik", "Novik", "Kondratenko" and the "Sibirsky Strelok"; we had 50 mines and the boats of the Special Half Flotilla — 35 each.

While laying the mines, a floating enemy mine was discovered in the course of the leading Ship; this occasioned a delay, as it had to be destroyed by shots; we had also to explode three of our own mines, which, for some unknown reason, came up to the surface.

Our task finished, the detachment cruised all night across the Strait, keeping watch over its entrance. In the morning the wind freshened up, and it became difficult to keep out to sea, so we anchored near Domesnes. Towards midday however the wind veered to the W. and we were so much tossed about, that we had again to weigh anchor and seek another shelter near Oesel island shore. The detachment found shelter in Pia bay, and there passed the night quietly.

In the morning Senior Captain asked our Captain to go ashore on Runo island to and see what damage the enemy had done there. On arriving at the island, we anchored, and several officers and myself went on shore.

According to the statement of the light-house keeper, the enemy had appeared quite unexpectedly, a few days before, early in the morning. Two destroyers came up to the island, apparently, flying St. Andrew's flag. A landing force numbering about sixty men and three officers, was at once put ashore; and it became clear then, that it was the foe.

The landing party first of all proceeded to the light-house and blew up a hut containing a barrel of benzine, and then the watch-tower on the light-house. After which a search was made, and four employes, of military age were taken prisoner conveyed to one of the destroyers. The inhabitants were not interfered with beyond the disturbance entailed by the searching of their houses.

After inspecting the island, we were at once dispatched to Reval where, on the following morning, we were ordered to take in forty mines. Having done so, we stayed in the harbour, the chief of the operation department of

the Staff Captain A. V. Koltchak, joining us in the evening; having him on board, the "Novik" went to Moonsund.

It then turned out that an expedition to Libau was intended in order to lay mines in sections which the enemy had been carefully trawling for some days, obviously in preparation for an offensive.

On May 6th about midday, having this aim in view, the second Flotilla, the Special Half Flotilla and "Novik" weighed anchor; the fifth Flotilla awaiting us near the Michailovsky light-house, whilst the third proceeded directly to Lüserort. Having passed the Riga gulf together, the detachment divided itself between Steinort and Backhofen; the Second Flotilla and the "Novik" proceeding out to sea, whilst the others pursued their way along the coast. Having retired a certain distance from the shore, we steered south towards Libau.

Having encountered no one, the destroyers came at 1 a. m. to the spot where the mine laying was to take place, 22 miles from Libau and 15 miles from the Pogranitchny light-house, and here the "Novik" dropped her forty mines. Meanwhile the Half Flotilla dropped eighty mines seven miles North of Libau.

As to the Second Flotilla, it carried no mines and only accompanied us in order to divert the enemy's attention in case of an encounter. But on account of the high speed, so many sparks came out of the funnels, it seemed ineffectual that the enemy's attention would be attracted.

Fortunately we were not seen and the operation passed off successfully.

On our way back, at about 3.3' a. m. when we had already sighted the Half Flotilla returning, we saw on the horizon, approximately N.W., flashes of guns, and heard the sound of firing.

We could only suppose that our cruisers had encountered the enemy's scouts: we knew that Admiral Bakhireff, with his cruiser division, was at sea, screening our expedition and we learned later that he had been in action with the enemy cruiser "Augsburg" and two destroyers.

After we had rejoined the Half Flotilla, the whole detachment successfully returned to Moonsund.

One cannot help expressing amazement that the enemy's reconnoitring off Libau gave such poor results for many destroyers came quite close to the very harbour on a light night, the funnels emitting flames like torches and no one noticed them.

The mine laying soon gave tangible results; for the enemy reported that a destroyer was blown up off Libau, and so all his intense trawling throughout several days was of no avail.

On the same day we had to take in fifty mines from the mine layer "Enisei"; and so at 6 p. m. the "Novik" and the Half Flotilla proceeded to the Michailovsky light-house. The weather had meanwhile changed for the worse a fresh wind was blowing and it was raining.

At 2 a. m. the destroyers anchored near the Michailovsky light-house, beginning the mine laying at 4. During the mine laying "Novik" was in the middle of the Half Flotilla. The mine laying did not go off quite smoothly, for the "Pogranitchny" did not peep in position; it was difficult in general, with ships of so many different types, to manoeuvre in one line.

After the detachment had retired a certain distance from the spot, two heavy explosions were suddenly heard: it was evident that two of our own mines had exploded after the sugar had melted.

Some time later a very dense fog suddenly came on, and it became very difficult to pursue the voyage; in order not to be separated, search-lights had to be used at times and this made it much easier to maintain the order.

About noon the detachment entered Moonound; as the whole crossing had been effected in the thickest fog, just as the leading destroyer turned into Kuivast, she got into shoal water and touched bottom on a 10 feet sized bank, thanks to an error in the dead reckoning.

Fortunately the fog lifted a little at that moment and we had less trouble than we expected; only the "Sibirsky Strelak" had touched ground with her screw. After that the detachment reached its anchorage safely, and when the weather cleared up entirely, the "Novik" came alongside the supply-ship "Volga" to take in oil and lay by until morning.

The next day the Half Flotilla and one group of the Second Flotilla went to Reval, the "Novik", the third and the 5th Flotilla and the second group of the Second Flotilla remaining at Moonound. We had all been given the task of patrolling over the entrance into Irben straits, and also of covering the withdrawal of the Observation station along the coast from Libau as the latter had been occupied by the enemy. For this purpose the Captain had crossed over to Kuivast, the other destroyers, by turns, being on duty at the Michailovsky light-house.

Up to the 12th of May the "Novik" lay motionless and we were already beginning to feel bored, but on the 14th of May in formation was received that the enemy intended to make a demonstration in force on the next day in the Gulf of Finland. In view of which, our submarines and destroyers were concentrated at Moonound.

On the same day an enemy light cruiser of the "Nympe" class appeared near Ute. It was obvious that she hoped to succeed in drawing out our cruisers anchored there. In stead of which however she encountered our submarine "Drakon" which twice attacked her, but unfortunately, without success.

On the next day a severe gale began blowing so that the enemy could hardly do anything that day; even in the Moonound it became so windy that we had to pass behind Moon island for shelter. A day later the wind began to calm down, and the weather soon became quite quiet again.

On the 22th of May the destroyer "Pogranitchnik" was urgently summoned to Reval, as it turned out, to transport the body of Commander in Chief Admiral N. O. Essen, who had died suddenly from inflammation of the lungs. The burial was to take place in Petersburg, in the Novodevitchy cloister, and the "Pogranitchnik" being his favourite ship had been chosen to convey his body from Reval.

This news impressed us greatly. By the death of Admiral Essen we sustained the severest loss of all since the beginning of the war; and one that was irreparable. And who was worthy to be his successor? Admirals Russin, Stetsenko, Kerber or Kanin had possibly, the most claim to consideration, but they had not distinguished themselves by anything particular, and in any case, they had not the personality of the late Admiral.

Admiral N. O. Essen was only 54 years of age, but broken down by nine months' intense hard work during the war, a slight cold proved fatal, and the Baltic Fleet lost its brilliant chief...

He comes back to my memory as if he were alive... Of small stature, with lively grey eyes, a small auburn beard, quick and energetic movements, he made a powerful impression from the first time one saw him.

Graf, Novik.

3

His lofty mind, military gifts and great organising capacity rendered invaluable service to the Russian Navy, whilst his paternal and just bearing towards his subordinates inspired deep affection from all ranks. Under his orders and for him men would work with whole-hearted devotion.

Nicolas Ottovitch Essen was born in Petrograd on the 24th of December 1860. In 1880 he finished as first the Naval School, his name being engraved on a marble slab. Later he went through the Naval Academy and the officer's Artillery classes, and was almost entirely at sea until the Japanese War. He spent several years in the Far East and the Mediterranean, and in 1902 was appointed Captain of the newly built cruiser "Novik" which was ordered to the Far East. When war broke out there, and during the defence of Port Arthur he, and his "Novik" covered themselves with imperishable glory. On the memorable 9th of February 1904 "Novik" was the first to attack the Japanese squadron, and under heavy fire, approached the enemy to within a distance of 15—17 cables. Such gallantry astonished even the enemy. Having quickly repaired the damages sustained in the first battle, he was ready on the 25th of February, to take an active part in the second battle with the Japanese squadron, after which he repeatedly made audacious raids and supported his torpedo boats. On the 11th of Mars, flying Admiral Makaroff's flag, he went to the rescue of the sinking "Stereugstchy".

The "Novik" was always in motion, always and everywhere first in the field, she was the terror of the enemy destroyers... Soon afterwards N. O. Essen received a new appointment and to him was entrusted the battleship "Sevastopol", she had been considerably damaged in various battles, but nevertheless, under Essen she took part in all Admiral Makaroff's sorties.

After Admiral Makaroff's death, N. O. Essen was appointed chief of staff of the squadron, and insisted all the time on the necessity of active operations. "The fleet does not exist for Port Arthur, but Port Arthur for the fleet" he used to say.

On the 23th of June, during the squadron's sortie, the "Sevastopol" damaged by a torpedo, had to defend herself against, repeated torpedo-attacks, and returned safely into the harbour only thanks to the able handling of her Captain.

Having rapidly repaired her damages, the battle-ship took part, on the 10th of August, in the unsuccessful attempt of the squadron to force its way to Vladivostok. During the battle the "Sevastopol" attempted to ram the enemy, and break through the lines; but in this she failed, and returned to Port Arthur with the squadron.

On the 23th of August, the "Sevastopol" proceeded into Takhe Bay; there with the fire of her twelve inches' guns, she silenced the enemy's batteries. On her way back, she was again damaged by a mine and returned into harbour under a hot fire from the enemy fleet.

On the 6th of November she was once more for action.

On the 3th of December, instead of perishing ingloriously in the harbour, Essen decided to break through the blockade at the very first opportunity. For this purpose the battle-ship proceeded to the outer roadstead. On the very same night she was furiously attacked by enemy destroyers, such attacks recurred almost every night. All were repulsed with great loss to the enemy. At last out of seventy torpedoes launched by the destroyers, two reached their objective, the "Sevastopol" being severely damaged.

But even after that she took part in the firing against the enemy coast batteries, damaging them considerably.

At the same time N. O. Essen was appointed chief of the Liaoteshan defence Division and continued on land his feverish activity for the defence of Port Arthur.

On the 1st of January orders to destroy the ships were received. In order that the "Sevastopol" should not fall into the enemy's hands even damaged, N. O. Essen, with incredible difficulty, brought her out and sank her near Liaoteshan at a depth of twenty five fathoms; he himself remained on board the "Sevastopol" up to the last moment and it was only when the battleship was already partly submerged and turning over, that the Admiral at last consented to board a tug which had come alongside to fetch him.

From this tug he watched the painful picture of his ship's loss.... He has described it himself as follows:

"....The list is greatly increasing on the starboard side. Now the deck is under water; everything upon it is rolling down. Now the ship taked in water through the funnels, and all at once turns over. Her red keel shows itself for a moment on the surface, then the stern heavily plunges down, and the battleship disappears into the sea....."

N. O. Essen's activity in Port Arthur did not pass unnoticed. Port Arthur brought him forward and entitled him to be considered one of the most prominent officers of our Navy. After N. O. Essen's return to Russia in 1905, a new period in his activity begins: that activity was one of organisation, and was founded on the experience he had acquired during the war.

In that year he was appointed Captain of the cruiser "Rurik" which was being built in England and at the same time—commanding officer of the 20th Naval barrack. Just at that time a mutiny broke out in Cronstadt, in which the crews of all the ships Took part. Outragious pillage and tumults went on in the town; continual firing was heard; drunken bands were to be met everywhere. Only the sailors of the 20th Barrack were not found among the rioters: they had all remained in their barracks and did not join the mutineers. They were, it is true also disposed to take part in the rebellion and had taken their rifles and were already making their way out, when at the gate they were met by their Commander—who was quite alone. He held a pistol in his hand. Next minute his peremptory command: "Back!"... was heard, and he added: "you will only step out of here over my dead body!" The sailors seemed to hesitate; and N. O. Essen took advantage of that moment to persuade them not to undertake so mad an act as mutiny. He spoke to them of the meaning of their oath of allegiance and he told them they would repent later, but it would be too late.... The sailors, listening sullenly to their Captain, grouped themselves around him: each one of his wards seemed to penetrate like an electric spark.... Very soon there remained no trace of their rebellious disposition and the sailors returned to their barracks.... They never loved a Captain better than they did Essen.

Such a deed deserved the "Novik" and the "Sevastopol"....

In 1906 a detachment of mine cruisers was intrusted to him. Under his able command, this detachment became the core of the growing Navy, and a great number of excellent Captains and young officers were trained there; and Essen's school began to exist like formerly Lazareff's, Boutakoff's and Makaroff's had existed.

In 1908, when already rear-admiral Essen was named Commander of the Naval Forces of the Baltic Sea, and later, conformed C. C., and remained in this post until the last day of his life.

In a little more than seven years, he literally regenerated the Fleet and abolished the routine which had already deep roots there.

He proved that the Admiralty to serve the navy and not vice versa; he also revived C. O. Makaroff's saying which was: "at sea—means at home" and he accustomed the fleet to sail in autumn or in winter, in the hardest conditions, as well as in summer. N. O. Essen always said that all depended upon practice—that without practice one could neither learn anything nor achieve anything. He was the first to oppose the regulation that Captains of ships were responsible every time a ship ran aground, which made them lose all desire to run the least risk. The result was, that the fleet under his command, became thoroughly familiar with home waters, and no longer employed pilots to navigate difficult channels. But not only this did N. O. Essen achieve, he also explained many other simple things, which were, somehow, not understood before.

N. O. Essen, always justified his opinions and his acts by personal example, and he not only wrote orders, but he saw that they were carried out, he was at sea continually, and cared for his own comfort least of all.

He was always on the move, and it was not easy to find him in any particular place: one day he was in Libau, the next, in Reval, the following: somewhere in the skerries... Only wireless could track the restless Admiral, and the Communications Division watch him from the observation posts. Even now, when he has passed into Eternity the result of his immense, productive work is seen. He left the Fleet in a brilliant state; the officers of his glorious schooling capable of continuing his work, and an excellent strategical position occupied by our Fleet.

The words of the late Admiral at the beginning of the war, in which his valour and his nobleness were fully expressed come to my mind: "Preparing to begin battle, perhaps the last in my life, I do it with a calm conscience, for I know that I have done all that is in my power to make the best use of the means at hand. We will do our duty to the last".

Essen is no more.... but the Russian Navy will never forget him, and what it owes him, will never be effaced from our grateful remembrance.

X.

The first apparition of enemy aeroplanes in Riga Gulf. "Novik's" reconnaissances. The Wreck of "Enissei". The action of "Dersky" and "Gnevny" against "Breslau". The fighting of the 5th and 6th Flotilla of destroyers with the cruisers.

After N. O. Essen's death, the Chief of the Staff, Vice-Admiral L. F. Kerber took temporarily the command of the fleet.

The following days were calm, and therefore we occupied ourselves with gunnery and mine practice, as during the winter we had lost the habit of those exercises.

On the 25th of May, it was at last known, that by the Emperor's order, Admiral B. A. Kanin had been appointed new Commander in chief of the Fleet. It was nearly generally recognized, that it was the best choice between all the candidates, as Admiral Kanin, from the very first days of war had showed

himself in a very good light, and a great part of the merit of the organisation of the defence was due to him.

At the same time, the newly appointed Commander of the Destroyer forces, Captain P. Trouhatcheff joined us at Kuivast. Everybody was very glad of this appointment.

We also learned, by the Emperor's order of the day, that the Turkish cruiser "Medjidie" was entered on the Black-sea Fleet's lists under the name "Prut", in honour of the mine-layer which had been wrecked at the beginning of the war.

In a few days "Novik" and the Special Half Flotilla were sent into the Irben strait on duty consisted in "Novik" lying in full readiness in the Arensburg harbour, whilst the rest of the destroyers, 49 turns, were on watch at the Michailovsky light-house.

However we were soon summoned to Kuivast, where we were ordered to take in a full supply of oil and be in readiness. We lay there waiting two days, and it was only on the third that we were called urgently to the Michailovsky light-house, as the observation station reported the appearance of the enemy at the entrance of the Riga gulf and near Dagerort and Ute.

At the same time an enemy sea plane appeared for the first time over the Gulf of Riga, throwing several bombs into the gunboat "Groziastchy" without however hitting it.

Still we did not reach Irben for having been urgently dispatched there were also urgently called back for some unknown reason.

On the same day the submarine "Okun" returned from the open sea having, on the parallel of Windau, met an enemy detachment consisting of ten big ships and destroyers. The "Okun" at once attacked them and launched a torpedo against the leading ship. Having noticed this the enemy attempted to ram the "Okun", and succeeded in bending down the periscope almost at a right angle.

After the "Okun" had launched the torpedo and began quickly to dive, she heard a great explosion; so great that the electric lamps on the "Okun" burst; there was therefore reason to suppose that the torpedo had reached its aim.

Owing to her periscope having been bent down, the "Okun" found herself in a most dangerous situation and returned back with the greatest difficulty.

During the whole day an enemy detachment lay near the entrance of the gulf of Riga: this detachment consisted of two light cruisers, a transport ship with sea planes and eleven destroyers; but no particular activity was manifested. The enemy's presence was also felt at night, and he apparently continued to lay not far off at sea.

At 10 a. m. on the 4th of Juni "Novik" was ordered to proceed to the Michailovsky light-house. When approaching it we saw for the first time two big enemy sea planes which had just finished throwing the bombs and were now flying away home southwards. They had cast twenty bombs; and though not one of these had hit us, justice must be rendered to the Germans: all the bombs were very well aimed and fell close to the very sides of our destroyers; the latter having no arms whatever to drive the sea planes away, only retorted by machine gun and rifle fire, and attempted not to be hit. Of course the effectiveness of these means of defence could not be ascertained; still they appeared, to some extent, to be effective; the most important thing

being however that the crews were thus reassured: as a matter of fact, the bombs, when thrown from above, acted on the men who were not accustomed to anything of the kind, in a rather unpleasant manner.

Having come up to the Michailovsky light-house, the "Novik" anchored. At the same time the Half Flotilla, which had jointed us, carrying the mines, was sent to lay mines across the northern entrance of the Gulf. By so doing the south passage alone remained for our sorties into the sea.

A wireless was received from "Groziastchy" in the course of the day, reporting that she had distinctly sighted in the Gulf an enemy submarine. Many of us however remained sceptical; for then such a piece of news seemed too improbable. The rest of the day the destroyers cruised along the mine field, smoke from the enemy ships being all the time visible on the horizon. From Lüserort it was reported that the same ships remained lying there which had been sighted the day before, viz. two light cruisers, a sea plane carrier and eleven destroyers.

At 5 p. m. "Novik" was approached by the Special Half Flotilla under the broad pendant of the Chief of the destroyer forces who ordered us to return to Kuivast. And the enemy too appeared to be preparing to withdraw, for the columns of smoke began to disappear little by little in a southerly direction.

On the way to Kuivast, we received by wireless the painful information that the mine layer "Enisei" had been sunk by an enemy submarine when proceeding from Reval to Moonsund, not far from the Odenshoorn light-house.

It was later ascertained that she perished in ten minutes, and as there was no one close at hand, and the water was still very cold, but twenty men were saved, amongst them only one officer—the chief engineer. Later the fishermen picked up a sailor, all the others—more than two hundred men—perishing.

Eyewitnesses relate, that when the "Enisei" was sinking, all those going to perish sang the national anthem; as for the Captain Prokhoroff he, standing on the bridge, declined to do anything to save himself. A particularly tragic circumstance connected with his death was, that this was his last cruise on board the "Enisei"; he had already been appointed Captain of one of the cruisers and had remained on the mine-layer only because he had not had time to transfer the commandment to his successor. As it was later known, the "Enisei" had been sunk by submarine "U 26", the same which had sunk the "Pallada".

About 10 p. m. "Novik" successfully returned to Kuivast and moored close to the "Volga".

In the course of the night Lüserort reported having sighted four enemy destroyers which apparently were laying mines; and the spot indicated by Lüserort happened to be a little nearer the open sea than the one where our mines had been laid. It thus turned out that the enemy had but strengthened our own position!

On the following day he did not appear any more; and it must be supposed that he had finished his operations, though it was difficult to ascertain what these consisted of. Most probably this was a demonstration in order to protect the carrying of troops by sea to Libau.

In the course of the day the torpedo boat "Rastoropny" sighted a submarine in the gulf of Finland behind the central position. Just at the time, our dreadnoughts were pursuing gunnery exercises not far from that very spot. They were ordered to return to Helsingfors at once, all the torpedo-

boats being commanded to search at once the suspicious region. After a search lasting several hours, no submarine was however found.

On the 6th of Juni the English submarine "E 9" returned from sea reporting she had sunk an enemy destroyer and supply-ship—possibly two destroyers near Gotska Sande. The submarine attacked these when they were moored near the supply-ship; and two big explosions were observed.

On the 7th of Juni a strong gale began to blow and we had to put off the intended torpedo practice. Next day however it was calmer and we could undertake the exercises. They were to be executed at a 20 knots speed, and the object was the steamer "Vodoley"; two volleys of mines were fired one after the other, consisting of four mines each. The first charge fell very successfully under the very bow of "Vodoley", the other under her stern.

On the 9th of Juni the "Novik" was ordered to proceed to Ute island to join the cruiser division. At 8 p. m. having taken in a full supply of oil we proceeded as directed. Having passed Moonsound and entered the sea, we prepared to repulse attacks of submarines for after the "Enisei" episode the C. C. had ordered to take all possible precautions.

At dawn we approached Ute but did not find the cruisers, and so had to proceed further on, as far as Lum, where we found them. Our Captain called at once on Admiral Bakhireff, and it then turned out that we had been called to protect the trawlers while working in the external channels.

At Lum the "Novik" was detained almost four days without however being used once. On the fourth day we were ordered by the Chief of Staff to go back to Kuivast, and at 8 p. m. the "Novik", in company of the destroyer "Moskvitianin" put out to sea and reached Moonsound without any accident.

Alarming news were received on the 17th of June: the enemy was undertaking some operation in our waters and the observation post on Dagerort had already seen the scouts.

Next day again scouts were observed, and the day after an enemy detachment, composed of 2 cruisers, 6 destroyers and a submarine appeared on the horizon. It could be supposed that they were laying mines.

That day the "Novik" received the order to lay a mine-field to the south of Windau in cooperation with the 1st group of the 5th Flotilla, the 2d group of the 6th Flotilla and the Half Flotilla. For this purpose our detachment went out to sea at 5 p. m. and having passed the Riga gulf, on the Luserort parallel divided: the "Novik" and the 1st group of the 5th Flotilla went out in the open sea, and the others continued going southward along the coast. Our group's purpose was, to screen the Half Flotilla while it was laying the mines; except that, the "Novik" was to make a search far into the sea. The 2d group of the 6th Flotilla, during that time, protected the mine-laying in the southern direction, having gone a little farther along the coast.

The "Novik", on leaving the coast, separated from the 5th Flotilla and started for the search at 24 knots speed. Having done 40 miles, the Captain ordered us to go back, diminishing our speed to 10 knots; during the whole time, nothing suspicious was to be remarked.

In that time the Half Flotilla and the "Finn" were to lay a mine-field 7 miles south from Windau and 3 miles from the coast. The end of the mine laying operation was to be indicated by a conventional wireless signal, after which the "Novik" could return. In a short time this wireless was received and having increased our speed we steared to the Riga gulf where we joined all the other destroyers.

From the 21st to the 26th of June the "Novik" lay quietly at Kuivast, where the news of the fight between the "Dersky" and the "Gnevny" against the "Breslau", which took place in the night between the 10th and the 11th of Juni, was received.

These destroyers went out scouting in the region of Zunguldak; it was at the period of the moonless nights which the Turks generally take advantage of to bring coal to Constantinople. The weather was very fine: the sea like a mirror, the sky quite clear, and warm; the cruise promised to be very agreeable.

At nightfall the destroyers diminished their speed and gliding noiselessly along the smooth water, they steared towards the Bosphorus.

Suddenly, late in the night, they discovered at the distance of 10—15 cables, the dark silhouette of a ship. Judging by its outline, it was the "Breslau". Evidently she also had perceived the destroyers, for a search-light was turned about on the line of the horizon, and a beam fell accidentally upon the "Gnevny" against which a salvo was immediately fired.

Not losing a moment, the "Dersky" came up under the "Breslau's" stern and opened fire alongside of the cruiser. The first salvo damaged the stern-gun. The "Breslau", seeing her disadvantageous position, tried to turn broadside so, as to have a wider area for action; but the Captain of the "Dersky" Commander A. O. Gadd, having a greater speed, continued to steer all the time in her way; every manoeuvre of the "Breslau" was immediately met by a contre-man oeuvre from his side. At last the enemy, having put out all the lights and having fired off several disorderly salvos, departed rapidly, pursued by the "Dersky" who was keeping close up to her. As it was later known, the "Breslau" lost in that battle her Captain and 60 men of the crew.

Having at last lost the "Breslau" in the dark, the "Derzky" returned to the spot where the encounter had first taken place, and began to seek for the "Gnevny". But she did not find her before dawn, after a search lasting two hours. The "Gnevny" was in the most helpless state. It turned out that she had been hit by the very first shells. One of them had pierced the main steam-pipe and the "Gnevny" at once lost every possibility of motion.

The "Derzky" immediately began towing it and both destroyers reached safely Sebastopol.

On the 27th of June all the destroyers were ordered to be in full readiness, as offensive operations on the enemy's part were expected. In consequence at 7 a. m. on the 27th of June, the "Novik", the sixth Flotilla, the first group of the fifth Flotilla, the first group of the seventh Flotilla and the first group of the eighth Flotilla proceeded to Svalferort.

After we had come there the Chief of the Destroyer's Force sent us on a reconnaissance in the direction of Gotland.

At half past one the "Novik" weighed anchor and proceeded past Zerel. When already in the open sea, a slight misunderstanding occurred: a periscope was supposed to have been sighted from the bridge and we went to ram it. But having come nearer, we made out that, it was but a fragment of some buoy, which when vertically floating, did in fact, much resemble a periscope.

Having reached the Gotland making twenty four knots, and not having encountered anything on the way, the "Novik", in accordance with instructions, turned and proceeded back, having diminished her speed.

When approaching Irben, we sighted a submarine on the surface of the sea. After examining it carefully, we assured ourselves that it was our own submarine of the "Makrel" type. But apparently the "Makrel" people did

not make out at once who was approaching, and the submarine dived rapidly. The Captain then went ahead at a very small speed and began approaching the "Makrel" zigzagging. The "Makrel" then understood it was the "Novik" and came up to the surface. She then joined us, and we proceeded together to Zerel.

On the same day, almost at the same hour, we were again ordered to make a reconnaissance and so went at once into the sea. When already on the way, we received a radio not to go farther than twenty miles.

Up to half past five the "Novik" steamed 280 and clouds of smoke from enemy ships were all the time visible on the left. As a matter of fact, and as was already known, enemy mine-sweepers were working near Windau.

Having made twenty miles as we had been ordered to, we turned and at this moment saw in the NW direction smoke and the tops of two masts; it was undoubtedly the enemy. As the "Novik" was proceeding without any smoke, it could be supposed with assurance that the enemy had not yet sighted us.

The Captain continued to advance, and the smoke we had noticed was fast approaching. He then increased the speed to seventeen knots. When the distance between us had diminished to such an extent that it became possible to make out what type of a ship this was, and when it turned out that it was a cruiser of the "Bremen" type with one destroyer, we turned and again increased our speed.

After that nothing remained but returning to Zerel. No sooner had we approached it, than we got a signal from the light-house that the sixth Flotilla had commenced fighting with enemy cruisers near Luserort. Our Captain of course ordered to weigh anchor at once, and the "Novik" hastened to the rescue.

When approaching the Michailovsky light-house we saw the half Flotilla coming with mines from the Riga Gulf and the fifth and sixth Flotillas coming from Luserort. Everything was obviously already over, and the chief of Destroyer's Force ordered us all to anchor, and sent for our Captain.

About 11 p. m. we were suddenly informed from the light-house that two enemy cruisers were proceeding from Luserort. The Captain returned urgently on board the destroyer, all of us being at the same time ordered to weigh anchor and prepare for battle. The submarine "Makrel" was sent against the cruisers first.

However the enemy, when still at 70 cables from us, turned and remained on the Luserort parallel soon afterwards retiring.

We accordingly remained anchoring and everything quieted down.

It then turned out that the fifth and sixth Flotillas when returning from Windau sighted two enemy cruisers. One was coming from the North and the other from the South. The former was obviously the one we had seen in the course of the day.

When the nearest cruiser was at a distance admitting of firing, the sixth Flotilla opened fire, the fifth following suit.

The destroyers were fifteen in number and they all fired as best they could. Still the distance was too great, and so we could not see whether our projectiles hit the enemy. As for the cruisers they fired systematically and were provided with long range artillery so that their shells began to fall very near our destroyers. However they had no time to control definitively their fire, and not one of their projectiles hit us. This was hardly to the honour of the enemy's gunners.

After thus fighting without any results, both sides moved to such a distance from each other, that there was no more any sense in going on firing, and so the action ended.

On the 29th of June at 10 a. m. all the destroyers Force weighed anchor and proceeded to Windau to lay mines there. The "Novik" was the leading ship, the fifth Flotilla following, the Spezial Half Flotilla with mines being last. When the "Novik" had come quite close to Windau, so that we could even see the breakwater with the naked eye, we all noticed that an enemy aeroplane was flying over the town. The Chief of Destroyers Force, fearing that the spot where the mines were to be laid would thus become known to the enemy, ordered us all to turn. "Novik" and Special Half Flotilla proceeded to Svalferort, the fifth Flotilla remaining in patrol near the Lüserort and Michailovsky light-houses.

It was decided to repeat the same operation in the evening. And so at 9 p. m. the Special Half Flotilla again proceeded to Windau, leaving us near Zerel for connection purposes; we were to hasten to the rescue at first call.

At three a. m. the wireless was received, stating that the mines had been laid, and at 5 a. m. all of us safely returned. We were then ordered to proceed to the Michailovsky light-house, to join there the sixth Flotilla and together to go to Kuivast. At eight p. m. we were to be ready and await instructions from the command in Chief.

In accordance with these orders "Novik" was ready at 8 p. m.; and "Lieutenant Bourakoff" arrived a little later from Reval bringing instructions.

XI.

Our cruisers before Memel. The battle near the Esterharn light-house. "Novik's" battle with "Roon" near Gothland island.

In accordance with the order received from the Chief of Staff, "Novik" started for Worms at 1 a. m. on the 1st of July, together with the 6th Flotilla.

About 4 a. m. the detachment was overtaken by a thick fog which obliged them all to anchor, not very far from Worms and there wait for the fog to clear up.

The forthcoming operation was to consist in the destroyers with the 1st Cruiser Division, bombarding Memel and destroying the enemy's scouts, in case of an encounter with any.

In about 50 minutes time, the fog cleared up enough for our detachment to be able to continue its way to the Winkova shoal, where an appointment for meeting the cruisers had been made.

But in arriving there at 8,30 a. m. we did not find the cruisers, for, not waiting for us, they had gone on. Then, together with the Commander of the 6th Flotilla, our Captain decided to steer for Dagerort, but just at that moment, a wireless from the Chief of the Detachment, Rear-Admiral Bakhireff was received in which an exact itinerary was given.

After that, we proceeded at a speed of 24 knots with the intention of joining the cruisers, whilst the 6th Flotilla, which could only develop a speed of 22 knots, increased the interval considerably. Soon the Admiral, to the officers of the Flotilla great disappointment, let them off entirely.

At about 3 p. m. "Novik" joined the cruiser Division, which was in the line ahead, "Admiral Makaroff" (Rear-Admiral Bakhireff's flag-ship) leading, and "Boyan", "Bogatyr", "Oleg" and "Rurik", following.

The sight of the cruiser Division was very imposing, and we could not help admiring the five beautiful cruisers going at full speed, proudly cutting into the waves, and all bristly with guns.

The Admiral ordered us to steer in the "Rurik's" wake, viz: to close the column.

The weather was uncertain and the fog was thickening every minute; we had a compact wall around us, thanks to which the "Rurik" soon lost contact with the rest of the division and therefore remained alone with the "Novik".

About 7 p. m. the fog lifted for a few minutes and we perceived, to our great joy, the division of cruisers near to us, the "Rurik" turned towards it; but at that moment a thick cloud of fog surrounded us, and again nothing was to be seen. However "Rurik" had caught sight of "Oleg's" track (she being the last in the line), and tried to turn in that direction, but as result went astray, and fell back into her former course.

It was very difficult for the "Novik" to keep up with "Rurik", as the latter did not at all reckon with her, and changed her speed and her course without even informing the "Novik", which ran the risk of losing her. On the bridge all were in a stramed state and tried hard to notice the changes in the course of "Rurik" in time.

At last the zone of fog was passed, but, alas, the rest of the Division was no more to be seen.

We were then at 18 miles from Memel and were informed from the "Rurik", that "if no special order were received, we were to bombard Memel at 3.30 a. m."

Before that, we had intercepted a wireless from the Captain of "Rurik" asking Admiral Bakhireff to signal his place. We never knew if he had received any answer, as the wireless communication was much impeded by the electric discharges in the air.

As there was much time yet till dawn, and not wishing to lie to near from Memel, the "Rurik" turned, and we again entered the zone of dense fog. At the same time it began to grow dark and it became nearly impossible to keep behind "Rurik" and at the first unexpected turning, the "Novik" lost her.

Having got into such a disagreeable position, it was urgent for the Captain to take a definite decision, so as to avoid meeting unawares our own forces in the night, as they were now somewhere near us, though we did not know exactly where.

On account of this, the Captain decided to steer N and having sent a wireless to say that he had lost "Rurik", he proceeded in the direction of Zerel; with a speed of 9 knots.

Unfortunately for us the thunder discharges continued all night and paralysed entirely the work of the wireless station, and it was only now and then that we succeeded in receiving fragments of messages. Some unknown enemy stations were all the time at work, and sometimes "Rurik" hindered them; then again all was stopped by the thunder discharges and nothing could be understood.

Amidst the fragments of different messages, there was one addressed to the Commander of the cruiser Division which stated that the cruiser "Augsburg" was at sea and would be at 2 o'clock in a certain place.

Though it was awfully provoking, but we could do nothing as we were bound hand and foot not knowing exactly where our cruisers were.

Thus, meeting nobody, the "Novik" continued its way all night. At 4 a. m. the Captain increased the speed to 17 knots, and at 9.30 a. m. we reached Zerel.

Suddenly, at 10 a. m., when we had already anchored, we succeeded in receiving the following wireless: "Novik" and "Rurik" to steer from Ester-garn NW 40"; this upset us very much, for it means that Admiral Bakhireff had not received our wireless reporting him that we had lost contact with "Rurik".

Having received this message, our Captain immediately put out to sea at full speed to go to meet the Division.

Soon a second wireless was received: "the cruisers have been in action; one enemy cruiser has run aground near the Ester-garn light-house." Afterwards it was made out that it was not a cruiser, but the mine-layer "Albatros".

Continuing our way towards the Division, we received a wireless in which the Admiral ordered us to return, though only 12—15 miles remained for us to meet him. We had to turn back and go to Kuivast, passing before Zerel.

Next day we were ordered by the Chief of Staff: "to await orders".

At 7 p. m. the "Iskousny" arrived with secret instructions and passed us the order to go to Reval, which made us put out to sea at 10 p. m.

At 5 a. m. "Novik" entered the Reval harbour and immediately began making supplies of oil, whilst the Captain went on the "Kretchet" to the Commander in Chief of the Fleet.

In Reval we succeeded in making out all the details of the operation and the battle of the cruisers.

After "Rurik", together with "Novik", lost contact with the rest of the cruiser Division, Admiral Bakhireff sent her a wireless message, asking her where she was, but received no answer, which made him fear that "Rurik" had struck a mine and had sunk. After that, having gone about 30 miles from the shore, the Admiral again inquired of "Rurik" about her place. Shortly after, the answer came more or less as follows: "See the coast, fog lifted, weather fine". The Admiral ordered her to join the rest of the Division immediately.

The Division continued its way slowly northward. As it was approaching Hoborg, a wireless was received from Admiral Nepenine, saying that the Dagerort light-house sighted enemy cruisers in the square No, course SW, speed 17 knots.

After he had received this wireless, the Admiral decided to put off the bombardment of Memel and to steer in a new direction, with the intention of meeting the enemy about 8 a. m.

At 7.30 a. m. not yet seeing the enemy, the call to the battle-stations was made in the Division and preparations for action began.

About 8.30 a. m. just on our course, at a distance of 50 cables, several silhouettes of ships appeared in the mist, they were about 5—6.

The Division was steering nearly N; the speed was 14 knots; the horizon was dark and there was no wind. The "Rurik" had not yet had time to rejoin the Squadron.

Having discovered the enemy, the Admiral ordered to go immediately at full speed, and to change our course and steer NW, with the aim of separating the enemy from the shore and to engage him from the starboard.

At the same time fire was opened. The enemy ships at once turned to the right abruptly and began to retire at full speed in the NW direction behind Gothland island. The last of the enemy ships replied energetically. The distance between us was all the time about 50 cables.

The horizon still continued very misty; the enemy ships were therefore but very indistinctly visible, and it was difficult to determine their type exactly.

It soon became apparent that two of the ships: one of the "Bremen" or "Augsburg" class—a light cruiser—, the other the mine-layer "Albatros" could not follow the other, which vanished in the mist in a NW direction.

The light cruiser remained for some time close to the "Albatros", but having apparently convinced herself of the critical state of the latter, developed full speed, withdrew in the NNW direction, and continued firing.

The "Albatros" remained more and more behind, and both "Admiral Makaroff" and "Bayan" concentrated their fire upon her at a distance of 40 cables.

As for "Bogatyr" and "Oleg" the admiral ordered them to act independently; so leaving the line they went to the right and also opened fire.

On the "Albatros" a severe fire broke out in the stern in consequence of our shells; and the foremast was knocked down. She then proceeded in the direction of the Esterharn light-house, moving slowly and giving off much steam. After which she went aground on the northern side of the bay.

When the battle was over it was already about 10 a. m. It had not lasted therefore more than about an hour and a half, the distance decreasing towards the end to 23—25 cables.

The "Albatros" had with her three destroyers which during the battle kept at a certain distance. But about the middle of the battle they made a dense smoke screen thus hiding "Albatros" for a certain time, so that it became quite impossible to fire at her. Then opening a severe fire they launched themselves at full speed against "Makaroff" and "Bayan" attacking them from their left side.

Our ships opened fire against them at once. Having reached a distance of about 20 cables, the destroyers fired their torpedoes which passed under "Makaroff's" stern. After which still going at full speed they disappeared in a southern direction.

During the action our cruisers had almost all the time a speed of twenty knots. Firing was difficult, though the distance up to the enemy was not too great. Such were the conditions in the beginning of the fight, at first—owing to the misty horizon and to the smoke screen, at the end—owing to our four cruisers having concentrated their firing on "Albatros" and thus hampering each other much.

"Albatros" fought with her four guns gallantly, her firing being very good at the beginning; however the worse her situation grew, the less precise her firing was, our cruisers in no way suffering from it.

"Admiral Makaroff" was the only ship the enemy managed to hit. "Albatros" shell pierced her forepart and deck and exploded in the battery without however wounding anyone. She was also hit by three or four shells from the destroyers. One hit the pulling boat, that was on the upper-deck, another—the fourth funnel, the rest—the stern bridge. One gunner was severely wounded and died in the hospital.

After "Albatros" had run ashore and the battle was over, the cruisers stopped their machines and began watching her. Many boats could be seen

approaching her from the shore, obviously in order to give help and take off the men.

Soon two columns of smoke became visible in the SO direction; they quickly approached our ships.

The Admiral immediately ordered the division to form a line ahead and to turn to the N-course. The smoke columns were coming up quickly, and we were soon able to make out the silhouettes of two cruisers.

A cruiser of the "Bremen" class was leading, the armoured cruiser "Roon" following at the distance of some eight cables.

"Bogatyr" and "Oleg" were ordered to advance.

At a distance of 75 cables, the "Roon" opened fire from 8" guns against the "Bayan".

"Bayan" returned the fire out of her 8" guns. People on her had the impression that "Roon" was hit but this was unlikely. Soon "Roon" attempted to fire from 6" guns but the shells fell short.

Meanwhile the distance decreased, being now but 65 cables.

The Admiral then ordered to go full speed. After which the distance began to increase and "Roon" turned about.

One 8" shell had hit "Bayan" during this firing of short duration. It pierced the upper board and struck a pulling boat, four men being slightly wounded by the splinters in the battery.

The cause why the Admiral did not engage "Roon" was this: two few shells of big size remained on "Makaroff": there were, e. g., but ninety 8" ones, only half the supply of the 6" remaining. It was the same with "Bayan".

In case however the cruisers should have after all to engage the "Roon", the Admiral had ordered the battleships "Cesarevitch" and "Slava" to come to his support from Oere, the latter immediately putting out to sea.

When steering N the periscope of a submarine was sighted from "Makaroff" and "Bayan"; and the cruisers manoeuvring, opened fire against it. At the same time the roaring of guns became audible: obviously "Rurik" had met "Roon" and engaged her.

And so in fact it was. The day before "Rurik" had lost contact first with the division, then with "Novik" which had kept close to her, and remained quite alone, having received in the evening a wireless message from Admiral Bakhireff ordering her to join him in a appointed square, she proceeded North during the whole night. She was warned during that voyage of a possible meeting with the "Augsburg" and other ships, and so was all the time in full readiness for battle.

About 8 a. m. she received from Admiral Bakhireff the message: "Am fighting enemy in square No."

"Rurik" at once steered NW making 19 knots. Everything was ready for battle, all anxiously peering into space trying to see the enemy. A new telegram was then received from Admiral Bakhireff: "Submarine between you and us".

About 10 a. m. there came another message informing us that the Admiral had engaged "Roon"; directions were also given as to the courses we were to follow so as to cross the enemy's course.

"Rurik" proceeded at full speed making twenty knots, and about 10.25 a. m. columns of smoke became visible on the horizon: first one, then another, at last a third one.

Soon the silhouettes of the ships became visible too: one was a four funnelled, the other a three funnelled cruiser. Meanwhile it was not yet possible

to make out whether these were Russian or German ships, for our cruisers too of the "Bayan" class had four straight funnels, whilst those of the "Oleg" class had three slanting ones.

But at last the three funnelled cruiser began making call signs: copper-coloured flashes. Obviously she too was doubting with whom she had to deal.

It then became clear to "Rurik" that this was the enemy; probably a cruiser of the "Bremen" class. At 10.42 a. m. still approaching "Rurik" opened fire.

But no sooner had she fired a salvo than several 8" shells from the "Roon" fell close to her bow. Huge columns of water submerged the deck and the conning tower; the range-finders being damaged. Immediately afterwards a 100 mil. shell hit the forecabin, pierced it through and exploded in the laundry.

Then a shower of small shells from "Bremen" fell on the deck and hit the protected side of the ship.

The "Rurik" was still advancing towards the "Roon" but meanwhile fired at the nearest ship "Bremen".

The enemy's order was as follows: first came "Bremen", then at some ten cables "Roon", farther still "Augsburg" which had been damaged in a fight with our cruisers. On account of the mist these were very badly visible; sometimes they were even entirely enshrouded by the fog.

Having managed to hit "Bremen" with two salvos, the "Rurik's" Captain began firing at "Roon" which was at the same time energetically firing at "Rurik". But the "Roon's" firing was not very accurate: only one 8" shell hit the aft-conning-tower and exploded; it also completely demolished the Admiral's deck cabin.

On the other hand "Bremen" now, after the "Rurik" firing had been transferred on to "Roon", left alone, went on firing most exactly, without however bringing the distance nearer than sixty cables; "Rurik" could not in consequence bring into action her 120 mil. guns whose range was but 60 cables.

It then became known that in the fore 10" tower the air compressor of the left gun had been damaged; it therefore could not fire any more, as the men were stifled by the gases of their own firing. The course had to be altered in order to be able to fire from the aft-tower.

Seven minutes after beginning to fire at "Roon", the "Rurik" fired quite exactly, and a shell could be seen to have hit the enemy ship behind the fourth funnel. A column of white smoke with a black base was seen to rise at this spot.

From that moment the "Roon's" firing became less accurate. Her shells falling all the time too far. Soon the firing became still worse; obviously, after she had been hit behind the aft-tower by a 8" shell; after that she was hit, evidently, by a whole volley, as the whole ship was enshrouded by a huge column of white and black smoke with bright tongues of fire. Then but one of her guns replied and the "Roon" turning abruptly southwards, commenced to retire.

The "Rurik" then began to pursue her. But soon the periscope of a submarine was noticed, and the "Rurik" had to alter her course for a few minutes, the distance meanwhile increasing considerably. The chase lasted however till 11.50 when a wireless message was received from Admiral Bakhireff ordering to return.



The battle over the damages and losses were ascertained. It turned out that there were but eleven wounded. One of these the blue jacket Iniakoff was wounded severely; he had had one arm torn off and one lung shot through, so he died three hours later; all the others were wounded but slightly. Apart from these, six men had been poisoned by gases from the 10" gun when the air compressor was damaged; among these was the Commander of a fore-tower. It should be noted that, in spite of the stifling gases which poisoned the men to such a degree that they could hardly stand on their feet, they still fired six or seven times.

Besides the cases already mentioned: one 8" shell and one of 100 m/m in the very beginning of the action, there were seven other hits of 100 m/m shells. Of these the most important were: an 8" casemate; casemate 16th where all the men were wounded; the 8" gun of the right aft-tower, four feet from the muzzle; after this there was a cavity in the gun but the gun was not put out of action; finally the fore-castle was hit after which the shell penetrated into the laundry causing there a small fire.

After "Rurik" had steered northwards, the remaining part of the operation passed very quietly; only at 7.30 p. m. as she was entering the Gulf of Finland and as a destroyers' flotilla was coming up for screening a submarine was sighted. The destroyer "Vnimatelny" was at once sent to ram it. And in this it seemed to have succeeded for later when it was brought into dry dock traces of paint were visible on the screws and the rudder was slightly bent.

In those days the English submarine "E 9" returning from a cruise reported having sunk on July 2d at the entrance of Danzig bay a battle-ship of the "Deutschland" class.

It was ascertained afterwards that this was the battle-ship "Pommern"; however the latter was but severely damaged and not sunk.

XII.

Operations in vicinity of Windau. The "Slava" in the Gulf of Riga. First enemy attempt to force the Irben straits. Fortifying the Irben position.

The "Novik" stayed in Reval until midnight July 6th, and in the early morning of the next day was already at Kuivast.

Then began the tedium of staying at anchor; we were to be always ready, always on the alert, and this we found a very wearisome task. The enemy gave no signs of activity whatever, nor did we undertake anything.

On the 14th of July the Captain decided to have some gunnery practise at a range of 60 cables bearing the enemy at different angles.

The firing passed off on the whole satisfactorily; however the mounting of the fourth gun was broken, so that for some time that gun could not be used, and this was unpleasant enough.

At last, on July 15th, the situation grew more alarming; it was ascertained that our troops had left Windau and that some of them were retiring towards Michailovsky light-house.

To be ready for all emergencies the Captain determined to take in a full supply of oil, for which purpose we went alongside the supply-ship "Volga".

Information was received in the course of the day that an enemy man of war accompanied by mine sweepers had appeared near Windau, they were joined later by a three funnelled cruiser and a destroyer.

Our submarine "Drakon" which was at the time on the exposed position attempted to attack the cruiser but was unsuccessful.

Throughout the whole day the enemy swept the approaches to Windau, only again putting out to sea when it was dark.

About midnight we were summoned to Zerel by the chief of the destroyer's Force. The sixth Flotilla was there already; the fifth was patrolling near Lüserort and Michailovsky light-house. The Special Half Flotilla was also anchored there, only the ninth Flotilla remaining in full readiness at Kuivast.

At 4 a. m. the "Novik" came to Zerel and anchored; day was dawning but nothing was visible on the horizon.

At 4 p. m. we were sent off to Michailovsky light-house and thence to Kuivast to take in mines. This we did the next morning, returning again to Michailovsky light-house at 4 p. m. Just at this time information was received from there that fighting had begun between four of our destroyers of the sixth Flotilla and two enemy destroyers; but the latter quickly retired and put out to sea. They were accompanied it was ascertained, by a submarine.

On the same day the enemy occupied Goldingen and marched on towards Windau, which our troops had already evacuated, so that the occupation of the latter town was but a question of time.

During the night it was intended to lay mines near Windau in the areas which the enemy had just been sweeping. But the chief of destroyer's Force received a report according to which the enemy was keeping patrol near Steinort, and therefore he decided not to risk sending destroyers with mines into that region: so that the mine laying was postponed.

On July 18th the enemy occupied Windau, in view of which we had to remove the observation post from Lüserort. So, little by little, we came more and more into contact with the enemy. All the male inhabitants of military age living in the locality, also those who did not wish to fall into the enemy's hands, were to be transported to Reval on the supply ship "Khabarovsk".

We stayed throughout the whole day near Michailovsky light-house and watched these men carrying their goods and chattels and driving their cows, pigs and sheep, and all were hastily embarked on the supply ship. Everything that could be of use for military purposes was destroyed. At first we wanted to blow up the light-houses too, but the chief of communications was reluctant to destroy them; later on however this omission caused us much annoyance.

At 3 a. m. we were ordered to lay mines on the central Irben position and then to return again to Michailovsky light-house.

On the next day the enemy did not appear. In the evening came a telephonogram informing us that a dry dock was available for us at Helsingfors as we needed to change our screws; and the chief of the destroyer's Force allowed us to proceed there for this purpose.

We were also ordered to replace our 1910 Whitehead torpedoes with newer ones 1912.

The "Novik" came to Kuivast at 10 p. m., took on board those who had to go to Reval and Helsingfors and on July 20th she was able to go into the Sandvik dry dock.

We remained in the dry dock from the 20th of July to the 4th of August, undergoing repairs all the time; we succeeded in changing the screws, which

happened to be in a rather bad condition; in repairing the tanks which were leaking, and in making some other necessary repairs.

On the 4th of August we finished the adjustment of our torpedoes by firing, and having taken in necessary supplies and enjoyed some rest ourselves, were ready to proceed to the gulf of Riga to continue operations there.

During our stay in Helsingfors a substantial change took place in the naval forces of the gulf of Riga: they being reinforced by the battle ship "Slava". This was done because, after our troops had retired towards the town of Riga, the gulf at once acquired a very great strategical importance; consequently it became necessary to strengthen its defences which were very weak at the time, consisting only of the "Novik", some twenty destroyers with coal fuel of an obsolete type and three old gunboats. With such forces it was of course impossible to defend the Gulf successfully, and so the C. C. decided to add the "Slava" to them. For that purpose the channel leading out to sea near Zerel was at first swept and in order that this operation should be performed in utter secrecy and that the enemy should not suspect anything, we had to work at night. When at last the channel was ready the battleship "Slava" escorted by all the destroyers put out to sea during the night, the battleships "Petropavlovsk" and "Gangut" protecting her.

Having successfully reached the Zerel parallel, the "Slava", the mine sweepers and destroyers entered the Irben straits; as for the dreadnoughts they proceeded a little more to the South, staying there until the successful end of the operation.

Everything passed off quite smoothly, and the next morning, when the "Slava" was already quietly lying at anchor in the Riga Gulf, the enemy aeroplanes could satisfy themselves of her presence there.

The importance of the "Slava's" arrival for the defence was not however to be exaggerated; we had undoubtedly now at our disposal four more 12" guns, but alas, these were of an old type, their range being short, as for the ship herself she was too obsolete to be able to resist modern battleships which the enemy could easily send against her.

On the 5th of August at 1.40 p. m. Admiral V. A. Kanin arrived for the first time since becoming C. C. in order to proceed, on board the "Novik", to Reval. We therefore steamed at a very high speed, and two hours after our departure were already moored in Reval harbour. There the C. C. immediately left us, and at 7 p. m. we proceeded further to Moonsound.

Having arrived at Kuivast we lay there two days, and it was not until the morning of the 8th that we received urgent orders to proceed to Zerel.

This time there was serious cause for alarm: for at dawn an enemy fleet consisting of not fewer than fifty vessels with mine sweepers and supply ships had appeared at the entrance of the Irben straits. From which it seemed clear that a decisive attempt was to be made to force the straits.

The "Novik" came up to the position at 10 a. m. Ranged against us three enemy scouts were clearly visible, two being of the "Nevelskoi" class and one of the "Bremen" class; behind these appeared a forest of masts and clouds of smoke.

It was a rather imposing array, the more so if it be taken into account that, on our side, we had nothing but the "Slava" and some twenty old destroyers to oppose the enemy and with such forces we were to prevent him from sweeping the mine field and penetrating into the gulf of Riga.

Of course such an achievement was beyond us. Not one of the guns on our ships could reach the enemy: while the latter having the advantage of

long range guns would be able without any risk to drive away both the "Slava" and the destroyers and be free to sweep unopposed, and then quietly advance without danger.

With a heavy heart one had to note the sad state of affairs. For the rest one had to confide in God and do what was possible under such circumstances.

Meanwhile the enemy was manoeuvring at considerable distance and as our guns were altogether unable to reach him, we could but wait, and so all the destroyer's Force anchored off Zerel.

At midday the "Slava" came up to the position, and two battle-ships of the "Deutschland" class immediately opened fire against her. Their shells at once began to fall quite close to the "Slava" the latter replying with her 12" guns, but her shots all fell short. After she had been hit several times, she had to withdraw from the position to avoid being sunk.

At this moment the Chief of the destroyer's Force ordered our Captain to proceed to Kuivast, to take in mines and then come back. Having taken the mines, "Novik" started back for Zerel at 5 p. m.

Arrived there we anchored, and the Captain went to the Chief of the destroyer's Force for further instructions. It was already growing dark. The enemy had ceased sweeping and columns of smoke could be seen disappearing in the South direction.

According to information in our possession, the enemy lost during that day: three destroyers, one mine sweeper, one light cruiser of the "Thetis" class and one auxiliary cruiser; the latter however was only rather seriously damaged and was taken to the nearest harbour.

The enemy had practically swept the whole area; but apparently, thought that he still had a very serious task before him requiring incomparably greater sacrifices, for he reported having met with stubborn resistance on our part.

The Captain returned from the Chief of the destroyer's Force with the order "Await instructions"; and the "Novik", as well as the whole of the destroyer's Force, remained anchored off Zerel. Such an anchorage was rather dangerous as the spot could easily have been shelled from the sea.

On the next day, August 9th, the enemy did nothing, whilst our forces spent the day in a state of full readiness and expectation.

Having made use of this breathing time to discuss the situation with his Captains the Chief of the destroyer's Force thought it his duty to warn the C. C. that in his opinion the forcing of the position by the enemy was but a question of time; that with his weak forces he was unable to oppose the mine-sweeping, and that the presence of the "Slava" did not alter the situation.

In the evening we were ordered to lay mines in those spots which the enemy had swept the day before.

At 9.30 p. m. the "Novik" weighed anchor and went to lay mines. The night was very dark and in order to help us to find our way, the destroyer "Donskoi Kazak" had been anchored near the main turning while it was still light, to serve as light-house.

We were to proceed all the time between lines of mines with nothing but our dead reckoning to guide us, and a very heavy responsibility lay on the navigating officers who however performed their task splendidly.

About 11 p. m. we reached our destination and successfully laid the mines where, the day before, the enemy had been sweeping his channel. About 1 p. m. we returned to Zerel and anchored there.

At 4.50 a. m. we were awakened by loud firing and the hissing and bursting of shells. I ran on deck to find out what was going on. The "Novik" had al-

ready weighed anchor, and the other destroyers quickly followed, a whole shower of shells meanwhile falling down from somewhere. However a glance beyond the light-house was enough to make everything clear; for the cruiser "Roon" and a battle-ship of the "Braunschweig" class had unexpectedly appeared out of the morning mist and at once opened fire against Zerel, the sheds on the Zerel peninsula and all the anchored ships.

The morning mist and an insufficient look-out had resulted in the enemy being sighted only at the last moment; he had opened fire before we had time to get up steam and weigh anchor. It is true this was done very quickly and in some ten minutes all the destroyers were in motion. Thanks to our speed the destroyer's Force came off very cheaply, only "Sibirsky Strelak" being hit twice. The shells hit her stern but rather fortunately for us; only the tiller rope being damaged, also a small fire caused, which was, however, almost at once put out. There were no losses among men.

Altogether the enemy fired no less than 200 shots. Besides "Sibirsky Strelak" several buildings on shore were also hit, such as a shed, a salvage station, the wing of an aeroplane and the like.

Supposing the enemy would repeat his morning visit, all the destroyer's Force passed to another place much farther from Zerel. As there were suspicious that enemy submarines had penetrated into the Gulf, the destroyers steaming slowly, proceeded to inspect the area near the position, but did not find anything suspicious.

The enemy did not appear any more during that day, but it was reported from Kilkonda and Ute that they had been shelled by big enemy forces.

At midday the submarine "Gepard" returned from sea and reported that she had sunk an enemy cruiser; though she had not seen the cruiser sinking, as she had plunged, she had heard a strong explosion, and therefore she was sure the torpedoes had reached their object. She had to plunge so speedily because the destroyer which accompanied the cruiser was about to attack her.

The 11th of August passed also quite quietly; "Novik" lay all day at anchor. Only towards midnight three silhouettes of ships, going in the direction of Leo bay, were sighted from Zerel; it was never cleared up what brought them there.

At 2 a. m. on the 12th of August we were urgently summoned to Kuivast and ordered to take in immediately 50 mines and a full supply of oil. At 5 p. m. we returned already to Zerel.

In the morning of that day the enemy again bombarded Zerel, but being wiser after our unfortunate experience, our ships lay out of range, and the battle-ship, after having fired for some time without any result, departed. At dusk she came again, but with no greater success; the unfortunate light-house even was not shelled.

At 9 p. m. we reached Zerel and anchored at 60 cables from it. Half an hour later we again weighed anchor and started to lay mines in the wake of the 9th Flotilla which also was to lay mines.

This expedition was as difficult as the last one as for its nautical part was concerned for we had to go through a whole lot of mine-fields, and in case of the slightest mistake, we could easily strike a mine. The night was quite dark; to make it easier to find our way the destroyer "Strashny" was placed as a light-house, after which we had to reckon by the revolving of the machines and the compass.

Nevertheless all went off smoothly, and having passed between all the mine-fields, we dropped mines whilst going at a speed of 18 knots, and safely returned to our anchorage at 1 a. m.

This night had been very efficient, as we had succeeded in reinforcing very much the Irben position, having laid the mines from the "Novik", from five destroyers of the 9th Flotilla, from the mine-layer "Amour", and the destroyers "Finn", "Dobrovoletz" and "Kondratenko" in all—about 400 mines. However the mine-laying did not pass off without damage. To make it easier for the mine-layer "Amour" to find her way, the "Amouretz" was placed near a beacon, and she was to keep a search-light open all the time; but as she was not anchored, the wind drifted her on an antisubmarin net. Its bursting-charge exploded and a large hole on her left boardside just opposite the machine-room was caused. "Amouretz" was already beginning to sink, when "Usurietz" came to her rescue and towed her safely to Kuivast.

At 7 a. m. we were sent to Zereľ to ascertain whether there was a telephon-message for the Chief of the Destroyer's Force; but nothing had been received there, and we returned to the "Pogranitchnik" on board of which the Chief of the Destroyer's Force had his flag since, "Sibirsky Strelak" had been damaged.

Soon after, we were ordered to go out patrolling together with the Half Flotilla and a group of the 6th Flotilla; our turn coming at midday.

All through that day columns of smoke were to be seen on the line of the horizon; they were moving all the time and it was evident that the enemy had recommenced mine sweeping but for the moment he was yet very far.

At 5 o'clock, when the patrolling was ended, "Novik" returned to Zereľ.

At the same time a wireless message reported that the submarine "Drakon" had unsuccessfully attacked a cruiser of "Pillau's" class.

We were again sent out patrolling in the night, and we wandered about till 4 a. m. along the positions. The night passed quietly and no movements were remarked on the enemy's part.

While returning from patrolling, we sighted on the line of the horizon, behind Zereľ, three enemy destroyers at about 70 cables from us. At that time "Okhotnik" and "Kondratenko" who were to relieve us, came up to us. Having perceived these destroyers, they immediately opened fire and "Novik" then joined in with them. After three salvos, when we saw clearly that our shells did not reach them, we ceased firing. The enemy quickly turned and went away in the direction of the light cruiser which had put out to support him.

On that same date information was received that the enemy would evidently begin next day to force his way through the position with big forces.

XIII.

The Enemy's Second attempt to force the Irben position. "Novik's" action against two enemy destroyers. The enemy in the Gulf of Riga. "Novik's" expedition to Domesnes. "Sivutch" and "Koreitz's" wreck. The enemy's departure from the Gulf of Riga.

All through the night of the 16th of August the enemy's presence was felt. Already at 5 a. m. the whole Destroyer Force, with all the boilers steaming, weighed anchor and went to the position.

Since early in the morning a great number of columns of smoke were to be seen on the horizon, but they were yet far off. Therefore the Chief of the

Destroyer's Force, having left the "Novik" and the "Kazanetz" as patrol-ships, returned to the anchorage with the rest of the destroyers at 8,30 a. m.

About 11 o'clock the number of the columns of smoke augmented considerably and they were clearly approaching us. Then our Captain let the Chief of the Destroyer's Force know of this, and immediately all our ships proceeded to the position. Alas! they were not numerous: 3 destroyers of the "Kondratenko's" class, 3 of the "Dobrovoletz's" class, and 3 of the "Ukraina's" class; except those: the "Slava", the mine-layer "Amour", and some torpedo-boats.

By this time the enemy had already approached us near enough to be able to define the number of his ships: there were about 40.

Slowly moving towards us, the enemy advanced having before him minesweepers and two light cruisers.

We continued moving along the position aimlessly, awaiting for further developments. At the moment when the "Novik" had gone up to the Michailovsky light-house, at about 55—60 cables distance, some land battery began firing at her, but fired very slowly, and the shells fell short.

About 1,30 p. m. a big explosion was remarked on the line of the horizon projecting on the silhouette of one of the enemy ships. Which ship had been blown up, and was a ship blown up, or was it only the explosion of a mine—was impossible for us to define.

After a time the "Slava", surrounded by torpedo-boats, entered the position. One of the enemy battle-ships and the light cruiser opened immediately a violent fire against her; the "Slava" responded, but her shells falling short, and seeing the uselessness of it, she ceased firing and went along the position to the Michailovsky light-house. In approaching it, she bombarded it with the 6" guns. The landbatteries immediately responded, but the distance between both sides being too great, they had to cease.

Soon after this, two battle-ships again opened fire against "Slava"; one of these ships was evidently of a new type, as she had very big and long ranged guns, and her shells riddled the "Slava". The latter could not at all reach the enemy by her fire and therefore she had to retire into the Gulf.

At 5 p. m. it was observed from the "Slava" that along the shore, coming from Lüserort, an enemy destroyer was stealthily advancing; a violent fire from the 6" guns was immediately opened against her, which obliged the latter to retire. At the same moment the battle-ships again recommenced firing at the "Slava".

Thus past all that day. The enemy continued his work unhindered, and drove us farther and farther into the Gulf. All our attempts to hinder him were brought to naught, as his guns were so much stronger and more far-ranged than ours.

When it grew dark, all the destroyers went to Kalbodargrund, and the "Slava" to Arensburg, where the anti-submarine nets was made. The destroyers "Kondratenko" and "Okhotnik" were left to patrol in the southern part of the position.

At 11 p. m. we received a wireless from "Kondratenko", stating that two enemy destroyers had forced their way into the Gulf and that fighting began between them, but that, thanks to the darkness, she had lost sight of them.

After all the events of the day and the entry of the destroyers into the Gulf, the night of the 17th of August was passed very anxiously by us all. We had to be all the time on the alert, to be able to repulse a possible torpedo-

attack. The night was frightfully dark, nothing could be seen at half a cable's distance; this simultaneously improved and aggravated our situation.

About 3 a. m. we suddenly perceived on the horizon flashes of fire, and immediately called the men to the battle-stations. Soon we made out through the wireless of the destroyer "Voyskovoy", that as she was going with the "Ukraina" to relieve "Kondratenko", they met the enemy and were in action with him, which lasted but a few minutes, during which "Voyskovoy" was slightly damaged and had three men severely wounded. The "Novik" was to begin patrolling from 4 a. m. and therefore, half an hour before that time, we weighed anchor and went to the position.

It was already beginning to dawn; the "Novik" was advancing along the position; the Michaelovsky light-house was seen on the horizon; suddenly two destroyers which were coming towards us at full speed were sighted from the bridge. At first it was believed that they belonged to the 9th Flotilla, but having looked closer, we saw that it was not the case, and to make sure, we made the call signs, but no answer ensued. It became evident that it was the enemy who had forced his way in, during the night and who had had in action with "Kondratenko" and "Voyskovoy".

The Captain ordered to open fire; after our first charge, the destroyers turned and began answering. Their shells fell very well, only some of them fell short, whilst others were falling over, but none of them touched us at that time.

Our firing, on the other hand, was perfect. The third charge hit the first destroyer and knocked down her funnel; fire broke out on her fore-castle, and she was wrapped in clouds of steam and smoke and on her stern a bright flame appeared. Her firing became weaker at once and lost its accuracy, but still she continued firing.

It was time to engage the second destroyer and the Captain ordered the firing to be transferred. Again our firing was very effective: fires broke out on the destroyer and her firing became inaccurate. Suddenly we perceived that the first destroyer seemed to recover and to turn towards shore. We had to transfer the firing against her again and we saw several shells hit her. New fires broke out upon her decks and her stern sank low down. She continued nevertheless to move slowly towards the coast, launching white and red rockets, and tried hard to ground on some shallow place.

At the same time we again transferred our fire at the second destroyer and damaged her still more, so that she was in a very bad state.

Then, evidently, as last means of self-defence the second destroyer made a smoke screen. The enemy made good use of this means, for thanks to the calm weather, the smoke screen hid entirely from us both destroyers and it became useless to continue firing.

During the action we had approached gradually the area where the nets and the mines were and pursuing the enemy had become useless.

The battle had lasted 17 minutes, our man oeuving had been of a very simple kind, for both sides were impeded by the proximity of the mine-fields. The Captain tried all the time to keep as much as possible the constant distance and bearing at the enemy. Our speed was all the time the same, not above 17 knots; this also contributed to our success.

We could consider the result of this action as brilliant for us, as the enemy was much stronger than we were, for he had six—100 m/m guns against our four of the same size.

Altogether the "Novik" inflicted great damage to the enemy and both the destroyers were put out of service for a long time, if they did not sink,

or run aground on their way back. Litterally speaking, we had not been damaged at all; only two shells exploded quite near our board and some damage was caused by their splinters. Also several holes were made in the second wooden motor-cutter and the after-bridge was slightly damaged in several places. Except that, in the wireless-cabin the apparatus was torn off by a violent current of air.

There were no men killed or wounded and only two small fragments of shells about the size of a pea, entered the legs of two sailors; it is impossible to call that wounds.

Towards the end of the action, three destroyers of the 5th Flotilla approached us under command of Captain P. M. Ploen. The immense moderation and understanding of the situation of this officer must be mentioned to his praise, for he at once appraised the situation and did not allow his boats to take part in our action, which saved us from disorder in the firing and did not destroy its accuracy. At the same time he remained close enough to us, to be able to give us support at any moment.

When our action was already ended, the "Slava" and the other destroyers entered the position; as soon as she appeared, the enemy opened fire against her from his battle-ships. The volleys fell very exactly; nearly immediately three shells hit her which caused serious damage. As the weather was very foggy, such exactness seemed rather strange, so much the more so, that the enemy ships were not even seen; this induced us to think that the firing was corrected from the Michaelovsky light-house.

During this action, a 12" shell nearly hit us while we were very near to the "Slava"; it exploded just near the stern. The whole destroyer gave a start; an immense column of water appeared under the stern, and it was only thanks to our speed that it did not cover the deck.

The day before this, the enemy had reported that he had reached the Michaelovsky light-house and that he meant to force the position. And in fact, he was approaching us nearer and nearer. He had only to sweep two or three lines more to be able to move about in the interior of the Gulf without any hindrance, for we could put no obstacle more to his advance.

When it became obvious that nothing more could be done, the Chief of Destroyer's Force sent the "Slava" and the gunboats to Kuivast so as not to expose them to unnecessary danger. Soon after he himself went there with the destroyers, leaving only the "Novik" in the Irben strait. He ordered us to remain there until dark, or as long as it would be possible.

This order was given us by the Chief of Destroyer's Force in person through a megaphone, as he passed along side of us on the "Pogranitchnik", and it was only then that our Captain had the occasion of reporting the result of our action.

After that we remained till dark in the region of Domesnes, and in the evening we returned to Kuivast. At that time we could reckon that the enemy had not yet entered the Gulf.

Next day, on the 18th of August, we learned that the enemy had definitely forced the position. The 5th Flotilla which was sent scouting, saw him, not far from Domesnes, moving slowly towards the inner part of the Gulf.

According to information at hand this time the Germans had decided to put an end to our activity definitely, in destroying the "Slava" and making a barrier at the outlet of Moonsound. Therefore we were prepared for a decisive battle at the entrance of Moonsound, and we feared very much for the fate of the "Slava".

On the 19th of August arrived the Chief of Operations department of the Staff of the C. C., Captain A. B. Koltchak, sent by the C. C.

After consulting with the Chief of the Destroyer Force, the "Novik" received the order to take in urgently 10 double-mines and be ready to set out to sea. After a time the Chief of the Destroyer's Force Captain Koltchak joined us and we immediately weighed anchor.

The object of the operation was, to lay mines at the entrance of Arensburg bay; steaming at 24 knots, the "Novik" steared in that direction. Approaching, we perceived from far already, that the enemy mine-sweepers were at work there under the protection of a cruiser.

Evidently it was impossible to lay mines in these conditions, and the Chief of the Destroyer's Force ordered to turn towards Domesnes.

While turning, a slight misunderstanding arose. The order from the bridge had been given to postpone the laying of the mines, but it had been understood at the stern: "lay the mines", and therefore one mine had been dropped.

Approaching Domesnes, we perceived there a cruiser also of the "Augsburg" class, which having sighted us, began pursuing us, and the "Novik" got away from her with great difficulty. There was even a moment when the distance between us was only 40 cables, and it seemed she would certainly overtake us. We could not however increase our speed as our air-compressors did not work well.

Happily for us, the cruiser also could sail no faster, and we soon remarked that the distance between us was increasing gradually, and after a time, the cruiser ceased her pursuit.

At 2 o'clock we returned to Kuivast where orders were given immediately for the "Amour" to lay mines at the entrance of Moonound and "Donskoy Kazak" was detailed as patrolling cruiser.

An hour had not elapsed since the return of the "Amour" when at 5 p. m. "Donskoy Kazak" already reported that large enemy forces were approaching our mine-field. The 6th Flotilla was to go to support her, but soon she herself returned safely to Moonound.

After that we expected the enemy to bombard the Kuivasto harbour, and therefore all our ships went over to Shildau island and prepared for battle; but the enemy did not advance, and as it had become quite dark, we supposed that he had put off until next day his further operations.

That same day, at 3 p. m. the gun-boats "Sivutch" and "Koreetz" had left Riga for Moonound. As was to be expected, they soon turned out to be cut off from both points. The Chief of the Destroyer's Force, being locked up with his ships in Moonound, could not give them any help, moreover he did not know in what part of the Gulf they were. Nothing was heard of them till evening, when suddenly a wireless message from the Captain of the "Sivutch", Commander P. N. Tscherkassoff, was received, stating that at dusk the enemy had discovered them and was pursuing them. Then all was quiet again, and only late in the evening we succeeded in getting a fragmentary, non-ciphered and even not signed message—"run aground on rocks." We supposed it was the "Sivutch" which reported, but it turned out to be the "Koreetz". Later on another message signed: "Koreetz" was received, it reported—"lost our way." After that all was definitely silent.

In all case, orders were given to the patrolling destroyer at the outer part of the mine-field, to keep the searchlights open during all the night, so as to facilitate the orientation of the gun-boats in case one of them came near the

entrance of Moonound, and to prevent her from getting on to our new mine-fields. The night passed and nothing was heard of either of the gun-boats; it could only be supposed that they had both perished.

Misfortune never comes alone. It was not enough that the enemy had entered the Gulf and that the "Sivutch" and the "Koreetz" had perished—except all that, the mine-layer "Ladoga" had been blown up in the morning. Having ended laying 800 mines in the area of Ute, and returning to the skerries, she hit against a mine in the inner channel and 3 hours later she sank. Happily all the men were saved. Only five men were lost, because at the moment of the explosion, struck with terror, they threw themselves into the water.

It was supposed that this catastrophe had happened because the enemy, of late, dropped mines from mine-saying submarines. Such a submarine has 6 mines and can lay them though remaining under water, so that it is quite impossible to discover the moment of the mine-laying. Most likely the "Ladoga" had struck such a mine; otherwise the observation stations would have seen the enemy if he had entered the skerries and had laid mines there. It was also lucky that it had happened on her way back, when the "Ladoga" was already empty, otherwise, certainly nobody of her crew would have been saved.

In morning of the 20th of August all was quiet and the enemy had not reappeared before Moonound. At 11 a. m. the pulling boat sent by the Chief of the Destroyer Force came up to us to invite our Captain to a consultation about the further operations. At the same time we learned that our Chief of the Destroyer's Force, Captain P. L. Troukhatcheff, had been promoted Rear-Admiral.

It was only on that day that some details of the wreck of the "Sivutch" and the "Koreetz" reached us. According to this information the "Sivutch" perished in the night while in action with a cruiser and two torpedo-boats. It was a short but fierce battle. The "Sivutch" was entirely shot to pieces: at the beginning of the action she was seriously damaged above and below. Fires broke out everywhere and she looked like one immense conflagration. But though her sides were red-hot and shells and cartridges were exploding, she did not cease to fight until the last moment. Out of the whole company of the "Sivutch" only two officers and 40 men were saved, whom the enemy rescued in the morning.

As to the "Koreetz", she escaped pursuit owing to the darkness, and steamed in the direction of Pernau. Continually changing her course and her speed, she lost her position and fouled on a shingly ridge which she cleared happily without sustaining any damage and thanks to which she was no longer in danger of being pursued.

On the 21st of August we received the unexpected and to us quite incomprehensible news, that the enemy had quitted the Riga Gulf. For what reason, we could not understand. He had made great efforts and had sustained considerable losses in attempting to force the entrance, then why, having achieved his aim, did he suddenly leave all and go away contenting himself with bombarding Pernau and sinking three steamers freighted with stones at the approaches of the Gulf? Not knowing all the circumstances, we certainly considered this as a quite incomprehensible although a very advantageous and agreeable event.

Nevertheless, the whole Destroyer Force stayed for two days more in Kuivast, expecting some action on the part of the enemy but, evidently, he had really retired. However the Captain of the "Koreetz", whom there had

not been time to inform of this, fearing the enemy's approach, destroyed his ship entirely after having transferred her guns to a schooner. All fittings that could be removed were also taken off and landed and then he set fire to the ship and blew her up.

Another item of good news was that of a successful attack on the armoured cruiser "Moltke" by the English submarine "E 1", and the sinking of an enemy light cruiser by the submarine "Akula".

Next day, the 24th of August, the Admiral sent us out scouting in the Zerel direction; we put out to sea at 7 a. m., skirting the mine-field which had been laid to protect the entrance of Moonound, and entered the Gulf. The first objects which struck our sight were the beacons which the enemy had placed to mark the swept spaces. Our Captain, supposing, that the enemy might have laid a mine-field in leaving the Gulf and marked the channels by placing beacons, went along the beacons, and the "Novik" reached Zerel safely. Hearing the light-house, the Captain asked, if anything had been seen at sea; but the answer was, that for several days nothing had been seen. Then we continued our way and went along our former position, where we found our manoeuvring beacons untouched. Having reached the end, we turned along the east coast and having advanced a little more, we sighted an enemy floating mine. We concluded that it was probably a mine which had come to the surface and the enemy might have a mine-field just at that place. Therefore the Captain kept along the western coast and so returned to Kuivast. We tried to make full speed on our way back, but we succeeded only in attaining 28 knots, as the air compressors did not work well. It was clear that all was not perfect in that respect and a note was made of the defect.

By 5 p. m. the "Novik" was already in Kuivast; and at the same time the "Sibirsky Strelak" arrived from Reval with the Chief of Staff of the C. C. Rear-Admiral Grigoroff.

Next morning, on account of the Admiral's arrival, a numerous gathering assembled on the supply ship "Oka" to elaborate a new plan for the restoration of the mine-area in the Irben Strait. It was decided, during this sitting, to lay a whole series of new mine-fields and in addition filled, to sink schooners and steamers with stones in all the shallow places near the coast, so that submarines and torpedo-boats would not be able to their way through there.

At 1 p. m. we were again sent out patrolling towards Zerel, and again we saw nothing throughout the whole day.

XIV.

The restoration of the Irben position. The commander of the mine-defence in the Gulf of Riga. The conferring of the order of St. George upon the captain of the "Novik" and the gunnery officer. Bombardment of the coast. The encounter of the "Stchastlivy", "Bespokoyny" and "Pronzitelny" with "Goeben". The action between „Pronzitelny", "Bystry", "Nerpy" and the "Hamidie". Operations up to the 19th of October.

On the 26th of August we began urgent works for the restoration of the position. At 2 o'clock the "Novik" went up to the "Supply ship No. 4" and took in 25 double-mines after which, together with the Half Flotilla, they

went into the Pia bay. There we found the 5th Flotilla, which was convoying the schooners and the steamers which were intended to be sunk. As this kind of operation can be effected only in calm weather, all this convoy was awaiting a propitious moment.

In the evening a council was held at the Chief of the destroyer Force, during which it was decided to make some modifications in the plans for the mine-fields and the sinking of the vessels. It was desirable to perform this operation on the same night, but of course favourable weather was a necessary condition. For the security of the operation two dreadnoughts and the 1st Division of Cruisers were to go out to sea. That was a very reliable protection and the Division could work quietly.

At 5 a. m. next day "Novik" put out to sea, to lay mines. The weather was comparatively quiet; therefore all our detachment put out at 2 o'clock with the steamers and schooners. At 8 a. m. "Novik" came up to the southern beacon of the position and laid there two lines of mines. All the other destroyers fulfilled equally their task: thus, in this one night we succeeded in laying 260 mines. This time also some damage was sustained: the Half Flotilla was to lay its mines on the outer side of the position; to get there it had to pass between our own and the enemy's old mine-fields. When the mines had been laid and the Flotilla was returning, the "Okhotnik" which came last, struck a mine and was considerably damaged. Luckily the charge of the mine was not very strong, or the "Okhotnik" would have certainly been lost; where as she was able to get out of the danger zone under her own steam and reached Kuivast safely. It is a strange thing that the "Okhotnik" which was fourth in the column should have struck the mine when three other destroyers, one after the other had passed there without touching any—that shows it was her fate.

Having returned to Kuivast at about 2,30, we immediately went up to "Supply ship No. 4" to take in 25 double-mines more, and then awaited information that the schooners had been sunk, as our new mine-field was intended to cover the approaches to this place. The question was, when would it be possible to perform this operation, for as it depended upon the weather, which at that time of year is rarely fine, our expectation could have lasted an eternity; and so it did: next day it was very windy; afterwards it seemed to quieten down, but the waves were still very strong, and we still waited.

On the 29th of August we received news that the Chief of Mine-Defence Rear-Admiral Maximoff was to arrive in Riga Gulf to assume the chief command over all the forces concentrated there. In fact, the Chief of the Mine-Defence arrived in Moonsound that very evening and hoisted his flag on the "Pogranitchnik", but he warned our Captain that he would soon come over to us.

Early next morning we went up to the supply-ship "Volga" and took in a full supply of oil and at midday proceeded to Zerel where the rest of the Destroyer Force was assembled.

We found the destroyers at anchor near the cape of Kavi; when we got there, the Chief of the Mine-Defence ordered us to enter the position at the Slavsky beacon and to verify with the map the place where the schooners had been sunk. Arriving there, we saw only the tops of the masts of the schooners, for they had been sunk in too deep a place and were not likely to be of great use thus. Having fulfilled our task the "Novik" went back. It was just 6 o'clock; the Captain and all the officers had assembled in the ward-room for supper, when suddenly, just along-side of our ship, we heard the

sound of fairly heavy explosions, and not understanding what the matter was, we hurried up to the deck. Then all became clear: a large enemy sea-plane was flying over us and was throwing down bombs. It was discovered from the bridge only when it had already thrown several bombs, for as it came from the sunny side it was not well seen. The Captain could only avoid the attacks by steering all the time in different directions. The bombs were well seen at the moment when they were thrown from the sea-plane and it was easy to calculate the direction they would take. The attack lasted 20 minutes; the sea-plane threw down at us 10 bombs, but luckily not one of them hit us. Some explosions were so near to our ship, that the splashes of the water and the small fragments of the shells fell on the deck like rain. In ordinary circumstances this would not have been so alarming; but we had about 50 mines on our deck quite ready for laying, and if a bomb had fallen on one of these mines, a terrible explosion would have ensued and nothing would have remained of us. Therefore we had to drop overboard all the mines during the attack. We, meantime, fired at the seaplane with rifles and machine-guns, but without result, for it was untouched.

On our return to cape Kavi, we learned that a renewal of the enemy's attempts to penetrate into the Gulf was expected, and at the same time he was to begin an offensive by land against Riga.

Next morning the Chief of the Mine-Defence hoisted his flag on our ship and came over to us with all his Staff. No sign of the enemy's approach was noticed that morning. During the day the wind freshened considerably, and some time later it turned into a gale. It was evident that the enemy could not undertake anything on that day. At 5.30 p. m. it became so windy that the whole Destroyer Force was obliged to go into Pia bay, for fear of being torn from our anchorage.

Next morning, the 1st of September, the waves in the bay also grew very strong. We had again to change our anchorage and all went over to cape Meris. A number of floating mines and submarine-nets appeared on the surface of the water in the Irben strait, on account of the gale; and it was feared that, as we lay at anchor, the wind and the current might drift some of them against us.

The storm lasted nearly three days and it was only on the 3th that it calmed down. The Admiral immediately profsted by this to send two destroyers of the 6th Flotilla to shell the townlats of Roen and Messorogatzem, where, from information at hand, the enemy had troops. Our destroyers appeared suddenly at dawn before these places and energetically shelled them, but it was difficult to judge of the result of the firing.

In the day time the Admiral decided to shell the Michaelovsky light-house and if possible, destroy it. For this purpose he sent the "Slava". After the shelling, big fires and explosions were seen round the light-house, but she did not succeed in touching the light-house itself, which apparently remained undamaged. Desiring to look at "Slava's" firing, the Admiral went towards her on the "Novik", but when we came up to her, she had finished and we had to return. At that moment an enemy seaplane, was sighted; it flew from the south in "Slava's" direction and dropped four bombs over her, but none of them reached their aim.

Next day, early in the morning "Novik" received orders at last to lay her mines. The Admiral did not allow us to lay them before the mine-layers "Mologa" and "Svir" had dropped mines on the outer side of the passage; they were to take advantage of their 3' draught to get there over all the be-

fore laid mine-fields; and they had done it only the night before. Our mine-laying proceeded quietly and we got rid of our 25 double-mines which had encumbered our deck very much and worried us dreadfully.

The operation ended, we learned that the Chief of the Mine-Defence was going to Helsingfors. On account of the Admiral's decision, we had to go to the "Sibirsky Strelak" to transfer all the affairs to the Chief of the Destroyer Force, and after that we took the Admiral over to Rogokul through Kuivast. Rogokul is a new base for the destroyers near Hapsal which was built during the war. The "Novik" was going there for the first time and the state of things we found there did not rejoice us. A cheerless locality, several wooden barracks and a harbour surrounded by two moles, which formed, as it were, two harbours—that was all. Certainly it was more convenient for the destroyers to lie here than somewhere at anchor, but on the other hand the bad levelling of the sides of the harbour, in case of alarm, would not allow the ships to get out rapidly, especially if south-winds were blowing; and that was very unsatisfactory.

We remained only one night in Rogokul, and having taken in for the "Slava", 68—12" shells, we went at 6 a. m. to Kuivast. There we took in provisions also and having become a real supply-ship, with cargo, we went on to Arensburg where the "Slava" lay. Having given over to her the shells, we moored near the "Sibirsky Strelak" and there delivered the mail and the provisions and then anchored in her neighbourhood.

All the last days had passed without the enemy showing himself; only his seaplanes exerted themselves, appearing twice a day: at 10 a. m. and at 5 p. m. One of them even came as far as Kuivast.

The 6th of September wereceived the joyous news that Rear-Admiral P. P. Troukhatcheff—had been found worthy by the St. George's Doume of receiving the order of St. George of the 4th class—for the actions in the Riga Gulf, as well as Commander M. A. Behrens and Lieutenant D. J. Fedotoff—for "Novik's" action against the two enemy destroyers. It turned out to be the destroyers "V 99" and "V 100" we had fought with. We hit them with eleven of our shells, 17 men were killed, 39 wounded, and 6—missing. The destroyers were seriously damaged, especially the "V 99". Moreover they got entangled in the anti-submarine nets when they were retiring and so were still more damaged. The destroyer "V 99" was obliged to run ashore, where she was blown up by her crew two days later.

From the 5th to the 7th of September no particular events occurred; the "Novik" lay all the time at Arensburg.

On the 10th the first enemy Tzepelin appeared over the Gulf of Finland. It was observed about midnight near Worms and was seen to be going in the direction of Reval. All the batteries were warned in time and so they were well prepared to give it a warm reception. But for some reason or other, it did not reach Reval, but having thrown out all its bombs into the sea in view of Baltic Port, it turned and disappeared westward. This kind of raid was new to us, and we were all very interested to see a Tzepelin.

That same day our air-forces were also active, having made a raid over Windau with 8 sea-planes. They saw there in the harbour a battle-ship of "Wittelsbach's" class and dropped many bombs over her, which however did not hit the objective. At the same time, one of our machines being injured, or because something was out of order fell, and two of our aviators were lost.

On the 11th of September, at the usual time, the sea-planes reappeared and threw bombs, but again with no result. They threw 3 bombs at the "Kha-

barovsk", 10 at "Finn" and 2 at the "Emir of Boukhara"—which were lying in Arensburg harbour. That showed that the seaplanes had begun to fly to Arensburg where we were very impeded in our manoeuvring by the smallness of the harbour, and therefore the Captain thought it better to go over to cape Kavi.

The next day did not differ from the last one, and the seaplanes again threw bombs unsuccessfully as was their wont. They threw 3 bombs at us, 3 at the "Vsadnik"—13 at "Khabarovsk" and 3 into Tzerel.

At 5,30 p. m. we received orders to go to Kuivast and on arriving there, we immediately took in oil, whilst our Captain went to see the Admiral. It was soon known that the "Novik" had been summoned to Kuivast with a view to the expected review of the C. C. who was to arrive next day. And in fact, in the evening of the 13th of September, Admiral Kanin arrived on the "Sibirsky Strelak" and warned us, that next day he would visit all the ships. All therefore prepared for the review, that is: dressed with more care, cleaned all the brass and after that wandered from one place to another not knowing what to do to make the time pass. The C. C. began his review from the "Slava", then went over to the "Orlitza", "Khabarovsk", "Novik" and all the other destroyers.

The "Novik" still lay at Kuivast on the 15th of September, after which we crossed over to Rogokul where it was more convenient, as there was immediate communication with the shore and one could, at any time, go for a walk. All the four summer months, except a fortnight, had been passed by us on the destroyer, never landing. There was another great convenience in this anchorage: provisions and other supplies and materials could be brought in straight from the wharf, instead of having to be brought by boats.

The sad news of the mine-sweeper "N 10" having struck a mine at the entrance of Moonsound and having instantly sunk, reached us on the 17th of September. The catastrophe happened 4 miles from the Worms light-house at the junction of the new and the old channels. Of course there was nothing out of the way in this, as the loss of a ship during war, is an ordinary event, and the crew must always be prepared for it. But in this case the misfortune happened in a place where the enemy was by no means expected to be able to penetrate. The mines turned out to be laid in the inner side of the channel, the entrance of which, from a nautical point of view was extremely difficult, especially as it was always under the immediate observation of the Signal station. The fact that the mines had been laid imperceptibly could only be explained by their having been dropped by a submarine, and the enemy having with him somebody well acquainted with the pilotage of these places. One cannot help giving their due to the captains of those submarines, who so bravely and so daringly penetrated hostile waters risking discovery or being blown up themselves by a mine. The next two days, 19th and 20th of September passed quietly and only on the 21st, in the evening, the news was received that an enemy detachment composed of 8 battle-ships, 2 armoured cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 7 mine-sweepers and one steamer with motor-boats had left Kiel steaming North. We were immediately all turned out of Rogokul and sent to Kuivast, where we anchored awaiting further events. That same day Captain A. V. Koltchak joined our Division as he filled Admiral Troukhatcheff's place while the latter was ill. He hoisted his pennant on the "Pogranitchnik".

On the 22th of September it freshened considerably and a gale from NW began to blow. All these days nothing had been heard of the enemy squadron.

For a moment only Dagerort had sighted some columns of smoke on the horizon.

It was ascertained on the 23th of September that this squadron had laid a large mine-field near the Oleg bank and had gone round Gothland; that was the reason why it had not been seen from our observation posts.

Thus, for several weeks the enemy had not undertaken anything against the Riga Gulf. On account of the autumn advancing, it could be supposed with certainty that he would undertake nothing more this year, and the Destroyer Force remained quietly lying at Kuivast.

The "Slava" was sent to a little borough Shlok on the 25th of September, to shell the coast and so help our troops to take possession of that region. When the shelling was ended, the "Slava" anchored, for dinner time, at the very place; when suddenly a land battery, which had not given any sign of its existence during the shelling, opened fire against her and one of the shrapnel struck the embrasure of the conning-tower where it exploded. The Captain of the ship was killed by this as well as an officer and four of the men who were just coming out of the conning-tower. Only a navigating officer lieutenant Waksmut, was saved. The Captain of the ship was Viasemsky. With him was Gunnery Commander of the Staff of C. C.

Commander Svinine who had remained quite accidentally on the "Slava" after the inspection of her guns, and had joined in the expedition of his own desire.

Next day, in accordance with our demand, a dry dock was prepared for us to examine our screws and the Chief of the Destroyer Force sent us off to Helsingfors. We stayed one day at Reval and on the 28th of September entered the dry-dock.

When the water was pumped out of the dock, it was found that our left screw was slightly bent, the middle one was in good order, and the right one considerably crushed; the way in which it was damaged was exactly like the results of an explosion. It was evident that it has been damaged when, during the battle in Riga Gulf, a big shell had exploded under our very stern.

From the 29th September to the 4th of October we had to stay in the dry-dock.

Here we learned of the encounter of the Black-Sea destroyers and the "Goeben". The action took place on the 22th of September in the following way.

Whilst at sea, and flying Rear-Admiral Sablin's flag, the destroyers "Stchastlivi", "Bezpokoyni" and "Pronzitelny" sighted, in the morning, on the horizon, a big column of smoke, and steamed in that direction. It soon turned out to be the "uncle" without the "nephew" as the Black-Sea sailors called "Goeben" and "Breslau" for fun.

Admiral Sablin decided to take advantage of this occasion and to attack "Goeben". Having let the destroyers approach him to within about 80—90 cables, the enemy opened a violent fire against them. His firing was very exact; it was only thanks to a lucky chance that they did not hit. The "Goeben" concentrated her fire principally upon the flag-ship "Stchaslivi" under whose stern two 11" shells exploded. However all ended happily. The attempt of the destroyers to approach "Goeben" so as to be able to discharge a torpedo was not successful; so turning about, they dispersed in different directions. The "Goeben" pursued them only a short time and soon they all met safely at the Kherson light-house.

In the morning of the 8th, "Novik" went out to Moonsound along the skerries. Getting out of them and crossing the Gulf, we saw, not far from Odensholm, a sea-plane floating on the water and approached it immediately.

It turned out to be one of our aera-planes with the aviator, sub-lieutenant Moustiaz. He had flown out of the Reval station the day before at 5 p. m. but soon had been obliged to descend to the water as his motor got spoiled; and so 16 hours had passed during which the plane, in a helpless state, was floating on the water. It was lucky that all the time there was a dead-calm, or else the aviator would have certainly perished long before. It was astonishing, nevertheless, that he had not been missed before that by the air-station and that he had not been looked for. If it had not been for us, he would have certainly perished after having suffered a few hours more.

To save the aeroplane, a four-oared boat was launched, and with its help the machine was towed to the side of the ship and then by a boats-davit lifted on deck. This operation was very well effected; the machine was not at all damaged and was conveniently placed on deck. At the same time our Captain sent a wireless message to the Director of Communications, Rear-Admiral A. J. Nepenine to report what had happened. He immediately received the answer: "Thank you, my friend",—and the request to send the plane to Reval; so we had to go there and stayed until morning.

At 6 a. m. having determined the compass errors the "Novik" continued her way to Moonound. The weather was calm but inclined to be foggy; and a short time later a dense fog came on, and we had to reduce our speed. Near Odensholm the fog lifted, and we succeeded in reaching safely the entrance of Moonound and got to Kuivast after having taken our bearings.

Next day the news was received that a detachment of enemy destroyers had gone to Windau. As a precautionary measure, we were sent to Zerel. But there all was quiet, and there was not a sign of smoke on the horizon; the enemy seaplanes alone were to be seen reconnoitring as usual. On the third day of our stay at Zerel, the request was made by the "Stereogoustchy" which was senior in the harbour, to send men on shore with an officer to uncharge some mines which had been thrown out on the coast and I had to go with five sailors.

While we were occupied with the mines, the "Novik" was attacked by an enemy aeroplane, which threw 3 bombs at her, but as usual—unsuccessfully.

In the evening the Captain received the order to return to Kuivast at day-break, and next morning we put out to sea.

On the 13th of October we had a visit from Captain A. V. Koltchak who was temporary Chief of the Destroyer's Force; after having deliberated with our Captain, he remained some time in the ward-room.

Inter alia, he gave us the details of the recent action of the Black-Sea destroyers "Pronzitelnny" (the flag-ship of the Chief of Division) "Bystry", and the submarine "Nerpa" with the cruiser "Hamidie".

Having gone out on duty on the—of September, the destroyers were already at Zunguldak towards the evening; then, slackening their speed to 10 knots, they went in the direction of the Bosphorus. At daybreak smoke appeared from the Zunguldak side. There was no doubt about its being the enemy, as all the Russian ships, at that moment, were in Sebastopol. The columns of smoke augmented gradually; it seemed that the enemy had also perceived the destroyers.

At the same time as the smoke of the enemy became visible, a submarine was discovered at a distance of only a few cables lengths; it turned out to be the "Nerpa" under the command of Commander V. V. Vilken. The Chief of the Division immediately went up to her and made arrangements for united action in case of a battle ensuing with the enemy.

After that, leaving the "Nerpa" and increasing speed, the destroyers went in the direction of the smoke. Soon after, when it became quite light, they perceived the cruiser "Hamidie" one destroyer and four supply ships. The latter were heavily loaded with coal. Most likely they had seen from the "Hamidie" not only the destroyers, but the "Nerpa" as well, for she at once began moving in zigzags, and one could judge by the smoke, that steam was being rapidly got up.

Having approached the enemy to within a distance of about 60—70 cables, the destroyers opened fire. The firing was very good, for the weather was exceptionnally fine. The "Hamidie" responded feebly, though some shells fell at 2—3 cables from the destroyers. The cruiser was all the time sending wireless messages to "Goeben" which was far off....

In that moment the "Nerpa" began an attack, but not being in a favourable position, she did not launch any torpedoes. Nevertheless her manoeuvre produced such a strong impression on the "Hamidie", that abandoning the supply-ships to fate she retired with the destroyer at full speed towards Bosphorus.

"Pronzitelny" and "Bystry" continued for some time yet to shell the retiring enemy, but afterwards—they turned their attention on the supply-ships which had already stranded themselves on shore. The destroyers shelled them from a distance of 15 cables and then fired several mines at them.—

On the 15th of October at 10,10 p. m. a Zeppelin appeared over Zerel and dropped several bombs, but as it turned out later, they all fell into the sea.

According to information which reached us, our submarines as well as the English ones were operating very successfully in the Baltic sea, and they succeeded in sinking very many steamers, which kept up cargo communication between Sweden and Germany. At the same time, the submarine "E 19", so as not to expend the very precious torpedoes, sunk a steamer by gun fire, and the "E 18" conveyed another to Reval in good order and with its cargo intact. This seemed to impress the enemy and he ceased, for some time, all communication with Sweden.

We lay at Kuivast until the 18th of October, when we were ordered to Zerel to complete the staff of patrol-boats, there being but three. This was on account, of all possible being sent to Riga to shell the coast were the enemy was again advancing.

Going up to the Irben position "Novik" anchored near the Slava's beacon, not far from the "Stereoustchy" to relieve her. There we remained until next day, when, having been relieved, we went, according to orders received, to examine the eastern coast of the Irben Gulf up to Domesnes. Having skirted it and not having discovered anything suspicious, we went to our anchorage at Mento.

On that day at last, the destroyer "Ingener-Mekhanik Zvereff" was got afloat again and safely brought to Kuivast; she had run aground near Runo island a fortnight before, on account of a mistake in the reckoning.

XV.

A landing at Domesnes. Sinking of the cruiser "Prince Adalbert". Disturbances in the battle-ships at Helsingfors. Sinking of the light cruiser "Undine". With the first division of battle-ships at sea.

On the 20th of October the chief of the Destroyers Force began to realise his idea as to making a landing on the shores of the Riga Gulf near Roen, in the rear of the enemy's landforces. A squadron of the dismounted cavalry, two compagnies of marine infantry and a demolishing party were to compose the landing detachment. Many officers from destroyers volunteered. They therefore had but a vague idea as to land operations and did not know their men. The command was entrusted to the Commander of the destroyer "Ingener Mekhanik Dmitrieff" Commander P. O. Shishko.

The detachment was therefore of a rather motley character and the men were quite unexperienced in such operations. Only the cavalry could be relied on, all the rest being most untrustworthy.

The gun boat "Khrabry" and the mine-sweeper "No. 5" escorted by destroyers of the 5th Flotilla, were appointed to carry the troops. The "Slava" and all the other destroyers were to support the landing operation and to shell the place of the landing. Only the "Novik" remained at Kuivast. Our Captain was entrusted with controlling the movements of the ships in Moonound and maintaining connections with the staff of C. C.

On the 21st of October the expedition had not yet returned; we continued giving orders in the Moonound and had much to do with the steamers, tugs and lighters coming from Riga and even the big pontoon bridge was also being brought from there. None of them knew either where or how to proceed; at every moment one of them would run aground; all were panic-stricken as is generally the case when an evacuation is taking place.

At last at 7 a. m. on the 22nd of October we received a wireless message informing us that the detachment had landed not at Roen however but at Domesnes. As was ascertained later the landing operation had been entirely unnoticed by the enemy. Only when all the men were already on the shore they were met by two small "landsturm" detachments, seventy men in each who apparently were patrolling the region and just at this moment relieving each other. Both these detachments were completely defeated, the enemy losing one officer and 42 men killed, 7 men were made prisoners, the rest being either wounded or escaping. Our losses were altogether four sailors severely wounded.

On the 23rd of October information was received that the enemy armoured cruiser "Roon" had perished in the Baltic sea only three men escaping. The circumstances of the disaster were not known to us, but it was commonly supposed that the cruiser struck a mine, for if wrecked by one of our submarines, the fact would surely have been known. In any case this was a heavy loss for the enemy.

On the 24th of October the English submarine "E 8" returned from sea and reported having torpedoed the cruiser "Prince Adalbert" near Libau, the cruiser sinking at once. It thus turned out that it was not the "Roon" but "Prince Adalbert" that had perished.

Meanwhile everything continued quiet in our waters.

On the 29th of October our aviators sighted six enemy battle-ships near the entrance of the Irben strait. This circumstance compelled us to be in

readiness whilst remaining at Rogokul. However the Squadron in question soon disappeared in the South and we remained in the harbour .

On the 1st of November in the morning the destroyer "Moskvitianin" sighted two miles SW 70 from Zerel an enemy seaplane floating on the surface, which plane was immediately taken in tow by the destroyer. On it were taken prisoners an aviator-officer and a mechanic; the seaplane was undamaged, but something was broken in the motor. On the same day the chief of the Destroyer Force again received from the land military authorities the request to send ships to shell the coast. The "Slava" and the destroyers proceeded therefore to Riga urgently.

The aviator had been made prisoner owing to a mishap having occurred to him the day before, by which he had spent the whole night on the water. He had thrown overboard all he could. Only the motor remained on the seaplane; it was due to the motor being damaged that the aviator had to come down. The motor was damaged during an attack on our destroyers, a machine gun bullet having pierced the gas-pipe. When towed by the "Moskvitianin" the plane turned over, but this did not damage it seriously, the hull remaining intact. There was however no hope of repairing it, as the motor could not be made good and we had none to replace it.

In the German aviator's opinion, seven of our destroyers at least had been seriously damaged by German air attacks; he even mentioned some of them by name. Alas, how deeply disappointed he was when shown these same destroyers absolutely intact.

We soon succeeded in learning interesting details as to the loss of the cruiser "Prince Adalbert" which an English submarine, the "E 8" had blown up near Libau. The submarine happened to have hit the cruiser with two torpedoes at once, each weighing eight poods, at the distance of six cables. The cruiser was seen from the submarine to shudder and rise up, then huge flames rushed out of the embrasures and the cruiser began to sink rapidly. The explosion was so terrific that even the submarine was severely shaken. Two destroyers accompanying the cruiser hastened to the rescue, but succeeded in picking up only three men out of the water. All was over in about twelve seconds. The "Prince Adalbert" explosion was obviously similar to the "Pallada" explosion, though the former sank still more rapidly. Thus was the "Pallada" avenged.

On the 3rd and 4th of November the "Novik" continued lying at Rogokul in a state of complete passivity, but on the 5th secret instructions were received from the chief of the destroyer Force. And though it all was very secret, and the Captain told us nothing, rumours spread at the pier, at which all the destroyers were moored and where we met each other during leisure hours, that an expedition, in which the dreadnoughts were to take part was to take place, and that the "Novik" and the 6th Flotilla were to accompany them.

And in fact on the next morning, November 6th, we left with the sixth Flotilla for Lapwik, where the coal driven-destroyers were to take in a full supply of coal. When at sea, we were severely rolled about, a strong wind blowing from NO. On our way to Lapwik we were ordered to proceed to Helsingfors. The Captain at once turned in that direction, and at four p. m. the "Novik" was already mooring in the Southern Harbour. When passing through the harbour we noticed that all big ships were absent from Helsingfors and that in general there were indications that something suspicious was taking place.

And in fact, on the next day it was ascertained that the intended expedition (for which the "Novik" had been summoned) was not likely to take place for disorders had unexpectedly broken out on the "Gangut". The cause was quite trivial: after loading coal the men generally received macaroni for supper, but this time, for some reason or other they were given buckwheat porridge. Taking this as a grievance, they declined to eat the porridge and began to behave in a provocative manner. The Captain was not on board at the time, and when it became known that he was returning, the men rushed to the ladder to meet him shouting "hurrah", thus laying stress on their sympathy for him and their animosity towards the senior officer. The Captain succeeded in quieting the men and he ordered them to form up in rows. Whereupon delegates of the men suddenly stepped forward and in the name of all, demanded that officers with foreign surnames should be removed from the ships: meaning the executive officer and some twelve others.

In this demand which undoubtedly was a dangerous one for the fleet, there was no logic at all. A political "dessous" was clearly visible in the whole affair, it being the result of underground propaganda, and by no means discontent alone on account of food or foreign surnames of the officers. It was imperative that the disorders should be stopped at once, and so orders were given immediately to arrest the instigators and send them on land to be imprisoned. Fifty such men were arrested and handed over to a court martial. A few days later a similar case occurred on board the battle-ship "Imperator Pavel I". Whereupon the C. C. ordered all the big ships to go out to sea, where the matter was investigated.

On the 8th of November a new destroyer of the "Novik" class (the first one); the "Pobeditel" arrived from Cronstadt and moored next to us. We spent the 9th and 10th of November at Helsingfors awaiting orders. Meanwhile the English submarine "E 19" reported having sunk the enemy light cruiser "Undine".

On the 11th of November at 1 p. m. we were ordered to proceed to Lapvik but were unable to reach the place on account of a severe snow storm and had to spend the whole night anchored at Espscher. On the next morning the weather had grown so much finer that we were able to proceed and went farther in the direction of "Sevastopol" harbour where we were due not later than 1 p. m. Not far from Hangoe the "Novik" overtook the sixth Flotilla and joined it.

On that day it was very windy at sea and we began to doubt whether it would be possible for the destroyers to keep close to the dreadnoughts, especially should the latter steam at full speed.

About midday we were in the "Sevastopol" harbour where we found the "Gangut" and the "Petropavlovsk", Vice-Admiral Kerber's flagship. Having anchored, the Captain went to the Admiral to get instructions. At 3 p. m. came the first cruiser division under Rear-Admiral Bakhireff, composed as follows: the "Rurik", the "Admiral Makaroff", the "Bayan" and the "Oleg". All began at once to weigh anchor. We were sent ahead of the squadron, the other ships steaming in the wake of each other surrounded by the destroyers.

As soon as the "Novik" was in the open sea she began rolling heavily, and when the squadron was making 19 knots, cutting through the waves, the water even came over the "Novik's" deck. All those who were on deck were drenched through, waterproofs not being of any avail. As for the other

destroyers they were unable to continue and had to be sent back. There were moments when the going was so hard that we hesitated and wondered whether we too should not request to go home, the chief reason being that matters might grow still worse later.

When the squadron was already in night order, the dreadnoughts took the lead, the "Novik" being the very last, behind the "Oleg". Happily for us it began gradually to calm down, it being absolutely calm at midnight. The "Novik" held on very well throughout the whole night, but the cruisers remained far behind the dreadnoughts, and at daybreak there was a great distance between the former and the latter.

At 8 a. m. the squadron reached the parallel of the southern end of Gothland island, where mines were to be laid. This the cruisers at once began to do. The work went on rapidly and without any hindrances on the enemy's part. Whilst it was taking place the dreadnoughts and the "Novik" were screening them from the South. When we were manoeuvring with the dreadnoughts, a little incident occurred which might have ended rather sadly. We on the "Novik" noticed, at a few cables' distance from us, in the course of the "Petrovavlovsk" a floating mine, with which a collision seemed unavoidable. Therefore without hesitation or waiting to ask whether the "Petrovavlovsk" saw the mine or not, our Captain ordered to make several alarm whistles. Apparently the "Petrovavlovsk" sighted the mine only when our whistle was heard, for at this moment she abruptly turned round, passing quite close to the mine.

After the mine laying operation was over, the squadron turned to the N and went between Gothland island and the Swedish coast, the ships having changed their respective positions so that two dreadnoughts were now in the middle, two cruisers being respectively before and behind them; as for us we kept abeam of "Petrovavlovsk".

A smoke was soon sighted on the horizon, seemingly belonging to some merchant vessel. The Admiral at once sent us to examine it, and we ascertained that it was a Swedish vessel proceeding with a cargo of wood to London via Malmoe. Nothing remained for us but to set the steamer free and so we rejoined the squadron.

At 4 p. m. smoke again appeared on the horizon, and we were sent reconnoitring again. Having come near we ascertained that it was also a Swedish steamer with wood. The Captain ordered the vessel to stop for the purpose of being questioned. In spite of which the steamer continued her way. We therefore fired a blank shot and pursued her. Apart from that the Captain determined to cut across her bows so as to compel her to obey at once. When the "Novik", cutting across her course was already very close to her stem, the vessel came so near us, that it seemed we would collide at once. The situation seemed desperate; yet at some 5—6 feet distance the steamer stopped at last, and we drew a breath of relief. Our first impression was, that all this had been done on purpose in order to damage us; the steamer's Captain assured us however that his vessel had a very weak engine, so she could not be stopped quickly, especially when the steamer was as heavily loaded as in the present case. It seemed difficult to dispute his statement; the Captain may have been right. His steamer proved to be proceeding to London too, and so having released her we returned to the squadron.

Meanwhile the weather had changed for the better, the wind had ceased blowing and there were hardly any waves. The squadron quietly proceeded on its way without seeing the enemy. According to our calculation the Dagerort

light-house would be visible at 12.30 p. m. after which we were to separate, the dreadnoughts and the "Novik" proceeding to Reval via the Gulf of Finland, and the cruisers to Lume via Ute. However Dagerort did not become visible at the anticipated time, and so we were unable to tell our position and had to remain at sea throughout the whole night until daybreak. The night was wearysome and long; the battle ships kept going to and fro within a certain space, we following. At last however day began to dawn. A little later the fifth, sixth, eighth and ninth flotillas joined us and successfully escorted us as far as Ute after which the squadron proceeded to Larwik via the skerries. On the traverse of Hangoe the Admiral raised the signal: "Special thanks to the "Novik" for the expedition"; whereupon he permitted us to proceed to Helsingfors, remaining himself for the night with the dreadnoughts in the Larwik harbour.

From the 14th of November to the 17th of November we stayed in Helsingfors, and were afterwards despatched to Reval having had time enough to take a good rest after the operations in Moonound.

On the 19th of November the enemy showed some activity at Lüserort and the "Novik" was urgently summoned by the Chief of the destroyer Force. At midday we proceeded as directed. It proved to be very foggy at sea, and we had to proceed under such conditions as far as Odensholm, where, happily, the fog dispersed; we managed to reach successfully Kumorsky buoy. But there met fog, and as entering the Moonound was a very difficult thing we had to anchor. Only two hours later the weather definitely cleared up, and so at 7 p. m. we were able to proceed further and to reach Kuivast.

XVI.

Sinking of a patrol-ship near Spaun Bank. Second expedition with the first division of battle-ships. Mine laying near Windau.

An unsuccessful undertaking. The "Zabiaka" damaged.

In the morning of the 20th of November Captain A. V. Koltchak arrived at Kuivast on board the "Okhotnik". At 10 a. m. the Captains of all the destroyers were invited to assemble in order to discuss the plan of the operations intended. At 1 p. m., on a signal being given by the Chief of the Destroyer Force, the "Novik", the "Strashny" and the first group of the 5th Flotilla weighed anchor and entered the Gulf of Riga following the "Okhotnik", on which the pennant of captain Koltchak had been raised. There was a thick fog at sea, and we went through the whole Gulf without seeing anything. Not before the Irben strait did it become possible for us to ascertain our position the fog having then dispersed.

The detachment entered the Baltic sea by a new channel past Zerel, the ships steaming in a single line ahead, the "Ameer Bukharsky", under the pennant of the Chief of the fifth Flotilla, Captain P. M. Ploen, leading, and the "Novik" being the last in the line.

Our operation had this aim: to destroy an enemy patrol ship near Spaun Bank on the approaches to Windau. When in the open sea the detachment turned southwards. The "Novik" was ordered to keep abeam at the right side of the "Okhotnik". It soon grew quite dark so that it was most difficult to see anything. About 9.30 p. m. our chief signalman

who was endowed with excellent sight and had much experience, succeeded in making out some silhouette abeam on the right. And all of us fastened, so to say, our eyes on the spot. It could be said that something was visible, but what—it was as yet difficult to define. When we had advanced a little, the silhouette of a ship became clearly visible. Then the captain ordered us to make the "Okhotnik" a signal previously agreed upon: G, G, G, ... which meant: "I see the enemy". Still advancing in the direction of the silhouette, we were attempting all the time to make out what kind of ship it was, and at a certain moment it appeared to us that it was a submarine on the sea surface.

As some little time before a wireless message from the Chief of Communications had been intercepted by us in which he informed the submarine "Vepr" that she was likely to meet our destroyers at sea, we could not be sure that the ship in question was an enemy ship.

And so with hesitation and fearing to be mistaken, we at last came near the silhouette and made a call sign. The answer came but incorrectly. And at the same time we noticed the smoke and outlines of an ordinary steamer. It then became clear that it was an enemy ship, and so the "Novik" opened fire which was followed by the "Okhotnik" which was steaming some little way from us.

From the very first shell of ours which hit the steamer, a fire broke out, and the steamer having returned a few disorderly shots, remained silent. Meanwhile we noticed that shells coming from somewhere were dropping near us. It might have been supposed that some enemy ships which had approached were firing, but nothing was visible around except the burning steamer and our destroyers. It then became clear that these shells came from the "Okhotnik" which had approached the steamer from the side opposite to us and was therefore shelling the "Novik" also. After three shells had in succession exploded close to our bows, we had to stop firing and at full speed to withdraw from the region shelled. And so having a little withdrawn to the N. we turned round and began slowly to approach the place of the fighting making calls signs.

Meanwhile the steamer, enveloped in flame, formed a veritable pyre. The "Okhotnik" and the "Strashny" were shelling it at close quarters. Time went on quickly and there was none to lose. The Chief of the destroyer Force therefore ordered the "Okhotnik" to discharge a torpedo which hit the steamer producing a tremendous explosion, after which she quickly foundered.

During the remaining part of the fighting the "Novik" waited at a distance, merely watching what was occurring. The sight was both awful and most beautiful, especially on so dark a night.

When the steamer had been done away with, the detachment at once turned in the N direction and withdrew hastily and in fact it was high time to do so, for we had been warned by wireless that the enemy had sent ships to pursue us and that several flotillas of destroyers had been ordered to cut us off from Irben. Apart from this while still at the very beginning of the fight, the wireless-operator of the steamer we destroyed began—apparently on his own initiative—to make signals convulsively, endlessly repeating the words: "Wir werden beschossen". . . . To which somebody replied marking the receipt 54 B. Also our prisoners stated that the cruiser "Lubek", accompanied by a destroyer, was cruising not far off, and that someone was hurrying from Libau to their rescue. As for our detachment, all the destroyers, our excepted, were rather slow; therefore the more important it was to lose no

time in retiring. And so thanks to these warnings, we succeeded in escaping in time, and having found our way by the Dagerort light-house, we entered the Gulf of Finland.

Later it was ascertained by questioning the prisoners, that the vessel the detachment had sunk, was a patrol-boat armed with but two guns of a 57 mil. calibre. She had been patrolling the whole day, and when the night came, anchored near Spaun Bank 25 miles NW of Windau. When sighted by us, all the men were sitting at supper and so noticed us too late. Having made out that we were hostile, they attempted to fire. But after two shots, they at once understood that resistance was out of the question, and throwing away everything they attempted to escape. Some of the men rushed to the boats, the others, having life belts on, threw themselves overboard. After the steamer had foundered the "Strashny" came to the place where the men from the steamer were swimming and succeeding in rescuing one officer and nineteen men. The "Okhotnik" and the "Moskvitianin" also saved one man each. According to the prisoners' statements, there were on board three officers and twenty three men; four men more could therefore have escaped in one of the boats but these we did not find.

At dawn the detachment approached the entrance of the Moonound and went to Rogokul, whilst the "Strashny" was sent to Reval with the prisoners. Enemy seaplanes were continuously flying over Irben on that day without however casting any bombs; it seemed as if they were trying to ascertain which ships had undertaken the night raid.

On the 10th of November a severe gale began blowing from the SW so that volens nolens we had to remain in Rogokul in a state of full inactivity. On the next day the chief of the destroyer Force Rear-Admiral Troukhatcheff having recovered arrived, and provisionally stayed on board the "Novik".

It had now become known in addition that four more men from the sunken patrol ship had escaped in a boat, and these were picked up by their countrymen on the next day. So not one of the men perished. The enemy succeeded in learning from those who escaped in the boat the details of the disaster; at first they had supposed it to have been due to a submarine.

On the same day information reached us that in the Aland skerries at radio-telegraphic code belonging to the submarine "Beluga" had disappeared from the possession of the officer on duty on board the supply-ship "Oland". So we had to change the whole code. Not to mention the difficulty of the task, obviously the enemy could have learned now many a secret.

On the 25th of November, having handed over the command to Admiral Troukhatcheff, Captain Koltchak left the destroyer's Force. Almost all the officers of the destroyers lying at Rogokul saw him off to the train. It was impossible not to acknowledge the merits of this energetic man with so clear a mind and so strong a will: into everything he undertook he introduced an individual and vivifying element.

But time went on, and winter was approaching. All kind of action in our waters was dying away, and the "Novik" still quietly lay at Rogokul. The Moonound was unbearably tiresome to all of us, and we were anxious to leave for Reval as soon as possible. But as if to annoy us, winter persisted in not setting in, and cold weather was not of long duration. And as soon as a South wind began blowing, the ice which had just commenced forming, thawed at once.

We then received the news that an enemy cruiser had been wrecked on the mines laid during the last cruiser raid, but what cruiser, and when, was not ascertained.

From an account of the Captain of the English submarine "E 19" we learnt the details of the attack on the cruiser "Undine". "E 19" was in the Arkona region between Sassnitz and Trelleborg. She suddenly saw on the horizon a smoke approaching: it was the cruiser "Undine" escorting a ferry together with two destroyers.

The submarine immediately prepared to attack; when the ships came near she launched a torpedo at the cruiser and hit the bow. The cruiser began to slant at once, a big fire breaking out in the forecastle. She began to sink slowly. All the men assembled on the stern and apparently were preparing to attempt to escape; as for the destroyers they were steaming to and fro and firing into the water, but in directions altogether different from that where the submarine was.

Seeing that the cruiser was sinking but slowly, and not feeling sure she would sink altogether, the Captain of the "E 19" ordered a second torpedo to be fired, the latter hitting the stern where the men were assembled at the moment. It could be seen through the periscope that a terrific explosion occurred and human bodies flew into the air. Three minutes later the cruiser existed no more, only the destroyers picking up the drowning men. They managed to save about a hundred. The passengers on the ferry were watching with awe the terrific tragedy occurring under their very eyes, fearing lest they too might have the same fate.

On the 2th of December the "Novik" was ordered to take a full supply of oil and be ready for 9 a. m. of the following day. At the appointed time we proceeded to the "Sevastopol" harbour together with the 6th Flotilla. There was a fearful snow storm and mist at sea, so that when about to enter the skerries, we were for about an hour, unable to find our way. We succeeded in getting in at last and reached our destination at 3 p. m.

The following ships were already in the harbour: the cruiser "Rurik", flagship of Rear-Admiral Bakhireff, the "Admiral Makaroff", the "Bayan" and the "Oleg"; the "Bogatyr" lay not far off at Jungfrusund. On the next day the mine-layers "Ural" and "Amur" came and provided all the ships with mines. The weather was very windy, a NW-wind blowing, and the temperature had fallen to six degrees Reaumur below zero.

At 2.45 p. m. of the 5th of December all the cruisers and destroyers weighed anchor and proceeded to the outer channel from Ere where they joined the battle-ships "Petropavlovsk" (Vice-Admiral Kerber's flagship) and "Gangut". After which all the squadron escorted by the 6th, 7th and 9th destroyer Flotillas proceeded slowly to the open sea. About 5 p. m. it began grow very dark, and as the squadron was now far enough from the dangerous zone, the Admiral dismissed all the destroyers but the "Novik".

On that day the weather was a little better than on the day before. The wind had calmed down, there were no waves. All night the squadron had steamed at 19 knots; towards midnight the weather got still finer, there was no wind at all and as the clouds had dispersed, it was quite light; it was easy to make way thus. In general, the expedition had commenced very favourably.

The squadron formed a line ahead having at the head of the column "Bayan" and "Admiral Makaroff"; after these followed "Petropavlovsk", "Gangut", "Rurik", "Bogatyr", "Oleg" and "Novik".

In the night we received the news that the enemy had began laying mines in the southern part of the outer side of the Irben position. They dropped

them from a mine-layer which was protected by the cruiser "Augsburg" and destroyers. It was a singular coincidence: the enemy came to us to lay mines, and at the very same time nearly, we went to him to undertake the same operation.

About 9 a. m. our squadron came up safely, 5 miles to the south of the place where we had laid mines last time, and the cruisers began immediately to lay the mines. We laid two lines of mines, 700 in all. This mine-field was to be the continuation of the former one, and was laid across the sea forming an area of 31 miles.

During the laying, the battle-ships and the "Novik" formed the screen from the south.

At 10.30 p. m. all was finished and the squadron steamed N, but we were ordered by the Admiral to go reconnoitring southward. Immediately, at a speed of 30 knots, we left the column and went due south. Having steamed for nearly an hour and not having seen anything, we turned and rejoined the squadron at about 12 o'clock and took up our place abeam of the flag-ship.

The squadron advanced constantly varying the course and having chosen the way between the Gotland island and the Swedish coast; our speed was 19 knots. The "Bogatyr" was leading-ship, behind were, on both sides "Admiral Makaroff" and "Bayan", in the middle were "Petropavlovsk", "Gangut" and "Rurik" and behind: the "Oleg".

At 5 p. m. as it was getting dusk, the squadron divided into two groups. In the first group were the battle-ships, the "Bogatyr" and the "Novik", and they were to go to Reval, locating our position by the Fare light-house, and the second—the cruiser group, was to go straight to Ute in the skerries.

At 5.30 p. m. we sighted Fare and having located our position, took our course towards the entrance of the Gulf of Finland. The more northward we went, the colder it got and the weather grew perceptibly worse. At the entrance of the Gulf of Finland a snow-storm set in and the temperature fell to 6° Reaumur below zero. When night came we had a bad time on the "Novik": it was frightfully dark, the snow stuck our eyelids together, and standing out in the wind one grew quite stiff and it was with great difficulty the "Novik" kept in the wake of the battle-ships, which were moreover changing courses continually.

Towards 9 a. m. the "Novik" quite covered with ice, with a thick coat of ice on her bow, and her stern at last reached Reval.

The C. C. and the Vice-Admiral Kerber expressed their special thanks to us and we were ordered to remain in harbour.

From the 8th to the 14th of December the "Novik" lay at Reval. It seemed evident that we were not to be sent any more to Moonound. It is true there was nothing further to do there as all activity on the part of the enemy had ceased, and only rarely, in fine weather did his seaplanes appear.

During this period a catastrophe happened in the loss of the submarine "Akula", which had been sent to lay mines in the enemy's waters. After a fortnight had elapsed without news. There could be no doubt that she had perished. It was our first experience in the use of a submarine for mine laying, and the whole accommodation for the mines was quite experimental and had only been tried in the harbour. It was probably on this account that misfortune resulted.

On December the 15th "Novik" to take in 50 mines from the mine-layer "Volga". Having done this, we went alongside the destroyer "Pobeditel"

which lay in the harbour and moored there. Next day an expedition was planned together with the destroyers "Pobeditel" and "Zabiaka" which had joined the fleet quite lately. They had just been completed with the exception of some small details and this was to be their first naval expedition.

The direction of the operations was entrusted to the Commander of the 1st destroyer Flotilla, who had not so far taken any personal part in this war, or in the past ones either, and had therefore no experience in action.

Weighing anchor had been fixed for 9 a. m. on the 18th of December; however, on account of a snow-storm, we started only at 10 o'clock.

Our detachment consisted of three destroyers—"Pobeditel", "Zabiaka" and "Novik", we formed a line of bearing at a speed of 20 knots. The weather was rather quiet, the snow-storm was over and the voyage was pleasant, and—best of all—the horizon was very clear.

Not far from Odensholm, just on our course, we sighted three floating mines and had to make a detour.

The detachment was going towards Windau in the region where the wrecked "Akula" was to have dropped her mines. The mine-field was to be made at the point of the crossing of the channels of Windau, Lüserort and the open sea. From informations received from prisoners, not far from this place was a buoy, but the patrol-ship also anchored there at times.

At 9.30 p. m. the destroyers approached the place indicated, but they found neither the buoy, nor the patrol-ship. It is true that according to the reckoning of the "Novik", we were not exactly at the right spot, but 3 miles away from it. To inform the "Pobeditel" of this without using signals, our Captain approached her and transmitted all through the speaking-trumpet. The immediately corrected her mistake but even then we could see nothing, though it may have been on account of the darkness.

About 10 o'clock the clouds dispersed, and the full-moon began to appear. Our detachment continued towards the coast. We were now in the most dangerous situation, for we were quite near to Windau and the mine-fields which surrounded it.

In accordance with some idea of his own the Commander of the Flotilla ordered the "Zabiaka" to lay mines before the detachment had reached the place indicated. After that the "Pobeditel" placed hers also. At last we arrived to the place which had been originally indicated, and the Captain gave orders for the mine-laying to begin there.

"Novik" was to lay three separate groups of mines: the first consisting of 25, the second of 20, and the third of 5. We succeeded in laying the first group very exactly, that is, across the channel going at a speed of 20 knots and dropping the mines every 5 seconds. We did not lay the second group so successfully: during the operation the "Pobeditel", on account of a false alarm, gave a sudden lurch and bumped against us. This group was to be laid along the channel with long gaps between the mines and therefore they were dropped every 10 seconds. The third and last group was to be laid at the place where the buoy was supposed to be, but again on account of an unexpected manoeuvre of the "Pobeditel", we did not succeed in placing it quite exactly; although, after all, it was not a matter of very great importance. The mine-laying done in this way lasted a very long time, more than an hour, and as we steamed at a great speed and dropped the mines every 5 seconds, everyone was very tired. In general, it is a very difficult task to lay mines so rapidly one after the other. At the least delay, the whole line gets extended and therefore the density of the mine-field and the limits of its area are

infringed; and for tactical reasons, the maintaining of these is sometimes very important.

During the mine-laying, we received warning that an enemy ship, I think it was the "Kaiserin Augusta", was to go out patrolling at 5 a. m. and it was ordered to light up Windau and Libau for her.

At 12,30 p. m. the detachment had quite ended the mine-laying and turned N. At 4,30 we were to see Dagerort light-house and locate our position to be able to ascertain our way to enter the Gulf of Finland. We came in sight of it half an hour later and even then we saw only a few glimpses of light. This circumstance puzzled the Commander of the Flotilla very much and he manoeuvred about this place for about 3 hours at a slow speed and so considerably confused our reckoning. It was only at dawn that we sighted Dagerort and Tahkona and then the destroyers, without any further trouble were able to make for Reval at a speed of 24 knots, reaching there at 1 o'clock.

Thus ended the 12th expedition of the "Novik" for mine-laying. Since the beginning of the war she had laid in all 542 mines, and in addition, she had taken part in other expeditions to protect other ships which were laying mines.

The 19th of December was a great day. Our Commander was promoted Captain, the executive-officer was promoted Commander and the junior engineer—Lieutenant. All day long we had congratulations and visitors from the other ships, and festivities going on.

In addition to all this, the good news, transmitted by wireless, had been received from the Staff of the Fleet: "The Fleet is informed that on the evening of the 17th of December, we sank in the Baltic sea the cruiser "Bremen" and a large destroyer". Later it was ascertained that these two enemy ships had got on a mine-field which had been laid by the "Novik" on the 17th of December near the Spaun bank, and were sunk only a few hours after our detachment had left. On account of the darkness and the coldness of the water the enemy succeeded in saving only 110 men.

On December the 23rd, the news was received that in that same minefield another destroyer had been blown up as well as a patrol-ship. Evidently the place had been well chosen for the mine-field and the enemy had not bestowed sufficient attention, after the first catastrophe, to the examination of the surrounding area as well as the actual place of the wreck.

The following period from the 24th of December to the 4th of January passed very quietly, the weather also changed and the rapid approach of winter was felt. Frost had set in for several days and the temperature was down to 16° Reaumur below zero. The conditions of navigation had become very hard and, for the torpedo-boats, with their thin sheathing—even dangerous.

On the 5th of January a new Chief of the Destroyer Force—Captain A. V. Koltchak was appointed and Rear-Admiral P. P. Troukhatcheff was given the 1st Division of Cruisers. That same day he went the round of all the destroyers bidding farewell to the officers and men.

In accordance with the temperament of the new Chief of the Destroyer Force, who was energetic and active, we were sent that same day into the harbour to take in 40 mines from the mine-layer "Volga". After having done so, we anchored in the harbour. At 6 p. m. the new Chief of the Destroyer Force came over to the "Novik" with all his Staff, having chosen us as his flag-ship.

At 8 p. m. he summoned a meeting of the Captains of the "Pobeditel", "Zabiaka", "Sibirsky Strelok", "General Kondratenko" and "Pogranitchnik"

who were to undertake an expedition together with us. The laying of the mines was to be attempted near the light-houses Pogranitchny and Steinort.

On the 6th of January at 7 a. m. the detachment weighed anchor and put out to sea. Having passed Nargen island we got into a rather thick fog, but nevertheless, continued our way. At Odensholm the fog cleared up, but on the other hand, the wind, which had been blowing all the time from the SW, suddenly changed to NW. This circumstance at this time of the year was very serious for us, as it might result in the ice which had formed at the northend of the Gulf being carried southward, and on our way back, we might be cut off from Reval. As for making way through floating ice, that was quite impossible for the destroyers on account of the thinness of the sheathing of their sides. Fearing this, the Chief of the destroyers Force inquired of the Communications division about the state of the wind near Nargen island, wishing to ascertain whether the wind which was blowing where we were was local only, or whether it had changed everywhere. Happily for us, near Nargen the wind was SW as before, and so we quietly continued our way.

At 1 o'clock the detachment approached Dagerort encountering on its course two floating mines and the "Novik" had even to turn aside to avoid them. The third in the line was the "Zabiaka" which, sighting the mines too late, struck one of them and a violent explosion ensued. The result was, that an immense hole was torn in her stern on the front side wrecking the warrant-officers room. Also both shafts were bent, and the ship listed considerably, the stern had sunk and the helm jammed. The first impression was that the "Zabiaka" would soon turn completely over and sink. The Chief of the Destroyer Force therefore ordered the "Pobeditel" to immediately pass over a hawser to the "Zabiaka" and take her in tow, but the "Pobeditel" manoeuvred so awkwardly, that she nearly rammed us. We were then ordered to make the attempt; going alongside the "Zabiaka", we succeeded in half an hour, in making fast two steel hawsers; but when we began to move at an increased speed, the hawsers broke after 70 revolutions. All our work had to be done again. Owing to the jamming of her helm and the heavy list to starboard of the disabled vessel, the tow-rope was too much strained and as we had only one thin hawser left, we decided to use an anchor chain. So we pulled out 40 fathoms of anchor-chain, fastened it with steel hawsers and began again to tug, easily making 100 revolutions, which corresponded to a speed of 5 knots.

We were obliged to put off our expedition, of course, and return to Reval. All went well after this: we succeeded in putting the helm more or less straight, and the tow-ropes did not part again. Nevertheless we passed all the evening and all the night very anxiously, fearing that the wind would rise and the chains break, and then, in the dark, it would be impossible to save the "Zabiaka". Only at 10 a. m. on the 7th of January did the "Novik" succeed in bringing the "Zabiaka" safely into Reval harbour and passing her over to the steamer "Ervi" which had been sent out to meet us.

It was fortunate that there was no greater loss of life in the crew of the "Zabiaka"—three warrant-officers were killed and five men badly wounded; none of the officers had suffered.

Our last expedition of this year ended thus very sadly, and though the Chief of the Destroyer Force wanted to try again, the weather was already too bad and winter was gradually setting in.

Nevertheless the "Novik" was held in full readiness till the 11th of January, and we were allowed to go for repairs only after that. Our activity ceased with the setting in of winter.

XVII.

New armament of the cruisers and destroyers. Beginning of operations in 1916. Raid by air-craft on the "Slava". Digging through of the Moonound canal. Three catastrophes. The destruction of a convoy near Landsort.

As in the previous year, our Fleet lay in the harbours held in by the ice, but preparing energetically for the forthcoming operations.

During this period important work had been done in the rearmament of several ships, whose armament was considerably strengthened.

The cruisers "Admiral Makaroff" and "Bayan" had all their 3" guns removed and instead of them the following were substituted: 1—8" on the stern and 2—6" broadside; besides these, each cruiser mounted 2—3" and 2—47 m/m anti-aircraft guns. The rest of their armament consisted of 3—8" and 12—6" guns.

On the "Oleg" and the "Bogatyr" all the 6" guns were replaced by 130 m/m making the armament of these cruisers 16—130 m/m and in addition they had two anti-aircraft guns placed on them.

On the "Rossia" and the "Gromoboy" only 12—6" were left and instead of the others 4—8" were mounted on each ship (which made, with the former 8—8" in all), two at the bow and two at the stern in the middle-line. They also had four anti-aircraft guns.

On the "Diana" instead of the 6" and 3" guns, 10—130 m/m guns were placed and two anti-aircraft.

The 6th Flotilla of Destroyers (of the "Ukraina" class) also received additional armament. The hull of these boats was strengthened, and a third 4" gun was mounted.

They were thus very heavily armed, being indeed not much weaker than destroyers of the "Novik" class. The "Novik" and the other destroyers which had formerly mounted 4" guns had these replaced by new ones on high mountings, having a range of 82 cables' length instead of 70. This was especially important for coast bombardment.

All the work was finished for the beginning of navigation, and our cruisers proved to be nearly twice as strong as before. And the entire Navy was also much stronger; we had a whole division of new battle-ships. Besides the two new destroyers "Pobeditel" and "Zabiaka" which had already been in action, the following were also ready for service: "Orfei", "Grom", "Desna", "Letoun", "Azard", "Samson" and "Kapitan Isylmetieff". New submarines were also constantly becoming available, and besides the "Gepard", "Bars" and "Vepri" which were already active, "Volk", "Lvitzza", "Panthera", "Kuguar", "Tigre", "Ryss" and five small American submarines, sent through Vladivostok, in separate parts, were ready.

The different divisions also had grown larger, for instance the division for mine-sweeping, consisted now of two detachments, in each one of which were four Flotillas. For patrolling and the pursuit of submarines a Patrol-Division was organised, consisting of two Flotillas of small destroyers and three Flotillas of special patrol-ships. In addition to these a special detachment was formed for placing anti-submarine nets.

The armament of the Abo-Oland fortified area was finished also, and as support to the landbatteries, a special Flotilla of vessels was formed.

The erection of batteries on the islands: Nargen, Wulf, Rensher, Russare, Ute, Ere, Dago, and all the region of the Sveaborg fortress was being performed in great haste, part of the 12", 10", 9", 2" and 8" batteries being already finished.

As to the "Novik", she had completed all repairs and had had all her machines inspected in anticipation of the beginning of operations.

Towards spring great changes occurred in the staff of officers. The Chief Engineer was appointed Chief Engineer of the Destroyer Force in February, and on the 20th of March our senior-officer was appointed to command the destroyer "Gromiastchy", and I took his place. At that time spring was already near and I immediately began to prepare the destroyer for a cruise.

On the 12th of April the "Novik" set out for the first trial of her engines and developed a speed of 31.5 knots. In general, thanks to the Chief Engineer, the trial succeeded very well. At the same time the guns on the high mountings were also tried and found quite a success.

After this we corrected the compass errors and came back to the harbour.

In the course of the next fortnight, the Captain very often went out in the harbour for torpedo- and target-practice; but it was as yet too early to go out into the Gulf of Riga.

On the 27th of April Rear-Admiral Koltchak (he had been promoted Rear-Admiral at Easter) ordered the "Novik" to be ready at midday to go over to Moonsound. This order turned out to be rather premature as, from information received, there was still much ice in Moonsound and the expedition had to be postponed. At 2 p. m. the Admiral, nevertheless, went there on the "Sibirsky Kazak" taking with him "Kondratenko" as well in order, to try if it were possible to get through the ice into the Gulf of Riga. In the night, when he had succeeded in the attempt he summoned us and all the rest of the destroyers.

So at 4 a. m. the "Novik", together with the "Okhotnik", "Pogranitchnik" and the 2d group of the 6th Flotilla started for Moonsound. There was a fair amount of ice on the route. At 4 p. m. we all joined company at Shildau island and passed over to Werder where the "Slava" had laid all winter; there we anchored in her neighbourhood.

The enemy had not yet appeared in the Gulf of Riga; only his aircraft used to fly there. Just the day before they had made a raid against the "Slava" which had very sad consequences for her. The aeroplanes had appeared quite unexpectedly at day-break and flying low, they threw down 10 bombs, three of which reached their objective, two exploded on the deck just above the ward-room, and caused considerable damage there; and the third hit a small pulling-boat which was in the davits and smashed it to pieces. 7 sailors were badly wounded, five of whom died soon after.

The Chief of the destroyer Force decided the next day to keep patrol-ships in the Irben position. The 6th Flotilla, which had just completed its refitting, was sent first. The ships now had 3—100 m/m guns each. As soon as the Flotilla appeared in the position, the enemy sea-planes greeted it with bombs, but were most likely, very disappointed being themselves met by shots from the anti-aircraft guns.

At 7 p. m. all the destroyers had to seek shelter behind Werder on account of the ice which the wind was driving towards us. Only the "Sibirsky Strelok" with the Chief of the Destroyer Force went again to Moonsound to meet the English submarines "E 1" and "E 18" which had been on duty in the Riga Gulf until our ships arrived.

At about 1 a. m. our lookout men heard suddenly a buzzing as of propellers working, but could see nothing suspicious in the sky; we were all rather sceptical as to their report. However, soon after, 10 heavy explosions were heard apparently at about 10 miles distance, as of the bursting of 12" shells; after each detonation a huge flame was seen. Then we realised that it must be a zeppelin. Judging by the direction of the flames, all the bombs had fallen into the sea. We supposed that the "Slava" was the objective, but not being able to make her out, all the bombs fell wide. They must have been very big and gave the impression that they contained not less than 5 pounds of explosive. If such a bomb had struck the "Slava", she would have fared badly.

On the 2d of May the Chief of the Destroyer Force ordered the "Novik" to cross over to "Rogokul", where she lay till the 11th. That day, at 8 a. m. we received orders to be ready for an expedition. Exactly at the appointed time, the C. C., A. d. C. to His Majesty, General N. J. Ivanoff, and the Chief of the Destroyer Force arrived with the intention of going with us as far as Kuivast. General Ivanoff had had the special mission given him by the Emperor of inspecting all the coast defences; and just now he wished to examine the islands Dago and Oesel.

When we arrived at Kuivast, General Ivanoff immediately landed and the C. C. inspected the "Slava" and the batteries on Moon island, after which he and the Chief of the Destroyer Force returned with us to Rogokul.

From the 12th of May until the 1st of June we again lay in Rogokul harbour and were not disturbed at all.

During that time the Irben position was being urgently fortified. A great number of mines and nets were laid by mine-sweepers and steamers of light draught. This operation was very difficult and was accompanied by great risk as many of the last year's mines were still about; and in any case, it was impossible to use the destroyers for this purpose as their draught was 12 feet.

We did not escape misfortune either, for on the 27th of May, the mine-sweeper "N 5" sweeping the channel in the Irben Strait, struck a mine which exploded and in a moment she sank. Only 3 officers and 11 men were saved, and they were nearly all badly wounded.

Besides these tasks, the digging of a canal has also been begun in Moon-sound for the passage of big ships. At first it was only to be made a depth of 30 feet, so as to enable, as soon as possible the "Tzesarevitch" and the cruisers to be brought in, and also to let out the "Slava" for repairs and for rest. But later it was to attain a depth of 40 feet.

The work was very energetically begun and more than forty dredgers were brought to Moonsound which worked day and night; and the undertaking advanced rapidly.

For the defence of Riga Gulf this canal was of immense importance and changed entirely the whole position. And if we succeed in making it 40 feet deep, the enemy will have perhaps to settle accounts with our dreadnoughts also.

Another catastrophe happened on the 28th of May, but this time in the Gulf of Finland. A bursting charge exploded on the deck of the mine-sweeper "Vzryv" during the laying of mines, and a mine which was near it exploded and another as well. The mine-sweeper was badly damaged in the stern and almost immediately sank.

There were many victims in this incident: the officer in charge of the mine-laying, sub-lieutenant Popoff perished as also 3 warrant-officers and 29 men.

This incident shows how very dangerous such works are and that consequently, they ought to be entrusted only to very experienced men.

In connection with this misfortune, another incident of the same kind involuntarily comes to my mind. It was also during the laying of mines, at the very beginning of the War, on the destroyer "General Kondratenko", and it ended happily but only thanks to the presence of mind and the courage of the torpedo-officer, Lieutenant V. E. Emme.

On the 14th of August 1914 the Special Half Flotilla received orders to make an additional mine-field in the Central position. Having taken in mines, it started to execute the order. On arriving at the place indicated, the destroyers formed in line "Sibirsky Strelak" being at the head, "General Kondratenko" the second, and then the two others.

When the mine laying had already begun, a strange confusion was remarked from the "Sibirsky Strelak" on the "Kondratenko", all the men were running from the stern to the bow, and only the torpedo-officer and the warrant-officer remained in the stern and they were frantically working at something. Soon a floating mine was seen astern, the horns of which were continually appearing on the surface of the water. In a few moments more a detonation was heard and an immense column of water rose behind the destroyer, and entirely covered her stern. When it dispersed, we saw a man swimming behind and Lieutenant Emme throwing him a gangplank; after that the destroyer stopped her engines and the drowning man was picked up.

It appeared that during the dropping of the mines, one of the mine-ropes caught in the board and the mine was thus dragged along behind the destroyer, its horns now and then appearing on the surface of the water part of which were very crushed.

In three or four minutes, as soon as the sugar, which had been put in as a preserver, would be melted, the mine would certainly explode and wreck the stern of the "Kondratenko". The torpedo-officer foreseeing this, ordered all the men to run to the bow, he himself and the warrant-officer remaining to try to sever the wire-rope with cutting-nippers as quickly as possible. It was a critical moment; an explosion might be expected every minute and then Lieutenant Emme and the warrant-officer would certainly perish.

They were working hard . . . , but still the wire was not cut through, and time was flying. It seemed as if a second more, and it would be too late. But now only two or three more strands remained; at last these also were nipped through . . . the mine floated loose and drifted away from the destroyer; but the distance attained was only a few feet when an explosion was heard. The stern went up, then down again and a flood of water covered it. Lieutenant Emme from several fathoms astern was violently flung on to the deck, and the warrant-officer was thrown overboard. Not losing his presence of mind even at this moment, Lieutenant Emme quickly sprang up and helped the warrant-officer to save himself by flinging him the first thing that he could take hold of, which was a gangplank.

In this case Lieutenant Emme saved the destroyer and all that were on board. Being a torpedo-officer he immediately understood that after the horns of the mine were crushed, an explosion was inevitable, but he did not hesitate a single moment to risk his life by cutting the wire-rope.

On the 29th of May a third misfortune happened. A little submarine of an obsolete type, "Som" having gone out to sea to watch for the enemy, did not return at the appointed time. Afterwards it was known that she had run across the course of a Swedish merchant-ship and the latter had rammed

her. As all on board were lost the details of the disaster were drowned with her, of course, and they will never be known.

On the 1st of June, at 4 a. m. our Captain received orders to go to Reval. He decided to profit by this occasion and try the engines at a great speed; the trial succeeded very well. Next day was devoted to target-practice, the target being towed by another boat and on the 3d we went to Helsingfors. On the way we were again to have a target practice, but were prevented from doing so by the fog, and therefore we made straight for Helsingfors.

There "Novik" lay for four days, after which she was sent back to Moon-sound. As we were approaching Odensholm, we received a wireless-message from the Chief of the destroyer Force telling us to go Reval. We had therefore to turn back and at 1 p. m. we entered the harbour and moored up to the "Sibirsky Strelok".

On the 10th of June the "Novik" was to go out for operations together with the "Pobeditel", the "Grom" and the "Orfei". At midday the Chief of the destroyer Force transferred his flag to our ship, and we were preparing to put out to sea, when an unexpected delay occurred. It turned out that "Grom" had not had time to leave the docks, and something was wrong with the engines of the "Pobeditel". At last we succeeded in leaving harbour at 2 o'clock, but without "Grom".

When the detachment was already at sea, the Captain told us that we were sent to destroy an enemy convoy which was going from Lulea to Germany. This convoy consisting of five steamers loaded with ore was to be that same day, at 7 p. m., in the region of Landsort. It was convoyed by four armed patrol-ships, one cruiser and several small destroyers.

Besides our Flotilla, a division of Cruisers consisting of "Rurik", "Oleg" and "Bogatyr" was also sent to intercept the enemy ships. Both our detachments were to try to discover the convoy, force an action with it, and destroy it.

It was dead-calm but there was fog in some places. Our Flotilla reached Dagerort quite well, making 24 knots; but later, things got worse. We learned that on account of the fog in the skerries, the cruisers had not been able to put out to sea in time, and on the "Orfei" which belonged to our flotilla, three ventilators were spoiled and she began lagging behind very much.

These two circumstances seemed sufficient for the assumption that the detachment would arrive too late at the place where they might expect to meet the enemy; therefore nothing else remained to be done, but to return. The Chief of the destroyer Force did so; he sent the "Pobeditel" and the "Orfei" to Reval, and went himself on the "Novik" to Rogokul.

Having come back to Rogokul, the Admiral passed on to the "Sibirsky Strelok", and we lay at anchor waiting to recommence operations. Among the events of importance at that time, the loss of the English submarine "E 18" must be noted. She had put out to sea three weeks before and had not returned, and therefore there was no doubt that she was lost.

During her last operations the "E 18" had succeeded in discovering an enemy destroyer on the 26th of May at 4.42 p. m. at a distance of 30 miles from Libau. The destroyer, which the submarine immediately attacked, was one of a new type. A torpedo was launched and struck her side just in front of the Captain's bridge. The submarine reported this immediately by wireless.

Some time after, the Director of signals division communicated interesting details about the result of the submarine "E 18's" attack.

The bow of this destroyer, it appears, had been entirely torn off, but she did not sink immediately, but floated for some time till all the air had come out. At the moment of the explosion, a number of the crew was in her bow, and they were all lost, though the destroyer herself was ultimately salvaged.

At a much later date when this book was already being printed, we had confirmation of Admiral Nepenin's informations, from important German sources. This destroyer was the "V 100", and 12 men of the crew perished, all attempts made to save them having been useless. In spite of the great damage done to her, the "V 100" was taken into harbour and afterwards a new bow was built and she continued service.

Next day at midnight, the Admiral again transferred his flag to our ship and came over with all his Staff.

At 2 a. m. on the 13th of June "Novik" put out to sea and proceeded through "Gango" to Lume. On our way we joined company with the "Pobeditel" and the "Grom" and at 10.30 a. m. we anchored at Lume, where the 1st Division of Cruisers was lying.

Having worked out all the details of the expedition with the Commander of the cruiser Division, Admiral Koltchak assembled on the "Novik" a gathering of all the Captains of the destroyers.

At 1.30 p. m. the cruiser Division, consisting of: "Rurik", "Oleg" and "Bogatyr" accompanied by the 6th and the 7th Flotilla of destroyers, weighed anchor. Half an hour later our destroyer weighed anchor also.

Having rapidly joined the cruisers, we went in front of them. In the open sea, the Flotilla separated from the Division and took a course towards Landsort. The cruisers going more south.

About midnight, when we were already near Landsort, we perceived on the horizon a number of vessels which were steaming with open lights. Between the steamers little silhouettes were to be seen, which we took for destroyers. We succeeded in counting 10—12 vessels, but we could not yet make out their types.

The Chief of the Destroyer Force immediately ordered full speed ahead and we rapidly neared the convoy.

The Admiral had to decide the dilemma: were these really German steamers or Swedish ones. It was known that the Swedes also, as a measure of precaution, convoyed their cargo-ships. If these were Swedish a disagreeable contretemps might ensue.

To clear up the situation, the Admiral decided to open fire and to see how the convoying vessels would act on this.

We fired, but apparently without result as the convoy continued its course quietly. Then the Admiral gave orders to fire a second time, which produced a quite different effect. A white rocket was sent up from one of the ships, then a red one, then again a white one and great confusion was evident amongst the vessels.

All doubts disappeared now, and the Admiral ordered to open fire and to concentrate it on the foremost ships.

However, we did not approach them very nearly as it was supposed that the ships which convoyed the steamers, were armed with heavy guns, and besides they were also accompanied by torpedo boats.

As our destroyers fired, flames and explosions were seen on the enemy ships, which proved that our gunnery was successful. The convoy was panic-stricken. From one ship a search-light was hurriedly operated, from another firing began, but without any particular aim, and all the steamers

gathered together in a group. The Admiral decided to take advantage of this latter circumstance and ordered the "Novik" to launch two torpedoes. It was difficult to say if they attained their objective, anyhow, on one of the steamers at the same moment a fire broke out and she began to let out steam.

During the whole time our Flotilla continued firing, trying to get behind the convoy to prevent it from taking refuge in Swedish territorial waters.

It was suddenly remarked, that several vessels had detached themselves from the convoy and under cover of a smoke-screen, were coming towards us; they were the destroyers. The Admiral immediately ordered our speed to be increased up to 30 knots and to concentrate our fire upon them. Soon the destroyers turned about, not being able to withstand our fire. We were nearing the convoy which continued tossing about in disorder. Most part of the steamers fled into territorial waters; the rest tried to go southward and only one lay motionless. Evidently she was greatly damaged. The Admiral decided to end with her and the Flotilla steamed towards her. The "Grom" by the Admiral's order having retired about 8 cables distance, launched a torpedo which exploded in her stern. After this, she sank slowly, meanwhile a fire broke out in the forepart and repeated explosions were heard from the interior of the vessel.

Towards that time action had ceased and the "Novik" was occupied in saving the drowning men, who were floating around us on different pieces of debris, damaged boats or struggling in the water, calling for help. It was difficult to save many men, for we had but little time before us, and could not launch the life-boats; we could only throw down ropes and pull the drowning men along side and then drag them on deck. We succeeded in saving only 9 men. I remember a very stout sailor with a life belt on had been pulled along side; he was quite stiff from the cold and could scarcely move his arms and legs, so that our men had great difficulty in getting him aboard. Just at that moment the "Novik" started and the sailor, not holding on fast enough, fell from the rope-ladder, nearly carrying with him one of our men; he was rapidly drawn into the screws, and so perished.

We learned from the saved prisoners, that they were all from the auxiliary cruiser "German" which contoyed the steamers and which was armed with two guns of small calibre. Being specially designed for fighting submarines she had special arrangements to keep her from sinking.

At 12.45 p. m. all was over. The steamers, which got off safely had fled into Swedish waters and we could pursue them no longer, so we retired.

Our Flotilla went in the direction of Landsort until 2 a. m. About that time, being on watch, I perceived a torpedo, which was moving in the same direction as the "Novik". I immediately reported to the Captain and the Admiral, and they, supposing that we were attacked by an enemy submarine, ordered our speed to be increased and our course changed. At that moment we perceived a second torpedo, again in our course. Now there was no doubt that the "Novik" was attacked by a submarine, though no sign of it could be seen. Evidently she had made a mistake in reckoning our speed and our distance, or she had not had time to get into the position.

About 4 a. m. we sighted our cruisers and went to join them, but after a time, the Admiral decided to part from them, and to go round Dagerort to Moonsound. Just at that moment a periscope was sighted from the "Rurik". The Cruiser-Division had time to avoid the submarine, which did not succeed in attacking us. Further on our way, the Admiral received, about 10 o'clock, the wireless-message that two enemy submarines were near Dagerort, not

wishing to expose the ships unnecessarily, he decided to go to Lume through Ute.

When the destroyers and the cruisers were already anchored in Lume, a wireless was received stating, that in the channel from Ute, through which we had all just passed, the mine-sweepers had discovered a mine-field and had seen a submarine.

In Lume the Admiral assembled all the Captains of the destroyers to elucidate the results of the action and hear their separate points of view. At this gathering the Captains came to the conclusion that no less than 3 ships had been sunk. Towards evening the first informations arrived, stating that two of the auxiliary ships which were convoying the steamers had sunk. The "German" was evidently one of them, as well as the ship which had been hit by our torpedoes, most likely.

Our Flotilla remained anchored at Lume, the rest of that day and the night, and next morning, the 15th of June, we went to Rogikul. Coming out of the skerries near Hangö, the Admiral dismissed the "Pobeditel" and "Grom", which made for Reval, whilst he went to Moonsound.

XVIII.

Operations of the 2d Cruiser Division and the 1st destroyer Flotilla. Cooperation of the 12th Army off Riga. The "Novik" strands on a rocky ledge. Ships bought from Japan. "Novik" in dry-dock. Appointment of Admiral A. V. Koltchak as C. C. of the Black-Sea Fleet. Vice Admiral A. V. Koltchak. His former activity. The wreck of "Dobrovoletz" and the explosion under the "Donskoy-Kazak". End of repairs to the "Novik".

At 4 p. m. on the 15th of June, the "Novik" arrived at Rogokul and the Admiral immediately transferred his flag to the "Sibirsky Strelak", and we remained in harbour, which was very tedious.

On the 17th of June more detailed information was received about the dispersed convoy: it consisted of 13 steamers, 6 armed mine-sweepers, 1 auxiliary cruiser and 3 destroyers; of all these 5 at the end were missing. This changed a little the situation, for we had caused more loss, it appeared, than we had expected.

On the 20th of June the Captain decided to put out to sea and see how the pneumatic pumps would work with their new fittings. The experiment succeeded very well; the destroyer easily attained a speed of 30 knots; the air pumps working very satisfactorily. After the trial, we wanted to profit by this occasion and do some firing practice with our new torpedoes, but when we came up to Runo island, the wind had freshened so much, that we had to return to Rogokul. Towards the evening the wind became a gale which lasted two days and was so strong, that even in Rogokul harbour, the waves were very heavy. We began to drift and had to throw out a second anchor.

About the 22th of June, at last it became calmer and the heavy motion ceased. On that day the English Rear-Admiral Philimore arrived at Moonsound on the "Pogranitchnik" to acquaint himself with our organisation for

defence of the Gulf of Riga. This brought some diversity into our hard life, and we repeated to each other his tales about the western front and the English Navy.

The "Novik" was still in Rogokul and the other destroyers were patrolling the Irben area. It did not mean that all activity had ceased in the Riga Gulf; on the contrary, very serious work for the fortification of the position was being done, and it was already considerably stronger than last year. One of the most important undertakings, which was of immense advantage for the defence, was the digging through of a canal in Moonsound this was nearly completed and was deep enough for ships with a draught of 30 feet. In addition, a second canal was being dug in Soelo-Zund (a strait between Dago and Oesel) for destroyers up to 16 feet draught, to enable them to go out to sea without passing the Irben strait or by Dagerort. A whole series of batteries were also being completed on the Moon, Oesel and Dago islands and on the Werder peninsula. In general, all the works for the defence of the Riga Gulf, were being done with feverish activity and it was becoming every day more and more fortified. It would not be easy for the enemy now to force the position.

On the 26th of June an air battle took place over the Irben strait, during which the anti-aircraft gun of the "Stere gustchy" brought down an enemy sea-plane.

On the 29th of June a second operation was undertaken against the steamer convoys. This time special other ships were detailed for the task, they were: the cruisers "Gromoboy" and "Diana", flying the flag of Vice-Admiral A. P. Kurosh, destroyers "Dobrovoletz", "Moskvitianine", "Amear Buharsky", "General Kondratenko" and "Ohotnik", and also the Flotilla of new destroyers which were: "Pobeditel", "Grom" and "Orfei", under command of the Chief of the first Flotilla.

At midnight, the 30th of June, the 1st Destroyer Flotilla, met, near the Swedish coast, 8 enemy destroyers of an old type. The Chief of the Flotilla decided to abstain from coming to action with them and began to retreat towards the cruisers, having warned the Chief of the Cruiser Division that he was bringing the enemy towards him. Admiral Kurosh let the enemy destroyers approach to a distance of 50—55 cables and then opened violent fire against them. Nevertheless, one of the destroyers launched several torpedoes which however were about 5—7 cables short. Seeing that they had come into very heavy firing, the destroyers threw out a smoke screen after which both forces withdrew. With this operations ended and all our ships returned.

On the 1st of Juli the Admiral was urgently requested to support our troops near Riga and having taken with him the "Slava", "Hrabry", "Groziaschty" the 5th Flotilla and "Voyskovoy", he himself being on the "Sibirsky Strelak", he immediately made for Riga. Judging by the reports which reached us, this was the beginning of the so long expected offensive of our army.

Next day, by order of the Chief of the destroyer Force, all the ships which had remained behind went over to Kuivast.

The Admiral with all the ships returned from Riga on the 4th of Juli. He had successfully shelled all the coast line and had sounded the batteries which the enemy had erected in great numbers as a defence against attacks from the sea. He had also succeeded in discovering the 4", 6" and 9" batteries. With the aid of aeroplanes we were able to correct our firing, which was very

good. In general, the Commander in Chief of the Army was very satisfied with the support he received from the Navy.

During the shelling, three of our aeroplanes came into action with three enemy Fokkers. Our machines obliged two enemy to descend; one of them came down on the water and the aviator and the mechanic were made prisoner, the other fell in the neighborhood of the enemy's troops. On our side, one of our machines was damaged and fell into the water; the aviator, Captain Isvekkoff and the mechanic perished.

On the 5th of Juli we were warned that the arrival of the C. C. Admiral Kanine, was expected, and that he intended to hold a general review. The "Ohotnik" and the "Pogranitchnik" were sent to escort Admiral Kanine to Moonsound. Next day he had not yet arrived, and it was only on the 7th that he came on the "Pogranitchnik". After his arrival, Admiral Kanine immediately went by motor-car to Arensburg to review the troops, and towards evening he returned to Kuivast.

At 8 a. m., on the 8th of Juli, flying the flag of the Chief of the destroyer Force the "Novik" with the entire destroyers Force put out for the review manoeuvres in the Runo island region, which would probably be the scene of action if the enemy broke through into the Gulf. The C. C. went to visit the "Slava" and Admiral Koltchak accompanied him. The manoeuvres were not long or complicated, but apparently Admiral Kanine was satisfied, for he very soon signalled "Special thanks to the Riga Gulf Forces". Afterwards all were ordered back to Rogokul.

In the evening of that day the Captain received information that a dry dock was prepared for the "Novik" at Helsingfors and we were permitted to go there by the Chief of the destroyer Force.

At that time we learned, that our Government had bought from Japan the men-of-war "Sagami" (f. "Peresvet"), "Tango" (f. "Poltava") the cruiser "Soya" (f. "Variag") and a former steamer of the Volunteer Fleet "Orel", which had been attached to the squadron of Admiral Rogdestvinsky as hospital-ship. They all took their former names again, except the "Tango" which was called "Tshesma". These ships were designed for the protection of the Russian coast in the Arctic Ocean and were to go to Archangelsk.

Soon after this, the "Peresvet", whilst she was coming out of Vladivostok to make her trial-trip, ran aground. The accident was so serious, that she had to be entirely stripped to lighten her, and only after a month's continual work was she set afloat again.

At 4 a. m. the 9th of Juli, having given over to the supply-ship "Olga" the superfluous oil we had on board, we started for Helsingfors, little thinking that this voyage would be accompanied by such trying and even nearly fatal circumstances.

When we put out to sea, the Captain ordered full speed to find the utmost speed the "Novik" was capable of. The weather was dead-calm and fine, but near Odensholm it became foggy and the fog grew denser and denser. At last we seemed as if surrounded by a compact wall but continued steaming at a speed of 32 knots although we could see nothing before us. It seemed a pity to reduce speed as the distance to the Nargen island was but small, and we meant to increase our speed still more. At Pakerort the destroyer was making 33 knots. Luckily for us the fog had lifted a little, so we could define our course. After a short time, it became foggy again, but we continued our way at the same speed, though seeing nothing. When, by our reckoning, Nargen island was already near, the Captain slackened speed to 17 knots.

Coming up to it, just before turning into the channel along the island, when according to our reckoning we had only 2—3 cables length to go, we suddenly perceived a dark form outlined on either side in the fog. We took them at first to be the buoys of the anti-submarine nets, but then saw that they were rocks; the Captain immediately ordered the engines to be reversed but it was too late; several violent shocks were felt, the "Novik" quivered and then stopped. The Captain instantly had the engines stopped and before undertaking anything, he gave orders for our situation to be ascertained so as not to make things worse by moving in different directions. After a very careful inspection, it was found that the stern was in clear water and the depth under it was 17—20 feet, but from the engine room to the bow, the ship was on the rocks.

Having taken his bearings, the Captain tried to move the "Novik" backwards; but only one screw, the left one, would revolve, as the others caught at the rocks. After several attempts, it became clear that we could not get off the rocks without help, and the Captain sent a wireless with the request to send powerful tugs to our assistance.

The place where we had run aground was on the west coast of Nargen island. When the fog lifted, we saw that our bows were nearly on the shore. One could literally jump down on to dry land. Luckily for us the weather continued dead calm and this saved us. If there had been a strong wind, from the W. direction the "Novik" would have been immediately smashed upon the rocks and then perhaps it would have been impossible to save her.

The first help arrived about 10 a. m. two hours after the accident. Three small tugs and the custom-house cruiser "Kondor" came up to us and passing us the hawsers took us in tow. But they turned out to be too weak and the "Novik" still lay motionless. Their further attempts to drag us off ended in the hawsers breaking. We had therefore to wait for a more powerful tug-ice breaker "Petr Veliky", which arrived at midday.

After wasting much time over this, we had nevertheless to pass the hawsers to "Petr Veliky" which towed us to Helsingfors.

Having later examined the inner skin of the destroyer we ascertained that it was quite unimpaired, therefore all the machinery was also in order, but all between the inner skin and the turbins at the bows up to the section of prow was full of water.

At 9 a. m. the 10th of Juli the "Novik" without any more incidents, was towed to the Sandvik dry dock, in which she was immediately placed. In the evening all the water was pumped out of the dock and one could examine the damages we had suffered more minutely. Alas, what we found was very sad. All the bottom, beginning from the engine room to the bow, was completely distorted and many plates had been torn off by the stones, which were even wedged in the holes.

After the engineers from the ship-yards had examined the damages, they declared that even working very urgently, they could not finish the repairs under six weeks, at the best. They had to change all the damaged plates straighten some ribs and renew others, straighten the keel in several places, then caulk the whole bottom and examine all the tanks to see if they were air-tight. This was particularly important as the space between the inner and outer skin served at the same time for the oil-reserve.

From that day began the tedium of lying in dock with all its privations and uneasiness, especially in the heat of the summer. All day and all night

the noise of the pneumatic saw-files and the hammers of the chasers and the workmen continued; it was even difficult to talk owing to the noise.

Time went on and the repairs on the "Novik" advanced rapidly. Only rumours reached us from the Gulf of Riga. Nothing particular was going on there. That was a little consolation for us. On the 17th of July we learned the unexpected news, that our Chief of the destroyer Force, Rear-Admiral A. V. Koltchak was promoted Vice-Admiral and appointed C. C. of the Black-sea Fleet.

Captain M. A. Kedroff, who was aide-de-champ to the Emperor and Captain of the battle-ship "Gangut" was appointed in his stead and promoted Rear-Admiral, being taken into the Emperor's suite.

A. V. Koltchak's high promotion was learned by all with enthusiasm; certainly it was very sad to lose him, as all the destroyer Force liked him very much and appreciated his immense energy, intelligence and courage; but we knew that in such a responsible post as Commander in Chief, he could be much more useful to Russia than in the modest position of Chief of the destroyer Force.

I cannot help giving more details about the remarkable personality of Vice-Admiral Koltchak. Of short stature, rather thin, well-proportioned and with supple and precise movements; with a sharp, regular profile; a proud, slightly hooked nose; a firm, oval clean-shaved chin; thin lips; eyes which sparkled or grew dull by turns under their heavy lids; all his appearance indicated strength, intelligence, energy, nobleness and resolution.

There was nothing false affected or insincere about him; all was natural and simple. He had something which attracted the eye and the heart; at the very first glance he charmed and inspired faith.

This is the portrait of the Admiral: it was evident that fate had destined him to direct other people.

If we glance over his former career, from the early days of his service, we shall see that it bore the same character as his exterior: he was always higher than the people round him; he went forward, making light of all conventional limits and order.

In 1894 he finished in the naval corps passing out second for that year.

From 1895 he remained four years running at sea in the cruisers "Rurik" and "Kreyser" in the Far-East.

Two months after having returned to Cronstadt on the Battle-ship "Petropavlovsk", he again goes away to the Far-East. But on his way, in the Mediterranean, he received an invitation from the Imperial Academy of Science to join in an expedition to the Arctic Ocean, under the command of Baron Toll. He had already then distinguished himself by his interest in arctic expeditions and his distinguished works in oceanography.

A. V. Koltchak accepted the invitation, and after some months of preparation, he started in the summer of 1900 with the expedition to Kara sea and to the coast Taimyr on the ship "Zaria".

Having passed the winter there, the "Zaria" went farther East in July 1901; she went round cape Tsheluskin and coming out into the Siberian sea, she proceeded to the New-Siberian islands where she anchored for the second winter.

In the spring of 1902 Baron Toll undertook a sledge expedition to Bennet Island. Owing to unfavourable winds and the state of the ice, the expedition did not succeed, and no news was received of the party.

Then the Academy of Science decided to organize a Relief expedition and entrusted the whole affair to A. V. Koltchak. In spring he was already on his way with six sailors and eight tunhuses and yakuts. First on sledges, afterwards on a whale-boat, he obstinately moved forward. After great difficulties and privations A. V. Koltchak landed on Bennett island on the 19th of August, but did not find there Baron Toll's party. After a detailed examination of the island and 43 days navigation in an open sloop in the midst of ice-floas, he returned.

For carrying through such a difficult expedition, the Imperial Geographical Society offered him the big Constantine medal, which until then, only three explorers had obtained.

Not having had time even to return to Petersburg, he learned that the Japanese war had broken out and started to Port-Arthur to join Admiral Makaroff's Squadron.

There he was first on the cruiser "Ascold", after which he received the command of the destroyer "Serdity" on which he accomplished a series of exploits. When the principal defence of Port Arthur definitely passed on to land, he was appointed commander of the 75 m/m battery of the North-East front, and remained there till the surrender of the fortress.

Later A. V. Koltchak devoted all his energy to the restoration of the Navy and worked in the General Naval Staff which he had himself created. There he became Chief of the operations department of the Baltic Fleet and worked out the plan of naval war with Germany.

In 1908—1909 he again took part in an arctic expedition, as Captain of the ice-breaker "Vaygatch". But he was soon recalled to Petersburg as the rebuilding of the Navy required his presence. Until 1912 A. V. Koltchak continued working in the General Staff, and then again—he is found on the deck of a ship.

That same year he was appointed Captain of the destroyer "Ussurietz" and in 1913—Captain of the destroyer "Pogranitchnik" and at the same time he fulfilled the functions of flag-captain of the operations in the Staff of the Baltic Fleet.

The Great War began, and A. V. Koltchak, remaining all the time in the operations department of the Staff, took part in a whole series of expeditions for mine-laying near the enemy's coasts, the plans of which had been worked out by himself.

In the autumn of 1915 he took command of our Destroyer-Force and reorganised it immediately; with its help he strengthened the defence of the very important Gulf of Riga, and in addition, he more than once gave support to the army of Radko Dmitrieff with his ships, which afforded the army the opportunity of fortifying itself before Riga and not surrendering this important place to the enemy.

It was for this that the order of St. George of 4th class was best owed on him.

And now he had been promoted Vice Admiral, at 41 years of age, having been Rear Admiral only two months which was against all tradition and appointed C. C. of the Black-Sea Fleet.

In July our Captain received information that the "Novik" was to be fitted out as flag-ship, and therefore he had quickly to arrange the necessary lodgings for the Admiral and his staff.

The news of the destroyers "Dobrovoletz" and "Donskoy Kazak" having struck enemy mines, and the former being instantly sunk, reached us on the 21st of August.

At that time the work was being undertaken every night of obstructing the channels near the southern coast, by the sinking of steamers and barques filled with stones. To help the vessels which were performing these operations to take their bearings, the "Dobrovoletz" was appointed to stay in position between the obstructions and show an open light all the time in a certain direction.

The destroyers "Donskoy Kazak" and "Zabaikalet" had been patrolling from the early morning of that day, it was very foggy most of the time with short clear intervals. In one of these intervals the "Donskoy Kazak", which was anchored at the south part of the obstruction, sighted to the SW, the silhouettes of enemy ships and immediately opened fire against them. But just then heavy fog again came over and nothing could be seen. The destroyer immediately gave alarm signals and all the forces of the Riga Gulf got into position for action. About 6 p. m. the fog again lifted, the horizon was clear.

Towards evening the wind freshened considerably, but nevertheless, the operations for blocking the channels continued. At the appointed time, the "Dobrovoletz" anchored in the place designated and opened the guiding lights.

She was watched all the time by the "Donskoy Kazak", which was about three miles from her. About 9,30 p. m. the light went out and did not appear any more, at the same moment an explosion was heard. Thinking that a mine had exploded as often happened during windy weather, no notice was taken.

But at 10,10 p. m. a wireless-message was received from the Chief of the 5th Flotilla: "the Dobrovoletz—is blown up." The "Moskvitianine" replaced the "Dobrovoletz" and rescued three officers and 50 men of the crew. Among those who perished on the "Dobrovoletz" was also her Captain. Commander N. A. Virenius, one of the most distinguished officers of our Navy, who had taken command of the destroyer only the day before when she was putting out to sea.

The next morning, after having finished her patrol, the "Donskoy Kazak" weighed anchor and went to the place where the "Dobrovoletz" had sunk—about 40—45 cables from the enemy coast. There she picked up five bodies which she was ordered to carry to Rogokul. The "Donskoy Kazak" therefore made for Moonsound, at a speed of 21 knots. At 9,48 a. m. a strong shock was suddenly felt on the destroyer as if the ship had touched bottom and she immediately came to a dead stop and began to list. It turned out afterwards a mine had exploded under her stern.

This explosion tore off nearly the whole stern up to the officers cabins. The left screw and the shaft were broken to the dead-wood, and the right one was bent at an angle of 10°. The Vicker's anti-aeroplane machine-gun was also torn from its place by the violence of the explosion, and having knocked against the second funnel was hurled over board.

The destroyer lay helpless and could not be steered; she was in imminent danger of sinking. The destroyers "Stere gustchy" and "Zabaykaletz" hastily went up to her; the former passed her a towline and the latter made fast along side, and thus they safely brought her to Kuivast.

As a result of the explosion on the "Donskoy Kazak" nine men were killed, two badly wounded, and 9 slightly.

It appeared that the enemy during the fog, had, with the help of light draught vessels, dropped mines on the inner side of the position. That region was immediately carefully swept.

In the meanwhile the repairs on the "Novik" were rapidly coming to an end. The Works kept their promise punctually and about six weeks later, on the 26th of August the "Novik" was ready to leave dock. Having remained a few days longer near the Works to complete small details which were necessary, and for repainting; we passed then into the Northern harbour to take in a full supply of oil.

On the 2d of September we were ordered to Reval; there, about 5 o'clock the C. C. and the Chief of the destroyer Force arrived, and we started back to Helsingfors.

XIX.

Return to Moonsound. Enemy operations in Irben strait. The shelling of the "Hrabry". The enemy submarines in the Gulf of Riga. Inauguration of the Moonsound Canal. The entrance of the "Tzesarevitch" and "Admiral Makaroff". Vice Admiral A. I. Nepochenine appointed C. C. of the Baltic Fleet. Our seaplane raids. "Sebastopol" run aground.

On the 4th of September it was decided that the Chief of the destroyer Force would definitely transfer his flag to our ship. That same day the "Sibirsky Strelok" moored along side and transferred all the belongings of the Staff, after which the Admiral himself came over to us.

In the evening the alarming information was received from Moonsound, that quite near the coast of Irben 23 enemy mine-sweepers and 2 Dredgers were sweeping the strait. On account of this the Admiral was in a hurry to leave, and at 6 o'clock we started for Reval.

On our way we learned that the destroyers "Orfei" and "Zabiaka" had been damaged (by the way, the latter had just been repaired). Both ran aground on banks in the skerries, and owing to a rather stupid error: in daylight, and in fine weather, they carelessly lost their channel. It is true that they were soon both afloat again, but still they were for some time out of service.

Going to Reval, we looked about us very carefully, as the day before the submarine "Pantera", which had gone out to sea for manoeuvres in the Central position, sighted an enemy submarine between Reval and Helsingfors, which launched a torpedo which passed her at a distance of only 20 fathoms. This news alarmed the Staff of the Fleet very much and day-communication between Reval and Helsingfors was interrupted. But we saw nothing suspicious and reached the harbour safely.

In Reval we were detained so as to give the Admiral time to confer with the Director of the Signals Division. In the night we continued our journey and entered Moonsound through the Nuke-Worms channel which had just been dupened and swept for ships of our draught. It was the first time that such a long ship as the "Novik" had entered it. We passed through safely, but it was a difficult, even dangerous undertaking, as on the way there were many abrupt turnings and we might easily have touched ground with our screws.

At 9 a. m. on the 5th of September the "Novik" was in Kuivast, where the Admiral meant to examine the new patrol-motor-boats which had just

arrived. Three enemy seaplanes were sighted at that same time, flying towards Kuivast. As soon as they were near enough, all the ships which were in the harbour, opened fire against them, and they immediately turned back without having dropped a single bomb.

At midday we made for Zerel and on arrival, moored to the "Stere gustchy" which was fastened to a buoy. All was quiet in Irben. Our aviators while scouting, saw enemy mine-sweepers anchored in the Smal Irbenriver, they were evidently resting.

In the evening news was received, stating that a submarine had been seen from Odensholm light-house in the Gulf of Finland in the foremost Position. Shortly afterwards, near that place, she attacked one of the patrol-ships which seemed to indicate that the foremost Position was accessible to enemy submarines, and that it was impossible to reckon upon it as a shelter from them, in spite of the great number of mines laid there.

In the night a Zeppelin was flying over Oesel island and tried to throw bombs into our air-station in Pappenholm, but owing to the darkness, the pilot made a mistake, and all the 22 bombs fell into the sea.

Almost at the same time we were awakened by violent firing and the buzzing of luminous rockets which were launched from the enemy's coast, where a whole line of batteries was disposed. What had been the cause of this, what had they fancied—it is difficult to say, as we had undertaken no operations that night.

The days when we were in the patrol, generally passed in such small events. We gradually got accustomed to this state of things.

Next morning our own and the enemy's Seaplanes flew about scouting as usual. Mine-sweepers and motor-boats were again discovered at the mouth of the Small and the Great Irbenrivers and the Admiral therefore decided to shell those regions. The "Novik" put out to shell the mouth of Small Irben, whilst the gun-boat "Hrabry" shelled the Great Irben. The firing went off smoothly; but it was very difficult to correct it and consequently to judge of the result.

A very risky laying of mines was planned for that same night from shallow draught mine-sweepers of the "Kapsul" class. The place for the mine-field was chosen just under the enemy coast, in the same region where mine-fields had been laid before, on the parallel of the Schlitter tower, in the vicinity of which several enemy's coast batteries were disposed. The command of this expedition was entrusted to the Chief of the 4th Flotilla of destroyers, Captain P. V. Vilken.

The mine-sweepers put out to sea at about 11 p. m.; the night was very dark and there was scarcely any wind. Soon after midnight we heard a violent cannonade, and saw rockets and beams from search-lights so thought that our mine-sweepers had been discovered. And so it proved, only luckily all the mines had already been laid and our boats were coming back. That same night, the patrol-destroyer "Pogranitchnik" sighted a zeppelin which was slowly moving Northward. Later it was ascertained that it had dropped 26 bombs on Runo island, but the damages caused were insignificant.

In the morning the "Hrabry" was again sent to shell the mouth of Great-Irben. An explosion was noted during the firing, as a result of which several fires broke out.

As a reprisal, at 11 o'clock, two enemy aeroplanes threw bombs at our patrol-boat. But in general, the air-craft had become more prudent and

attacked our destroyers with caution, as now nearly all of them had anti-aircraft guns.

After midday it was again remarked that the enemy was sweeping near the coast. Immediately the "Hrabry" was sent to shell him and after her first salvo, all the mine-sweepers made off in haste. The next day brought no change; the usual life continued. Our air-craft, and the enemy's also went out scouting in the morning and the "Hrabry" shelled the coast and the mine-sweepers.

As the enemy himself owned later, we succeeded in sinking several mine-sweepers and motor-boats during these shellings at the mouths of the Great and Small Irben.

At 1,30 p. m. the Admiral went with us to Rogokul, where we remained in harbour. The "Novik" was all the time in full readiness to put out to sea, as the enemy was persisting in trying to sweep near the coast. Such persistence on his part could only be explained by his desire to introduce submarines into the Gulf.

In the morning of the 12th of September, still more alarming information was received stating, that near the Mikhaelovsky light-house a cruiser of the "Bremen" class, 4 destroyers and 8 mine-sweepers had appeared, and that 4 big ships and 2 submarines were seen at sea. The Admiral then started with us for Zerel at 1 o'clock, and at the same time gave orders for all the forces of the Gulf of Riga and the cruiser "Diana" to draw together there, the "Slava" alone being left for the moment at Kuivast, but in readiness to put out to sea at any moment. In addition to this, the battle-ship "Tzarevitch" was to pass that day through the newly opened Moonsound canal and join the naval forces of the Gulf.

The 2d Destroyer Flotilla, composed of the "Letun" and "Captain Isilmetieff" under the command of the Chief of the Flotilla, Captain A. V. Rasvossiff, were on patrol at that time.

While at sea, we received a wireless-message from the Captain of the "Diana" telling us that they were attacked by an enemy submarine near the Allirakh. Just at that moment the "Novik" was due to pass by the same place.

Carefully scanning the horizon, we sighted a periscope, which however disappeared under water as soon as we came into view.

At 7 p. m. we came up to the position where we found the "Diana" convoyed by the "Zabaykaletz", "Voyskovoy", "Strashny", "Sibirsky Strelak", and the "Pogranitchnik", and also the patrol-destroyers "Letun" and "Captain Isilmetieff".

On the "Diana's" arrival, the enemy cruiser, which was in the position, immediately departed. Seeing no signs of any more aggressive acts on the enemy's part, the Admiral, having given the necessary instructions to all the ships, proceeded to Zerel on the "Novik". There we moored to a buoy so as to be able to communicate by telephone with the shore.

Soon after that, 7 enemy aeroplanes appeared over us and fired rockets from time to time. Evidently these were signals for the submarines which had penetrated into the Gulf.

With darkness all became calm again and the enemy disappeared beyond the horizon, the night was very still and light, but towards morning; a strong wind from the W began to blow and it soon became a gale. The buoy to which the "Novik" was moored began to drift and we had to anchor elsewhere.

The enemy was no more to be seen; most likely he had sheltered himself in Libau or Windau. During that time it was definitely ascertained that he had succeeded in bringing three submarines into the Gulf.

This same day the "Tsesarevitch" was safely brought through the canal, and she joined the other big ships. Now we were stronger by four 12" guns, but unfortunately they had not a long range.

In the morning of the 14th of September the gale ceased and the Admiral started for Arensburg to discuss the situation with the Captain of the "Slava".

The principal aim of the Chief of the Destroyer Force was to discover the base for the submarines which had penetrated into the Gulf, so as to make their stay there impossible. As it was supposed that they had their base somewhere near Roen, the "Okhotnik" and the "Kondratenko" were immediately sent there to lay a mine-field.

On the 15th of September the cruiser "Admiral Makaroff" was also brought into the Gulf. Now we had four big ships at our disposal; which was quite different from last year, when we had but the "Slava" and 16 old coal-burning destroyers.

It was quite calm on the 16th of September and the enemy took advantage of that immediately and began mine sweeping. It was ascertained by our air scouts, that near Luserort and Mikhaelovsky light-houses 40 mine-sweepers were at work. Such energetic action was serious, and the Admiral began to fear, that preparations were being made for an offensive. Therefore it was decided to lay mines that same night in the rear of the enemy, not far from the Luserort and Mikhailovsky light-houses. This had to be done by passing over the enemy mine-fields, and so the shallow, flat-bottomed Volga-steamer "Pripiat" and several other steamers and mine-sweepers of the "Kapsul" type were designated for this task.

These ships completed the work that night without having been discovered by the enemy. The Chief of the destroyer Force was present himself at the mine laying having gone with the "Pripiat". The darkness and the absence of wind contributed much to the success of the enterprise.

On that day for the first time since they had penetrated into the Gulf, did the enemy submarines show themselves. One of them appeared near the fourth beacon in the position, not far from the "Ussuriets" which was patrolling, but she did not attack her.

For several days after this, the activity of the enemy again ceased; no sweeping was noticed and even in Windau only two light cruisers remained.

On the 17th of September the "Barsuk", a watch-boat which was patrolling, saw near the enemy coast three explosions and instantly reported this to the Chief of the destroyer Force. The Admiral decided to shell that whole region immediately as he feared that the enemy was mine-sweeping from ship's boats.

At 2 p. m. the "Novik" entered the position and lying at anchor near the farthest outer beacon, made a list of $3\frac{1}{2}$ degrees and fired several shells at a distance of 80 cables. But on account of the distance it was impossible to define the result.

In the evening our seaplanes had an air battle which ended without damage to either side. On our machine No. 28 the mechanic was wounded by shot from a machine-gun.

Again nothing was heard of the submarines; but after a time it was ascertained that there were only two submarines left in the Gulf; where the third had disappeared was unknown.

During the following days, the weather got much worse. Having passed over to Arensburg, the "Novik" soon went to Kuivast, and awaited there the development of events.

On the 20th of September we quite unexpectedly received a wireless message signed by Admiral Kanine, which ran as follows: "By order of the Supreme C. C. have passed the command of the Baltic Fleet to Vice-Admiral Nepenine".

Being all the time far from the centre of events, we were very astonished and at the same time rejoiced in hearing this news, as in the command of Admiral Kanine there was some apathy and passivity apparent, whereas the Fleet wanted more vigorous and active methods.

The results of this change were not long in appearing. At 1 p. m. a telephonic message was received, announcing that the new C. C. on the destroyer "Pobeditel", accompanied by the "Grom", "Strashny" and "Finn" had started for Kuivast to discuss the situation with the Chief of the destroyer Force. At 6 o'clock the "Pobeditel" flying the C. C.'s flag entered the harbour and anchored in the vicinity of the "Novik".

A short time later, Admiral Nepenine came over to us, embraced the Chief of the destroyer Force and the Captain and went into the Admiral's cabin. There he conversed a long time with the Chief of the destroyer Force, and afterwards with the Captain, the members of the Staff and the Chief of the Operation department of the Fleet Staff, Captain Prince Tcherkassky. The interview lasted till 10 p. m.

The new C. C. devoted next morning to the inspection of the ships, and at 9 a. m. we went together with the "Pobeditel", to the men-of-war which were anchored in Arensburg harbour and also to Zerel for an inspection. The Admiral was all the time in great haste, and therefore we steamed at a speed of 27 knots.

The appointment of Vice-Admiral A. J. Nepenine as C. C. of the Baltic Fleet was received with great joy and hope by all the Fleet, especially by the Destroyer Force, which being all the time in the van, appreciated the former activity of the Admiral. How many times had the Chief of Communications, by his striking information, saved our ships from great mishaps, and how often had very difficult expeditions succeeded, only owing to his great knowledge.

Admiral Nepenine distinguished himself especially during the War, being Chief of the Communications Division and Commander of the Maritime Front of the Peter the Great Fortress. His extraordinary gift for organisation, his untiring energy, strength of will and of mind rendered invaluable service to our Navy.

The Chief of Communications division always knew everything, everybody believed in him blindly, and he certainly was the most authoritative person in the Fleet; he was respected, loved and also feared. He was a bright and prominent personality on whom one could fully rely, and who inspired great hope.

We did not stay long at Zerel and as soon as the C. C. had finished inspecting the seaplane sheds and the light-house, we immediately weighed anchor and went into the Arensburg harbour. There the Admiral visited the "Slava", "Admiral Makaroff", the "Sibirsky Strelak" and the "Novik". He made a speech on board our boat, in which he said, that he considered the "Novik" as the most valiant ship of the Baltic Fleet, and was sure she would always keep up her fame and honour.

Graf, Novik.

7

At 5 p. m. we returned to Kuivast and the C. C. went on to Reval.

After that again avearissime, monotonous days passed; the autumnal rainy weather and the long dark nights made life on board very tedious.

On the 24th of September three German seaplanes attacked two merchant steamers on their way from Riga to Moonsound. Flying low, they threw down several bombs, but missed their aim; then one of the seaplanes descended on to the water and launched two torpedoes against one of the steamers, one of which passed under her bows, and the other sank before reaching her. This attack produced a dreadful panic. One of the steamers made off hastily towards the coast, where she was left to fate, and the crew of the second immediately got away in the life-boats. As it was windy and the boats overfilled, one of them turned over, and two sailors were drowned. During that time, the enemy had disappeared, so the crew thought it better to return to their ship, after which they reached Kuivast safely. The interesting part of this incident is, that the enemy had used quite a new method of attack by seaplane with bombs and torpedoes. We had had such an experience before with the "Slava"; when she was lying in Arensburg harbour, several seaplanes had appeared and two of them, flying low, even touching the surface of the water, ran up to her and launched a torpedo each. Both torpedoes missed her, as in this last case, and we doubted then, their having been launched; but now there could be no doubt of it having been really a fact.

On the 26th of September, three of our aviators made a very daring raid on the enemy air-station on the lake of Angern. Twenty enemy seaplanes flew out to meet them nearly at the same time; a cruel fight ensued the victims of which were, on our side, aviator Lieutenant A. N. Gorkovenko, who fell into the sea with his machine and was killed, and the mechanic of another plane, who was badly wounded. Our aviators had succeeded in bringing down one enemy machine and in throwing several bombs into the air-station.

In the night a Zeppelin appeared over Zerel and threw down several bombs, but caused no damage.

In the night of the 28th of September, again a Zeppelin appeared, but this time in the entrance of the Gulf of Finland; later it flew over Ute and Ere, but no bombs were dropped.

Everything went on in the usual way. Once the enemy tried to sweep the mines with 11 mine-sweepers, but was obliged to give it up as the weather had become too bad. In general, it was very windy and therefore we lay inactive in Kuivast.

As before, the Admiral was especially preoccupied about the question: were there submarines in the Gulf of Riga. In spite of all attempts, it had been impossible to discover where their base was, and how they got in through the mine-fields. From time to time we undertook expeditions for carefully inspecting different areas. Thus the 30th at 2 a. m. the "Novik", "Ukraina" and three destroyers of the 7th Flotilla put out for Markgrafen. The operation was to take place as follows: our detachment was to appear there at dawn, and the seaplanes from the Seaplane-carrier "Orlitz" (which was to remain all the time near Runo island), were to join us at the same time.

At daybreak, our detachment was at the appointed place, but the seaplanes appeared only at 8 o'clock. As soon as they were sighted from the enemy's air-station on Angern lake, 5 aeroplanes flew out to meet them. Our planes had to find refuge near the "Novik", and it was only after she

had fired several times that the enemy planes retired. We however found no signs of enemy submarines in the Gulf, and returned to Kuivast. A little later the report was received that at day-break, that same day, our patrol-motor-boat had discovered them near Great-Irbenriver. They lay moored to each other on the surface and the crews, evidently, were asleep. At a distance of 25 cables, the motor-boat opened fire at them, and the submarines rapidly separating, submerged. The motor-boat did not cause any damage to the enemy boats, as the distance had been too great and the Captain had not had patience enough to get nearer unremarked, and then begin firing.

One of those submarines, evidently, attacked about 10 a. m. our destroyer "Turkmenetz" which was patrolling; it was only by an exceptionally happy chance that the torpedo passed under her bow.

Judging by the incident with the motor-boat, which confirmed the C. C.'s opinion, the enemy submarines entered the Gulf by passing along the coast and went out to sea near the Domesnes shoal; it was also possible that they had passed between the 2d and the 3d beacons in our mine-field doing this when it was dark and they were not likely to be seen.

On the 3d of October the Admiral decided to again search the Gulf with all the destroyers available. The start was fixed for 5 a. m. when it was yet quite dark, but out at sea it was so windy, that all had to return.

That day, near Runo island, an enemy seaplane came down on the surface of the water and we succeeded in capturing it in a comparatively good condition. The aviator, called Roche, and the mechanic were taken prisoner.

On the 5th of October, the Admiral decided to renew the search for submarines which had not succeeded the first time; at 5 a. m. the whole Destroyer Force put out to sea. It was still dark. In leaving the harbour our Captain, wishing to pass out before the 4th Flotilla, cut across its course, but very unluckily: the "Novik" bumped against the "Okhotnik" and twisted her stem slightly; happily the damage was so insignificant that we were able to continue our cruise without repairs. As to the "Okhotnik"—her side was pressed in.

After that the Destroyer Force tacked about in the Gulf changing courses, for about eight hours, but discovered nothing suspicious. In the evening, when it grew windy we returned to Kuivast.

From the prisoner aviators we learned that the submarines penetrated into the Gulf by passing along the coast, but remained only a short time and then returned the same way. So the supposition of the C. C. turned out to be right.

The prisoners said also that their seaplanes did not fire torpedoes, but flew down to the water to divert attention from the doings of other planes.

On the 7th of October our Admiral was summoned by the C. C. and after that, next morning, we went to Helsingfors, where we stayed three days.

During that time a sad incident took place: the battleship "Sebastopol", passing through the skerries by the strategical channel, grounded on a Shoal. In spite of all the means that were used, it was impossible to float her, so she had to be cleared of all her gear.

On the 10th of October the "Novik" went back to Moonound, passing by Reval.

XX.

Mine-laying near Steinort. Exploit of the "Tulen". Operations in the vicinity of Sarytchef light-ship. Catastrophe of "Imperatrīša Maria" in Sebastopol. Loss of the "Kazanīš". The "Letun" damaged. Raid of enemy destroyers against Baltic Port. Description of the forcing of the position on the 9th of November by the Chief of the German Flotilla. The "Rurik" damaged. Appointment of Captain M. A. Behrens as captain to the "Petropavlovsk". Loss of the "Peresvet" in the Mediterranean. The Navy at the end of the 1916 campaign.

Until the 17th of October the "Novik" remained entirely inactive at Rogokul. In that day only it became evident that we were to undertake an expedition, as we were ordered to take in 40 mines of the 1908 model. The "Letun", "Desna", "Kapitan Isylmetieff" and "Orfei" received the same order.

At 12,20 p. m. the detachment weighed anchor and put out to sea through Soelo-Sund. On emerging from it we perceived two seaplanes; something had happened to one of them, and it had been forced descend to the surface of the water, whilst the second flew low near to us and the airman begged us to help his comrade. The Admiral immediately ordered a motor-boat to be lowered to tow the machine to shore, whilst we continued on our way.

The weather was propitious; the wind was about 3 balls and was still dying down; we still were rolled by the after-tossing and the sky was cloudy, becoming very dark after sunset.

We perceived a search-light operating on the parallel of Kilkonda where our air-station was; it came from the light-house which tried to prevent surprise enemy attacks being made from the sea.

Our detachment formed a line ahead having as foremost, the "Novik", the "Orfei" being last. As some of the destroyers had only lately come into service, and were for the first time taking part in an expedition, we rather anticipated that some mishap might happen them. At midnight, when the detachment was already near the place where the mine-field was to be laid, the outlines of two vessels going in the same direction as ourselves could be perceived from the bridge.

We gradually overtook them, and when the distance between us decreased, we could distinctly see, that they were two destroyers. Evidently they were going to Libau; they did not see us, for as is generally the case, all their attention was directed forward.

In spite of our superiority in force and in speed, we could undertake nothing against the enemy, and we even tried not to be discovered, as we were carrying mines which had to be laid secretly.

At 12,20 p. m. the detachment approached the Steinort light-house quite near, and though we had not yet reached the appointed place, the Admiral, not wishing to let the enemy escape, decided to lay the mine-field a little earlier. Owing to the unexpectedness of this order, we had to hurry very much, as our mines were not quite ready. Nevertheless, several were behind, and a great extension of the line ensued; our three last mines had to be dropped much later.

After the laying was finished, and the Admiral was about to give orders to pursue the enemy, suddenly the "Letun" asked by hand signals, when the mine laying was to begin. As it turned out afterwards, the other destroyers had not made out the signal announcing the beginning of the mine-laying, and had continued on their way. We had to turn back to the same place, abandoning all idea of pursuing the enemy. It was very provoking to have keep about Steinort for two hours running; we might have been seen from the light-house and then it would have been suspected that we were mine laying. When at last the mines were laid, the detachment turned North and returned to Soelo-Zund.

At 8 a. m. it was at the entrance of Soelo-Zund. Our motor-boat came up and the petty-officer reported that he had safely towed the seaplane to shore and that it was being repaired.

In the strait we met the "Amuretz" and the "Ameer Bukharsky". The latter in manoeuvring, stranded on a shoal before our very eyes, and was damaged. On the Kassarsky Bassin we met also the "Orlitza" which was on her way to take up her seaplane.

About 1 o'clock the destroyers entered the Rogokul harbour and anchored at their usual place.

The C. C. was very satisfied with the result of our operation and considered that the enemy had not detected us.

On the 19th of October the details of the exploit of the submarine "Tulen" on the 11th of October reached us.

The "Tulen" under command of the Senior Lieutenant M. A. Kititzin was, as usual, patrolling in the region of Bosphorus. It was night. She had come up to the surface, when suddenly the silhouette of some big steamer, coming to the Bosphorus, appeared in the darkness.

The Captain of the "Tulen" decided not to sink her by a torpedo but to try capture her, and bring her to Sebastopol. With this in view he turned about and went towards the steamer, approaching her noiselessly.

The steamer did not remark the submarine, and the shells which struck her a moment later were quite a surprise. A fire broke out immediately, and signs of alarm were seen on board; intermittent firing commenced, as the steamer had several guns. Happily the "Tulen" was not within range and did not suffer any damage.

After several more shells had reached them, the steamer's crew was panicstricken and rushed for the life-boats. Seeing this, the Captain of the "Tulen" ceased fire and sent one officer, one engineer and 5 men over to the steamer. The fire was extinguished towards morning, steam was got up, and she was brought to Sebastopol unaided. She was the "Rodosto" and 3000 tons dead weight. A German was in command and he was taken prisoner together with two other German officers, one Turkish officer and 20 men.

The "Tulen" immediately reported the event by wireless to the C. C. The news flew round Sebastopol with the rapidity of lightning, and an immense crowd gathered on shore to see them come in. When smoke was perceived on the horizon, all fixed their eyes on it; soon after, the "Rodosto", convoyed by the "Tulen" and flying the flag of St. Andrew under which was the Turkish crescent, slowly entered Sebastopol harbour. A loud and prolonged "hurrah" arose at the arrival of the Black-sea Fleet's capture.

On the 20th of October, the C. C. received information that an enemy detachment composed of three half-flotillas of destroyers was in the region of the Sarytcheff light-house. There were reasons to believe that they had laid mine-

fields. On this account the C. C. sent us to overtake them. We urgently put out from the harbour to the Kassarsky bassin in the following effective force: the "Novik", the "Pobeditel", "Orfei", "Grom", "Letun", "Desna", "Kapitān Isylmetieff", "Delny" and "Deiatelny". Before we started the channel from Soelo-Zund to the sea, was to be swept by the 2d Flotilla of mine-sweepers.

At 2 o'clock, when we came up to Soelo-Zund, we saw that all the mine-sweepers were quietly riding at anchor. In answer to the Admiral's question, had they swept the channel, they answered that they had been prevented by the rough-sea. We had all to anchor and the mine-sweepers were sent out to try to clear the channel; but at 5 p. m. they reported it was impossible to work; so we had to wait.

At dawn, next day, the mine-sweepers set to work and reported at midday that they had finished. Our detachment immediately weighed anchor and set out to sea. Having safely passed Soelo-Zund, we steered towards the Sarytcheff light-ship. At sea, there was nothing to be seen, which was of course not astonishing, for two days had passed since the enemy had appeared and it was very unlikely that he would remain so long in the neighbourhood.

We had to return in the dark; to aid us, the "Delny" and the "Deiatelny" were stationed beforehand at the turnings. Towards 7 p. m. the destroyers reached the strait safely and anchored at Serro, as it was too dark to pass through the canal.

Next morning, at dawn, the detachment passed through the canal and entered Kassarsky bassin. There a dense fog surrounded us, and it was with great difficulty that we reached Kuivast. Two destroyers even had their screws damaged.

On the 22d of October we heard, that the battleship "Imperatritza Maria" had sunk, it was said, on account of defects in the ventilation of the bomb holds, a fire broke out and spread in spite of all measures taken; and one hold after another exploded.

When the C. C. Admiral A. V. Koltchak heard of this, he immediately went on board the "Maria" and directed himself the putting out of the fire. But it was impossible to stop the explosions and therefore, to save the ship, Admiral Koltchak ordered her to be sunk in shallow water. He was the last to leave the "Imperatritza Maria" when she was already going down.

Some days later Admiral Kedroff was again summoned by the C. C. and we went to Reval. There it turned out that the submarine "U 32", a steamer, and three mine-sweepers had been blown up on our Steinort mine-field. So our mine-lying had really passed unnoticed by the enemy, and the place had been well chosen.

A day later we returned to Kuivast and the monotonous lying at anchor recommenced.

During that time a disaster had happened to the "Kazanetz" which, together with the "Ukraina" had convoyed the supply-ship "Habarovsk" to Reval.

At 11.45 a. m. near Grassgrund she was attacked by a submarine which took advantage of her slow progress. The torpedo hit her nearly amidships and she sank at once. Three officers were saved; and the Engineer, the Senior Lieutenant, E. E. Rosengren and Lieutenant Shakeef—perished; of the crew 2 warrant-officers and 29 men were saved.

The "Novik" lay all the time at Kuivast or at Rogokul, up to the 11th of November. That day the battleship "Slava" and the cruiser "Diana" were to go from Moonound to Helsingfors. On account of this, the Admiral desired

to say goodbye to them and to escort them to the outlet of Moonsound. At midday both ships entered the canal and moved slowly towards Worms which they reached safely at 6 o'clock. Until 4 a. m. they were to lie there and only after that to continue their way to Helsingfors through Lapvik.

It was a great event for the personal of the "Slava", which had been kept for more than a year in the Gulf of Riga. During that time there had been several moments when she had been in great peril, as she was locked in from the sea by a stronger enemy force and could not escape it not being possible for her to pass through Moonsound. The opening of the canal, at once changed her situation, and now she was able to come out of the Gulf safely, to the great joy of all her officers and men. One must render justice to the "Slava", she bore with honour all the heavy tests that fell to her lot, and there was a time, when the strongest enemy attacks were directed only against her.

On the 7th of November information was received that the "Letun" struck a mine at 11.50 a. m. near the Woolf sign. The explosion had made an immense hole in the stern and from the turbines compartment to the stern all was full of water. She could not move and was towed to Reval harbour by tugs.

There were also victims in this incident: 5 men being killed, 6 severely wounded and 8 slightly.

The place of the disaster to the "Letun" was behind the Central position and it was considered impossible for the enemy to penetrate there. The only explanation was the supposition, that some days before, an enemy submarine mine-layer had succeeded in penetrating somehow through our obstructions and that a small number of mines had been dropped in the easterly part of the Gulf of Finland. As they had been dropped over a large area, it was nearly impossible to discover them. Therefore ships had to move in that part of the Gulf only through the channels, though it could happen that there also mines might be found.

That same evening supplementary details were received, stating that on our Steinort mine-field two more steamers had been blown up.

The night between the 9th and the 10th of November was very disturbed. The alarm began by the observation stations of the Worms and the Tahkona light-houses reporting having heard at 10 p. m. in the NW direction several heavy explosions. Judging by the direction of the sound, they came from the foremost position.

At 2.45 a. m. still more alarming news arrived: the Pakerort light-house had sighted 8 enemy destroyers. Soon after, it reported that the destroyers having approached Baltic Port had shelled it for 20 minutes, after which they disappeared westward.

As soon as the first report from Pakerort had been received, we were all awakened and the destroyer Force was ordered to put out to sea promptly and cut off the enemy destroyer's retreat.

All the destroyer Force immediately began getting up steam; about 5 a. m. the 1st and the 5th Flotilla and the "Novik" had already left the harbour and were entering the Nuke-Worms passage, but at that moment a wireless message was received from the C. C. cancelling the order. We remained in the roads until daybreak and then reentered the harbour.

At 10 a. m. the order was again given to go immediately to the foremost position where a damaged enemy destroyer had remained.

At 11 a. m. the "Novik" put out to sea and on the way, joined company with the 1st and the 5th Flotilla. It had been indicated that the enemy was

in the 148th square. Reaching there at 3 p. m. we found nothing and as a thick fog came on, the Admiral decided to abandon the search and return to Rogokul.

According to information received by the Staff of the Fleet, during that night operation, the enemy sustained considerable losses; two destroyers were blown up in forcing their way into the Gulf; and in addition, one destroyer was damaged on her way back, but did not sink immediately and for some time the other destroyers took her in tow. There are reasons for believing that these were not the only losses. 11 destroyers had forced their way into the Gulf and therefore, according to the first information, three of them were sunk.

On the 12th of November the C. C. summoned the Chief of the destroyer Force to Reval. At 11.30 a. m. together with the "Pobeditel", and the "Grom" we put out to sea and reached Reval safely. There they had received supplementary details about the last enemy raid. It turned out that 7 destroyers had sunk out of 11. The incident had been as follows: the detachment of 11 destroyers, which tried to force the entrance of the Gulf formed a line ahead. Near the Appolo bank the two first destroyers were blown up. Then the Chief of the destroyer Force inquired (by wireless) if he was to go farther, and in answer received orders to continue the operation. The further way to Baltic Port was passed safely and arriving there three destroyers entered the harbour and opened fire. 2 soldiers, 2 women and 4 children were killed by their shells, 7 persons were wounded and in addition, 12 horses were killed. As far as could be judged in the darkness, the detachment consisted of 4 destroyers of a new type, and the rest, though big, were of a comparatively old type.

On the way back the detachment, skirting the Finnish coast, got again on a mine-field of the Foremost position, where three destroyers were immediately blown up. This circumstance perplexed the rest of them greatly and they steered south along the position. During their passage over the mine-fields another destroyer was lost. Then, the remainder, most likely in despair, decided to risk everything, and turned W. After a short time, another one was blown up, and soon sank. Only three destroyers remained unharmed and got away into clear water, though one of them had something wrong with her boiler and lost the faculty of moving, under her own steam so that the other two had to take her in tow. During all this time two light cruiser and several small destroyers were cruising at the entrance of the Gulf of Finland, ready to cover the retreat of the detachment in case of pursuit on our part.

It is interesting to note how accurately and minutely the C. C. Admiral Nepenine described this incident. We have once more confirmation of the fact, that all his information and deductions were invariably correct.

The following description of the enemy destroyers raid, translated from the German and written by the Commander of the Flotilla, Captain Witting in the book "Auf See unbesiegt" page 68, coincides very much with what Nepenine reported.

On the mine-fields.

It was on the 9th of November. The 11 destroyers of the X Flotilla which were under my command, steamed at a furious speed into the Gulf of Finland to meet the enemy.

What could he better.

I have at my orders brave officers and men, hardened in the war; who blindly trust in each other and who work hand in hand at arduous moments. They are dying with impatience to meet the enemy, to fight for the victory and the glory of Germany. My Flotilla consists of the newest and best destroyers. We have been given a purpose—to destroy the enemy's ships; every seaman like a soldier, must be proud of such an aim. It is true that it is a difficult and risky task. The Admiral who sent us has taken upon himself a heavy responsibility; but this is not our, nor my affair. We know that the Russians have laid many mines in their waters, but luck accompanies risk, why should not we be lucky!

And so, forward! "Course—East—21 knots forming a line ahead" that was the signal I had been given when darkness set in.

It was in an endless column that our destroyers followed the leading ship "S 56". Such a formation had been chosen to avoid the mines; the distance between the destroyers is 300 metres. Only the three last destroyers are seen, the others are lost to sight on account of the darkness. It is inconvenient, but there is nothing to be done; the whole line, from the leading ship "S 56" to the last one extends to 3000 metres.

The weather is propitious: the moon is hidden behind the clouds and the sea is calm. At 8,38 p. m. a Morse message informs me that the rearmost destroyers have lagged behind. I had to turn back to see what had happened. The three last destroyers are missing: the "S 57" (the valiant Senior-Lieutenant Prittwitz; perished later), the "V 75" (Lieutenant-Commander Mönche) and the "G 89" Leutnant-Commander Zampej. They are no more to be seen. Then the last destroyer of the remaining line reports, that one of them has been blown up by a mine. It was a sad beginning. But what is there to be done! A long search in the darkness would not bring any result as the destroyers had remained somewhere far behind in the west. In addition to this, two destroyers had stayed by the damaged one, as had been ordered beforehand. We turned again and continued our way Eastward with the rest. It was only later that we learned the details of what had happened. It appeared that a mine exploded under the Captain's bridge on the "V 75" and the engine-room rapidly filled with water. The "S 57" came up to help her, but suddenly a new, terrific explosion was heard which tore the "V 75" into three parts. The same explosion tore off the main steam-pipe from the "S 57", and soon after she also struck a mine and sank. The "G 89" saved the crews of both destroyers.

Meanwhile the Flotilla continued her course at a speed of 21 knots. At 10 p. m. we discovered, with great difficulty, Odensholm island and located our position, to find exactly our place in the forthcoming operation.

Finally, a wireless message from the "G 89" informed me that the "V 75" and the "S 57" had sunk. I wanted to give immediate orders for three destroyers to go to help the "G 89" as she had 3 ships crews on board, but at the same moment a second wireless message was received informing us that the "G 89" had turned westward making 30 knots. So much the better; I can then continue on quietly with the remaining 8 destroyers. May the success of the expedition repay us for the loss of the two boats.

But where is the enemy? Has he again been treacherously warned of our raid? There is not a single ship, not a single patrol-vessel to be seen, though we have been for some time already in the Gulf of Finland. It is provoking . . . So, not to remain inactive, I decide upon entering Rooger-Vik

and shelling the fortified Baltic-Port. May be the enemy's ships are lying in its harbour.

I leave five destroyers before the bay, and together with the "G 90" (Lieutenant-Commander Herring), the "S 59" (Lieutenant-Commander Klein) and the "S 56" (the gallant and joyful Lieutenant-Commander Krech; who later perished) I enter the bay of Rooger-Vik. The mine-field is evidently laid in the middle of the bay. Prudently passing very closely to the fort from the eastern side, we approach the mole at a distance of 600 metres; not a ship is to be seen; how very provoking. Nothing else remains to be done, but to shell the military buildings.

Poor Baltic Port! In vain do the inhabitants feel themselves safe behind the mine-fields. What a dreadful alarm there must have been there, most likely, when at 1.30 a. m. six search-lights, unexpectedly, threw their beams backwards and forwards and a terrific shelling began. But the "barbarians" fire only at the buildings in the harbour: the store-houses, sheds and the like, they spare the peaceful town . . . 162 explosive shells were fired with the result that soldiers and horses were killed and the military buildings turned into ruins . . .

After this we leave the bay and making 26 knots, steam westward. There, behind the mine-fields in a place agreed upon, we are expected by our light-cruisers. So as not to pass by the spot where the "S 57" and the "V 75" were blown up, I change our course slightly. Suddenly behind our last destroyer in the line, a flame flashes and the rumble of guns is heard! So the enemy has discovered us and has attacked our rear. Onward at the fullest speed! Onward to assist them! In that moment, on the "G 90" (Lieutenant-Commander Herring) which was second from the end, an immense column of water arises and nothing is to be heard a round. On the destroyer herself—there reigns an exemplary calm. As I pass before the "G 90", I learn the details of the disaster: it appears a mine has exploded under the turbines. This is the third destroyer which is lost. The "S 59" (Lieutenant-Commander Klein) comes alongside of the "G 90" and takes her crew on board whilst she is sinking.

The impression of this disaster has not had time to cool down, when the search-light of the last destroyer begins to make signals. We make out with despair: the "V 72" M. M. (minestruck). No—it is mines not submarines! . . . But it is a hell into which we have fallen! I go up to the "V 72" (her gallant Captain, Lieutenant-Commander Baron Roeder, who also perished later). Alongside of her is already the "V 77" (Lieutenant-Commander Stratman) taking off the crew. To tow the damaged destroyers into harbour cannot be thought of, they are so damaged that they can hardly keep afloat. And so the "S 57" and the "V 75" had sunk on our way forward, and now the "G 90" and the "V 72" are lost; only six destroyers of our proud Flotilla remain and goodness knows what Fate has yet in store for us! Meanwhile the "G 89" has come up safely to the cruisers.

We continue our way westward. But the destroyers have not had time yet to join the line, when behind me again appears the dreadful signal "M. M.". That is the "S 58" (her gallant Lieutenant-Commander Herman; later—perished). This destroyer also is so damaged that she cannot keep afloat. Floods of water pour into her and suddenly she turns over. Happily, the greater part of the crew is already on the "S 59".

What a dreadful night! Around-all is dark, the weather is getting worse and behind the mine-fields, most likely, the enemy is waiting for us with his

Flotillas. In this devil's boiler, there are mines everywhere and no protection from them.

Suddenly again the search-light flashes: "M. M." That means that, risking many lives, one must take on board the crew of the blown up destroyer, and then she will sink, which is most disastrous, with all her torpedoes. Alas, they must go, for we cannot take them with us, and they must not float lest they fall into the hands of the Russians. But to relieve all this horror stands out the gallant courage of officers and men. But there is no time for reflection. There is much work for all the destroyers—for those who are sinking and for those who are trying to save them. Myself I am giving one order after the other and trying to lead the destroyers so that those remaining avoid striking mines. We are steering South, as I think it is the least dangerous direction; most likely the mine-fields are laid in that direction and consequently we shall be running parallel to them.

Certainly those who approach the damaged destroyers are themselves in great danger, but this cannot be avoided. If one knew the plan of the mine-field, the destroyers could remain behind it and the saving of the crew been effected by the ships boats. But since the mines are all around, I, as commander can do but two things: either leave the damaged destroyer to her own fate and try with the rest to get out of the mine-field at full speed, or send a destroyer to the damaged one to save her crew, remaining with the rest in the vicinity, ready to help the second one if she also strikes a mine. The first deviation could not even enter my mind, being a German officer; therefore the second, was the only thing to do.

Life saving by boats lasts too long. It is more than an hour since the "S 59" began taking over the crew of the "S 58"; she cannot go alongside, because mines are seen on the surface just next to her; and all this time the other destroyers must remain on the mine-field waiting.

At last the "S 59" is ready and follows the other destroyers. But she has not gone more than 1000 metres when the same fate befalls her. Through the darkness again flash the ominous "M. M.". Now I go myself alongside the "S 59". The course is very risky, for I see two large mines floating on the surface near to the "S 59". Quickly alongside, to save the crew, and then away from you, valiant ship! You are too heavily damaged to be brought home.

The "S 59" had already two extra crews on deck, therefore, when the "S 56" had to take over all the men. We had nearly 400 on board.

But how well the men behaved! There was no fear, no anger, no word of reproach; they did not even hurry particularly coming on board; all went on like drill; from time to time was heard: "take over the wounded first, we will come after them". Yes, those were reliable men! . . .

I have four destroyers now! Is it possible that this dreadful night is not yet ended? No! We are still on the mine-fields. But enough meditation! It is of no use. Quickly, as quickly as possible away from these evil waters! Farther, farther to the West with the "S 56", "V 76", "V 77" and "V 78" at a speed of 27 knots!

The only consolation is, that day is beginning to dawn. But we are not yet at the end of our misfortunes: suddenly the low sound of an explosion is again heard from under the last destroyer, the "V 76" (Lieutenant-Commander Jasper). A large column of water and—"M. M.". The "V 77" saves the crew whilst the "V 76" sinks.

Only three destroyers remain. Solitary and sad we seek our way home, and this time we find it . . . By a strange concurrence of circumstances, the "S 56" escaped all the mines, though as flag-ship, she was leading the column. At last she also had a mishap, though it had no serious consequences; one of the pipes burst unexpectedly and the water ran out of the boilers; the destroyer has to stop. The "V 77" (Lieutenant-Commander Stratman) and the "V 78", with my faithful Commander of the Half Flotilla, Lieutenant-Commander Regensburg and the valiant Lieutenant-Commander Kranz, immediately come alongside and having moored to our ship give us water. The repairing of the damage takes about an hour. Around us are still mines.

At last we are in safe waters, the anxiety and care of keeping the destroyers intact, are over, and several other destroyers come to meet us; they are sent by Rear-Admiral Langemak, who is on the "Colberg". Soon he himself meets us with a signal of welcome which moves heart and soul.

And thus, we have not seen the enemy. As was ascertained later, he did not even appear at sea.

The cursed, wicked night was behind us!

Out of 11 destroyers only 4 remained: the "S 56", "V 77", "V 78" and the "G 89".

I, my officers and the men endured heavy moments.

But we had done all we could, and that is a consolation.

War requires sacrifice. It is true we had not sunk a single enemy ship, but we had demolished all the important buildings of Baltic Port and penetrated the waters in which the Russians thought they were quite safe.

From this day they must always be ready for such emergencies as this. Our operation however had a serious side as the enemy was just then preparing to transport troops from Reval to Riga which was very disadvantageous for our army. In these hard hours we, officers and men of the X Flotilla learned to understand and to appreciate each other. Not a word, an act, or an order darkens the remembrance of those hours of close, selfdenying and serene union.

In reporting with sorrow the loss of so many destroyers, but being proud of the crews and hoping to take part in other operations with such officers and men,—I ended my report thus:

. . . The short intervals between the explosions, the frequent losses, the continual consciousness of the possibility of perishing—required immense self-restraint on the part of the officers and men, bordering on heroism.

It is with pride that I report, as Commander of the Flotilla, the valiant-behaviour of the personnel. The men vied with each other in self-command and saved first of all the wounded. All the manoeuvres, the saving of life, the preparations in anticipation of the explosions, were executed with the greatest self-possession and care.

It is owing only to this exemplary, calm and heroic conduct of the officers and men that so many were saved, and that the losses were no greater than 16 killed."

On the 15th of November the "Novik" together with the "Desna" went again to Rogokul, where we remained a long time. On the 16th of November the 3d Flotilla of mine-sweepers discovered a mine-field at the entrance of Nukke-Worms channel. It was difficult to say when the enemy had laid it, but it might have been in the night of the destroyers' operations. Thanks are due to the C. C. who, foreseeing this possibility, countermanded our expedition; we were already entering the channel and the "Novik" would have suffered the first, as she was the leading-ship.

The evening and the night of the 17th of November were again alarming, for we expected a raid on the part of Zeppelins, and in addition to this, about 20 destroyers were at sea off Oesel island. For a moment the C. C. feared even that they were preparing to break into the Gulf of Finland with great forces, and therefore all the ships and principally the Destroyer Force were in full readiness to put out to sea at any moment. Afterwards all these preparations were countermanded, as the Zeppelins did not appear in the vicinity and the destroyers soon departed.

That same day a mine was found off Nerva light-house, that is, not far from Cronstadt. This confirmed the idea that the enemy submarine mine-layer had dropped mines in the whole eastern part of the Gulf and therefore we had to be very cautious.

On the 22nd of November we had further confirmation, but of a sadder kind: the "Rurik", on her way to Cronstadt struck a mine and was seriously damaged.

The details of this incident are as follows: on the 19th of November the "Rurik", together with the "Andrei Pervozvanny" and the "Bayan", started from Helsingfors to Cronstadt at 4 o'clock for repairs.

The detachment formed in line ahead the "Andrei" leading, then came "Rurik" and "Bayan". It was convoyed by the 8th Destroyer Flotilla.

At 8.15 p. m. in turning round the line of the south Hochland light-houses, at a distance of the $3\frac{1}{2}$ cables from the shore, the "Rurik" having sloped to the left, struck a mine with her right side, approximately between the eighth and tenth rib. Evidently the enemy had laid a group of mines on the very line. By some lucky chance, the "Andrei", though she had a deeper draught than the "Rurik" passed without touching any.

The sound of the explosion was so loud, that it reminded one of the discharge of the guns from all the towers of a dreadnought. An immense flame appeared on the surface of the water and penetrated through the right anchor on to the deck. After which a gigantic column of water, about 140 feet high, higher than the fore-mast, rose and covered the fore part of the cruiser. The men who were on the bridge were instantly carried off to the quarter-deck, and only the captain, the navigating-officer and the watch-keeper remained on the bridge held against the flooded deck-cabin by the force of the water.

The first impression of the officers, sitting at the moment of the explosion in the ward-room, was, that the powder-magazine in the forepart of the ship had exploded. And the crew thought that bombs were thrown down on the cruiser from a Zeppelin, and therefore they all rushed below.

As all were deafened, or washed off from the bridge, the alarm bells could not be rung and the men called to their stations. The executive officer ordered immediately the officers to go round the ship and send the men to their posts. Three minutes later the pumping turbines were already at work and all the doors and portholes were closed. The task was very much facilitated because the electric fluit was in order.

The state of the "Rurik" gave much anxiety, for the water had penetrated into all the forepart of the ship and it was rushing into the forecabin compartment at a speed of $1\frac{1}{2}$ —2 feet a minute.

The bow of the cruiser went down to 2' 4". After examination it was ascertained, that all the forepart up to the bulkhead on the 30th rib was full. So that the bulkhead should not give way, it was immediately propped up by wooden supports.

When the task was ended the "Rurik" tried to move; it was 20 minutes after the explosion. At first she made 2, then 4, 6, and at last 8 knots; but soon she had to slacken her speed to 6 knots as the bulkhead was beginning to swell.

The great quantity of gas which had filled the forepart of the ship impeded very much our work. It was invisible and nearly odourless, but all the symptoms of gaspoisoning were felt. There was no good ventilation on the cruiser and the movable ventilators were too weak; the anti-gas masks did not help either. All the officers and 128 men were poisoned. As soon as the officers recovered a little, they went below again, only to be carried up a short time after nearly senseless. The energetic and selfdenying work of the engine room staff with Senior-Lieutenant S. K. Rashevsky at their head; they were all poisoned and Rashevsky was three times carried up senseless.

The attempt to apply a plaster on the hole, ended unsuccessfully, for it turned out to be three times smaller than the surface of the damage. In addition to all this, the darkness rendered the task more difficult.

Happily, nobody was killed by the explosion, though some of the sailors were in the forepart of the ship at the moment of the explosion; they were only thrown up by the pressure of the air.

At the news of the blowing up of the "Rurik", the C. C. ordered immediately Cronstadt to send out all the effective tugs at hand to meet the cruiser.

At 4 a. m. on the 20th of November, the detachment neared Lavan-Sari island, where it anchored till 8 a. m. so as to examine minutely the props of the bulkhead. At Seskara the Cronstadt tugs met the detachment, and at 8 p. m. the ships entered safely the outer-basin.

The "Rurik" was put into dry dock on the 22d of November. After the water had been pumped out, it appeared that the superficial extent of the damage was equal to about 800 feet square. The forepart to the first bulkhead was entirely destroyed and an immense arch had been formed. All the interior of the cruiser was twisted outward. The stem, over the ram, had burst, and the ram was helplessly hanging down. The keel up to the 27th rib had quite disappeared and all the iron work was so distorted that it was difficult to remove it. The cruiser was out of service for at least 10 weeks.

On the 23rd of November we received the telephonic message that M. A. Behrens was appointed captain of the battle-ship "Petrovavlovsk", and the "Novik" was to be under command of the captain of the destroyer "Moskvitianine", Commander A. K. Pilkin.

On the 28th of November the first expedition to Zerel with the new captain took place; the Admiral was to inspect the works for the construction of a 12" battery. The "Novik" arrived there at 5 p. m. and moored to a cask. In the night a strong SW wind began to blow, and it was difficult to communicate with the shore in the morning. After the inspection of the work, which was advancing very successfully, we returned to Rogokul at midday at a speed of 24 knots.

In the night of the 12th of December, a sad incident happened to one of the motor-boats while laying mines in the Irben strait. A mine of her own exploded on deck and she instantly sank; on this occasion torpedo-officer, Lieutenant E. R. Greve and two sailors perished; the others who were heavily wounded were saved by another motor-boat.

Until the 14th of December we remained consecutively in Rogokul, pining away with tedium and monotony; but on this day the Admiral went with us, the "Isylmetieff", and the "Desna", to Helsingfors.

During the crossing these destroyers were to make trial of full speed. They succeeded in increasing up to 30 knots, but at this speed the "Novik" outran them quite easily. In general, though many new destroyers began service, she has remained until now the fastest ship in the Navy.

On the 16th of December we returned to Moonound for the last time this year, as winter was setting in and all was beginning to freeze gradually.

On the 18th of December the Admiral decided upon visiting the Zerel battery before leaving definitely the Gulf, and to go to Riga after that. Starting in the morning, we were at 3 o'clock at Zerel. The Admiral immediately went to inspect the works and to take leave of the personnel remaining there for the winter. Next morning we started for Riga, very glad of the occasion to be in the immediate vicinity of the land-front.

Entering the Dvina and going up to the town the "Novik" moored up to the custom-house quay. The same day the Admiral went on Zaiatchy island to inspect the lodgings in which the crews of our patrol-boats were to live. The next morning was devoted to the inspection of the Ust-Dvinsk fortress and at 2 o'clock we had the visit of the C. C. of the Army, General Ratko-Dmitrieff. He examined very minutely the destroyer, talked with the crew and after that was invited to the ward-room. We immediately began questioning him about the state of things on all fronts, and principally about his. The General answered our questions very willingly and seemed to be very optimistic.

He told us that on his own front he had now a great superiority of force, compared to the enemy, and that he hoped to begin an offensive in the near future.

On the 21st of December the "Novik" started for Kuivast. The Dvina was already covered by a thin coat of ice and it was quite impossible to remain there any longer. At 3 o'clock we were in Kuivast, where we moored to the "Pogranichnik" and the "Kondratenko", which were moored to a cask.

Next morning the Admiral went to take leave of the "Tsesarevitch" and "Admiral Makaroff" which were to remain in Moonound for the winter, and at midday we went to Rogokul. Behind Shildau island thin ice already showed and this time it seemed that Moonound really was going to freeze up.

On the 23d of December it was decided to leave Moonound and to go to Reval for the winter. It was a great joy for us all, as the stay at Moonound these nine months had been very tedious.

The "Novik" came to Reval quite frozen. The tank and the stern were covered with a thick coat of ice; therefore it was high time to end the campaign.

On the 25th of December the "Novik" crossed over to Helsingfors and immediately went to the Sandvik works for repairs. Our Fleet had ill-luck towards the end of the year. On the 21st of December the battle-ship "Peresvet" going from the East to Archangel struck a mine in the Mediterranean and sank.

In connection with this incident it will be timely to note an interesting detail of the expedition of the Special Detachment of the Baltic Sea, which had nearly the same fate. In Port-Said, the Chief of the Special Detachment, Rear-Admiral Bestougeff-Riumine, received from the Allied Command of the Mediterranean the exact indication of the channels through which he was to pass. Using these, he was all the time in the area where the destroyers and the patrol-ships of the Allies were on watch. It was a safeguard from the submarines, which for such slow ships as the "Tshesma" and the "Variag" was of great importance.

However, the Admiral decided, that it would be safer to cut across the Mediterranean, than to go along the channels and went by the way he chose. He took upon himself an immense responsibility, and in case of misfortune, all the fault would fall on him.

The detachment crossed safely the whole sea not having met a single boat. In the first port they entered, they learned that just during these days, exactly in those channels, submarines had appeared and had sunk several ships. Thus, thanks to its Admiral, the detachment had avoided disaster.

The "Peresvet" which crossed later, chose the indicated channels and—striking a mine—was lost.

Thus ended the third campaign which had lasted nine months. War was still going on, and its end seemed dreadfully far.

This campaign had been much quieter for the "Novik" in the sense of action, but it had been much more tedious in comparison with former years, and we were very tired on account of this.

The defence of the Gulf of Riga in which the "Novik" principally took part, was much more organized and was strengthened by the opening of the Moonound canal, by the building of batteries, and the laying of many mine-fields.

The boats of the Destroyer Force were very much increased in number. As well as destroyers of a new type, many patrol-motor-boats and auxiliary vessels were added. The necessity of such had been felt by experience during the War; one could not do without vessels of shallow draught, which could pass over the mine-fields, lay mines and carry comparatively heavy guns for shelling the coasts. On account of this, as the building of such vessels would have taken too much time, the flat-bottomed steamers of the river Volga were made use of, and 75 m/m guns were placed on them at first, but later they were replaced by 100 m/m ones.

In general, the defence of the Gulf of Riga had become much stronger. The following year the enemy would have met a very serious resistance even had he sent his new battle-ships to help the attacking forces.

Exactly the same increase of means of defence, but even on a larger scale was observed in the Gulf of Finland. During the War a great number of very strong batteries was built along its coasts, which made the Gulf look like a fortress.

The Baltic front, in general, had been brought to a very great capacity of defence and it was very difficult to break through it.

All that has just been said, concerns the material part; but as to the personnel, we were much worse. All officers and sailors alike were very tired of the war; the continual tension of the nerves and the hard conditions of war life lasted too long and were tedious. Conformably with this, the morals of the officers began to fail. It was partly due to the great number of outside elements who joined the staffs during war-time. Card-playing and the abuse of spirits spread amongst the officers in spite of all prohibitions. On this account there were conflicts and failures in service.

Among the men the same decline of morals could be observed: they tried by all legal and illegal means to get away from the war, and to hide from danger. With them also card-playing and drink was excessive, though the last was minimised somewhat by the high prices of alcoholic liquors.

The relations between officers and men on the ships, with rare exceptions, were very good. The hard conditions of war and danger which were lived through together served to unite them.

But one felt, nevertheless, that war had lasted too long, that it was too much for the Russian people; they bore with great difficulty all the privations which accompanied it.

I have stopped longer on the analysis of the disposition of the navy personnel in order to emphasize how important it is to reckon with the spirit of the army and the navy, especially in a prolonged war. Often the general state of things grows worse, in spite of good material conditions, on account of the moral fatigue of man.

Part. II. Death of the Navy.

XXI.

On the eve of revolution. Admiral Nepenin's part in the days of the crisis. Echo of the events on the "Novik". Revolution in Helsingfors. The night of the 17th of March. Murder of Admiral Nepenin. Tumult on the "Andrei Pervozvanny". Murder of officers on the ships and on shore. Who was guilty of the bloodshed. Reval. Moon sound. Cronstadt. Death of Virene, Boutakoff and Rein.

In January the winter season began with its usual life: leaves, repairs, exercises, commissions and the like winter occupations. That year all, somehow, tried to amuse themselves ceaselessly. During the last months it had even a wild character, it seemed as if people, having nothing to lose, did not care about anything more and hastened to forget themselves.

January had passed thus, and February was nearly ended. At that time my term for fulfilling the duties of executive officer expired; I was appointed to a new place and had to leave the "Novik".

Towards the end of February the political situation of Russia was becoming very acute. Very alarming news came from Petersburg. They spoke of a revolution, of the Emperor's abdication, and the formation of a provisional government. It was said that amongst the rebels was also the Naval Guard-Detachment, who, not believing in the sympathy of their officers for the revolution, behaved towards them in a most threatening way. All the officers who were on duty, were immediately arrested, and the sailors spoke of arresting the others as well, and later making short work with them all. At last, the situation became so acute that nothing remained to be done for the Commander of the detachment of the Guards. The Grand Duke Kiril Vladimirovitch but to lead them himself at their request, to the "Douma".

The information also was received that on the cruiser "Avrora" which was lying in the Neva, Captain M. J. Nikolsky was killed for having tried to prevent a band of unknown, suspicious people from coming on board the cruiser. He came forward to meet them with the executive officer, and barricaded their way by standing before them. They instantly killed him and broke in by force.

At last communication by train with Petersburg was stopped; all rumours ceased and the following information came only through the Staff of the Fleet which was immediately connected with the Naval General Staff in Petersburg by Use's apparatus.

Unexpectedly, the C. C. Admiral Nepenin, received from the president of the Douma, Rodzianko, a telegram saying, that a muting had broken out in Petersburg which was spreading every minute. On account of the evident weakness of the Government, the Douma in order to avoid innumerable calamities, had formed a provisional Committee, which had taken the power in its hands. The preservation of the Dynasty could only be hoped for, if the Emperor abdicated in favour of the Heir to the Crown under the Regency of the Grand Duke Michael. In addition to this, the telegram stated, that the provisional Committee of the Douma was already recognized by the Grand Duke Nicolai Nicolaievitch and several Commanders in Chief of different fronts. On account of the acute state of things, Rodzianko begged Nepenin to give an immediate answer.

This telegram affected Nepenin very much; he, who had always kept aloof from all internal politics could not understand this movement and the consequences of it frightened him; he foresaw a sad end. Deep in thought and very agitated, he walked about the cabin, not knowing what to do.

The fact that the revolution was taking place with the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievitch's and the other Commanders' in Chief approval, showed that a formidable crisis had begun. Feeling that dissension between the chief war commanders at such an acute moment as war-time, might have very serious consequences, and wishing to keep the Fleet which was entrusted to him in a state of efficiency, Admiral Nepenin, after a long internal struggle decided upon recognizing the provisional Committee of the Douma.

He sent Rodzianko his answer in that sense.

Alas! Admiral Nepenin, who was omniscient in his own sphere, did not know how cruelly he was being misled. The situation was not at all as Rodzianko described it. The latter knew how to make the Admiral yield; being far from all politics he could not be aware of what was going on. Most likely several other Commanders in Chief on the different fronts were deceived in the same way as Admiral Nepenin and so gave the impression, that the Chief Command had unanimously recognized the revolution.

Admiral Nepenin could hesitate no longer, as sinister rumours about the home events were already circulating, and some of the ships could not be relied upon; evidently propagandists from land were working incessantly. Nepenin had to face events so as not to let the initiative out of his hands. There is no doubt that if Rodzianko had sent a telegram of a different kind than the one that was received, Nepenin would have answered by a refusal, in spite of all, of the disorders in the Fleet and of the threats to murder the officers.

But the deceitful telegram spoke only of the Supreme power going over to the Tsesarevitch, and there was a hint of its being only a provisional measure which was dictated by the necessity of the moment.

Admiral Nepenin, after having sent the telegram was quite down cast. He did not approve of and could not sympathise with what was being done in Petersburg. The former joyful, energetic Admiral was no more to be recognized. He seemed bent down and grown old in a few hours. He told those near him, that he foresaw the destruction of the Navy. Next day he sent Rodzianko a second telegram in which he warned him that if special measures were not taken, the Baltic Fleet would certainly go to ruin.

Having sent the answer the Admiral immediately gathered all the flag-officers on the "Kretchet" and invited also the Commandant of the place. When all were assembled he told them about Rodzianko's telegram and his

answer and added that if anybody did not agree with his decision, he asked him to come to his cabin.

All present agreed with the decision of the Admiral. They certainly did not welcome the events that were taking place, but reckoned, as it seemed then, that they were inevitable.

Only one flag-officer could not agree with the logic of the arguments. This was Admiral M. K. Bakhireff. Immediately after the sitting he passed into Admiral Nepenin's cabin and announced to him that he would remain faithful to His Majesty and therefore did not consider it possible for himself to continue service.

In answer to this he heard the low, choking voice of Nepenin: Listen, Michail Koronatovitch, could you really for a moment doubt of my being as faithful to the Emperor as yourself. . . I cannot yet imagine how all this has happened, and who has placed the Emperor in this situation. . . . It is war-time now, and it must be brought to an end. I believe that after it is ended, the Emperor, if he finds it necessary, will take the authority in his hands again; but we now must not leave, but remain and struggle with the outer as well as with the internal foes, by directing the forces entrusted to us. For if we go away, it will only be to the advantage of our enemies. . . .

"And I think" answered Bakhireff, "that nothing can be done if the abdication takes place. To-day they will demand that the power should go over to the Tzesarevitch, to-morrow they will no longer content themselves with this and will claim a republic, and after to-morrow, they will bring Russia to ruin. You say it is wartime now and consider it our duty to remain. Perhaps you are right; but perhaps also we shall not live to its end as it will be preferable to get rid of us. Certainly, if there is no Emperor, there is still—Russia which we must serve. I shall remain, but only until the end of the war. . . ."

In consequence of his answer to Rodzianko, Admiral Nepenin considered it his duty to report to the Emperor through the General-Head-Quarters. On the 14th of March General Lukomsky transmitted by direct wire to Pskov: "Admiral Nepenin reports, that he has not found it possible to protest against the appeal of the provisional Committee of the Douma".

On the 15th of March the C. C. sent the Emperor a second telegram: "It is with immense difficulty that I keep the Fleet and the troops which are entrusted to me under discipline. In Reval the position is critical, but I don't lose hope of keeping order. I most devotedly join the petition of the Chief Commanders of the fronts begging you to take the decision formulated by the President of the Douma. If the decision is not taken in the ensuing hours, it may result in a catastrophe which will bring innumerable calamities to our country. 23 h. 40 m., 15th of March 1917, No. 260. Vice-Admiral Nepenin."

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Only three destroyers remain. Solitary and sad we seek our way home, and this time we find it . . . By a strange concurrence of circumstances, the "S 56" escaped all the mines, though as flag-ship, she was leading the column. At last she also had a mishap, though it had no serious consequences; one of the pipes burst unexpectedly and the water ran out of the boilers; the destroyer has to stop. The "V 77" (Lieutenant-Commander Stratman) and the "V 78", with my faithful Commander of the Half Flotilla, Lieutenant-Commander Regensburg and the valiant Lieutenant-Commander Kranz, immediately come alongside and having moored to our ship give us water. The repairing of the damage takes about an hour. Around us are still mines.

At last we are in safe waters, the anxiety and care of keeping the destroyers intact, are over, and several other destroyers come to meet us; they are sent by Rear-Admiral Langemak, who is on the "Colberg". Soon he himself meets us with a signal of welcome which moves heart and soul.

And thus, we have not seen the enemy. As was ascertained later, he did not even appear at sea.

The cursed, wicked night was behind us!

Out of 11 destroyers only 4 remained: the "S 56", "V 77", "V 78" and the "G 89".

I, my officers and the men endured heavy moments.

But we had done all we could, and that is a consolation.

War requires sacrifice. It is true we had not sunk a single enemy ship, but we had demolished all the important buildings of Baltic Port and penetrated the waters in which the Russians thought they were quite safe.

From this day they must always be ready for such emergencies as this. Our operation however had a serious side as the enemy was just then preparing to transport troops from Reval to Riga which was very disadvantageous for our army. In these hard hours we, officers and men of the X Flotilla learned to understand and to appreciate each other. Not a word, an act, or an order darkens the remembrance of those hours of close, selfdenying and serene union.

In reporting with sorrow the loss of so many destroyers, but being proud of the crews and hoping to take part in other operations with such officers and men,—I ended my report thus:

. . . The short intervals between the explosions, the frequent losses, the continual consciousness of the possibility of perishing—required immense self-restraint on the part of the officers and men, bordering on heroism.

It is with pride that I report, as Commander of the Flotilla, the valiant-behaviour of the personnel. The men vied with each other in self-command and saved first of all the wounded. All the manoeuvres, the saving of life, the preparations in anticipation of the explosions, were executed with the greatest self-possession and care.

It is owing only to this exemplary, calm and heroic conduct of the officers and men that so many were saved, and that the losses were no greater than 16 killed."

On the 15th of November the "Novik" together with the "Desna" went again to Rogokul, where we remained a long time. On the 16th of November the 3d Flotilla of mine-sweepers discovered a mine-field at the entrance of Nukke-Worms channel. It was difficult to say when the enemy had laid it, but it might have been in the night of the destroyers' operations. Thanks are due to the C. C. who, foreseeing this possibility, countermanded our expedition; we were already entering the channel and the "Novik" would have suffered the first, as she was the leading-ship.

The evening and the night of the 17th of November were again alarming, for we expected a raid on the part of Zeppelins, and in addition to this, about 20 destroyers were at sea off Oesel island. For a moment the C. C. feared even that they were preparing to break into the Gulf of Finland with great forces, and therefore all the ships and principally the Destroyer Force were in full readiness to put out to sea at any moment. Afterwards all these preparations were countermanded, as the Zeppelins did not appear in the vicinity and the destroyers soon departed.

That same day a mine was found off Nerva light-house, that is, not far from Cronstadt. This confirmed the idea that the enemy submarine mine-layer had dropped mines in the whole eastern part of the Gulf and therefore we had to be very cautious.

On the 22nd of November we had further confirmation, but of a sadder kind: the "Rurik", on her way to Cronstadt struck a mine and was seriously damaged.

The details of this incident are as follows: on the 19th of November the "Rurik", together with the "Andrei Pervozvanny" and the "Bayan", started from Helsingfors to Cronstadt at 4 o'clock for repairs.

The detachment formed in line ahead the "Andrei" leading, then came "Rurik" and "Bayan". It was convoyed by the 8th Destroyer Flotilla.

At 8.15 p. m. in turning round the line of the south Hochland light-houses, at a distance of the $3\frac{1}{2}$ cables from the shore, the "Rurik" having sloped to the left, struck a mine with her right side, approximately between the eighth and tenth rib. Evidently the enemy had laid a group of mines on the very line. By some lucky chance, the "Andrei", though she had a deeper draught than the "Rurik" passed without touching any.

The sound of the explosion was so loud, that it reminded one of the discharge of the guns from all the towers of a dreadnought. An immense flame appeared on the surface of the water and penetrated through the right anchor on to the deck. After which a gigantic column of water, about 140 feet high, higher than the fore-mast, rose and covered the fore part of the cruiser. The men who were on the bridge were instantly carried off to the quarter-deck, and only the captain, the navigating-officer and the watch-keeper remained on the bridge held against the flooded deck-cabin by the force of the water.

The first impression of the officers, sitting at the moment of the explosion in the ward-room, was, that the powder-magazine in the forepart of the ship had exploded. And the crew thought that bombs were thrown down on the cruiser from a Zeppelin, and therefore they all rushed below.

As all were deafened, or washed off from the bridge, the alarm bells could not be rung and the men called to their stations. The executive officer ordered immediately the officers to go round the ship and send the men to their posts. Three minutes later the pumping turbines were already at work and all the doors and portholes were closed. The task was very much facilitated because the electric fluit was in order.

The state of the "Rurik" gave much anxiety, for the water had penetrated into all the forepart of the ship and it was rushing into the forecastle compartment at a speed of $1\frac{1}{2}$ —2 feet a minute.

The bow of the cruiser went down to 2' 4". After examination it was ascertained, that all the forepart up to the bulkhead on the 30th rib was full. So that the bulkhead should not give way, it was immediately propped up by wooden supports.

When the task was ended the "Rurik" tried to move; it was 20 minutes after the explosion. At first she made 2, then 4, 6, and at last 8 knots; but soon she had to slacken her speed to 6 knots as the bulkhead was beginning to swell.

The great quantity of gas which had filled the forepart of the ship impeded very much our work. It was invisible and nearly odourless, but all the symptoms of gaspoisoning were felt. There was no good ventilation on the cruiser and the movable ventilators were too weak; the anti-gas masks did not help either. All the officers and 128 men were poisoned. As soon as the officers recovered a little, they went below again, only to be carried up a short time after nearly senseless. The energetic and selfdenying work of the engine room staff with Senior-Lieutenant S. K. Rashevsky at their head: they were all poisoned and Rashevsky was three times carried up senseless.

The attempt to apply a plaster on the hole, ended unsuccessfully, for it turned out to be three times smaller than the surface of the damage. In addition to all this, the darkness rendered the task more difficult.

Happily, nobody was killed by the explosion, though some of the sailors were in the forepart of the ship at the moment of the explosion; they were only thrown up by the pressure of the air.

At the news of the blowing up of the "Rurik", the C. C. ordered immediately Cronstadt to send out all the effective tugs at hand to meet the cruiser.

At 4 a. m. on the 20th of November, the detachment neared Lavan-Sari island, where it anchored till 8 a. m. so as to examine minutely the props of the bulkhead. At Seskara the Cronstadt tugs met the detachment, and at 8 p. m. the ships entered dafely the outer-basin.

The "Rurik" was put into dry dock on the 22d of November. After the water had been pumped out, it appeared that the superficial extent of the damage was equal to about 800 feet square. The forepart to the first bulkhead was entirely destroyed and an immense arch had been formed. All the interior of the cruiser was twisted outward. The stem, over the ram, had burst, and the ram was helplessly hanging down. The keel up to the 27th rib had quite disappeared and all the iron work was so distorted that it was difficult to remove it. The cruiser was out of service for at least 10 weeks.

On the 23rd of November we received the telephonic message that M. A. Behrens was appointed captain of the battle-ship "Petropavlovsk", and the "Novik" was to be under command of the captain of the destroyer "Moskvitianine", Commander A. K. Pilkin.

On the 28th of November the first expedition to Zerel with the new captain took place; the Admiral was to inspect the works for the construction of a 12" battery. The "Novik" arrived there at 5 p. m. and moored to a cask. In the night a strong SW wind began to blow, and it was difficult to communicate with the shore in the morning. After the inspection of the work, which was advancing very successfully, we returned to Rogokul at midday at a speed of 24 knots.

In the night of the 12th of December, a sad incident happened to one of the motor-boats while laying mines in the Irben strait. A mine of her own exploded on deck and she instantly sank; on this occasion torpedo-officer, Lieutenant E. R. Greve and two sailors perished; the others who were heavily wounded were saved by another motor-boat.

Until the 14th of December we remained consecutively in Rogokul, pining away with tedium and monotony; but on this day the Admiral went with us, the "Isylmetieff", and the "Desna", to Helsingfors.

During the crossing these destroyers were to make trial of full speed. They succeeded in increasing up to 30 knots, but at this speed the "Novik" outran them quite easily. In general, though many new destroyers began service, she has remained until now the fastest ship in the Navy.

On the 16th of December we returned to Moonound for the last time this year, as winter was setting in and all was beginning to freeze gradually.

On the 18th of December the Admiral decided upon visiting the Zerel battery before leaving definitely the Gulf, and to go to Riga after that. Starting in the morning, we were at 3 o'clock at Zerel. The Admiral immediately went to inspect the works and to take leave of the personnel remaining there for the winter. Next morning we started for Riga, very glad of the occasion to be in the immediate vicinity of the land-front.

Entering the Dvina and going up to the town the "Novik" moored up to the custom-house quay. The same day the Admiral went on Zaiatchy island to inspect the lodgings in which the crews of our patrol-boats were to live. The next morning was devoted to the inspection of the Ust-Dvinsk fortress and at 2 o'clock we had the visit of the C. C. of the Army, General Ratko-Dmitrieff. He examined very minutely the destroyer, talked with the crew and after that was invited to the ward-room. We immediately began questioning him about the state of things on all fronts, and principally about his. The General answered our questions very willingly and seemed to be very optimistic.

He told us that on his own front he had now a great superiority of force, compared to the enemy, and that he hoped to begin an offensive in the near future.

On the 21st of December the "Novik" started for Kuivast. The Dvina was already covered by a thin coat of ice and it was quite impossible to remain there any longer. At 3 o'clock we were in Kuivast, where we moored to the "Pogranichnik" and the "Kondratenko", which were moored to a cask.

Next morning the Admiral went to take leave of the "Tzesarevitch" and "Admiral Makaroff" which were to remain in Moonound for the winter, and at midday we went to Rogokul. Behind Shildau island thin ice already schowed and this time it seemed that Moonound really was going to freeze up.

On the 23d of December it was decided to leave Moonound and to go to Reval for the winter. It was a great joy for us all, as the stay at Moonound these nine months had been very tedious.

The "Novik" came to Reval quite frozen. The tank and the stern were covered with a thick coat of ice; therefore it was high time to end the campaign.

On the 25th of December the "Novik" crossed over to Helsingfors and immediately went to the Sandvik works for repairs. Our Fleet had ill-luck towards the end of the year. On the 21st of December the battle-ship "Peresvet" going from the East to Archangel struck a mine in the Mediterranean and sank.

In connection with this incident it will be timely to note an interesting detail of the expedition of the Special Detachment of the Baltic Sea, which had nearly the same fate. In Port-Said, the Chief of the Special Detachment, Rear-Admiral Bestougeff-Riumine, received from the Allied Command of the Mediterranean the exact indication of the channels through which he was to pass. Using these, he was all the time in the area where the destroyers and the patrol-ships of the Allies were on watch. It was a safeguard from the submarines, which for such slow ships as the "Tshesma" and the "Variag" was of great importance.

However, the Admiral decided, that it would be safer to cut across the Mediterranean, than to go along the channels and went by the way he chose. He took upon himself an immense responsibility, and in case of misfortune, all the fault would fall on him.

The detachment crossed safely the whole sea not having met a single boat. In the first port they entered, they learned that just during these days, exactly in those channels, submarines had appeared and had sunk several ships. Thus, thanks to its Admiral, the detachment had avoided disaster.

The "Peresvet" which crossed later, chose the indicated channels and—striking a mine—was lost.

Thus ended the third campaign which had lasted nine months. War was still going on, and its end seemed dreadfully far.

This campaign had been much quieter for the "Novik" in the sense of action, but it had been much more tedious in comparison with former years, and we were very tired on account of this.

The defence of the Gulf of Riga in which the "Novik" principally took part, was much more organized and was strengthened by the opening of the Moonound canal, by the building of batteries, and the laying of many mine-fields.

The boats of the Destroyer Force were very much increased in number. As well as destroyers of a new type, many patrol-motor-boats and auxiliary vessels were added. The necessity of such had been felt by experience during the War; one could not do without vessels of shallow draught, which could pass over the mine-fields, lay mines and carry comparatively heavy guns for shelling the coasts. On account of this, as the building of such vessels would have taken too much time, the flat-bottomed steamers of the river Volga were made use of, and 75 m m guns were placed on them at first, but later they were replaced by 100 m m ones.

In general, the defence of the Gulf of Riga had become much stronger. The following year the enemy would have met a very serious resistance even had he sent his new battle-ships to help the attacking forces.

Exactly the same increase of means of defence, but even on a larger scale was observed in the Gulf of Finland. During the War a great number of very strong batteries was built along its coasts, which made the Gulf look like a fortress.

The Baltic front, in general, had been brought to a very great capacity of defence and it was very difficult to break through it.

All that has just been said, concerns the material part; but as to the personnel, we were much worse. All officers and sailors alike were very tired of the war; the continual tension of the nerves and the hard conditions of war life lasted too long and were tedious. Conformably with this, the morals of the officers began to fail. It was partly due to the great number of outside elements who joined the staffs during war-time. Card-playing and the abuse of spirits spread amongst the officers in spite of all prohibitions. On this account there were conflicts and failures in service.

Among the men the same decline of morals could be observed: they tried by all legal and illegal means to get away from the war, and to hide from danger. With them also card-playing and drink was excessive, though the last was minimised somewhat by the high prices of alcoholic liquors.

The relations between officers and men on the ships, with rare exceptions, were very good. The hard conditions of war and danger which were lived through together served to unite them.

But one felt, nevertheless, that war had lasted too long, that it was too much for the Russian people; they bore with great difficulty all the privations which accompanied it.

I have stopped longer on the analysis of the disposition of the navy personnel in order to emphasize how important it is to reckon with the spirit of the army and the navy, especially in a prolonged war. Often the general state of things grows worse, in spite of good material conditions, on account of the moral fatigue of man.

Part. II. Death of the Navy.

XXI.

On the eve of revolution. Admiral Nepenin's part in the days of the crisis. Echo of the events on the "Novik". Revolution in Helsingfors. The night of the 17th of March. Murder of Admiral Nepenin. Tumult on the "Andrei Pervozvanny". Murder of officers on the ships and on shore. Who was guilty of the bloodshed. Reval. Moon sound. Cronstadt. Death of Virene, Boutakoff and Rein.

In January the winter season began with its usual life: leaves, repairs, exercises, commissions and the like winter occupations. That year all, somehow, tried to amuse themselves ceaselessly. During the last months it had even a wild character, it seemed as if people, having nothing to lose, did not care about anything more and hastened to forget themselves.

January had passed thus, and February was nearly ended. At that time my term for fulfilling the duties of executive officer expired; I was appointed to a new place and had to leave the "Novik".

Towards the end of February the political situation of Russia was becoming very acute. Very alarming news came from Petersburg. They spoke of a revolution, of the Emperor's abdication, and the formation of a provisional government. It was said that amongst the rebels was also the Naval Guard-Detachment, who, not believing in the sympathy of their officers for the revolution, behaved towards them in a most threatening way. All the officers who were on duty, were immediately arrested, and the sailors spoke of arresting the others as well, and later making short work with them all. At last, the situation became so acute that nothing remained to be done for the Commander of the detachment of the Guards. The Grand Duke Kiril Vladimirovitch but to lead them himself at their request, to the "Douma".

The information also was received that on the cruiser "Avrora" which was lying in the Neva, Captain M. J. Nikolsky was killed for having tried to prevent a band of unknown, suspicious people from coming on board the cruiser. He came forward to meet them with the executive officer, and barricaded their way by standing before them. They instantly killed him and broke in by force.

At last communication by train with Petersburg was stopped; all rumours ceased and the following information came only through the Staff of the Fleet which was immediately connected with the Naval General Staff in Petersburg by Use's apparatus.

Unexpectedly, the C. C. Admiral Nepenin, received from the president of the Douma, Rodzianko, a telegram saying, that a muting had broken out in Petersburg which was spreading every minute. On account of the evident weakness of the Government, the Douma in order to avoid innumerable calamities, had formed a provisional Committee, which had taken the power in its hands. The preservation of the Dynasty could only be hoped for, if the Emperor abdicated in favour of the Heir to the Crown under the Regency of the Grand Duke Michael. In addition to this, the telegram stated, that the provisional Committee of the Douma was already recognized by the Grand Duke Nicolai Nikolaievitch and several Commanders in Chief of different fronts. On account of the acute state of things, Rodzianko begged Nepenin to give an immediate answer.

This telegram affected Nepenin very much; he, who had always kept aloof from all internal politics could not understand this movement and the consequences of it frightened him; he foresaw a sad end. Deep in thought and very agitated, he walked about the cabin, not knowing what to do.

The fact that the revolution was taking place with the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievitch's and the other Commanders' in Chief approval, showed that a formidable crisis had begun. Feeling that dissension between the chief war commanders at such an acute moment as war-time, might have very serious consequences, and wishing to keep the Fleet which was entrusted to him in a state of efficiency, Admiral Nepenin, after a long internal struggle decided upon recognizing the provisional Committee of the Douma.

He sent Rodzianko his answer in that sense.

Alas! Admiral Nepenin, who was omniscient in his own sphere, did not know how cruelly he was being misled. The situation was not at all as Rodzianko described it. The latter knew how to make the Admiral yield; being far from all politics he could not be aware of what was going on. Most likely several other Commanders in Chief on the different fronts were deceived in the same way as Admiral Nepenin and so gave the impression, that the Chief Command had unanimously recognized the revolution.

Admiral Nepenin could hesitate no longer, as sinister rumours about the home events were already circulating, and some of the ships could not be relied upon; evidently propagandists from land were working incessantly. Nepenin had to face events so as not to let the initiative out of his hands. There is no doubt that if Rodzianko had sent a telegram of a different kind than the one that was received, Nepenin would have answered by a refusal, in spite of all, of the disorders in the Fleet and of the threats to murder the officers.

But the deceitful telegram spoke only of the Supreme power going over to the Tsesarevitch, and there was a hint of its being only a provisional measure which was dictated by the necessity of the moment.

Admiral Nepenin, after having sent the telegram was quite down cast. He did not approve of and could not sympathise with what was being done in Petersburg. The former joyful, energetic Admiral was no more to be recognized. He seemed bent down and grown old in a few hours. He told those near him, that he foresaw the destruction of the Navy. Next day he sent Rodzianko a second telegram in which he warned him that if special measures were not taken, the Baltic Fleet would certainly go to ruin.

Having sent the answer the Admiral immediately gathered all the flag-officers on the "Kretchet" and invited also the Commandant of the place. When all were assembled he told them about Rodzianko's telegram and his

answer and added that if anybody did not agree with his decision, he asked him to come to his cabin.

All present agreed with the decision of the Admiral. They certainly did not welcome the events that were taking place, but reckoned, as it seemed then, that they were inevitable.

Only one flag-officer could not agree with the logic of the arguments. This was Admiral M. K. Bakhireff. Immediately after the sitting he passed into Admiral Nepenin's cabin and announced to him that he would remain faithful to His Majesty and therefore did not consider it possible for himself to continue service.

In answer to this he heard the low, choking voice of Nepenin: Listen, Michail Koronatovitch, could you really for a moment doubt of my being as faithful to the Emperor as yourself. . . I cannot yet imagine how all this has happened, and who has placed the Emperor in this situation. . . It is war-time now, and it must be brought to an end. I believe that after it is ended, the Emperor, if he finds it necessary, will take the authority in his hands again; but we now must not leave, but remain and struggle with the outer as well as with the internal foes, by directing the forces entrusted to us. For if we go away, it will only be to the advantage of our enemies. . .

"And I think" answered Bakhireff, "that nothing can be done if the abdication takes place. To-day they will demand that the power should go over to the Tzesarevitch, to-morrow they will no longer content themselves with this and will claim a republic, and after to-morrow, they will bring Russia to ruin. You say it is wartime now and consider it our duty to remain. Perhaps you are right; but perhaps also we shall not live to its end as it will be preferable to get rid of us. Certainly, if there is no Emperor, there is still—Russia which we must serve. I shall remain, but only until the end of the war. . ."

In consequence of his answer to Rodzianko, Admiral Nepenin considered it his duty to report to the Emperor through the General-Head-Quarters. On the 14th of March General Lukomsky transmitted by direct wire to Pskow: "Admiral Nepenin reports, that he has not found it possible to protest against the appeal of the provisional Committee of the Douma".

On the 15th of March the C. C. sent the Emperor a second telegram: "It is with immense difficulty that I keep the Fleet and the troops which are entrusted to me under discipline. In Reval the position is critical, but I don't lose hope of keeping order. I most devotedly join the petition of the Chief Commanders of the fronts begging you to take the decision formulated by the President of the Douma. If the decision is not taken in the ensuing hours, it may result in a catastrophe which will bring innumerable calamities to our country. 23 h. 40 m., 15th of March 1917, No. 260. Vice-Admiral Nepenin."

These two telegrams, especially the second seemed to denote that Admiral Nepenin was a partisan of the revolution and considered it necessary to accept the demand of the Douma. But could he think that the Douma was itself the centre of the revolution and did not think of putting it down. Rodzianko represented the case as quite hopeless. The news received by him by direct wire from the Naval General Staff of Petersburg, drew the picture in the same light. Added to this, he was receiving continually reports from the commanders of the different sections of the Fleet and from the secret service, stating that amongst the men a mutinous spirit was brewing and a rebellion might break out at any minute. What could he do? How could he disbelieve what he heard from all sides? How could he suspect deceit on the part of the provi-

sional Committee which had been recognized by the Grand Duke Nicolai Nicolaievitch and by most of the C. C. on the different fronts? How could he pay no attention to those menacing symptoms of rebellion in the Fleet which were but too evident.

Admiral Nepenin did not participate in and did not even know of the conspiracy, which had then grown into a luxurious flower; neither could he suspect treason on the part of the Commanders in Chief of the army.

All the time while Helsingfors was cut off, the C. C. used to inform all the ships of the news which reached him, so as not to let anybody think that he passed over in silence the events that were taking place, and so that no one should believe the malign rumours that were circulating. In that respect he acted rightly and understood the responsibility which lay upon him. He informed the officers that he alone would be answerable for all that happened in the Fleet, and only asked them to rely entirely on him and requested absolute obedience.

Nobody had the right to accuse Nepenin of concealing or perverting facts: all was public, all was announced as was transmitted from Petersburg.

The crews of the ships at first were calm and did not show any suspicion, not realizing, evidently, like most of the officers, what was going on.

On the 16th of March the text of the act of abdication of the Emperor was received. Admiral Nepenin asked to put off for a short time the announcement of the act on the ships, for special political reasons.

The disposition of the men was more excited since that morning; evidently revolutionary propaganda was being made amongst them. At 5 p. m. I left the ship. In town all was quiet and life continued as usual. The sailors I met saluted respectfully and had their usual sturdy look. Towards 7 o'clock I returned to the destroyer as the C. C. required all the officers and men to be on their ships by 7 p. m.

About 8 o'clock, the Captain, on account of rumours circulating in the town, to the effect that a telegram had been received announcing the Emperor's abdication, decided upon telling the news to the crew without awaiting the order from the Staff; nearly at the same time the order arrived.

The act of abdication was received by the men calmly, and my impression was, that they were acquainted with it before. After the reading of it, I remained on deck to talk to the men. Suddenly the Captain came down and informed us that he had learned by telephone that tumults had broken out on the "Andrei Pervozvanny" and the "Pavel I", and that there were officers killed and wounded. He told the men that he was sure of their good sense and begged them to remain quiet.

Soon after 9 p. m. I left the deck; the men at that time were quite calm and were on good terms with the officers.

When I came into the ward-room, I was told that supplementary news had been received that the 5th and the 9th Flotillas of Destroyers¹⁾ had also joined the mutiny and that they had also had officers killed.

At that moment a request arrived from the "Kretchet", viz., from the Fleet's Staff, for two delegates to be sent from the crew of each ship.

About 10 o'clock two representatives of the crew came to me and asked me to go down to the lower deck. When I got there, I was requested to give

¹⁾ The news was wrong concerning the 9th Flotilla, the rebellion broke out on the mine-sweepers.

up all revolvers to the crew. When I asked for what reason, the sailors answered that a meeting was to be held in town which the men from all the ships were to attend armed. I began to persuade them not to go anywhere, as it could only and in disaster. But I saw immediately that all persuasion was useless; the decision to go was evidently forced on them, and the opposition of the officers could only mean more victims. I had to consent, which I reported to the Captain.

After that I again went down to the lower deck; there the crew asked me to give them cartridges. It was clear, that this was out of politeness and that if I did not give willingly, they would be taken by force.

To be just, I must say that their disposition was quite friendly. I remarked that many of them would have been glad not to go, but were afraid of the blame of the rest. During that time several other officers came down and tried to dissuade the men from going to town, but, as might have been expected, without result. About 40 men insisted on going and they went down the gang-plank to shore. There were assembled the crews of the neighbouring ships, and calls were heard to hurry up our men and threatening to force them as they had not fulfilled their "public duty". While the crew was leaving, our Captain came near to the gang-plank and began loudly to argue with them and to prove how absurd it was to go out in the night, armed, when all were in such a nervous state, that at the least misunderstanding, in the dark, they might shoot each other. They listened to him, but still went. I began to fear that the other crews on shore might hear him and that excesses might follow. Therefore I begged him to leave the deck which he did reluctantly and having made a movement with his hand which meant he gave up all hope.

Then the sergeant came up to me and asked me in the name of the crew, to strengthen the outer posts, which I did withingly.

When the crew went on shore, there was a complete silence on our destroyer, but in our hearts, we officers did not feel quiet; we were very anxious for the fate of the officers on the other ships.

At the moment, when the crew left the ship the telephone was cut off by somebody, by general order, evidently, as we were informed from the shore.

After a time, one of our officers coming out of the ward-room saw a sentry standing at a little distance from the door, which looked as if the officers were under arrest. I immediately went to inquire what this meant and sternly asked the sentry why, and by who's order he was there. "I don't know, Sir", answered the man put out of countenance. Then I put the same question to the watchman, who explained that a new order had appeared by which the men were to arrest their officers and take away their weapons; this was already done on most of the ships; but our crew, trusting their officers entirely, but not wishing at the same time to bring down upon themselves the displeasure of the other men had placed a sentry at the door of the officers-room only for form's sake.

About 2 a. m. on the 17th of March, our men came back from the meeting in perfect order, not having used a single cartridge. Immediately the sentry was sent away, the telephone repaired and all went to rest.

After some time, one of our officers who was ill, telephoned from the hospital that badly wounded officers and dreadfully mutilated corpses were continually brought to the hospital.

After all these events, at last we also, the officers, tried to go to sleep; but we had a painful, heavy feeling that a dreadful, irreparable disaster had happened.

About 4 in the morning, the telephone in my cabin began to ring. When I took the receiver the Staff of the Destroyer Force replied. The flag-lieutenant informed us that a big crowd of soldiers and sailors armed with rifles, were going to the ships lying near the Sandvik works, to kill the officers, viz. just where the "Novik" was anchored. This news did not produce any impression on me, so very tired did I feel, mentally and physically, after this 24 hours. Understanding how hopeless our situation would be if this gang came, I decided to wait for further news before giving the alarm. I lay a whole hour listening for any sound, but all was quiet and only occasional shots were to be heard in the town. The rest of the night passed calmly for us, and if it had not been for the shots, one could imagine that in town all had calmed down. But they eloquently proved that, under the pressure of some one's evil influence, acts of mad ferocity were going on, the victims of which were innocent people, or guilty only of being, in such a moment of revolution, in the position of Commanders, on whom consequently the hatred of the rebels was bound to fall.

Can one picture to oneself what the relatives and those most dear to the unfortunate officers lived through in those dreadful hours! They were united to the Fleet by the closest bonds, by all that was most dear to them: their husbands, fathers, sons and brothers. . . .

Rumours of the mutiny on the ships rapidly spread over the town; of course much was exaggerated. At that time disorderly rifle-shooting began in the streets; wild screams were continually heard and motor-cars were driving about at a mad speed. These motor-cars, filled with an armed gang, pierced the air by their shrill prolonged whistles which made people grow numb with terror. Dark, hopeless pictures involuntarily rose in the minds of the officer's families. It seemed that all was over, and that none of the officers could escape. . . .

The telephone were working ceaselessly. Acquaintances asked each other if they had not received some news and communicated to each other all the information they had been able to gather. These conversations gave rise to still more anxiety and disconcerted one still more as it was impossible to make out what was true and what was fiction.

But suddenly the telephones cease working; by somebody's order they have all been cut off. The emotion and alarm attain their climax; nobody thinks of sleep; all are tormented by the idea of what is going on there in the port and in the harbour. Are those who are so infinitely near and dear-alive? Cautiously, so as not to be seen, and so as not to be struck by random bullets which from time to time flew into the rooms with a sound of broken glass, the mothers, wives and children stay near the windows looking out into the darkness.

After a time, some of the families were informed from the hospital, where the wounded and the bodies of the murdered officers were brought, that their dear ones were amongst those brought there. In the first moments the unfortunate women lost entirely the faculty of thinking, and ran about like mad. . . . The moaning, the womens' sobs and the children's cries united in one frantic outbreak of despair. Is it possible that this should be true? Why, only a few hours ago he was here. For what reason could they kill him when he was so much loved on his ship. . . .

All in tears, dressed in anything which had fallen into their hands, the unfortunate women run to the hospital, to the dead-house . . . still holding somewhere in the recesses of their hearts a secret hope that it is not he—that a mistake has been made. . . .

But now they are in the dead-house . . . Oh heavens! What horror! . . . How many maimed bodies! They are all thrown anyhow, on the floor in a general dreadful heap. They are all known faces . . . Their glassy eyes are staring unconcernedly. Now everything is indifferent to them—their souls are far away from all the suffering they have gone through . . .

No one is allowed to approach the bodies. They are watched by wild beasts in human form. With horrible abuse they send away the wives and mothers, and jeer at the dead in their presence. . . . What is there to be done? Where can they seek help, protection? . . . Who will give them at least, these maimed bodies? . . . The new revolutionary authorities, perhaps they will be moved . . . Quick—to them! But there they meet with new insults and derisive laughter. It is as if Satan himself were laughing triumphantly at the approaching reign of the Hooligan.

Day is breaking and one has the impression that in the half light of dawn, sinister fluids, associated with the cruel deeds committed, are hovering around. The nightmare just lived through, rises again in the memory with an increased strength, and a wave of burning despair overwhelms the inconsolable soul.

The day is beginning. The streets are full of noise, screams and shots. A purple sun rises over Helsingfors, a sun of blood. Oh, cursed night! Cursed morning! . . .

On the 17th of March, at 8 a. m. at the request of the Captain, I ranged the crew on the fore-deck. He wanted to speak to them about the events of the present moment, and in particular about their yesterdays going out. When I entered the fore-deck, the men were already ranged. The boatswain met me and requested, in the name of the crew, that three officers, one warrant-officer and two men who had remained in service after their term was ended, should be immediately sent away as not being liked by the crew. I began to try to persuade them that it was wrong and impossible to execute. The Captain came in at that moment and learning what was going on, also tried to persuade them that it would be dangerous for the fighting capacity of the ship. But all was useless; they insisted on their request. Later, one of the most insolent sailors declared most cynically, while I had a talk with him, that the crew had not touched them out of respect for me, and so as not to stain the "Novik" with blood. Therefore, in spite of the bloodshed on the other ships, they contented themselves with requesting that all these people should be sent away. There is no doubt about its having been done out of brag, for I know positively that the sailors did not at all dislike these men. It was all done to show their power, and to be "no worse" than the crews of the other ships. It was not without reason, that the reproach was made of the old crew of the "Novik" being of a reactionary disposition, and not wishing to go ahead of the revolution. And such an accusation at that moment was considered by the men as the greatest insult.

After this incident part of the crew landed and all became quiet on our destroyer.

At midday most of the men returned, and having dined hastily, they came to the ward-room to invite the Captain, myself, the chief engineer and another officer to go to the Railwaystation place to meet the members of the Provisional Government and the deputies of the Petersburg soldiers and workers Soviet, who were to arrive from Petersburg. The Captain did not wish to leave the ship at such a serious moment, so I had to go with the rest of the "invited" officers.

On the big Railwaystation Place, an immense crowd of representatives of the army and the fleet in Helsingfors was assembled; all the soldiers and sailors were armed, and all the officers were without weapons.

When our group entered the place, all the others who had arrived before, met us by a loud "hurrah" as if wanting to show their joy at another martial detachment joining the revolution.

On the left side of the principal entrance of the station, at that time opposite to the "Fennia" hotel, stood the sailors and on the right—the land-army. The aid-de-camp of the commandant of the place tried to put some order in this crowd, but the revolutionary mob composed of many thousands of men, obeyed unwillingly; there was dreadful chaos. Suddenly, in the midst of all this noise, several shots were heard from somewhere. In their fright, some soldiers caught hold of their rifles, but did not know how to use them. These rifles had been sent only lately from America, and had been stolen from the plundered arsenal, therefore the soldiers did not know how to use them. Some accidental shots were fired; then those, who did not see this, thought that the firing came from the windows around and desultory firing began. All these thousands of revolutionists were panic-stricken; some of them rushed to the station, trampling and crushing those before them; others, having thrown down their rifles, were lying flat on the pavement, and some were crawling on all fours, trying hard to hide their heads. . . .

To calm this crowd which had gone mad, somebody ordered the orchestra to play a march, and then they seemed to recover their senses. When at last all was quiet and the people were in order again, the whole place was surrounded for prudence sake, and to avoid a second panic, the surrounding houses were searched and sentries placed in them.

The panic had begun on account of the motor-car in which General N. F. Koten was driving, being stopped, and armed soldiers having got in and requested him, in a rough way, to give up his weapons. The general refused to do so and pulled out his pistol; he was immediately killed.

The train of the deputies was very late and we continued waiting.

At 3 p. m. the rumour spread that at 1,20 p. m. in the Sveaborg Port gateway, the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, Vice-Admiral A. J. Nepenin, had been treacherously murdered, when going to the Railway Station place.

Vice-Admiral Maksimoff immediately took command of the Fleet, being the senior after Nepenin; he directly called himself the first revolutionary Admiral and was proud of this. Soon we were able to ascertain the truth of this rumour: a motor-car drove into the place with Admiral Maksimoff in it, wearing an immense red tie and surrounded by several officers of his Staff and armed soldiers. The sailors greeted him with loud "hurrahs". It gave the impression that this was one of the most popular leaders of the revolution and the enemy of the old "regime" but not at all the Vice-Admiral Maksimoff, who had passed all his life in service of His Majesty.

Later on some interesting details were known of the murder of Admiral Nepenin as well as of the appointment of Maksimoff as Commander of the Fleet.

Admiral Maksimoff always distinguished himself by being an upstart and was of a narrow ambitious character. Having no reason to claim the high post of Commander of the Fleet, either on account of his intellect, or owing to any personal merits, he was dreadfully offended when Admiral Nepenin had been appointed to this post and not himself. For Nepenin was younger than he! . . .

At the very first symptoms of revolution, Maksimoff felt that the moment was come for him to realize his ambitious designs. He began to work upon his subordinates, that these should elect him to the post he so wished to fill. It was not difficult for him to succeed. Soon after, due to the help of his active Flag-Lieutenant Vassilevsky, who was of the same mind as himself, he was elected . . . by the clerks and copyists of his own Staff. But, as this seemed rather insufficient, by the help of this same flag-lieutenant, a crowd of sailors, called the "shore company", whose Commander this same officer was, were assembled. Stray soldiers and all kind of rabble joined them, and at the instigation of special persons, they elected the new Commander of the Fleet. Directly after this, he and his principal assistants, decorated with red bows and ribbons got into a motor-car. This motor was literally surrounded by armed sailors, also ornamented with red bows. In this state Maksimoff went to the "Kretchet" to tell Admiral Nepenin that he had been elected. But the latter positively declared to him that he recognized no elections, that himself and the Fleet had submitted to the Provisional Government, and that he would pass the command only to the person whom the latter indicated.

Maksimoff departed, having arbitrarily put the sign of Commander in Chief of the Fleet on his motor-car. In this way he proceeded to the Railwaystation place. During that time Admiral Nepenin was killed and thus the command of the Fleet in fact passed to him, being the senior. Admiral Maksimoff became Commander in Chief of the Fleet! . . .

The murder of Admiral Nepenin took place in the following circumstances. Most part of the crew of the "Kretchet" went to the Railwaystation place to meet the members of the Provisional Government. A large crowd, all armed, of course, came up to the "Kretchet" during that time, and began requiring of the Admiral, that he should also go to the public place to meet the deputation. Fearing that they would break into the inner offices of the staff, where different important documents, the ciphers etc. lay, and that all this would be plundered, Admiral Nepenin decided upon going, and accompanied by his Flag-Lieutenant P. J. Tirbach, he landed. They went in front and the crowd followed. Amidst it was the future murderer of the Admiral dressed in the uniform of a naval petty officer. He kept all the time behind the Admiral, holding his rifle in trail. They say that on his cap-ribbon was the word "Gangut" but it is impossible to be sure of this. Most likely he was a specially hired murderer.

When the Admiral was at the Port gateway, several sailors approached the flag-lieutenant and said to him: "Go away, Mr. Lieutenant, there is going to be some evil doing here". And in confirmation of their words, just as the Admiral was going out of the gates, a shot resounded behind him. The murderer in the sailors uniform had done his evil deed. The Admiral fell, but even then several shots from rifles and pistols were fired at him.

The flag-lieutenant at the first shot, and during the riot that followed, was dragged aside by force by his well-wishers and thus saved. This incident clearly shows that in this case the aim was to kill Admiral Nepenin and it had no connection with the general murders of officers.

At last, at about 4 o'clock the long expected train arrived and in it were: the minister for Finland Roditcheff, the deputy Skobelev, and two representatives of the Petersburg soviet of workers and soldiers.

All four made florid speeches about the necessity of ceasing all tumults and of keeping up order and discipline. The words: "comrades", "the con-

quests of the revolution", "revolutionary honour" etc. came streaming forth as out of a cornucopia. The audience was very satisfied and cried out "hurrah" for a long time. What would come next—nobody knew, but for the moment, involuntarily rose before the eyes, the shades of the officers all stained with blood, who had been killed in the name of the revolution. . . .

After the welcome, all departed quietly to their quarters, and all seemed in an animated humour.

Several days past. In Helsingfors and in the Fleet all were yet under the impression of the horrible, bloody night of the 16th to the 17th of March. Every moment one might expect a new break out, new violence, new murders. However our blunted nerves could react no more. Gradually the details of what had happened on the ships in that night, became known. If in general there was some exaggeration in the rumours which circulated then in town, they were very near the truth in the cases of some ships.

The harbour of Helsingfors sleeps under the cover of heavy ice; the sky above is lit up by stars and the snow sparkles. The dark outlines of the battleships and the cruisers detach themselves indistinctly on the white background. Here are concentrated the principal forces, the bulwark of Russia on the Baltic Sea. Farther out than the other ships, the Division of dreadnoughts is distinguishable; the "Andrei Pervozvanny", the "Emperor Paul I", the "Slava", the "Gromoboy", the "Rossia", and the "Diana" are likewise to be seen. The small columns of smoke which go up to the sky like ribbons, prove that restless life is going on in them. Around, all is quiet, nothing indicates that a tragedy is drawing near. . . .

All of a sudden, as if by some signal, here and there, on all the ships little red lights, on the top-masts began to twinkle. In the darkness of the night they produced a gruesome impression and seemed to carry with them a forboding of ill. They were the stormy petrels of revolution, of crime and of infamy. The dry crack of disorderly rifle shots which resounded in the silence of the night, was an explanation of the red lights. A muting had broken out, the blood of the officers was being shed. . . .

It was worse than all in the 2d Division of battleships. This is what was going on on the "Andrei Pervozvanny" as her Captain, G. O. Gadd, has related it later. Together with his officers he passed that night in most dreadful circumstances.

"On the 14th of March the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, Admiral Nepenine came on our ship and announced to the crew which was ranged in a line, the abdication of the Emperor and the transfer of power to the Provisional Government. Two days later, the Act of abdication of His Majesty the Emperor was received and read to the crew. They took all very quietly.

On the 16th of March our Chief of Division, Rear-Admiral A. K. Nebolsine, returned from Petersburg and decided to go the same evening on the "Kretchet" to the Fleet Staff.

About 8 p. m. of that day, when I was called to the Admiral, suddenly the executive officer came in and reported that great excitement was perceptible amongst the crew. I immediately ordered the trumpet to be blown and the men assembled, and myself hastened to report to the Admiral; but he answered: "Settle it yourself, I am going to the Staff", and went away.

Then I turned my steps towards the compartment where the crews lived. On the way I heard that the watch-keeper had been killed, and farther on that the Admiral also had been murdered. Then I met several warrant-officers

who were running towards me and calling out that the crew had laid hold of the rifles and were firing.

Seeing that there was no time to lose, I rushed into the ward-room and gave orders to the officers to take their pistols and to stay all together near me.

Indeed, soon after, shooting commenced, and the officers and myself passed into the fore-deck through a number of shots. On my way I relieved the man who was on watch near the safe, for fear of his being accidentally killed and ordered one of the officers to report to the Staff of the Fleet by telephone, what was going on.

The crew, seeing that the officers were armed with pistols, did not dare to advance through the passages and began to shoot through the portholes into the upper deck, which was very convenient for them as our cabins were lit up.

Then I rushed, with another officer, to put out the lights in the Admiral's cabin; but at that same moment a heavy discharge was fired through the porthole on the deck. The bullets were buzzing over our heads and a quantity of splinters and fragments fell around us like hail. We had to jump out nearly immediately, having had time to put out only part of the lamps.

During that time the officers had divided into two groups each of which was keeping watch over the entrance of its passage, having decided to sell their lives at a high price if they did not succeed in getting away alive.

The bullets crossed through the thin iron partitions threatening to hit one of us at any moment. Mingled with their buzzing and the sound of the falling fragments of glass, we heard the wild cries, the abuse and the threats of the crowd of murderers.

The space which we had taken possession of, united two passages leading to the admiral's saloon, and had no deck portholes in it. But on the other hand it had a ladder leading to the upper deck and the entrance of the hatch-way was surrounded for the winter by a light wooden superstructure. The bullets, passing easily through its walls reached us, so very soon the sub-lieutenant T. T. Vorobieff was badly wounded in the chest and the stomach, and one of the orderlies was killed.

After a time, as the siege continued, I proposed to the officers to go up to the crew and try to bring them to their senses.

We went . . . I went in front; but as soon as I stepped on deck, several bullets whistled over my head and I saw that for the moment it was impossible to go out and that we would have to continue sustaining the siege downstairs.

This abominable shooting at the officers had continued for three quarters of an hour, when we heard the following cry near the hatch-way: "Sub-lieutenant R. on deck". This sub-lieutenant had always been a favourite with the crew and therefore I advised him to go up, as evidently no danger could await him, on the contrary, they wanted to save him; and at the same time he could help us in persuading the crew to be quiet.

But the firing continued nevertheless, and seeing no end to it, I decided upon going to the crew, but this time alone.

Having gone up the ladder and having opened the door of the wooden superstructure, I saw before me one of the young sailors with a rifle pointed at me and about twenty steps farther a throng of about hundred men were standing gloomily silent. Small groups of men were running about the deck firing and screaming something. It was nearly dark, so the faces could not be recognized.

I went up swiftly to the crowd, from which two sailors detached themselves. Coming towards me they called out: "come quickly to us, Captain". Running into the crowd I jumped up on an elevation, and taking advantage of the general consternation, I turned to the men with the following speech: "Sailors, I am your Captain, I always was your well-wisher, and now I have come to help you to make out what is going on, and to keep you from falling into error. I am alone before you, and you can easily kill me, but listen to me and tell me: what do you want, why have you attacked your officers? What wrong have they done to you?"

Suddenly I remarked that next to me was a workman, evidently an agitator, who interrupted me and began to cry: "bloodsuckers, you have drunk our blood, we will make short work with you" So as not to let his cries act on the crowd, I called out in answer: "Let him explain, who and whose blood has been drunk." Then suddenly a voice from the crowd said: "they gave us fish for dinner," and another added: "the officers did not let us speak to you." I answered instantly: "It is not true, for I questioned you all once a month to know what your complaints were, and I always told you, that if any one of you wanted to speak privately with me, he could say so, and a time would be appointed for it. Do I say the truth or not?"

And a sigh of relief escaped from me, when I heard in answer the murmur of voices: "It is true, it is true, they tell lies, we have nothing against you."

In that moment heartrending screams were heard, and I saw two warrant-officers with their heads all covered with blood, who were dragged on deck, and shot then and there; after which the murderers came up to the crowd and began shouting: "What are you listening to him for, throw him over board, there is no necessity for pity." And from the stern exclamations were heard: "The officers have killed the watch at the safe."

Taking advantage of this evident lie, I said aloud: "It is a lie, don't believe them, I relieved him myself to protect him from their bullets".

During that time, the crowd which surrounded me increased rapidly and I saw that a great part of the crew was passing over to my side, and therefore I continued to speak with more assurance, telling them that in time of war all mutinies and disorders were very harmful to Russia and very advantageous to the enemy, that the latter reckons upon them, etc. etc.

Suddenly some unknown sailors came up to our crowd shouting: "Disperse, we are going to take him up on our bayonets." The crowd around me instantly became quite silent, whilst I grasped my pistol convulsively. Seeing the murderers approaching nearer, I thought: my pistol has 9 shots in all; I shall fire eight at these villains, and kill myself with the ninth."

But in this moment a thing happened which I did not at all expect. About fifty men of the crowd which surrounded me detached themselves from the rest and went to meet the murderers; "we shall not allow our Captain to be injured". Then the rest of the crowd began to call out also, and to forbid them to touch me. The murderers retreated. . . .

Having thus escaped death, I again addressed myself to the crew, praying them to save the other officers; I was quite tired out and hoarse; my voice did not obey me any longer and I had to be silent involuntarily. The agitators who were standing near could certainly take advantage of this to recommence exciting the crowd against me therefore, to get out of this dangerous situation, Sub-lieutenants B. and R., who had been called on deck

by the crew, called out loud: "Well, let us lift up our Captain with an "hurrah", and I was instantly caught up and thrown up in the air.

This was a victory and I was definitely safe. But the other officers were in great danger yet, and as I heard the firing at them continue, I decided upon speaking about them again. As all this was going on in the open air and I was without my overcoat, I felt very chilly; the sailors remarked this, and one of them offered me his cloak. But I refused it and was decided we would go into the nearest casemate. There again I addressed the crew and requested them to save the officers; I asked them to give me their word of honour, that no hand would be lifted against them, and I would go to them and ask them to surrender their pistols, after which they would be arrested in the Admiral's saloon and a watch would guard them. At this they answered: "No, for before you reach them, you will be killed". Then the idea struck me that it would be better to make the officers come to my casemate; this was very risky, but in remaining in the forepart of the ship, they would inevitably be all shot.

The crew consented to this, but on condition that one of the sailors would speak through the telephone instead of myself. I had, of course, to consent; but so as to let the officers know that I was alive, and not to let them think that they were going to be entrapped into a snare, I stood near the telephone and dictated in a loud voice what was to be told them. In this way the officers heard my voice, and they understood that the summons came from me.

Later, it was known that when the gang of murderers saw that the greatest part of the crew was on my side, they urgently improvised a tribunal, which, without much deliberation, condemned all the officers to be shot. By this they wanted, evidently, to legalize their murders in the eyes of the other part of the crew, and to avoid reprisals later.

While the telephone negotiations with the officers were going on, a sailor from the "Pavel I" came into the casemate and asked in an insolent, cynical way: "Well, have you finished with the officers? Are they all killed? You must not be slow about it." But he received the rough answer: "We know ourselves what we have to do"—and the villain, put out of countenance, disappeared very quickly.

Soon all the officers came over safely to my casemate and one could read in their pale faces, how many dreadful moments they had had to live through in this short period of time. The badly wounded Sub-lieutenant T. T. Vorobieff, was also brought here. They seated him on a chair, and to all the questions that were put him, he only laughed madly. The unfortunate boy had entirely lost his mind during these two hours. I asked the junior doctor to take him to the hospital. Two sailors volunteered to accompany him, and taking him under the arms, they went out together with the doctor. As it turned out later, they killed him on the way, in the presence of the doctor.

Once more having requested the crew's promise that they would not touch the disarmed officers, I and all the rest delivered our pistols. After that we all went into the admiral's saloon, at the door of which a sentry was placed who had the order from the crew: "Not to let anybody out, except the Captain".

It was lucky that the crew was yet sober and could be talked to; but I feared very much that they would be taught to break into the wine-cellar and then nothing could have saved us. Therefore I persuaded the crew to put a sentry near the wine-cellars.

Time passed, but on the ship it was not yet quiet and the gang of murderers were continuing their work. We heard firing and the last screams of new victims. They were hunting up the warrant-officers and the petty-officers, who had hid in different quarters of the ship. It was dreadful that I could do nothing to protect them.

We were left alone for the moment, and I sat generally in my cabin, from which I could see the door of the passage, or I was with the officers.

Suddenly, I heard a noise in the passage and saw several men of the crew running towards me. I went to meet them and asked what they wanted. They answered with dreadfully frightened voices that a battalion was coming from the fortress: "Help us, we don't know what to do". I gave orders not to let a single man from the outside come on board. They answered "tak tochno"¹⁾, and began to beg me humbly to take their command.

Then I went up, ordered the gang-board to be taken off and the crew stood near the 120 m/m guns and machine-guns. We cast light on the crowd with a search-light; it was passing over the ice, past our ship, and had, evidently an other aim, for it went by without paying the least attention to us, and disappeared in the direction of the town. As it was known afterwards the crowd was on its way to kill all the officers they met, and they even pulled them out of their apartments for that purpose. After the crew, which had been so brave when the killing of a handful of unarmed men was in question, and so frightened at the first shade of danger, that they begged humbly the help of those whom they just had wanted to kill, got quiet, I went down to my cabin.

While I was on the upper deck I saw that on all the ships sinistre red lights were burning, and on our neighbour "Pavel I" flashes of fire were continually seen coming from rifle shots.

All the rest of the night was passed by the officers and myself without sleep and we were expecting every moment something to happen, for we did not trust the crew. But at last, about 6 o'clock, day began to dawn and immediately our hearts became lighter. The shots on the ship had ceased definitely and everything seemed quiet. Then I went into my cabin, thinking I would take a little rest. On looking round I saw that the walls, the writing-table and the berth were full of bullet holes and the floor was covered with splinters of wood and fragments of broken glass from the port-holes.

It was a sad sight to see the cabin of a Captain of a battle-ship in this state in war-time, not after action with the enemy, but with his own crew! . . .

Later, from conversations with the officers I learned in what circumstances Admiral Nebolsine had been killed. It appears that after his talk with me, he went down on the ice, but had not had time to cross it when shots were fired at him. He turned back immediately to the ship and when he was going up the gang-way, two shots were fired point blank at him, and he fell dead.

As to the watch-keeper, Lieutenant G. A. Boubnoff, he was killed while trying to make the sentry obey him. He had caught hold of the rifle of one of the sailors, but at the same moment was killed by someone from the after-bridge. The bodies of the Admiral and Lieutenant Boubnoff were taken to the dead-house but not until they had been rifled of everything they had on them.

¹⁾ Meaning exactly so: answer used before the revolution from inferior to superior.

Next morning the crew chose a ship committee, which, of course, was composed of the most notorious of the villains and brawlers. At the same time a "Court of Justice" was constituted, and commissioned to judge all the officers. It was not long in justifying the confidence reposed in it, and condemned five officers to be shot, among them the junior medical officer, who was condemned apparently, only because he had been an eye witness of the cowardly murder of the wounded Sub-lieutenant Vorobieff.

In the evening the members of the ship committee came to me with the verdict of the Court and declared their intention of reading it to the officers. Now a new difficulty was before me—that of delaying the carrying out of the verdict in the hope of persuading the men to abandon it entirely. To begin with, I proposed to the committee to bring the condemned officers over to my cabin on condition that I should not be allowed to enter there without the members of the committee or they without me. They consented to this and the unfortunate officers were taken over to my cabin, whilst the others were set free but not allowed to go ashore.

I passed two days in endless talk, trying to persuade the crew to cancel their absurd verdict, but all was in vain. Meanwhile, it was impossible to obtain any further delay, and the sentence was to be carried out next day at three o'clock. I decided then to try, as a last hope of saving the condemned officers: to take advantage of the arrival of the members of the Provisional Government, and so began to endeavour to influence the crew in that direction, saying it was strange that the members of the government had visited all the ships except ours. And really it was strange that they had not come to us, for their help was particularly needed and the C. C. Admiral Maksimoff could not ignore this fact.

At last, next morning, I succeeded in persuading the crew to invite Rodicheff, who was one of the deputies. Under the control of one of the members of the committee, I gave the invitation, at 10 o'clock in the morning in the name of the crew so as to make it appear that they desired to see Rodicheff that very day on the ship. I tried to word the invitation in such a manner that it would be understood, that if he did not come, more tragedies might ensue.

But not being very sure that my request would be complied with I rang up again after an hour and told them at the Staff that the crew was expecting Rodicheff and that it was necessary to hasten his coming.

At 1 o'clock I rang up again and was assured that Rodicheff would come at 2 p. m. I told them that must be the very limit of time as the crew would wait no longer, and I repeated: "You understand me." The answer was: "We understand you and it will be done."

After that began an anxious period of expectation. Time was passing rapidly; it was soon nearly two o'clock, and only one hour remained before the verdict was to be carried out. If Rodicheff, in spite of my request, did not arrive, the last hope of succour would disappear, and the 5 unfortunate officers would be shot before our eyes.

At last two o'clock struck and in a few minutes I was informed that Rodicheff was on his way to us in a motor-car.

Coming on deck he asked me in a whisper whether there were any arrested officers. I answered that five of them were expecting every minute the execution of their death sentences.

Rodicheff's speech in favour of the officers made a great impression on the crew and they carried him on their shoulders to the motor-car shouting: hurrah! The arrested officers were released and the verdict annulled.

Thus ended the torture of those three days and except the Admiral, two officers and several warrant-officers, all the other victims were saved. But the memory of these three horrible days still remains and they have left for ever a deep impress on our souls.

Nevertheless, the crew was not quite quiet yet, and agitators were making speeches from morning to night, trying to arouse them against the officers and especially to destroy my influence; they could not pardon it having been of more weight than all their propaganda.

We passed all our evenings until late at night with the officers in the ward-room. They did not wish to go to their cabins as they were persuaded that they would be murdered that very night, each one of them separately.

The result of all these incidents was, that two officers lost their reason entirely and had to be taken to the hospital; and three warrant-officers also went mad, one of whom was taken down from the loop of a strap with which he had hung himself in his cabin. Another, having put on his full uniform, came out of his cabin calling out that he would go directly to the Captain and tell him who had killed whom. This did not please the murderers and they immediately shot him.

The following days were passed in propaganda against me. The incident with Rodicheff was explained to the crew, showing how they had been deceived. After that the rumour was started that the officers, wishing to avenge themselves, had decided to blow up the ship and to drown all the sailors. All this had effect, although it did not result in an open mutiny but all the time one could feel an under current of excitement, and we had to be always on guard. I had to clear up the silliest misunderstandings and to try to calm the men and entreat them to look at things more critically. I succeeded up to a point, but there was no guarantee that suddenly excesses would not break out again.

Soon after I was appointed to the post of the murdered Chief of Division; and I had to struggle now with three ships on which complete dissoluteness reigned; it was not in vain that our division acquired the name of "convicts division" after the revolution.

After a time, again great excitement could be noted amongst the men, and a repetition of the march events was to be feared. The reason of this was propaganda in favour of the officers' shoulder-strips and the sergeants, chevrons being taken off, as they were considered as a glaring distinction of the "old regime".

When the C. C. was informed of this, he said he would communicate immediately with the Government about the desirability of a change in the uniform of the whole personnel of the Fleet, and ask that it should be hence forward without the shoulder-strips.

One day, when I arrived on the ship, I was met by the non commissioned officers without their chevrons and the executive officer reported that the crew were getting excited and requested the officers to take off their shoulder-strips immediately. I instantly summoned the ship-committees from all the ships of the division and explained to them how the matter stood, and told them that it was necessary to wait until the question of the changes in uniform should be worked out, and until the officers had had time to get new outfits. The committees were quite of my opinion and promised to calm the crews.

While these negotiations were going on, I was twice informed that the behaviour of the crew on the "Andrei" was getting more and more threatening. When the conference was ended and I went into the passage, I saw the executive officer and several others, very agitated, who looked at me in an appealing manner, as if expecting me to come forward in their defence.

Then I decided to put an end to all this and to protect the officers from new danger. Going on deck, I ordered in a loud voice the signal to be hoisted: "In view of the imminent change in the insignias of the fleet, I propose that the officers and the warrant-officers take off their shoulder straps, and the sergeants—their chevrons." When all the ships had answered to this signal, I took off my own shoulder-straps. I was watched; but not a muscle trembled in my face, I think, though tears were nearly choking me

But this was quite enough for me; it was evident that such mogueries would have no end. Therefore I decided to leave the division on the first convenient occasion, and in general, to abandon the naval service as it was becoming clear that there was no improvement to expect, but that it was every day nearer to complete desintegration.

While the above was taking place on the "Andrei Pervozvanny", on the neighbouring "Imperator Pavel I" still more dreadful events were going on.

A mutiny began and the navigating-officer, Lieutenant B. K. Lange, was pierced through by the bayonets of the men on deck, under pretence that he was an agent of the political police; in reality, of course, it was a lie.

Hearing the noise caused by this murder, the executive officer, the Senior-Lieutenant V. A. Janovsky, went immediately on deck, having previously sent the officer on duty: Sub-lieutenant Shoumansky to tell all the other officers to join their companies. Having transmitted this order Sub-lieutenant Shoumansky and several other officers quickly went along the passages to their companies. In the passage a group of sailors met them; Shoumansky got through quite accidentally, but the next officer, Lieutenant Savinsky, was stopped, and the sailors asked him not to go any further as he would be killed. Lieutenant Savinsky was completely disarmed, therefore at this warning he lifted up his arms and said: "well, kill me" . . . and at that moment he was killed by a hammer blow on the nape of his neck. It was the stoker who had killed him, sneaking up from behind; the murderer's name was Roudonok and he was a peasant of the government of Poltava.

When the sailors who had warned Savinsky, wanted to carry him to the hospital, the murderer gave him several more blows on the head. With this same hammer the stoker Roudionok killed Shoumansky who had escaped the crowd at first, and also Sub-lieutenant Boulitch.

The executive officer, who had tried on the upper deck to bring the crew to their senses, was seized by them, beaten with the first thing they caught hold of, dragged by the feet to the ship's side and thrown over on to the ice.

The Captain of the ship, S. N. Dmitrieff, did not decide himself to step forward in defence of his officers, and did not try to calm the crew, but remained during all these crucial moments sitting in the ward-room, leaving each one to act as he thought best!!!

After evening prayer on the cruiser "Diana", the executive officer Commander B. N. Rybkine, read the Manifest of the Abdication of the Emperor and of the Grand Duke Michail Alexandrovitch. In answer, several hesitating "hurrahs" were heard, but they were silent immediately after the executive officer had called out: "What are you shouting for, fools."

At that moment at the top-masts of all the neighbouring ships red lights appeared; when this was reported to the executive officer, he went up on deck with several other officers and from there on to the bridge where the red lamp was switched the light off the crew gathered round in groups and wanted to get on the bridge to show the light again but the executive officer would not let them, and to stop further attempts he had the wire cut.

When it was remarked on the neighbouring cruiser "Gromoboy" that the "Diana" had no red light, shouting and swearing began and cries of: "Light the red lantern; don't you recognize it (it meant the revolution) if you are not quick about it we shall fire . . ."

The crew of the "Diana" became quite disconcerted and asked the executive officer to allow the red lantern to be lit, to stop the tumult on the neighbouring ships. Permission was given and the light was lit.

Soon after, the Chief of the Division Captain Pyshnoff came on board our cruiser to find out the state of mind of the crew, and told the officers to carry no weapons, so as not to excite suspicion among the men.

The crew continued quiet, and the officers mingled with the men in the forecabin or sat in the ward-room; by order of the Staff of the Fleet delegates were sent there. About midnight all went to sleep.

At about 2 a. m. a group of sailors came over from the First Division of battle-ships and asked whether all was quite right on the cruiser, having received an affirmative answer they immediately went away.

In the morning, about 8 o'clock delegates from the crew entered the ward-room and announced that the officers were to consider themselves under arrest, and were to remain in their cabins, but they tried to console them, saying it would not last long. The officers protested, but it was all in vain, so they had to submit. The negotiations were conducted in a conciliatory manner, in proof of which the crew proposed to the officers that two or three should stay together in each cabin, so as not to feel dull. A sentry was placed in the passage and all the rest of the crew left the officers' quarters.

The reason of the order of arrest was, that two officers having got up in the morning and having gone to take their coffee, instead of sitting down near the table, sat near the open portholes through which they could be seen by the passers by on the ice. Seeing such a "bourgeois" picture, the sailors of the battle-ships declared to the crew of the "Diana", that if they did not arrest their officers immediately, they would come and put things in order themselves; then the crew consented to comply with the demand, so as not to have a dispute over the matter.

At about 2 o'clock all the officers, except the executive officer, the navigation-officer, the first torpedo-officer and the pay-master, were let free. At the same time the crew begged the first gunnery-officer to take command until the return of the Captain who was on leave, and the second gunnery-officer to be executive officer. Later, after much discussion with the officers, the crew consented at last to set free the torpedo-officer and the pay-master, but as to the executive officer, and the navigation-officer, they declared that they did not trust them and would not serve with them, and therefore they had to remain in custody. But at last the crew consented to set them free also, on condition that they should immediately leave the cruiser. Understanding the seriousness of the moment, both officers immediately consented to go, and went rapidly up on deck. All the officers accompanied them there, and the ship committee was present and asked to be allowed to search them to be sure they had no weapons with them. Both officers themselves showed

them that they were completely disarmed; then the committee claimed that a convoy should accompany them to the shore, to which they did not object either, and two men went with them. When their group was already at some distance from the ship, and the town was still far off—they saw that several men in sailor's dress and winter caps without ribbons were coming in their direction with rifles.

Having come up to the arrested officers they sent away the convoy, and themselves fired several shots point blank at the unfortunate officers. They instantly fell down bleeding to death, as they were wounded in several places.

The navigation-officer though badly wounded, did not immediately lose consciousness, he saw the murderers go up to the Commander Rybkine, who was lying without movement, but was still breathing heavily, they finished him by blows with the butt end of their rifles and firing several times more. Only when they were quite convinced that he was dead, did they go up to the navigation-officer. He pretended to be dead, and they, having touched him and given him several blows with the butt end of their rifles, left him. Those men-beasts, had killed two men as if they had done the most ordinary deed and went away with an air of having fulfilled their duty!

Soon after this, the navigation-officer lost consciousness. When he came back to his senses he saw that it was already getting dark and that a boy of about fifteen, a Finn, was passing by. He called to him in a weak voice, asked him to help him to get up and to take him to some house. The boy came immediately; the officer got up with great difficulty and both making great efforts, they advanced slowly. But it was not an easy task, the boy was too weak and the officer could hardly stand. Thus, falling, resting and crawling they succeeded in getting a little aside from the road. There the boy left the officer and ran to fetch a cab from the town.

After a time he arrived in a sledge and together with the cabman they put the wounded man at the bottom of the sledge and covered him with the fur cover. An hour later he was lying in a private hospital with washed and bandaged wounds. And after a month's time, though he had had three shots through his body, his health was so much better, that he could go secretly to Petersburg and afterwards escape abroad. All the time of his illness, the staff of the hospital carefully protected him from any encounter with the crew of the "Diana" and even concealed that he was an officer. Certainly the fact, that all thought him dead, rendered the task easier

In the First Flotilla of mine-sweepers the crew were also in a very excited state of mind, but they committed no murders, except on the mine-sweeper "Retivy", whose Captain was killed together with Lieutenant A. N. Repninsky and Sub-lieutenant D. N. Tchaikofsky.

Most part of the officers of the 1st Division were absent at that time, but as soon as the alarming news was received, all of them returned to their ships. One of the Captains, Senior-Lieutenant V. N. Koulibine, returning to his mine-sweeper, met on his way a big crowd of sailors, soldiers and workmen. They threw themselves upon him, and wanted to arrest him, and would have killed him there and then if the sailors of his division had not protected him; thanks to them, he was allowed to go. On arriving on his ship, he did not remark anything particular; the crew were quite quiet and dwell disposed towards him as he was liked by them. Having talked some time with them about the events of the moment, Koulibine went down to his cabin.

After a time he suddenly heard that some one was calling him from the upper deck. Having gone up, he saw a sailor from the "Retivy" standing at the head of the ladder with a pistol in his hand. As he had a threatening look about him, Koulibine wanted to go down and fetch his pistol; but it was too late, several shots resounded and he fell down wounded by two bullets. The sailor continued shooting till one of the bullets of his pistol having struck against the steel wall of the hatch, rebounded and hit him in the stomach, he fell down and the crew immediately carried them both to the hospital, where the murderer, after several hours of great suffering, died.

Koulibine was very badly wounded as one of the bullets had touched the spine, and he remained lying for more than a year without being able to move, for his legs and arms were paralysed. His murderer was numbered as one of the "victims of the revolution" and was solemnly buried in a red coffin. . . .

There were some more officers killed in the mine-sweeper Division, but not by their own crews, but by quite unknown men in sailors' dress. They killed the Captain of the "Vzpyv", Commander K. P. Hildebrandt, the Captain of the mine-sweeper No. 218, Senior-Lieutenant A. K. Lvoff, and the Captain of the mine-sweeper "Minrep" Lieutenant A. G. Boye.

On the first day of the revolution a large crowd of sailors and soldiers armed with rifles and pistols, assembled on the wall next to which lay the Patrol-Division, and made a great deal of noise requesting the officers to be given up to them. Hearing that something wrong was going on on shore, several officers and sailors came up on their decks; among them was the Captain of the "Metky" Senior-Lieutenant P. G. Witt.

Seeing what it was, and having ascertained that nothing threatened his destroyer he turned and was on the point of descending, when he was killed by a rifle shot fired at him by a soldier in the crowd. In the same manner were killed the Captains of the supply-ship "Kunitza", Lieutenant A. P. Efimoff, and Lieutenant Count V. M. Podgoritchani-Petrovitch, Captain of the net-layer "Zeia".

On the very first day of the revolution those same murderers, apparently, appeared on the floating booms to which the 9th and the 5th Flotillas of Destroyers were moored. It was about midday, when nearly all the crew had gone to the Railwaystation Place and evidently reckoning upon this, the gang first came up to the 9th Flotilla and requested the watchmen to give up their officers. But the watchmen sent them away, not allowing them even to come on deck; then they went to the 5th Flotilla. The watchman on the nearest destroyer "Ameer Boukharsky" was absent at the time. Having received "liberty", he began to make use of it in the widest sense, and therefore, without waiting to be relieved he went to dine. The wretches went down to the ward-room without interference, three officers were sitting there dining: the senior Lieutenant Varsar, Sub-lieutenants Laudansky and Neuberger. Having murdered them in the most brutal manner, the assassins quickly disappeared. Most likely they intended to get rid of the officers on the other ships in the same way, but they were accidentally remarked by the orderly of one of the officers who was taking the second course into the ward-room; he immediately gave the alarm and the criminals fled and disappeared from the booms fearing to be pursued.

The evening before on this same Flotilla, the Captain of the destroyer "Ussurietz", Commander M. M. Polivanoff, and the engineer Lieutenant A. N. Pleshkoff were killed. The Captain of the "Gaidamak" hearing shots,

sent Sub-lieutenant Bittenbinder to enquire what had happened; but the latter had scarcely stepped on deck, when several bullets of a Nagan-pistol were fired at him nearly point blank, three of which wounded him in the abdomen. He fell down instantly but he had yet the strength to crawl from the gangway to the bow of the "Ussuriets", from whence he was taken by the crew of the neighbouring "Vsadnik" and carried over to his own ship but he died. After several hours of suffering. The whole crew of the "Gaidamak" was present at his funeral for they regretted him very much. But at the same time, the sailors considered that he was an inevitable victim of the revolution, and therefore justified his murder committed by the crew of the "Ussuriets".

On the second or the third day of the revolution the Commander of Sveaborg Harbour, Lieutenant-General V. N. Protopopoff, and the young naval-constructor L. G. Kiriloff, were killed. The first was a very humane, kindly man and all loved him, as to the latter, he had only just began service and had not yet had time to distinguish himself in any way. So that it cannot be said that the relations between officers and men had anything to do with these murders. In fact they were committed by unknown assassins from behind a corner, who were able to get away to escape their deserts.

But it was not everywhere that the murderers succeeded in their abominable deeds. When, for instance, they came to the dreadnoughts and requested the officers to be given up to them, they were answered by the guards being summoned and that made them disperse rapidly.

Only a few minutes were given them to leave the cruiser "Rossia", and they were threatened that fire would be opened against them if they disobeyed.

Thus went the revolution on the Fleet, on shore the murders of officers took place in still more dreadful conditions. They were killed in the street, or in their lodgings where the murderers broke in, or in the offices where they worked, and they were inhumanly mocked at during their last moments. But even this did not satisfy this crowd of brutal murderers, they disfigured the dead and did not allow relatives or friends who witnessed these atrocities to go near the bodies.

It is said that the body of one of the officers was placed standing in the corner of the dead-house by these monsters, and then they ran up to him with all sorts of grimaces and contortions saying: "See how he stands! . . . Well, stand, stand . . . we also stood upright before you formerly! . . .

It was even made impossible to bury those martyrs in the way they deserved by their death; mockery was to be feared at the funeral ceremonies; and the revolutionary organisations, and the revolutionary chief of the fleet did not take upon themselves to ensure order. The bodies were secretly taken to the cemetery and quickly interred. At first no inscriptions could be placed on their crosses, because there were some villains who used to stroll about the cemeteries and write abominable words upon them.

The next days passed quietly and the murders of officers in Helsingfors nearly ceased, except for a few isolated instances. But what had been done—could not be undone, and the "bloodless" revolution in Helsingfors cost the life of thirty eight naval officers, not counting the army officers. Most of them perished at the hands of mysterious murderers in the dress of sailors and soldiers; but some fell victims to the crews of their own ships!

In analysing the motives for these murders in connection with the mutual relations of the officers and men, it is impossible not to come to the conclusion

that all that happened was an organized campaign of murder and not unpremeditated crime. But with what aim?

All kinds of suppositions were mooted to explain the real reason of the murder of our unfortunate officers. Some attributed the crimes to German agents who committed them with the idea of weakening the war capacity of the Fleet; others—to a mysterious organization; the more so, that a list of all the officers who were to be killed, was found in the town, and on this list were all the Captains, the executive-officers and all the senior-specialists. If the murders had been committed strictly in accordance with this list, the Fleet would have been left without any leaders or guides. But, in any case, it was clear to everybody that these excesses had been engineered artificially, by propaganda, that they had been committed by hired murderers and were not due to an outbreak of indignation on account of the behaviour of the higher ranks to wards their inferiors.

A long time afterwards one of the best known representatives of the Bolsheviks, a Jewish lawyer Spitzberg, in talking with several naval-officers, threw light upon this drama. He announced quite frankly that the murders had been organized by the Bolsheviks in the name of the revolution. They had to use this means, as their hopes that the hardness of the conditions of life, of the regime and lastly the revolution would bring on automatically the murder of the officers, had resulted in nothing. "Two or three days had already elapsed from the beginning of the revolution" said Spitzberg, "and the Baltic Fleet, intelligently guided by its Chief, Admiral Nepenine, continued quiet. Then we were obliged, before it was too late, to "deepen" the revolution by separating the officers from the men, and creating a gulf of hat red and distrust between them. For this reason Admiral Nepenine was murdered as well as the other officers, the gulf was made, there was no able guide now, the officers looked on the sailors as on murderers, and the sailors feared the officers' vengeance in case of reaction"

Spitzberg was right: we shall never forget those days, those murders. But we will not lay the responsibility on the fooled sailors, but on the organizers and leaders of the revolution.

Those murders were dreadful, but what was still more dreadful—was that they were condemned by no one. Did society demand investigation into them, did it condemn them? . . . But what can be worse than the fact, that the minister of War and of the Navy in the new government, Goutchkoff, himself sanctioned the bestowing of the Cross of St. George on the sergeant of the Reserve Battalion of the Volynsky regiment, Kirpichnikoff, for having killed the commander of his battalion!

In those days Messrs Kerensky, Goutchkoff, Lwoff and others, proclaimed an amnesty for all such murderers and thus condoned their deeds in the name of the revolution, and legalized them after the first outbreak of the revolution had calmed down. On them is, therefore, the responsibility for the blood shed by these hired murderers, who had been sent to "create the gulf"; they deserved the eternal curses of those to whom their victims were dear, and of all Russia as well! . .

The crosses on the graves in Helsingfors church-yards will be a reproach to these men, for ever, and will cry for vengeance

In each of the other harbours of the Baltic sea the revolution had its particular character, and passed off quietly or violently; according to the disposition of the crews of the various ships, and principally on the attention propagandists had paid to the different places.

The second base of the Fleet was Reval; the First-Cruiser Division, the submarine Flotilla and part of the Destroyer-Force passed the winter there. They were all ships which had been much at sea, and which had been often in contact with the enemy; therefore the men were much more alive than on the dreadnoughts and the battle-ships. The men were more united, knew their officers better and having been many times in trying situations together, had learned to appreciate their chiefs, understanding how difficult it was to replace them.

On the 14th of March the ships were informed of the revolution which had taken place in Petersburg and of the power having passed to the Provisional Committee of the Douma. After that came the news of the Emperor's abdication for himself and for the Tsesarevitch. The men received these tidings calmly, there were no disorders on the ships and not a single naval-officer was killed. The men addressed themselves to their officers for explanations of facts concerning current events, asked their advice and treated them all the time with due respect. Discipline on the ships was not relaxed at all, but became even more severe; the crew tried to perform their duties more conscientiously and watched each other; everyone wished to continue fighting and no one wanted to hear about peace.

The calm attitude of the crews towards current events made it possible for the officers to organize, on the lines of the revolutionnary organization of the sailors, an alliance for the defence of officers' rights, and for the regulation of the new situation.

In town the revolution did not pass off as quietly: then a big mob released the prisoners, burnt the prison and then did the same with the guard-house. During the conflict, the watch-keeper was killed; an army ensign and the Commander of the Fortress who came to try to calm the rioters, was beaten.

In Moonsound, in the foremost position, the battle-ship "Tsesarevitch" and the cruiser "Admiral Makaroff" lay all winter; the news of the revolution did not at all mar the relations between the officers and men.

In a third large port, where the active Fleet had no base during the War and only some school- and transport-ships lay, was a great number of young sailors, who were being drilled and taught in special classes; there also were assembled companies of old sailors who had been dismissed from the ships for bad behaviour and had served their time of punishment in the prisons and the disciplinary battalion.

This harbour afforded, on account of the kind of sailors who lived there, fertile soil for rebellion. The young sailors of 1917 began service having already been the objects of propaganda, and very unwilling to fight. In their villages already, they had been taught by revolutionaries, that it was quite unnecessary to fight, that the chiefs, who lived splendidly at the cost of the treasury expenses, did nothing but oppress their subordinates. And thus they were quite ready to listen to any secret propaganda and to accept the idea of "peace at any price" and to look upon the officers as their worst enemies. It is useless to speak about those sailors who had been fined, or had been in prison or in the disciplinary battalions, they were always ready for any outbreak, especially as they had nothing to lose.

The Commander in Chief and military Governor of Cronstadt was Admiral R. N. Viren; he was somewhat imperious but of straight-forward and brave character.

There were scarcely any active-service officers in Cronstadt; the greater part of the chiefs of Staff and naval institutions had already long ago lost

all contact with the Active Fleet; and those officers who were passing the courses of the Torpedo-school, and were sent there for the winter to study, had no relations whatever with the crews, and the sailors of Cronstadt did not know them at all, neither did the officers know the Cronstadt sailors.

The sailors there were under command of officers belonging to the Admiralty, many of whom had passed over from the Army; and others were Sub-lieutenants and noncommissioned officers of the merchant fleet, who had been promoted during War.

The officers of the Admiralty were not at all prepared for managing the sailors, and did not understand them, and the latter, considering them as interlopers did not treat them with enough respect, especially as they were "army"-officers. As to the sub-lieutenants and the noncommissioned officers, they had no authority with the men, being only provisionally their chiefs; they could not therefore develop in their subordinates a proper spirit.

At the head of all schools was Vice-Admiral A. D. Sapsai, a very reserved man with no energy, who kept very aloof from the men and whom they scarcely knew.

The number of sailors in these schools was 3000. On account of the scarcity of officers they passed the whole time in classes, during the drilling, and all the evenings, under the command of the sergeants and the instructors. The latter were not very reliable, and as they were very much in demand, those who seemed to be more or less suitable, and who consented to undertake the task had to be taken on. The scholar-sailors did not respect their instructors at all, on the contrary, the latter let themselves be influenced by the sailors. And in this way a propitious state of things was created for the spreading of propaganda.

Whilst in the last days of February the outlook in Petrograd was growing gloomier, life in Cronstadt ran peacefully and normally. Though it was quite close to Petrograd it had been forgotten in those moments of general confusion and neither the Ministry of the Navy nor the C. C. had given any instructions to the chief Cronstadt authorities. The circumstances were still more complicated by the fact that Vice-Admiral A. P. Kurosch was appointed Commander of the Fortress in the place of Major-General Daniloff; which fact provoked the discontent of land-forces as did also an order to remove guns of small calibre from the forts. The agitators specially availed themselves of the latter fact in order to spread among the population rumours of treason and intentional disarmament of the fortress in order that the enemy should take it the more easily!

All these circumstances helped the agitators to incite the land forces to revolt first; these were joined during the night of March 14th by the ship crews. During the night the arsenal was plundered, and at 6 a. m. began the "bloodless" revolution which cost the gallant Admirals Viren, Boutakoff and Rein, as well as many other naval and army officers their lives.

But very few of the eye-witnesses of the Cronstadt events could form a clear idea, in the light of events, how the revolution occurred; for that reason the following extracts from the diary of Admiral Viren's wife are particularly precious: she remained with her husband almost all the time and having escaped from Cronstadt on March 18th, wrote down everything that had occurred:

"March 9th: In the morning the garrison was reviewed in the presence of the Minister of the Navy. At 4 p. m. the Minister suddenly left for Petro-

grad without inspecting the harbour and without staying the night, as had been intended.

March 10th and 11th: Saturday and Sunday passed off quite normally. As usual our Petrograd relations came for a couple of days. I went to mass. At 6 p. m. Kurosch came and dined with us. He stayed with us til 10 p. m. conversing all the time in a friendly and quiet way.

March 12th: Our relations left for Petrograd with the morning train without saying good bye to my husband, who as usual was making before midday an inspection of the institutions under his orders:

Having learned that they had left, my husband regretted that I had not induced them to stay with us in Cronstadt where it was quieter, whilst disorders had already begun in Petrograd.

The day passed off working in the clothing-depot. At 9 p. m. I left the house to have some fresh air. It was quiet and peaceful everywhere. Having come back home, I learned that a military council had assembled in my husband's study after which he went down to the sea-coast together with the Commander of the fortress. They came back at 11 p. m. and passed into the dining-room for tea, where were Boutakoff, my daughter and myself.

Though events in Petrograd were taking a serious turn, there seemed no cause for anxiety in Cronstadt.

General Alexejff had asked the Fortress-Commander by telegraph from the Headquarters whether he could at the Emperor's command and if necessary, send two artillery regiments to be at General Ivanoff's disposal. Kurosch replied in the negative because he did not feel sure these regiments would be faithful to the Government on their arrival.

The Fortress-Commander also mentioned a curious question which Engelhardt, a Duma member, had put him by telegraph: "Are you for us or against us?" "I cannot say either YES or NO", was Kurosch's reply, "I am watching over the fortress entrusted to me." "Come here", proposed Engelhardt. "But can you guarantee me a free passage to Petrograd and back?" asked Kurosch. And the conversation ended with the Fortress-Commander's statement, he could not leave the fortress.

Though the admirals were quiet, even they expressed astonishment at not receiving any instructions: When taking leave of his guests my husband expressed his conviction that it was necessary to publish an appeal to the town population, and to the workmen and troops, and he requested the Fortress-Commander to prepare an appeal to the troops.

Then together with me my husband passed into his study and wrote the following: "Workmen of the harbour of Cronstadt and inhabitants of the town. You certainly know already the events in Petrograd and you cannot help being troubled by them. Accept my paternal advice and request: let every one of you go on with his business and remember that on this depends not only general but also personal welfare."

The Fortress-Commander also sent through his A. D. C. an appeal whose contents were somewhat as follows: "The fortress must defend itself against the external foe and in accordance with Peter the Great's command, defend it to the last drop; meanwhile one must remain quiet and await future events".

Both these appeals were sent to the Fortress-staff to be printed; and not before 5 a. m. after revising the proofs was my husband able to go to bed.

There was in him no nervousness nor any agitation. One felt he was sure of his ability to maintain order.

March 13th: About 7 a. m. a fire broke out in the harbour. My husband went there at once having slept not more than an hour during the night. The fire was soon put out; my husband returned home; he was all pervaded with a smell of burning; he changed his clothes and then went to inspect the institutions as usual. He went to the powder factory where it had been decided to strike to express their sympathy with their Petrograd comrades. He there engaged in conversation with the workmen calling their attention to the fact that from the food stand point Cronstadt was all right and that they lacked every reason for any protests whatever. A voice from the back rows shouted: "But your wife does not stand in queues! does she?" and then finding no support remained silent.

Conversation proceeded again in a friendly way and ended with my husband's promise to come to a meeting on the Sobornaya Square on the next day at 9 a. m.

Then my husband proceeded to the electric station where the workmen also intended striking; he pointed out that if they ceased work this would entail a cessation of bread baking in the bakery of the Ministry of the Navy; no bread would be given to the crews in consequence; and this induced these workers to decide not to strike.

On coming back home about midday, my husband was besieged with telephone messages: one from Oranienbaum informed him that 13000 soldiers had become insubordinate, had got drunk, were plundering shops, behaving themselves as hooligans at the railway station and invading the railway carriages with victuals for Cronstadt. Near the railway station there were also three carriages with tarred boards for Cronstadt. After talking the matter over with the Fortress-Commander in my presence, my husband gave by telephone orders to General Petroff, Commander of the Cronstadt Rifle-school, to send as quickly as possible to Krasnaia Gorka the railway carriages containing explosives; he also ordered V. N. Yastchoumoff, member of the Cronstadt Alimentary Committee to start at once for Oranienbaum and take measures in order to ensure the safety of the railway carriages with victuals.

After hastily lunching my husband left again: though this was not in accordance with his usual daily routine: he ought to have received different people with reports. Still I did not feel either astonished or anxious. I well understood that he needs must show himself everywhere and see everything for himself; I also knew that he would relate all details to me at leisure. I went to the Depot to sew there; as usual many ladies had assembled, and the work proceeded quickly as a transport was soon to be despatched to the front. In spite of the striking workmen, who were walking about the town in groups, the ladies had left their families without fear and come to the Commander in Chief's house. The town was quiet the workmen decent and sober and dresses as on holidays.

At 4 p. m. Kurosch called on my husband but not finding him at home called on me at the Depot. He had already called in the morning without finding my husband either. I felt that Kurosch had something of importance to say and so requested him to pass into one of the remoter rooms ordering tea to be brought there; meanwhile my husband returned and in my presence they spoke about their not having as yet received any instructions; meanwhile events were becoming more and more acute: 4 regiments had already betrayed the Throne in Petrograd, only two remaining faithful to their. On my being called up to the Depot both admirals passed into my husband's study. I did not say Good bye to Kurosch and have never seen him since.

What the admirals conferred about, what questions were settled at the military council of March 12th, where was my husband on that day after luncheon—all these facts remained unknown to me. Events began now to run so quickly that there was no possibility of concentrating one's thoughts on anything. Kurosch having retired, my husband lay down on his bed leaving it to me alone to decide when he was to be roused up. Whilst he was resting, Pell, A. D. C. to the Staff, came to report that in accordance with my husband's orders he had destroyed all the supplies of vodka which existed in the town. This was no easy job, all the vodka being in small bottles. No one woke up my husband, but at 6 p. m. he roused himself in time for dinner. When passing into the dining-room through the depot where work was still going on, he stayed there for some time, being as always affable and calm. He talked with several of the ladies. When conversing with M-me Kluschin he called her husband a capital fellow: apparently he was remembering the decision of the workmen of his electric station not to strike.

After dinner I continued sewing at the depot and requested my husband to lie down, but in this he did not succeed as he had visitors up to 10 p. m. About the same time the last of the ladies working at the depot left, the daughter of Dr. Medvedeff among them.

I passed into my husband's study and found him engaged in drawing up another appeal to the workmen in which he wrote: "Workmen of Cronstadt Harbour! The conversation I had to-day with you in the machine factory has convinced me that it is impossible to talk with a crowd; I therefore propose that you should elect from your midst delegates enjoying your confidence, in order that through them you may inform me of your needs, with the full conviction that I shall do all that is possible in order to satisfy them; the care I am constantly taking as to Cronstadt, yourselves, your wives and children being a guarantee. Remember that all disorders will be in the interests of our foes and therefore whilst quietly doing our business let us continue to defend our dear Country."

The husband had arrived at the conclusion that it was desirable not to send policemen to the meeting; nor to use them in general in the course of these troublesome days in order to maintain order in the town; he also suppressed for that period their right to wear arms. Having sent the M. S. to the printing office, my husband began talking by telephone. It was then 11 p. m. From that moment up to 4 a. m. I was with him almost constantly. In my hearing he telephoned to the Minister asking about instructions. Altvater came up to the apparatus. I did not hear the answer but understood that the Minister was not at home. Then my husband telephoned to Kurosch. The A. D. C. answered that he was asleep. He then telephoned to some one else and then repeated aloud the words: "Mikhail Vladimirovitch Rodsianko; he knows me, I will ring him up."

Then having left the telephone he said to me sadly: "We have no instructions from anywhere."

I only then understood that the situation was growing serious. I then again heard my husband talking by telephone to Petroff in Oranienbaum: "People say a manifesto granting the constitution has appeared; do find out all about it; we must promulgate it as quickly as possible." And in the tone of his voice his conviction that the situation had become hopeless could already be felt.

At 11.30 it was announced by telephone that the soldiers had started to incite the sailors to mutiny. And my husband laconically remarked. "So it has begun."

I was standing dumbfounded near the table and was only able to utter: "Poor man, poor man."

First of all the crowd went to set free those who had been arrested and my husband rang up at once to G. M. Panferoff, Commander of the second Naval-Barracks, ordering him to release those he himself had arrested, so that this should be an act of the legitimate authorities.

In general all his directions were given in such a spirit as not to irritate but rather to soothe the crowd. For instance Major-General Stronsky, Commander of the First Naval Barracks, whom the men disliked, was dismissed from his post and replaced by his assistant at midnight.

When listening to telephonic reports my husband rejoiced on hearing that the troops were marching in order through the town to the strains of the usual military tunes, and not the Marseillaise.

I remember my husband asking someone by telephone: "Who is leading them? may it be a man knowing what discipline and order are; otherwise it will be no liberation but a disorderly revolt."

Seeing my husband alone in so awful a moment; knowing that in the preceding night he had slept but one hour and must take care of his strength, I asked him to call in some officer if only for the telephone service. To which he briefly replied: "There is no one: all are busy." "If so call in A. A. Stchekin" (this was the Secretary to the Governor, who had just returned from the front whither he had been sent on an official errand). My husband at once sent an orderly after him, obviously because he had recollected that this man might be useful to him.

Stchekin lived close by and five minutes later was sitting at the telephone writing down the messages: the more important ones he communicated to my husband.

It was already long after midnight when it was announced by telephone that the crowd were approaching the Naval Staff building.

In our house the lights had been put out with the exception of that in my husband's study. We could see from the windows that the crowd had approached the Staff; the Marseillaise was already resounding. It was reported through the telephone that the crowd had invaded the premises of the Naval Court, had commenced throwing the legal documents into the yard and burning them in a pile.

Part of the crowd approached our house, dismissed the sentries, for which purpose the officer in charge of the guard was called in and scattered themselves about the two streets adjacent to the house.

Soon after the Arsenal was plundered and occasional shots were heard.

At 2 a. m. the director of the "Gymnasium" who lived opposite suggested that I, my daughter and my sister should seek a refuge with him. We all unanimously declined, whilst thanking him, having determined not to part with the head of the family, and it seemed to me that our decision was approved by my husband. Still covering his face with his hands and with his head bending low he uttered sadly the words: "How grieved I am not to be able to defend you." I ran upstairs, fetched an image of Nicholas the Miracle Worker which all of us had used when giving him our blessing and hung it round his neck.

Next day I learned that at this time sailors had repeatedly come into the vestibule enquiring whether the Admiral was at home. "He is at home, he sleeps" the orderlies' answered though knowing that he was awake. "Well, let him sleep," was the sailors reply, "we do not yet know what we shall want him for."

Our house was now surrounded but nothing terrible had as yet occurred. Every one of us understood the danger of the moment without however clearly visualising how it could all end. We were unable to talk; not only our tongues but also our thoughts seemed to be paralysed. But more than once in the course of those hours did my husband say to me: "Pray" and listened to the words of my prayer, kneeling down with all of us.

About 4 a. m. my husband retired to his study. When I went there a few minutes later, A. A. Stchekin said to me that my husband was resting as he wanted to collect forces for next day. I stood for some time deep in thought near the closed door and dared not enter.

Apparently God's hand kept me there in order, that he should not see my grief, and so be deprived of the courage with which he was going to face death. Having made over him the sign of the cross through the door, I went upstairs, threw myself on my bed and, worn out as I was by two sleepless nights, fell asleep.

March 14th: When I opened my eyes it was 5,20 a. m. and quite light. My daughter and sister were standing near the bed and said they had just heard my husband's voice as he was talking with the men past the windows of our house.

I rose up as I had slept dressed. At this moment we heard the sound of piano playing from the upperstory and the noise of numerous voices. Hundreds of sailors were now filling the house, someone was playing waltzes; there was electric light on in the hall though it was daylight.

I then understood all the horror of the situation: we were six defenceless women: myself, my daughter, my sister, a visitor from Petrograd, the dressmaker and the maid. If death is awaiting us let us meet it as quickly as possible! "What do you want from us?" I enquired of the sailors, who were going upstairs with fixed bayonets.

"Do not be afraid, Madam," was the leader's answer. "We do not touch women. We are seeking arms and are fighting for liberty."

I gave him my husband's loaded revolver and requested that there should be no bloodshed. We did not notice any hostile looks, no one insulted us, though some thirty men were around us. Their leader tried to reassure us by explaining that in order to avoid bloodshed it had been decided to arrest the officers. He advised me to be in no anxiety as to my husband's fate and spoke about the possibility of my being permitted to see him next day in order to bring him food. So convincingly did he speak that we believed his words and I requested him to leave us under the protection of his men and should he be able to, to reassure my husband as to our fate.

That leader, young and of small stature, wearing a peaked cap, an overcoat, a sword and decorations, with the ribbon of St. Anne over the shoulder, judging by certain mistakes of speech he made, gave me the impression of being an agitator, not a native of Cronstadt or one of the sailors.

I met him once again on March 18th on the platform of the Oranienbaum railway station, with an enormous bundle of revolutionary literature. He was clamorous and vulgar but entreated the sailors not to plunder and evidently enjoyed authority.

When having come downstairs he saw the sailors in the act of pillaging, and eating all that was eatable, he shouted at them: "What are you doing? We are neither thieves nor robbers", and he then commanded them to leave the house.

When, in obedience to his command, the crowd had disappeared, I found all our servants in the hall. With tears in their eyes they expressed their de-

votion and sympathy and begged to be forgiven that they had not been able to defend their admiral. Having thanked them for everything I quieted them by saying that I understood their powerlessness and did not accuse them of anything. Having quickly run over the whole floor I saw traces of the destruction wrought by the mob and therefore determined to leave the house. My husband's study had especially suffered. His writing table stood with drawers pulled out and rummaged. Letters and papers had been scattered all over the room. Apparently important documents, ciphers etc. had been sought for. Later I heard that the sailors had hoped to find evidence of the treason of the naval authorities, the latter having—it was supposed—sold themselves to the Germans. The decorations, the insignia and an enormous collection of counters of gold and silver had been stolen. On the floor were lying the Cross of St. George, the Order of the White Eagle and a few admiral's epaulets which the maid picked up and kept for me.

The fireproof safe was broken; and all its precious contents had vanished: Imperial gifts, silver plate, jewels belonging to my mother and myself.

Here and there silver forks or spoons were lying on the floor.

I realised that we could not stay in the house any more, so we put on our fur cloaks and without taking anything passed into the orphan asylum where I had worked a good deal in the course of the eight years during which I had been president of the Benevolent Society.

I walked automatically, neither seeing nor hearing anything only thinking how I could be of service to my husband. In the asylum people tried to console me, and then my sister came up: she had had time to hear from some one that my husband had been murdered and so after a few preparatory sentences she informed me that my husband was alive no more and that he had been murdered. To this she added that mass arrests and murders of officers were taking place. At the same time somebody sent me the copy of a wireless message of the C. C. of the Fleet stating that the Baltic Fleet with all the ports, ships and men had passed over to the Provisional Government.

"Too late". If this order had been received the day before, all might have been otherwise. . . .

I heard later that the whole of the night of March 14th had passed off without excesses, but in the morning, after 5 a. m., a detachment of sailors came up to the house of the Commander in Chief requesting that he be roused up and come out to them.

My husband, when this was reported to him, was found to be quite ready. Having put on his overcoat and cap, with gloves on his hands, he went down into the street and said "Good morning" to the men, the latter answering according to the rules and greeting him by his title of "High Excellency". Then the men surrounded him and they all walked quickly in the direction of the Naval Cathedral.

So far as could be ascertained from enquiries, my husband began saying something to the men, the latter listening to him; then suddenly two shots were heard and he fell mortally wounded in the back.

The square before the Naval Cathedral was the Cronstadt Calvary. There my husband and other officers met their end. And as the revolt was progressing their bodies remained lying there to be plundered and stripped by the prisoners who had been set free and who incited the mob to murder. From there the bodies were later transferred to the Naval Hospital, thence to the cemetery. But only on March 21st was permission given for the victims to be buried."

Early next morning, the Chief of the Staff of the Port, Rear-Admiral A. G. Boutakoff was arrested. When he was intreated by his family, to leave Cronstadt, he answered by a resolute refusal, saying that he preferred death to flight. When the sailors twice proposed to him to recognize the new Government, the Admiral, without hesitating a second, answered: "I have taken the oath to the Emperor and will never betray Him, like you do, you wretches!" After this he was condemned to death and shot near the monument of Admiral Makaroff. (A few years before, Admiral Boutakoff had acted as a model for this monument.) The first shots were harmless and only the cap of the Admiral was shot through. "Scoundrels, you don't know how to shoot", said he, and for these words, he was pierced by bayonets and thrown into a ditch, where he died slowly and painfully, gradually freezing on the snow.

The Chief of the 1st Naval Barracks, Major-General N. V. Stronsky, was also brutally murdered, not being liked by the sailors on account of his exactness.

The Commander of the training-ship "Imperator Alexander II", Commander N. J. Povalishine, was killed on the ice. Seeing that death was inevitable, he endeavoured to escape, but was seen by his pursuers and instantly killed.

The Senior-Lieutenant N. N. Jvkoff, who was on the training-ship "Africa" was thrown alive under the ice by the crew of the ship. All night the murderers went about the town dragging officers out of their lodgings to murder them. Amongst the killed were: Captains K. J. Stepanoff and G. P. Pekarsky; Commanders A. M. Bassoff and V. J. Sokhachevsky; Senior-Lieutenants V. V. Boudkevitch, V. K. Ballas and Sub-Lieutenant B. D. Viskovatoff. There were also officers of the Admiralty, sub-lieutenants and noncommissioned officers. In all about 77 or 78 persons were killed and not for some days was permission given to bury the bodies.

Those officers who had remained alive on the ships were arrested, their weapons had been taken from them and their shoulder-straps taken off. Those who lived on shore were locked up in the guard-house, and amongst them—Vice-Admirals A. D. Sapsai, A. P. Kourosh and Rear-Admiral N. G. Rein. Kourosh as well as Rein behaved with much dignity during their imprisonment and trial, and bore the mockeries of their guards with great stoicism.

All the officers were continually questioned and charged with all sorts of absurd crimes. Some of them were shot on the open space before the guard-house; if an officer were called out, he might be sure he would be shot.

When Admiral Rein who was an old knight of St. George, was called out, he calmly bid farewell to everybody, as he said he knew he was going to his death, and indeed, a few minutes later, he was shot. During the execution he astonished even his murderers by his calmness: on his proud, fine face a smile of contempt hovered for a moment at the sight of the loading of the rifles. . . .

For those unfortunate officers who had survived the rebellion, long days in prison were in store; the little rooms were so full of prisoners that all of them could not lie down at the same time; they had to sleep on bare boards and do the most dirty work and often their food was "forgotten". . . . And the food that was given was so disgusting, that it only created a feeling of nausea. Relations were not allowed to visit the prisoners and the provisions they brought were not handed over to them, or not accepted at all. It is useless to speak of the moral agony they had to live through: the licentious hovligans were inventive in that respect. Admiral A. P. Kourosh was parti-

cularly exposed to the refined mockeries of his tormentors, who tried to avenge now his energetic suppression of the mutiny in Sveaborg in 1906.

Two weeks later, thanks to the solicitation of the deputies from the ships of the Active Fleet, the officers who studied in the Torpedo-school were let free. But the rest of the prisoners, in spite of the persuasions of the weak Provisional Government, for whom Cronstadt did not care a bit, continued to languish in the prisons as hostages as well as objects of blind hatred.

Cronstadt's doings made much noise all over Russia; a whole book might be written about these revolutionary bacchanals which the Provisional Government was afraid to put down. The character of the Cronstadt doings had something brutal, barbarous, really revolutionary. There was nothing ideal, the only object was the demolition, the entire annihilation of the inheritance from the past and a desire to satisfy the lowest instincts.

These are the surroundings in which the usurpers of authority in Russia prepared the new type of sailor; their faithful partisan, who was to play a decisive part in the "deepening of the revolution", and transform all Russia into a dark torture-chamber of the Soviet.

After the revolution I remained only a few days on the "Novik". Order was kept up more or less, but discipline declined visibly. The sailors seemed in a state of stupor; most of them, in spite of their "ultra-revolutionary" disposition, did not at all understand the sense and the meaning of the events which had taken place.

During that time propagandists were not idle; amongst the crews one could note some "conscious" elements; before it was an exceptional phenomenon, where as now it had become very frequent. The example of Cronstadt and of the particularly revolutionary ships, the weariness after three years war, and especially the continual mistakes made by the Provisional Government and the revolutionary Commander of the Fleet, who tried hard to insinuate himself into the good graces of the Petersburg soviet of workers and soldiers, also the ship committees,—all this brought on the ruin of the Fleet, and meant its near death. . . .

XXII.

The state of things in the Gulf of Riga before the enemy's offensive. The disasters of the "Bars", the "Lvija", "AG 14", "Lieutenant Bourakoff" and the "Stroyny". Vice-Admiral M. K. Bakhireff appointed Commander to the naval forces in the Riga Gulf. Vice-Admiral Bakhireff. Disaster of the "Okhotnik". The enemy's offensive. Operations in the Kassarsky basin. The state of the land-front. Surrendering of the batteries on Svorbe. Disaster of the "Grom". Action in the harbour of Kuivast. Disaster of the "Slava". Departure from Moonsound. The cause of the fall of the Gulf of Riga.

In consequence of the March revolution there were great changes in the command of all the Fleet in general, and particularly in the Destroyer-Force. During the very first days of the revolution, the Chief of the Destroyer-Force Rear-Admiral M. A. Kedroff was summoned to Petrograd and appointed

assistant Minister of the Navy. Captain A. V. Rasvozoff, one of the most eminent officers of our Navy, was appointed to replace him.

The "Novik" continued being in repair during the whole spring, but owing to the revolutionary state of things, the work advanced slowly. It was only in the middle of May that she could leave the Sandvik works and join the other ships of the Division in the Gulf of Riga. The Chief of the Destroyer-Force immediately transferred his flag on the "Novik".

All the first part of the campaign of 1917 in the Gulf of Riga and Moon-sound was spent in struggling against the decomposition of the ship- and land-crews. Under the influence of strong and continual propaganda, they tried all the time to escape danger for themselves, under cover of revolutionary mottoes. This dreadful decomposition was partly restrained, owing to the extraordinary energy, strong will, and remarkable ability of speaking to the men, which the Chief of the Destroyer-Force, Rear-Admiral A. V. Rasvozoff had. Subjecting to his influence the best part of the sailors, he, in this way made them influence the rest. But it was a most difficult task, for the demolition of the whole Empire was going to so rapidly that it transferred itself of cours on the Navy. Even the supernatural will of separate commanders could not stop this.

In July, by order of the Provisional Government, the C. C. of the Fleet, the too farsighted Admiral Maksimoff was dismissed from his post. He was replaced by Rear-Admiral D. N. Verderevsky; but the latter remained but a short time in command; after the well known conflict with the Provisional Government, the Admiral was summoned to Petrograd and arrested there. His post was given to Vice-Admiral A. V. Rasvozoff, whilst Captain U. K. Stark became Chief of the Destroyer-Force; he was a thorough gentleman, but not at all capable to play this part in the very heat of the revolutionary outbreak, when all the ideas and notions were fermenting. From this moment things went on quite badly.

The general ruin of the Fleet after the revolution, had influence, naturally, on its luck at war. In that period, three new submarines were lost—the "Bars", the "Lvitz" and "AG 14". The "Bars" having put out for a fortnight's cruise in the Baltic Sea, never returned. The "Lvitz", having gone towards the enemy coast, did not come back either; the English submarine "E 19", which was then not far from the south end of Gotland island, accidentally fell upon the traces of her disaster: having perceived an object floating vertically, the "E 19" came up to it and saw that it was a torpedo without the charge, and recognized it as belonging to the "Lvitz". Whilst examining the torpedo, the "E 19" was attacked by an enemy submarine and nearly became her victim. It is possible that the "Lvitz" was blown up by this same submarine.

The "AG 14" was lost whilst patrolling near Libau; her Captain was the only son of the late Admiral N. O. Essen, a young officer of great promise. He was an experienced captain and did remarkable things with his boat. Did they become the victims of an enemy submarine, or did they sink on a mine-field—was never known.

A disaster happened also to the submarine "AG 15" which ended, it is true, rather luckily. This boat sank because at the moment of the loading, the main gangway was not made waterfast enough, and therefore the water rushed into it, but all the men were saved at the last moment. As the "AG 15" sank in shallow water, she was soon raised.

Graf, Novik.

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Finally, on the 12th of August the avizo "Lieutenant Bourakoff" struck a mine which had been laid by the enemy in Led-Sund near Oland island; one part of the crew escaped, but all the officers were drowned.

In connection with war, the whole period, up to the surrender of Riga on the 4th of September passed very quietly in the Gulf of Riga; the enemy did not manifest himself at all. But from that time things seemed to grow darker and one felt that the time had come when he would act more energetically.

At the end of August, owing to the neglectfulness of her captain, the destroyer "Stroyny" ran aground off the cape Kavi near the Irben strait. This Captain, who had been elected by the sailors, was a glowing example of the famous "election system". They immediately began trying to put her afloat again, but the enemy having been informed, sent seaplanes there every day. At their apparition, all instantly left off working, and hid themselves. After several bombs had hit the destroyer and had caused great damage, the work had to be abandoned, and after a time, the "Stroyny" was entirely broken to pieces by tempests.

During that time, according to the order of the C. C., the command over all the forces of the Gulf of Riga was entrusted to Vice-Admiral M. K. Bakhireff, who directed all the operations up to the very last moment.

Vice-Admiral Michael Koronatovitch Bakhireff was a sailor to the marrow of his bones. He had passed all his service life at sea; for him, the sea and the Navy were all; all his interests were concentrated on them. But he was not only a sailor, he was also a good chief at war "by the grace of God", which he proved brilliantly during the Japanese War, when he was Captain of the destroyer "Smely", which under his command did wonders of valour and boldness.

When the Great War began, M. K. Bakhireff was in the function of Captain of the cruiser "Rurik". His brilliant martial capacities soon drew him out as Chief of the Cruiser Division, afterwards as Chief of the Dreadnought Division, and finally, as Chief of the Mine-Defence.

Who in the Navy did not know Michael Koronatovitch, who did not love him and did not look upon him with the greatest respect! Always even, calm, self-possessed, in the moments of danger he never lost his presence of mind and was always irreproachably brave, even exceptionally brave. It must be noted that in spite of his great personal valour; before sending out his ships to any dangerous operation, he weighed the circumstances and deliberated for a long time over the possibility of exposing them to the least risk, and then he was anxious about them all the time until they returned.

With a severe look and a silent appearance, he was far from any self-conceit, and in the naval officers' circle he was simply loved and respected and was a charming comrade to navigate with. He had no need to keep the appearance of a chief, for he was always respected and nobody would ever think of taking liberties or being familiar with him.

The Admiral disliked "words", he only acknowledged deeds. The catastrophe of the February revolution produced a desponding effect upon him; he wanted to quit everything immediately and retire, but the dreadful position in which Russia was after the revolution, obliged him, as a faithful son of his native-country, to remain some time more until war would be ended. He valiantly ended the life of the Russian Baltic Fleet in fighting against a stronger enemy during the action in Moonsound.

But after war was ended, he did not find it possible for himself to remain in service and he retired. But in spite of the danger there was at that time of working at the revival of the former Great Russia, especially for such an eminent man as he was, he took upon himself the leadership of the rebellion in the Fleet against bolsheviks, despising danger as always. After the failure of this enterprise he fell at the hands of the ruling-rules.

The Admiral could not bear politics and he despised party-talkers who ruined the country. He loved Russia simply and honestly, loved her with all the strength of his original, proud soul and suffered and tormented himself for her. All the nobless of M. K. Bakhireff's soul came to light whilst on trial: "I sympathise with no particular party," said he, "but I love Russia"; and also in his answer when his death-sentence was announced: "Well, you are free to kill my body, but you cannot kill my spirit." He was a hero and died like one; his name will never be blotted out of the history of Russia's Navy to which he sacrificed his life. His name is synonymous to Honour, Faith and Faithfulness, and we, officers of the Imperial Navy, will always be proud of our heroic Admiral never to be forgotten.

In September things were getting every day more and more alarming. In the Irben strait the enemy mine-sweepers were trawling persistently; every night lights were seen, and not only in the strait, but also to the west of the Zerel light-house. That showed that they worked also at night. Evidently, knowing the existence of our 12" battery, the enemy was afraid of its firing, and therefore was preparing a safe region for his ships to be able to destroy the battery.

On the 26th of September the destroyer "Okhotnik" sank, having struck a mine whilst patrolling in the Irben area. As soon as they heard the explosion, the men rushed to save themselves: they took all the life-belts, the hammocks and lowered the life-boats. Soon the boats were full of sailors, who had not thought of offering a place to the officers, and these, considering it impossible for themselves to ask the men to take them, remained on the destroyer silently observing the retiring boats. The destroyer was sinking and soon the water covered the deck on which the officers were standing. . . . With the "Okhotnik" perished her Captain, senior Lieutenant V. A. Fock, Lieutenant V. K. Panferoff and two more officers.

During all this time, our aviators reported continually about ships which were sighted in the mouths of the Great and the Small Irben rivers, and also about a great number of small mine-sweepers, which were systematically working along the coast.

The enemy air-craft became also very active in making ceaseless reconnoitring flights not only over the Irben strait, but also as far as Kuivast. They did not content themselves with reconnoitring, but dropped several bombs on our 12" battery. One of these night-raids was very successful for the enemy: a bomb fell into the shell-hold, which immediately took fire and flew up in the air. Added to the immense material loss which this explosion caused us, it cost the life of 40 men, in their number were the distinguished officers: Commander K. V. Loman and Lieutenant D. M. Timofeeff. Thus, every hour the position became more alarming; it was clear that more definite action was shortly to be expected from the enemy. With the state of fermentation at home, this produced a particularly nervous and ponderous disposition.

On the 12th of October the news was received, that the enemy, under cover of his naval forces among which were also dreadnoughts, was landing troops in the Taggalaht bay.

On account of this information, all the forces of the Gulf of Riga were ordered to be in half an hour's notice readiness.

Fearing that the enemy would break through in the Kassarsky basin, Admiral Bakhireff sent the destroyers "Kondratenko" and "Pogranitchnik" to guard Soelo-Sund. But it was too late: two hours later the "Kondratenko" reported that an enemy destroyer had entered the basin and that they had come to action. The gun-boat "Groziachy" was sent out as support, and added to this, it was decided to lay a mine-field as soon as it would be possible, in Soelo-Sund, for which purpose the flat-bottomed mine-layer "Pripiat" was detailed.

In the course of the day, news about the successful landing of the enemy forces, reached us. Our batteries in that region, opposed little resistance and were soon destroyed by the enemy's shelling. Only the Serro battery resisted more efficiently and it even succeeded in sinking an enemy destroyer.

Nearly at the same time another destroyer approached our air-station at Pappenholm and shelled it. Our aviators had nothing else to do, but to leave Oesel island.

At about 4 p. m. "Kondratenko" reported that several more destroyers had forced their way into the Kassarsky basin. The Admiral sent out immediately the "Isiaslav", "Grom", "Zabiaka", "Samson" and the "Novik", which was unoccupied, as the Chief of the Destroyer Force was in Rogokul.

When the detachment approached the Kassarsky basin they saw that in the NE. part of the basin on the SE course were coming our destroyers with the "Desna" as leading-ship, flying Admiral Stark's flag (he had come from Rogokul), then came the "Kondratenko" and the "Pogranitchnik". Behind all, came the gun-boat "Groziastchy", which was very slow.

In the SW direction from our forces, in about the same course, the enemy destroyers were moving; in the growing darkness it was very difficult to define their number and their class; they seemed to be of a rather obsolete type. The action ceased at the approach of darkness, and leaving two destroyers in patrol, the Chief of the Destroyer Force returned to Kuivast with the others.

Next morning, the 13th of October, the "Novik" (flag-ship to the Chief of the Destroyer's Force), the "Grom", "Konstantine", "Pobeditel" and the "Zabiaka" entered at dawn the Kassarsky basin to reconnoitre. Having gone all round the basin the detachment did not discover the enemy; only some monstrous silhouettes of steamers were to be seen on the horizon; they were at a distance of about 60—65 cables. The "Novik" and the "Grom" were ordered, to open fire against them. Evidently, the shells hit right as the steamers, letting out much steam, began to retire. At that moment a cruiser of the "Graudenz" class appeared from behind the cape and came to the steamer's help. She opened a heavy fire against the "Novik", which had come up quite close to the Dago island along the same course, and which had to turn abruptly towards the East, and begin to retire. The enemy shells struck very well and after the third discharge they covered the "Novik", and continued doing so until she came out of range. It is difficult to say why not a single shot struck her, especially as in retiring she did not go zig-zaging at all and the shells fell quite along-side of her.

All the other ships forming a line ahead retired behind the "Novik" and anchored at some distance from the strait.

At about 4 p. m. the mine-layer "Pripiat", which had come from Rogokul with mines to lay at the entrance of the basin moored, alongside of the "Novik". The crew of the "Pripiat" was very unreliable and therefore there were great doubts about the success of the mine-laying.

Towards evening the weather got bad, the wind freshened and it began to rain. When it was yet light the Chief of the Destroyer Force ordered all the destroyers to go to their anchorage near the Shildau light-houses, and only himself remained on the "Novik" at the place where he was, so as to be present at the departure of the "Pripiat" to lay the mine-field; when she started to fulfill this task, convoyed by the destroyer "Raziastchy" the Admiral also went to Shildau and anchored next to the other destroyers.

About an hour and a half, or two hours later, a wireless message was received from the "Raziastchy": the expedition has not succeeded, returning with the "Pripiat". Soon they arrived themselves.

Next day it was cleared up, that owing to the influence of agitators (the cowardly part of the crew), the rest refused to execute the mine laying, giving as reason of this, the too great danger of the task; the strait remained open for the passage of the enemy. Such cases can only happen in revolutionary time when they remain unpunished.

On the 14th of October at dawn, the "Novik" proceeded to Kuivast, whilst the "Pobeditel", "Zabiaka", "Grom" and "Konstantine" were ordered to go to patrol the Kassarsky basin. The gun-boat "Hraby" went to support them.

As to the land front, towards the 14th of October the whole island of Oesel was already in the enemy's hands. It was decided to defend only Moon island. For this purpose a detachment of volunteers from the "Tzesarevitch", the "Slava" and from other big ships was placed at the crossing so as to keep back the enemy until the arrival of a shock-battalion from Reval.

On Oesel island, on the peninsular of Svorbe, the 12" battery continued keeping firm at the beginning of the enemy's landing, and was in a fighting disposition, but later on, when the events developed less favourably for us, they lost courage and insisted upon the big ships being sent as support. The "Tzesarevitch" was sent there on the 18th of October, but her help was useless: the battery had already surrendered. She was ordered to take the men and to destroy the battery by shelling it.

At midday on October 14th the wireless message was received from the "Pobeditel" stating that the destroyers were being shelled by enemy dread-noughts and that a shell had hit the "Grom", which in consequence, had to be taken in tow by the "Hraby" and to leave the basin.

After this a second wireless was received from the "Pobeditel" in which she reported that several enemy destroyers had forced their way into the basin and that our destroyers had began action against them; the gun-boat "Hivinetz" was sent out to them as support.

About 3 p. m. a third wireless from the "Pobeditel" saying that our destroyers were retreating in fighting and demanded help. Admiral Bakhireff immediately sent the "Novik", flying the flag of the Chief of the Destroyer Force, the "Samson" and five coal-driven destroyers.

Coming up to the Kassarsky basin, the detachment sighted the "Zabiaka" which was in front, listing to the star-board and with the stern-gun knocked off. Then came the "Pobeditel", the "Konstantine" and a little aside the "Hivinetz" and the "Hraby". The "Grom" was not with them. At a distance of about 60 cables the enemy destroyers were perceptible, they were motionless and both sides kept up but an insignificant firing.

The "Pobeditel" reported that the "Grom" had perished, and indeed, a ship might be perceived on the horizon, half sunk and enveloped in flames and smoke. An enemy destroyer went up to her and tried to take her in tow; but soon the "Grom" definitely sank.

As the detachment approached the place of action, the shells fell always closer around them and when they were quite near, they saw that owing to the narrowness of the basin all the destroyers were massed together as in a heap. As the enemy's shells fell straight upon them, and they had no possibility of turning or moving about rapidly, they were in great danger and therefore the Chief of the Destroyer-Force gave orders for them to retire. Moving very slowly, they at last came out of the fire range. Having left patrol ships behind, the Chief of the Destroyer-Force with the rest of the destroyers, returned to Kuivast.

Having got there and moored to the supply-ship "Libava", all learned that the Captain of the "Grom", Lieutenant Vaksmut, whom one had considered as lost, was there. The disaster of the "Grom" happened as follows: when the enemy destroyers forced their way into the basin, our destroyers retiring steamed at such a great speed that the water, which was very shallow, was in such a strong motion that the tow-ropes between the "Grom" and the "Hrabry" broke. The "Hrabry" came up to her, wanting to take her in tow again, but all the other ships had had time to retire. The enemy, seeing the hopeless state of the "Grom", concentrated his fire upon her; several shells hit her; the crew was so panic-stricken that when the "Hrabry" came up to the "Grom", the sailors, instead of passing the tow-ropes, threw themselves on the "Hrabry" like madmen. Nothing remained for the officers, but to pass over also; the Captain who refused to leave his ship, was taken over by force. When the last men were leaving the "Grom" she was in flames. The fire was especially strong in the ward-room from which nothing could be saved.

In this action the "Hrabry" sank an enemy destroyer by her firing, and herself was not damaged at all. In general, it must be noted that the "Hrabry's" deeds were irreproachable in the sense of warfare, and highly gallant in the moral sense.

In the morning of that day, the C. C. of the Fleet and several members of his Staff had come over from Rogokul on the "Finn" to consult with Admiral Bakhireff. It appeared that the land-troops refused to fight, and therefore it was impossible to reckon upon them.

On the 14th of October, the "Bayan", flying Admiral Bakhireff's flag, proceeded to Zerel to raise the spirit of the Svorbe batteries, and came back in the evening. Next day, as was mentioned higher, those batteries surrendered.

On the 15th of October, we ascertained that the Kassarsky basin was entirely in the power of the enemy, who did not quit it any more. It was decided, by the initiative of the Chief of the 3d Flotilla, Commander K. V. Sheveleff, to try and take back the bassin. The "Isiaslaff" (under the pendant of the Chief of the 3d Flotilla) the "Avtroil" and the "Gavriil" put out for the basin; about midday, the Chief of the Destroyer-Force, joined them on the "Novik".

When the "Novik" reached the bassin, the destroyers of Commander Sheveleff were already returning. He reported to the Admiral that seven enemy destroyers had come to meet the detachment in the basin; an action ensued. The great superiority of force of the enemy, made our destroyers

turn about. In doing so, owing to the great speed, the "Isiaslaff" touched ground with her screws, and twisted her arms, and a shell struck the "Avtroil" and made a hole near the water-line.

The destroyers remained some time in the basin and the gun-boats were ordered to shell the enemy's patrol destroyers. After several of our salvos, they turned W and deployed a smoke screen which hid them entirely.

During that time the enemy grew still stronger on Oesel island. Moon was still in our hands; we had succeeded, with difficulty, to land two infantry regiments and a shock-battalion. In case of an attack against Moon island, the "Slava" was placed so as to be able to shell the passage.

In the morning of the 16th of October the "Tzesarevitch" came back from Zerel bringing part of the battery men from Svorbe. It appeared that the enemy had offered to the batteries to surrender, promising them the best conditions of captivity if they did not blow up anything. The 12" battery was willing to consent to this, but the others, categorically refused, and the batteries were destroyed.

Our destroyers did not try to penetrate into the Kassarsky basin anymore. For its defense, two gun-boats and several destroyers were placed at the eastern entrance, and later the cruiser "Admiral Makaroff" was added, which could shell the whole eastern part of the basin.

But in the morning the news was received that the enemy was going to land troops on the NW side of Moon and that he had already introduced his transport-ships into the basin. In addition to this, destroyers had passed between the islands Oesel and Moon, and had begun to shell the passage which was still in our hands. The "Slava" was ordered to open fire against them and after several discharges the enemy's firing ceased.

To prevent the enemy landing through the basin, Admiral Bakhireff decided upon attacking his transport-ships and destroyers, which had entered the basin, by coal-driven destroyers during the night. In the day time he assembled on the supply-ship "Libava" the Captains of the destroyers and the Chiefs of the Flotillas to deliberate over the plan of the attack. It was decided that the destroyers would proceed by pairs, and the turns of the pairs would be fixed by casting lots.

After the sitting was over, the chief of the Destroyer Force proceeded on the "Novik" to the Shildau light-house from where he was to send out personally the destroyers to the attack. At dusk the 5th and the 6th Destroyer Flotillas, which were detailed to assault, arrived. But a little later a wireless message was received, stating that the operation was cancelled. It was ascertained afterwards that the reason of this change was, that some of the Captains did not sympathize with this operation.

At dawn, on the 17th of October, the "Novik" weighed anchor and proceeded to Kuivast. On the way, a wireless message from the destroyer "Deiatelny" which was patrolling to the south of the entrance of Moonsound, was received, stating that in the SW direction 17 columns of smoke were sighted. It was evident that the enemy had crossed the Irben position and that now the decisive moment approached. The fall of Moonsound was inevitable.

Reaching Kuivast, the "Novik" moored up to the "Libava"; just at that time the supply-ships were ordered to go to Rogokul; they hastily weighed anchor and made for Rogokul.

A whole cloud of seaplanes appeared over Kuivast at the same time as the enemy ships entered the strait, and they overwhelmed the harbour and

the roads with bombs; immense columns of water and of smoke were to be seen everywhere.

Nearing Verder, the enemy ships opened fire against it, but at first their shots fell short. During that time our ships, the "Bayan" (flying the flag of Admiral Bakhireff), leading, the "Tzesarevitch" and the "Slava" formed a column ahead in the Kuivast roads in the direction SW; together with them were the destroyers of the 6th and the 9th Flotillas. When the enemy mine-sweepers approached, our forces opened fire against them.

About midday the "Bayan" anchored and lifted the signal: "The crews have time to dine." Soon after that, when the enemy mine-sweepers succeeded in clearing a sufficient space for big ships, the whole harbour turned out to be in the range of their fire. The enemy kept up a heavy firing. Around the "Bayan", which was still at anchor, a whole wall of water was standing from the explosions of the shells, it seemed as if she would inevitably sink. The "Slava" also was surrounded by columns of water; on her side, near the first-tower several holes were clearly visible. Sloping to the left side and her forepart much lower than of wont, she steamed northward at full speed.

The "Bayan" which succeeded in getting out of range of fire fairly luckily, proceeded behind, with her oil-tank burning, and the signal "S" lifted (which meant: stop the engines); evidently Admiral Bakhireff feared, that the "Slava" might run aground in the canal and stop up the passage for all the rest of the ships.

The "Tzesarevitch" was last, moving slowly northward, and firing all along out of her 12" guns, which struck their aim several times.

At last the "Bayan" and the "Tzesarevitch" entered the canal and the "Slava", whose draught did not allow her to enter there, was sunk by a mine at the entrance, though unsuccessfully, for she did not obstruct it entirely, as was desirable. Her crew had been taken off by the destroyers of the 6th Destroyer Flotilla and taken to Rogokul. At that time a complete evacuation had begun there, and all that could not be taken away, was destroyed.

Towards the 18th of October all the forces of the Gulf of Riga were concentrated near Vorms. Admiral Bakhireff meant to take them out of Moonsound that very night, for informations had been received that the enemy had the intention of cutting off and sinking in the Moonsound all our ships.

However our ships could not leave Moonsound that night, for the mine-sweepers had not cleared the channel. It was only twenty four hours later that all the ships passed into the Gulf of Finland. In the morning of the 20th of October, all the Forces of the Riga Gulf were in Lapvik.

There we learned the news, that on the 18th of October one of the enemy destroyers on its way along the Shildau canal struck one of our mines and sank immediately. It was the destroyer "S 64".

The short crossing to Lapvik was very difficult, as the enemy had succeeded in laying a mine-field at the entrance of Moonsound. It was cleared at the last moment thanks to the personal energy of the Chief of the detachment of mine-sweepers. In spite of the ill-will of the crews to work in the night, he obliged them to do so.

Thus ended the epic and obstinate defence of the Gulf of Riga and Moonsound, which had lasted three years. All the labour, all the sacrifices were lost, owing to the treason and the cowardice of the garrisons on the islands and the gunners detachments of the batteries. Certainly one cannot accuse the gray mass of soldiers and sailors alone, for they had been promised peace at the most important moment of the war, and on account of this, discipline

was premeditatively undermined, and the authority of the officers as well. The principal fault is not theirs, but it lies on the February conspirators and the treacherous leaders of the revolution, who pushed Russia on the way of shame and ruin through the revolution. . . .

If it were not for the revolution, never would the enemy have taken possession of the Gulf of Riga and the Moonsound, so easily. Owing to the measures taken by the Imperial Government, its defence in 1917 had become really formidable. In spring the 12" battery near Zerel which had been begun in November 1916, was to enter in action, and two light ones were already quite ready. On Moon and Verder the batteries were finished even earlier. Since the Moonsound canal had been dug 30 feet deep, all the cruisers and the "Tsesarevitch" and the "Slava" could enter the Gulf; and in the year of the revolution it was to be deepened to 40 feet, and then it would have been possible at any time to bring into the Gulf the "Andrei Pervozvanny", the "Imperator Pavel I" and even the dreadnoughts. To this must be added, that all the new destroyers and submarines had began service and had their base in the Riga Gulf, which strengthened considerably its defence. The well drilled crews of the ships and the experienced battery-servants, who had all been continually in action before the revolution, were a guarantee that the enemy would not have been let in, if it had not been for the revolution. It was only owing to the destruction of everything that the defence of the Gulf had arrived to such a pitiable state, that the enemy could take possession of the Gulf, without any particular skilfulness or heroisme. The sight of the enemy was enough for the land troops to be panic-stricken and to surrender without resistance; and as to the Fleet, it was impossible to rely upon its comparative fighting capacity.

After the surrender of Moonsound the "Novik" remained for some time with the Destroyers Force which was in Lapvik, after which she was sent for fundamental repairs to the Baltic iron works in Petrograd, and therefore took part in no more operations. But there were no more military or naval operations, and the Baltic Fleet was rapidly decaying in the harbours of Helsingfors, Cronstadt and Petrograd.

XXIII.

The "ships' committees". The centrobalt. Inciting the men against the officers. The shoulder straps taken off. Abolition of the titles of warrant-officers and long service men. Changing of the ships' names. "Unions" formed. An officers' delegation to Kerensky. Dismissal of Maximoff and appointment of Rear-Admiral D. N. Verdevsky. His conflict with the Provisional Government. Appointment of A. V. Razvozoff. The Korniloff episode. Assassination of four of the "Petropavlovsk" officers. Kerensky's view as to this crime. "Deepening of the Revolution" in the Navy. The elections to the Constituent Assembly. The bolshevist coup d'état. The loss of the "Gepard" and the "Bditelny". "The Naval College". Modest Ivanoff. The post of Commander in Chief of the Fleet suppressed. Resignation of Razvozoff, Bakhireff, Behrens and other officers. Decree about "the Red Fleet". Troubles among the men in connection with rumours as to a German landing. Vice-Admiral Razvozoff's election and his arrest. The German "squadron at Hangō". Destruction of the "A G 11", "A G 12", "A G 15", "A G 16", "Oland" and "Yastreb". German ultimatum ordering the Fleet to leave Helsingfors. The English submarines destroyed. Passage of the Fleet to Cronstadt. Trial and execution of A. M. Stchastny.

The formation of "ships' committees" was the first great reform in the organisation of the Navy after the Revolution. These were created spontaneously, but were almost immediately legalised by the Provisional Government, which ordered that the elections should take place on all the ships.

This elected body stood between the officers and the men. According to the idea, on which it was based, it had to deal with questions concerning the personal life of the men only, such as: distribution of work, food, going ashore and punishments. Before long however the committees began to interfere with absolutely all directions given as to the ship. In spite of it being war time, they convoked general meetings of the men so as to discuss orders regarding putting out to sea; they admonished and blamed all their officers, not excepting the Captain etc., they would also decide some political question of State importance. And the "resolutions" adopted, were generally published in one of the democratic organs. Such cases happened as this: a committee of only twelve men, in the name of the crew of some patrol-boat like the "Kunitza", insisted on the immediate conclusion of peace "without annexations and indemnities"; and on all power being transferred to the Soviets, or something of the same kind; they also stated they were ready to support these demands by force of arms.

And the further this so-called "deepening of the Revolution" went on, the more the committees took power into their hands. They chiefly attempted to "show their rights" to the officers and owing to that the authority of the latter fell from day to day. Among the sailors, with few exceptions, the committees enjoyed a great influence. But here too everything went on smoothly

only so long as their decisions did not run against the men's desires. As soon as unpleasant decisions were adopted, such as the limiting of going ashore or leave; the insistence on the fulfilment of certain duties or punishments—dissatisfaction was at once expressed and demands were made as to a new committee being elected.

At first the elected members of the committees were those who clamoured most, chiefly those who had distinguished themselves during the Revolution. Soon however, in view of the creation of numerous revolutionary organisations—committees, congresses etc. which every day required the sending of more and more representatives from the ships—all these dispersed. A quieter—it is true—but only an absolutely uncultivated element remained on the ships, quite incompetent to deal with the questions which arose. Such people acted blindly in accordance with the directions of an organisation, at first emanating from the local Soviets, then from the Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet; they also followed the suggestions of secret bolshevist agents.

In some cases officers too were elected members of the committee from among those who were liked by the men; in such cases, if energetic, they easily succeeded in taking hold of the committee and carrying through it any decision. However they did not stay there long and were blackballed at the very next election. Obstinate agitation reached its aims. As time went on, cases of officers being elected grew scarcer and scarcer, the committees being composed almost exclusively of men.

The Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet (abbreviated "Centrobalt") was formed a little later and consisted of plenipotentiaries from different sections of the Fleet and the ports, such as battleships and cruiser's squadrons, Destroyer's Force, Cronstadt port etc. Its statutes were drawn up at the first congress of representatives of the Baltic Fleet at Helsingfors. The Centrobalt began at once to strive after sole power and commenced a ceaseless struggle with the Staff of the fleet and the C. C. himself. Energetically supported in local revolutionary organisations the Centrobalt began little by little to get hold of the administration part and later on even succeeded in securing the suppression of the post of C. C., the whole power being handed over to the Centrobalt. And as the importance of the Centrobalt increased, the number of its members increased also, they being almost exclusively sailors (in the beginning one officer was among them). At first the Centrobalt had modestly selected a domicile on a small steamship called "Viola", but later it had at its disposal the Imperial yacht "The Polar Star" and later still the "Standard" also. The members of the Centrobalt, so far as their mental development was concerned, were slightly superior to the ship committees but of a much more radical and revolutionary turn of mind. Of special questions bearing on naval technic they understood absolutely nothing. All branches but one, the operative one, of the Fleet administration lay with this committee, chiefly of course political questions.

The various questions were discussed by sub-committees, these also deciding the less important ones, whilst the more important matters were discussed in the "plenary" sitting of the whole committee. If the question were of extreme importance the committee, not daring to take all the responsibility upon themselves, called a general meeting to which the ships' committees or representatives from different ships were summoned.

In once attended a "plenary" Centrobalt sitting on the "Standard". In the yacht dining room, which quite recently had been a luxurious one, but now was very dirty, some thirty men sat who very little resembled sailors.

These were plainly degenerates of extraordinary appearance; they were dressed as their fancy, pleased them some in vests, others in blue flannel shirts etc. Some were sitting round the table in very unceremonious postures and smoking cigarettes continuously; others were half lying on sofas close to the walls. The chairman, when reading the questions to be discussed, often confused the contents, unsparingly mutilating difficult words, but pronouncing them apparently with the greatest satisfaction. When some complicated technical question was being dealt with, the members of the meeting listened most absentmindedly, and such a question would slip through quickly and without any discussions or disputes, even if it were of the greatest importance for the fleet. But as soon as an understandable item was brought up such as—salary, uniforms, furloughs, food and especially—politics, all at once every trifle gave rise to a regular fight: there began discussions, disputes and finally personal invectives between some of the committee members. Now passions would blaze up, now—calm down. In such a chaos of words and ideas most curious stipulations were often proposed and seriously discussed for hours. This was a “sitting” of children trying to imitate grown up people.

In this way began first the collective administration of separate ships then of the whole fleet. The history of all countries in all times has condemned and proved the utter absurdity of such a system of governing military forces. But the active revolutionists insisted upon this principle throughout with obstinacy and, at different sittings and meetings attempted to prove its appropriateness by references to the distrust felt by masses towards personal administration. By so doing they ultimately succeeded in breaking up the Navy which lost all its fighting capacity. However, this was precisely their aim and they had selected the surest and quickest method.

The consequence of this preponderance of the committees was that such questions were discussed as—putting out to sea, target practice, winter quarters, the carrying out of orders with regard to mine laying, or other war operations etc. Frequently the men would refuse to execute orders received from the C. C. himself. For instance the “Slava” did not enter the Moon-sound until at length persuaded to do so; at the most decisive moment of the defence of the Kassar basin, the minelayer “Pripiat” declined to go and lay mines, and the trawlers refused to work. Many other analogous cases consequent on collective administration could be cited.

Whilst part of the fleet was in advanced positions, ready to oppose the enemy, another part was taking part in meetings in the rear.

The chief efforts of the agitators was directed against any bond of union between officers and men, so that the latter should not fall under the influence of the former.

When after the Revolution it had become clear that officers were no more to be feared, i. e. had no influence whatever either at Helsingfors or at Cronstadt, attention was at once directed to Reval. As mentioned above, there the coup d'état had been of an altogether peaceful character and the officers had not yet lost influence over the crews.

But in the end of March and in the beginning of April there began there an intense agitation, which very intelligently took into account the more or less bellicose mentality of some of the men. Obstinate rumours began to be circulated in the town and on the ships that there were many German agents among the officers, all the officers bearing foreign names being specially pointed out. This method proved effective, and arrests were made of: the chief of the fourth Destroyer Flotilla, the Captain of the destroyer “Pogra-

nitchnik", the chief of the second mine-sweeping group, the instructor of the submarine detachment and an aviator. A whole series of other officers with foreign names had accusations of espionage laid against them. Nor was this all. Other rumours soon began to be spread about, as to malpractices in regard to the catering for the men and the repairs of ships. The men greedily clutched at these rumours in the expectation of getting money which could be divided among them. Without any foundation the former "paymasters" of the "Rurik", the „Bayan", the "Dvina" and many other ships were arrested and several Captains were under suspicion.

Good relations between officers and men began to be spoiled at once; distrust was engendered. Seeing how dangerous this agitation was, the officers began to struggle against it energetically, but could do nothing. Simultaneously with the arrests on the ships another incident occurred—this time in town, and in connection with the A. D. C. to the commander of the fortress. He was disliked by the men on account of his severity. When the Revolution began, he, foreseeing vengeance, tried to leave Reval, but was arrested and brought back. At first he was imprisoned in the sailors' lock up, but later it was decided to transfer him to the shore prison and he was taken there in broad daylight guarded by four sailors; on the way the crowd which had assembled around, forced him to put on "laptis"¹⁾, hung a pair on his neck also, and put a broom into his hand; in this way they accompanied him to the prison doors, illusing him all the time. Neither the escort, nor the members of the soviets tried to put a stop to this outrageous conduct.

This incident discredited the officers still more, and as it remained unpunished, made their enemies still more daring. In fact, Reval was rapidly rivalling Helsingfors and Cronstadt.

The next thing that occurred to make matters still worse between the officers and men, was the question of the wearing of shoulder-straps and the abolition of the rank of warrant-officer and the privileges of long service men.

The officers prized very much the historical associations of their uniform which was the same as that worn more than a century ago in the Navy, but appreciating the situation they were ready to submit to the request for a modification. This question had become especially acute on the 2d Division of battle-ships, which was called the "convict division" and nearly resulted in a recommencement of the brutalities of the early days of the Revolution.

To settle this urgent question quickly, an assembly of naval and military officers was called together at Helsingfors. The assembly was very numerous and tempestuous; the officers had to acknowledge that among them also there were black sheep to be found. Thus, major-general Alexeievsky, speaking from the platform, tore off his shoulder-straps and threw them on the floor, exclaiming: "It is enough, I cannot any longer wear these imperial shoulder-straps, they press too heavily on my shoulders. . . . If you think they mean something to me, you are mistaken" . . . the officers were quite amazed by the behaviour of the grey-headed general who so easily abjured the ideals he had served all his life. . . .

Not less shameful was the pronouncement of lieutenant-colonel A. Nojine of the hydrographical Corps. He also tore off his shoulder-straps, threw them on the floor and went still farther, for he trampled upon them, and beat his chest, calling out hysterically: "This accursed emblem of the tzarist power

¹⁾ Shoes plaited out of strips of lime-trees bark which the peasants wear.

burns me; I was always ashamed of this livery and I blushed with shame when I met the wrestlers for liberty."

It was evident that Alexeievsky as well as Nojine wished to attract the attention of the deputies of the soldiers and workers soviets who were present. In answer to some exclamations of indignation on the part of the officers, Nojine uttered some threats; then the president of the assembly requested him not to continue his speech.

On account of the turn the discussion had taken the assembly decided to send its representatives to the Commander in Chief of the Fleet to ask him to indicate his point of view. In answer, Maksimoff tore off his shoulder-straps and said he was going to publish an order abolishing them. Then the assembly passed a resolution that the wearing of shoulder-straps should be discontinued so as to avoid new tumults, and that sleeve chevrons should be worn instead. During the following days there were several cases of soldiers and sailors attacking officers who had not yet taken off the shoulder-straps.

So much for the matter of the shoulder-straps; as for the warrant-officers and long service men, this was much more serious. With their departure the Fleet lost its best technical men who were cast out without any means of livelihood, and most of them were men with families. They had all acquired through many years service great experience and were the best assistants of the officers in technical line. In abolishing these ranks great damage was done to the fighting capacity of the Navy, for it was deprived of its principal specialists.

The propaganda against the warrant-officers and long-service men was conducted with great persistence; it was founded on the accusation that these men had played the part of "gendarmes and police agents" during the former regime, reporting everything to the chiefs. Such propaganda met with success and the lives of these poor men hung on a thread. Only the officers took their the C. C. did least of all for them, though it would have been natural for him not to allow this measure to pass. The intervention of the officers was without result and the C. C. ordered the abolition of these ranks with as much facility as he had torn off his shoulder-straps.

Amongst the revolutionary reforms of the Provisional Government, the recognition of the right of the men to change the names of their ships, must be noted. From the very foundation of the Navy, there had been a certain tradition attaching to the naming of ships; the names were given either in honour of prominent Admirals or some great hero, or commemorated past victories, or the Saints on whose days those victories were won. When a ship was too old for service, was lost in action, or sunk, her name was given to some new ship that was being built.

In this way the glorious names were not lost, but passed from generation to generation and each ship had her past and her history. It seemed as if the soul of the old ship went with her name into the new one and the ancient traditions passed over also with the name. The ship's crew were proud of the deeds of their predecessors and tried likewise to keep up her fame and to add fresh laurels to the former wreath. The name of the ship was always dear to her crew and the traditions surrounding it were of great value in the training of the men and an inspiration to them in time of war.

When the revolution broke out, the crews, under the influence of the general intoxication, began to change the names of their ships so as to indicate their revolutionary and democratic sympathies. It was done especially with the ships which bore the names of Emperors, or Imperial titles. Thus

the battle-ship "Imperator Pavel I" was renamed "Respublica" and the gallant old "Tzesarevitch"—"Grajdanine" ("Citizen").

"Red" Cronstadt distinguished itself particularly in that line. The old battle-ship "Imperator Alexander II", in time of yore the pride of Russia, which had helped to crush the mutiny on Crete, received the name of "Zaria Svobody" (dawn of liberty); the training ship "Rynda", which was a relic of the ancient sailing-fleet and had been many times round the world, was turned into "Osvoboditel" (liberator).

A little later the new destroyer "Vladimir" was named "Svoboda" (liberty) and the training ship "Dvina" became again "Pamiat Azova"¹; this name had been taken away from her after the mutiny in 1906 during which the sailors killed their officers.

The Black-Sea fleet had the same fate: the new battle-ships were named: "Democratia" (democracy) instead of "Imperator Nikolai II", the "Ekaterina II", "Svobodnaia Rossia" (free Russia) and the "Imperator Alexander III"—"Volia" (which means freedom). I had myself witnessed the final action of the predecessor of this latter ship during the Tsoushima fight. All shattered by the Japanese shells, without her funnels and all a flame, she proceeded at the head of the Squadron instead of the flag-ship "Souvoroff" which had sunk. Her moments were numbered; she was rapidly listing more and more, but before turning over, the "Imperator Alexander III" gave her enemy one last broadside. . . . Not a man of her crew escaped.

The battle-ship "Panteleimon" and the cruiser "Kagul" received their former names "Kniaz Potemkine Tavrichesky" and "Otchakoff" which they had lost as punishment for their mutiny in 1905. However, the first was soon renamed "Boretz za Svobodu" (wrestler for freedom), as they found the glorious name of the Prince of Tauride, not democratic enough.

It was only accidentally that the old "Rostislaff", the most exemplary ship of the Black-sea fleet, which had always held very high the standard of loyalty, escaped being named "Edinenie" (Union). At first she was safe, but later danger threatened her also, for the student-son of the well-known leader of the tumult on the "Otchakoff" in 1905, Lieutenant P. Schmidt, arrived at Sebastopol where he was triumphantly received. Seeing on the capribbons of some sailors the name of "Rostislaff", Schmidt exclaimed: "Rostislaff"? why, your ship is a dark spot on the whole Black-sea fleet: she crushed down the mutiny on the "Otchakoff", and her crew shot my father." . . . A great tumult ensued, and the same day an extraordinary-meeting of the ship committee was held. There was much shouting and disputing, and they nearly came to blows, but nothing was decided, and as it was supper time, they put off their sitting till next day. Next day the question had already lost interest, and it was dropped without further discussion.

All these new official names did not take easily. They had little meaning for the Navy and did not at all represent the character of the ships; even the most revolutionary sailors often called their ships by their former names.

One of the characteristic manifestations of the revolution was, that so many political and professional associations were founded in the Navy. All the "comrades" united: the musicians, the chauffeurs, the doctors, the assistant surgeons, the sanitary staff and other employers. In entering the associations, they had to demonstrate their opinion about the revolution, show their "political individuality", that is—their political platform.

¹ In remembrance of Azoff.

These associations used to begin work immediately by claiming particular rights for their members; raising the price of their work, or their salaries, shortening the number of working hours, and waged an implacable war against all "bourgeois" organisations. They considered this way of acting as defending the interests of their organization. The more democratic the association was, that is, the lower their members' station in life was, the more success had their requests. For instance, the "association of sickbay" attendants played the principal part in the hospitals; the "association of assistant-surgeons" drove out the doctors; the association of the "hired employees of the port-offices" meddled with the administration of the port, and so on endlessly.

The officers were least of all prepared to struggle for their rights and privilege. Added to this, it must be remembered that, although professional associations of all kinds were welcomed and greeted with approbation, the officers' associations were looked upon with displeasure. The revolutionary authorities considered them a danger to "revolutionary winnings", and kept vigilant eyes on the officers, limiting all their attempts to defend themselves. If anybody needed defence, it was certainly the officers, for they were exposed continually to arrests and persecutions and to all sorts of affronts which remained unpunished.

In Helsingfors, where the position of the officers was particularly hard, the idea had arisen amongst them to also form a "union", but without any political bias; they therefore assembled to discuss matter but on this becoming known to the "soviet of the workers, sailors and soldiers", representatives were sent who insisted, that before forming a union, the officers must determine on a "platform" in order that the democracy should be convinced of their sincerity. However, the officers attempted to prove that they stood outside politics and unreservedly carried out all the orders of the Provisional Government, but the members of the Soviet persisted in sticking to their standpoint and began to threaten they would not allow the union to be recognised. A "platform" had therefore to be invented. But what could be the officers' platform? Though brought up in old traditions and in the old spirit they could not but take into account the general circumstances of the moment. They had therefore only to accept the "platform" of legality, right and order. And the platform proved to be not a complicated one. It did not speak either about the "conquests of the Revolution", the universal proletariat or the authority of the Soviets, only about submission to the Provisional Government. But this platform did not please the local demagogues, the latter remained convinced that the officers were untrustworthy and must be watched.

Politics had turned everyone's head to such an extent at the time, that not even the simplest of questions could be approached without endless hours being wasted on discussions as to the political platform.

In this connection a characteristic example was afforded by the first Pan-Russian Congress of the officers of the Army and Navy in Petrograd. That congress was convoked by the Petrograd Officers' Union, which by the way was of a very "revolutionary" disposition. Officers assembled from all parts of Russia, those of the rear being naturally more numerous than those from the fighting front. Officers of the navy also came from the fleets of all the Russian seas. The staff officers both from the front and from the navy understood that the task before them was simply to make clear the general situation of the Army and the Navy as well as their own position after the Revolution, and lay down the lines to which they must adhere in

future. But other officers, chiefly from among students who had not finished their education, and had from the very University benches, become contaminated with socialism and politics, insisted first of all on making clear the officers' attitude towards the Revolution, and endless controversies began. Every one of them attempted to parade his eloquence and his devotion to the "conquests of the Revolution". The sittings lasted from ten to twelve hours a day leading only to this—that all those present separated themselves into 3 groups: the first stood on the Provisional governments' platform, the second—on that of the Soviet of workmen and soldiers' deputies and the third was outside politics (so called "savages").

And when, after a week, the discussion on the "platform" was ended, but three days remained for the rest of the programme. And it had, of course, to be abridged, many people having already left by that time. The Congress ended in nothing. It only brought to the souls of many a bitter disappointment as to the possibility of the officers being united. In spite of all possible hindrances two officers' Unions were still formed in the Baltic Fleet: one at Reval, the other, later, at Helsingfors. Later on these two were merged into one and existed up to the passage of the fleet to Cronstadt.

The part played by these organisations was a very insignificant one, the officers not even being able to express their opinions publicly otherwise the Union would have been dispersed at once. Also the officers seemed to adapt themselves but little to politics and looked on such organisations most sceptically, applying to them only in cases of great danger.

The period I have described above embraces the end of March, April and the beginning of May, coinciding with the preparations for the summer campaign. The Navy was still holding on and those ships which were due in the Riga Gulf, proceeded thither in time. Other work as to the restoration of military positions was also carried out and so, from the technical standpoint, the state of defence in the Baltic Theatre continued normal.

The end of May and June brought nothing new; the situation continued indefinite, being the reflection of events in Petrograd. In any case the disposition of the men was far from quiet. The work of "deepening the Revolution" went on at full speed, the men becoming more radical every day. Insults and threats directed against the Provisional Government were more and more openly made.

Among the officers of the Navy the opinion still prevailed at the time, that Kerensky, who was Chief of the Government and also "Minister for the Army and Navy" was an exception when compared with the revolutionary tribe in general. Nor were the officers of the navy alone in being mistaken in their views of Kerensky; for some reason the whole of Russia persistently talked about his "extraordinary uprightness and honesty".

Therefore when bolshevist tendencies began to increase in the Baltic fleet, the Officers' Union sent to Kerensky a delegation of two men in order that there should be no misunderstanding in Petrograd as to the true situation thereof.

Having come to Petrograd, these officers called at the flat of the Minister of the Navy where Kerensky then lived and explained the object of their visit. They were asked to wait some time in the vestibule, as the "Minister" was lunching. Having waited for an hour the officers enquired whether they would have to wait long. It then appeared that "the Minister was taking a little rest". Another hour passed. Then the officers again sent a reminder of their existence. And the answer was: "The Minister has got up but has

been urgently called to a meeting. He said he would return soon." But not until an hour and a half later did the officer on duty come into the vestibule and announce at last, that Kerensky requested the officers to proceed to his study and he would come there at once.

And then he did come, surrounded by a whole suite, an indulgent and majestic smile playing about his face. Having said "Good day" to the delegates and asked all those present to be seated, he gave them to understand by a slight inclination of the head that he was ready to listen.

At once one of the delegates began to explain in detail the general situation which was already then not without its disquieting symptoms. Such information, it seemed, ought to be of interest to the Minister for the Navy and Chief of the State. Did not officers address him who had just arrived from the very places they were speaking about and who understood well the situation in the fleet? Besides, this was no impromptu talk but a special deputation of representatives dispatched by the officers of the Baltic fleet; all our officers were, so to say, speaking through these two.

Having talked for a few minutes the delegate glanced at the "Minister" and—stopped. For on the pale, colourless face (adorned by two very small eyes) of the "People's Chief" he saw not only indifference but unutterable ennui expressed. "When are you going to leave me alone?" Kerensky seemed to ask. He obviously did not care a straw either about the delegates or the officers who had sent them or the fleet itself. Deep silence prevailed for a few minutes. The officers were expecting something from Kerensky to indicate whether they should go on or not. But Kerensky seemed to be absorbed in thought. Then one of the members of his suite respectfully reminded him that "the report was over". Coming back to his senses Kerensky uttered a few words of thanks for "such valuable information" and began to say good-bye.

The officers left in sheer bewilderment and looked at each other in silence. It was now clear to them that so long as a lawyer remained at the head of the Army and Navy no good was to be expected. It is probable that any delegation from "comrade sailors" insisting on an increase in pay or food ration would have been differently received; but there was surely no sense in wasting one's time with officers!

In July the Provisional Government at last removed Maksimoff from his post as Commander of the Fleet, appointing Rear-Admiral D. N. Verderevsky in his stead. This change was not without incidents. At first Maksimoff categorically refused to withdraw. He was supported by the crew of the dreadnought "Petropavlovsk" now very probolshevistic, who even issued an ultimatum declaring that they would open fire on the "Kretchet" should the new C. C. take up his command. And by way of demonstration, the "Petropavlovsk" raised a second C. C. flag. Admiral Verderevsky had to use persuasion with Maksimoff for a long time. The latter at last consented to retire and sent the "Petropavlovsk" a telegram "entreating" that the flag be hauled down and the authority of the new C. C. recognised. The incident was over and Admiral Verderevsky assumed command.

The new C. C. well understood the situation in which the fleet was. From the very beginning it became clear to him that now, after the Maksimoff regime, it was doubtful whether anything could change for the better. Days were spent in ceaseless negotiations and persuasion: incredible dissensions and misunderstandings constantly arose. All the time one had to smooth down, explain, make clear or prove something.

At this time there assembled in Helsingfors the First congress of representatives of all parts and units of the Baltic fleet. Representatives from Cronstadt also came and in connection with them new misunderstandings arose. They insisted on the measures of democratisation they had *proprio motu* introduced in Cronstadt being applied to the fleet—also the ward-rooms were to be handed over to the men: they insisted also on the abolition of all rank including that of C. C. Only thanks to the representatives of the Destroyer-Force, of the Cruisers' Division and to the influence of the C. C. himself, were these demands over ruled. In the beginning of August the first bolshevist insurrection broke out in Petrograd. The Provisional Government found themselves in a very critical situation and in a fit of panic requested that the C. C. should send at once a few destroyers to their aid. But the Centrobalt energetically protested against affording aid to the Government nor did the men want to go. Meanwhile the Government got the upper hand. Feeling they now stood on solid ground, they ordered Admiral Verderevsky to go to Petrograd and report. The Admiral at once proceeded thither on board a destroyer and after his arrival called on the Minister for the Navy at once. But there he was met by the officer-on-duty only, though all had known about his arrival beforehand. The officer-on-duty could not explain anything intelligently and seemed to be in a state of *désarroi*. Then, a few minutes later an officer of the guard came at the head of a few soldiers, and notified the Admiral that he was arrested in the name of the Provisional Government. And Verderevsky was taken into one of the empty apartments in the building occupied by the Ministry of the Navy.

This arrest provoked much indignation not only among the officers but also among the men and so Kerensky himself was called upon to explain his act. After several persistent enquiries the answer came at last that the Admiral was accused of High treason and that an extraordinary commission of enquiry had been appointed for investigation. During the first days it seemed as if some serious danger was threatening him, but the investigation led to no result whatever; and not only was the Admiral set free but, later on, even became Minister for the Navy. The most popular Admiral at the time A. V. Rasvosoff, chief of the Destroyer-Force, was appointed C. C. in Admiral Verderevsky's stead.

Officers and men, all alike were glad of this appointment, because he seemed the right man in the right place in those disturbed times; and the hope was entertained that he would perhaps be able to do something for the Fleet.

And really, at first there seemed to be some reason for that hope. The Admiral knew how to influence the crews, and even demagogues from different committees and "soviets". He seemed to be able to take the committees in hand, especially as they were impressed by the support he found among the crews of the destroyers.

On September the 8th a new mutiny broke out in Petrograd. At first it was difficult to make out who had revolted against whom, but gradually it became clear. It turned out that Kerensky, after having agreed with General Korniloff, betrayed him cruelly when the time came to act. To excuse himself, he sent telegrams to all the armies and to the Navy, saying that Korniloff had claimed that all authority be passed to him, so as to be able to form a new government at his own discretion. "Considering this request as an attempt against the conquests of the revolution"—wrote Kerensky—"I decided, with the Provisional Government's authorization, to use ener-

getic means for the salvation of my Country, Freedom and the Republican regime." But in what consisted these energetic measures? In deceit and betrayal?

Korniloff himself and several generals of the Chief General Staff were arrested. After General Alexeieff, who had taken the Chief command provisionally, General Klembofsky, was appointed to that post; he was known for his bolshevist tendencies.

The Korniloff incident had the saddest consequences for us naval officers. The bolshevist agents, of course, profitted by this "anti-revolutionary conspiracy of the generals"; for all the officers were requested to sign a paper declaring that they recognized only the Provisional Government and that they had no participation in the Korniloff incident. Evidently they had reckoned upon some officers refusing to fulfill this order and then they hoped to be able to use the fact as propaganda. As a matter of fact, the officers could not have had any part in the Korniloff incident, and they knew nothing about it beforehand; but it is comprehensible, that when it happened, all sympathized with it in their hearts.

It was very painful to give it up, and to have to confirm once more their loyalty to the Provisional Government which was despised by everybody. But this question had to be decided immediately, for there were already threats of new brutalities being in store for the officers.

The C. C. who was at that time in Reval, profiting by this turn of events, hastened to promulgate an order in which he reminded the officers that during war-time they must be far from all politics and fulfill only their duties; he in this way put aside all the naval officers from participating in the events of the time. We had to sign our subordination to the Provisional Government.

However it did not pass without outrages. In Abo, under pretence of his having sympathized with the Korniloff incident, Lieutenant A. J. Makarevitch, was shot, and on the "Petropavlovsk", Lieutenant B. P. Tisenko and the Sub-Lieutenants D. Kandyba, K. Michailoff and M. Kondratieff were arrested and afterwards shot, for having refused to sign the act of submission.

The arrest and the murder of these officers by the crew of the "Petropavlovsk" took place on September the 12th, when in fact the Korniloff incident was already closed, the ship-committee of the "Petropavlovsk" assembled a meeting of all the crew and the president of the committee announced, that the revolutionary committee of Helsingfors required all the officers to sign a declaration, stating that they would not obey General Korniloff but would fulfill only the orders of the Soviets. The crew, as is always their wont on such occasions concluded with a demand for the immediate capital punishment of Korniloff and the transmission of power to the soviets.

After the meeting, the members of the ship committee asked the officer in charge, when the officers would sign this resolution. They received the answer that they would decide and make their own declaration and not the proposed one. A little later all the officers assembled in the ward-room and voted for the following form of declaration: "Disapproving the action of General Korniloff, which might bring on civil war, the officers will not obey his orders, but will submit to the Government acting in accordance with the Pan-Russian Central-Executive committee of the Soviet of the workers, soldiers and peasants." It was signed by all the officers, except by Sub-Lieutenants Kandyba and Kondratieff; but at last they also let themselves be persuaded, and therefore it was signed by all.

After lunch, at about 1 o'clock, the ship-committee invited the officers to their deck and there the declaration was handed over to them. It satisfied neither the committee, nor the men: they insisted upon the officers signing the general declaration.

The discussion lasted an hour and a half, and ended in the officers adding to their form the following phrase: "and the orders of the Central Executive Committee in accordance with the local organizations and the members chosen by them." During the discussion in the presence of the committee and a great number of men, of course there was no possibility for the officers to talk over any question, and as for the conference being transferred again to the ward-room, the committee would not hear of it. The officers had to decide and to act independently.

The result was, that the Sub-Lieutenants Kandyba and Kondratieff, as well as Lieutenant Tisenko who had just arrived after having been on leave and who, straight from the station, came to the meeting, refused to sign the new declaration with the words above mentioned, appended thereto. Tisenko had not signed the first declaration either.

These three officers handed over a separate declaration as follows: "1. We, the undersigned, pledge ourselves to obey unflinchingly all the orders of the C. C. appointed by the Provisional Government, supported by the central-democratic organ, directed against our external foe. 2. Not wishing to shed the blood of the Russian citizens, we refuse to participate actively in any home politics. 3. We protest against the accusation aimed at us, of having anti-revolutionary ideas, and ask to be allowed to prove our fidelity to Russia by sending us to the Zeret front so that we may be in the closest contact with the external foe of our country."

Sub-Lieutenant Michailoff, who was all the time on guard, on account of some considerations of his own, did not sign the general declaration of the officers, but the separate one.

Then a general assembly of the crew was summoned at which the president made public the general declaration of the officers as well as the separate one. Having heard these, the sailors seemed to take the matter very quietly, and the officers thought that the question was settled.

In the evening agitation recommenced; the 4th company declared they would not have Lieutenant Tisenko and Sub-Lieutenant Kandyba amongst them, and insisted upon a new chief of the company being appointed; at the same time, they forbade Tisenko and Kandyba to go on shore.

Next morning, the officer in charge called the president of the ship-committee, the sailor Diutchkoff who was electrician on board, to settle the matter. The latter advised the officers who had written a separate declaration, to talk over the question with their companies.

So they did; but soon Sub-Lieutenant Kondratieff reported to the executive officer that he had not succeeded in settling anything with his company. The other three officers were to speak with them later.

At about 11,30 a. m. Diutchkoff came to the Captain D. D. Tyrtoff and said that he was afraid of the crew again taking to lynch-law, and therefore he thought it better to arrest all four officers and send them on shore to be judged by the revolutionary committee. He added that the revolutionary committee had left it to the crew to decide whether the declaration was satisfactory or not.

After dinner the committee invited the officer in charge to come to them; the Captain went with him. On entering, they saw there all the accused officers; it was evident that they were being questioned.

The questions that were put to them were very provocative, for instance: "If the C. C. were to pass over to Korniloff's side, would you obey his orders?" or—"if the Central committee ordered you to go to Petrograd, and it was occupied by Korniloff's troops—would you fulfill this order?" Three officers answered curtly: "no, we would not fulfill it", and the fourth, Kondratieff, said he thought these questions quite idle, as he would in any case, fulfill only the C. C.'s orders.

The Captain, the officer in charge and one of the members of the ship-committee—an officer, protested against this kind of questioning, but of course without result.

When the examination was ended and the protocol was signed, Kandyba and Kondratieff begged the Captain to send them somewhere, where they could fight and not be occupied by politics only. Diutchkoff who heard this, said as if talking to himself: "Well, as to Kondratieff, it would be possible."

The ship-committee decided definitely upon arresting the officers, but so as to avoid their being lynched, they were to be sent on shore, to the revolutionary committee.

When all the crew assembled to listen to the reading of the protocol, there were demands that the accused should be lunched then and there. The president Diutchkoff proposed a vote on the question; the more moderate elements protested against this, but Diutchkoff, without taking any notice put the question to the vote, "whether they were to be sent to the revolutionary committee, or to be executed immediately"; there were only 30 voices for the last proposition and there were 800 men present.

During that time two representatives of the Centrobalt arrived, whom the news had reached that a lynching was likely to take place. They insisted upon the officers being given over to them, but the ship-committee refused, saying there was no danger of their being lynched, and that they were to be sent, anyhow, to the revolutionary committee, that same evening. The committee insisted particularly upon their being sent in the evening, saying that otherwise violence might be attempted. Soon afterwards, the member of the committee who was on duty, came to the executive officer and reported that the officers desired to speak to him. When he came to them, they asked him to arrange that they should be allowed to put on clean linen, to gather together their washing-articles and say goodbye to their comrades. Their two first requests were granted by the committee, but to the last, they answered: "They will see each other again."

At the door of Sub-Lieutenant Kandyba's cabin, where the arrested officers were, a crowd of sailors, who behaved very insolently, stood all the time, and threats, abuse and jeer were heard.

The officer in charge had to insist several times upon the members of the committee driving the crowd away.

In the evening, before the departure of the officers for the shore a meeting was held by the sailors, but not on the upper deck, as usual, but on the lower deck. As was ascertained later they condemned the officers, during this meeting, to be shot. The ship committee did not say a word to the officers of this condemnation and even concealed that there had been a meeting.

Finally at 8.45 p. m. a cutter was launched and the arrested officers under a guard of 16 sailors, chosen by the committee, were embarked on it. Some of the sailors had rifles, others—pistols. The president Diutchkoff announced that the members of the committee electrician Klimientieff and gunner Kokine were to go also. The electrician Mamonoff (a former village school-

master) and the blue-jacket Guileff were in the escort. The arrested officers were to have been taken to the Esplanade wharf, opposite the Marinsky palace, where the representatives of the Centrobalt were to meet them.

However, instead of going there, the cutter was steered towards the Elisavetinsky wharf farther away from the centre of the town. Seeing this, the officers insisted on being taken to the Esplanade wharf, as had been decided, but the escort declared to them that they were condemned to death and that they would be directly shot. On coming up to the wharf, Sub-Lieutenant Kondratieff who was very strong, jumped with his little port-manteau over the heads of the sailors into the water and began calling for help, in the hope of attracting the attention of the men on board the merchant ships which were lying close by there. His cries were heard, it seems, but fearing the armed sailors, nobody dared come to his rescue. The sailors on the boat began pursuing Kondratieff; he was a splendid swimmer and they had great difficulty in seizing him, so they gave him a blow with an oar, or the butt-end of a gun, breaking his arm between the shoulder and the elbow, after which he was dragged into the boat where the sailors struck him with their rifles and kicked him.

When the officers were landed, they were ranged with their backs to the sea at a distance of twenty feet from the corner house; one of the sailors went to fetch a motorcar. It was suggested that they should say goodbye to each other. They only shook hands in silence, then a volley was fired and Sub-Lieutenants Kandyba and Kondratieff fell, Lieutenants Tisenko and Michailoff remaining standing but wounded and covered with blood. Lieutenant Tisenko shouted: "what are you doing, you villains", and the exclamation: "kill me straight away, you scoundrels" . . . escaped Michailoff's lips.

The sailors then made a savage attack on the officers firing point blank with their pistols, piercing them with their bayonets and beating them with the butt-end of their rifles; later no less than sixteen wounds were counted on each body; their chests were pierced by many bullets, skulls were smashed in and teeth broken. Lieutenant Tisenko was a long time dying and begged them to kill him quickly, then several sailors with the butt-ends of their rifles gave him blows which broke his teeth and his nose and terribly disfigured his face. Then the bodies were placed sitting in the motor-car and taken to the dead-house where they were thrown on the floor.

The corpses were a dreadful sight with clothing torn to pieces, and bootless, all covered with dirt and frightfully disfigured.

About a quarter of an hour after the boat had left the "Petropavlovsk" with the arrested officers, it was reported to the Captain and to the executive officer who were together, that shots were heard in the direction of the port; which made them very anxious.

Soon after that, two members of the revolutionary committee, a soldier and a sailor in private dress, arrived on the ship. They had a strange manner; they spoke first of the bad rumours about the "Petropavlovsk", and then thanked the crew for their union and organization. After their arrival the news spread of the four officers having been shot. The officer in charge called immediately Diutchkoff and asked him what this meant. The latter pretended to know nothing whatever and only said that he had given a letter to the escort which was to be handed over to the revolutionary committee when the officers were brought before them.

The officer in charge ordered him to question the escort as soon as they returned and to report to him immediately. The escort finally returned, but

Diutchkoff had to be summoned three times before he appeared. When he came, he declared shortly: the letter was handed over, but the officers have been killed; he refused to say where their bodies were.

Two officers were immediately sent on shore to find the bodies and to send telegrams to the C. C. and to Kondratieff's father, whose address turned out to be known on board. At first the committee did not wish to let them go, and they consented only after long discussion. As it was already past midnight, they did not succeed in finding the bodies of the murdered officers.

Next morning on September the 14th the flag-lieutenant was sent to search for them. He went to the revolutionary committee and there he succeeded in getting a copy of the letter which Diutchkoff had sent with the escort. It was as follows: "Herewith are the bodies of four officers, shot by the verdict of the crew."

Thus, Diutchkoff and the committee who tried to persuade everybody that they did everything possible to save the accused officers, were cynically lying and deceiving the Captain and the senior-officer; in reality they had already been condemned and Diutchkoff and the Committee had organized the murders and only left the execution crime to trusted executioners from among the crew. The flag-lieutenant succeeded in getting permission to bury the victims.

The watchman of the dead-house consented to wash and to dress the bodies after having been promised money. With the help of the ship-officers they were put into coffins and that same evening transported on motor-lorries to the chapel in the cemetery.

On September the 16th they were buried in the presence of a great crowd of people; these murders had profoundly shocked everybody in Helsingfors, not only the Russians, but also the natives; and many utter strangers came to pay last homage to these victims; their graves were entirely covered with flowers.

The murdered officers were yet quite boys: about 18—19 years old. They had not taken any part in politics, so they could not be suspected of being in any conspiracy. They were the victims of the brutal instincts of a gang of criminals who had made the "Petropavlovsk" their stronghold.

In spite of all the efforts of the officers, the murderers remained unpunished, for the government of Kerensky considered the murder of officers as an inevitable thing.

In Kazan Cathedral, during the prayers for the dead, there were so many people present besides the relations and the friends of the murdered young men that the Cathedral was quite full. Amongst the clergy who officiated, was also the father of one of the victims of the crime, an old greyhaired priest. It was painful to look at his profoundly sorrowful face and at the tears which rolled down his emaciated cheeks, and to hear his voice. Many in the Cathedral were crying; from time to time the words of the "revolutionary leader of the Army and the Navy" Kerensky, were heard; he had found nothing better to say than: "These victims are inevitable" . . . and: "It was necessary for the storm of the popular indignation to break in that way. . . ."

Does M. Kerensky remember now his words, or has he the shamelessness to deny having uttered them?

When the Korniloff incident was over things were still worse in spite of all Admiral Razvozoff's efforts, the condition of the fleet went from bad to worse.

In September the enemy began the attack upon Riga Gulf. After the sad incident of the defence of Moonsound, the fleet retired to Lapvik; soon

Reval also surrendered and the ships which had had their base there, went to Helsingfors.

During that time bolshevist propaganda spread widely. The ships, which had been all the time in Moonsound, were considered as far from reliable in a revolutionary sense, and therefore the well-known "Maroussia" Spiridonoff was sent there to influence the crews. On the decks again was heard the appeal: "Comrades, don't believe your officers, look after them, and if you remark anything wrong, kill them."

A little later the elections for the Executive Assembly began. They were organized in a most flagrant manner, and took place under the pressure and the interference of the ship committees; the sailors might choose only bolshevist candidates.

As to the officers, there were so few of them, that their voices had no weight whatever. They had their own candidates, officers also, whom they chose, though they knew that nothing would come out of it; but they could not elect people like Miliukoff, Kerensky, Tchernoff, Trotzky, Dybienko, Proshian and co.

On November the 6th the bolshevist revolution broke out. This time the Centrobalt itself requested destroyers to be sent to Petrograd, not to support the Provisional Government, but to act against it, and in cooperation with the bolsheviks. The destroyers that were to be sent were chosen by the general assembly of the Centrobalt and the representatives from all the ships. It was with heavy hearts that the officers turned their ships towards Petrograd, but there was no other alternative, all the efforts of the C. C. to persuade the assembly not to send them, had no result. However the officers of the destroyers declared to the men, that personally they would take no part in the attack; this did not pass unpunished everywhere: on the destroyer "Deiatelny" all the officers were arrested, except the Captain who succeeded in escaping. They were sent to Cronstadt where they were to be judged as "enemis of the people". Thanks to the efforts of the C. C. these officers, happily were saved, and got off with a fortnight's arrest. On arriving at Petrograd the destroyers moored in the different ports. The "Avrora" which lay near the Franco-Russian iron-works, changed her place and anchored in the centre of the Neva, near the Nicolas bridge. The unusual picture of Petrograd turned into a naval port appeared before the eyes of the citizens. It was rumoured amongst them, that the ships were to shell the town, during the bolshevist offensive. The passers by as they went along the quays and bridges looked timidly at the guns of the "red Avrora", and thought of them as monsters always ready to despatch them to that world "where there are no liberties, no revolutions and no sighs".

These fears turned out to be exaggerated, as is generally the case. During all the days of the revolution not a single destroyer opened fire, except the "Avrora", which fired several blank shots just to keep the people in awe.

The fate of the Provisional Government was already sealed. And Kerensky, who had vowed so energetically to die for the revolution, took to his heels and went off in a motor-car (dressed up as a sailor or a woman) in the direction of Gatchina. The council of ministers which was having a sitting in the Winter Palace under the protection of the women's battalion, was arrested by the bolsheviks and taken to the Peter and Paul fortress. Their power was gone.

In analysing the circumstances attending the bolshevist revolution, it must be noted that the fleet played a decisive part in it; for if the rebellion

had not ended successfully, certainly neither the "Avrora" nor the destroyers would have hesitated to bombard Petrograd, which could have made no resistance. In any case, having the fleet at their service, the bolsheviks were sure of being able to master the metropolis.

In connection with this revolution, a very interesting episode was related, which happened in Petrograd and which shows what an important part the submarine "Ersh" was to play. She had just been finished and lay amongst the other boats in the Neva. At that time all the bolshevist leaders, as Lenin, Trotzky, etc. had gone on the "Avrora" whose crew was entirely composed of bolsheviks; they intended, in case their enterprise should fail, to escape on her; and they had embarked on the "Avrora" all the gold, papers of value and other precious things they had "socialized". Trotzky told the crew that if they saved their lives, the name of the "Avrora" would become immortal in the history of the revolution. The sailors had promised not to leave a stone in place in Petrograd if the Provisional Government kept the upperhand.

Having heard of this intention in regard to the "Avrora" and also that Lenin and Trotzky were on her, a small group of daring fellows decided to disarm the crew of the "Ersh", take possession of the submarine and to sink the "Avrora". Their plan, however was accidentally discovered. When the "hermits" on the "Avrora" heard of this, their first question was: "and how about the other ships, are they all reliable?" In spite of an affirmative answer, they preferred, nevertheless, to leave the cruiser and in their haste they nearly forgot to take their goods with them, which evoked unanimous laughter even from the ultra-revolutionary crew.

The committees wanted to make the officers sign a declaration again, but this time against the Provisional Government. However it was postponed and later this question was not so acute. The new revolution passed without bloodshed so far as the officers were concerned. Towards that period the officers had fallen into complete apathy, as there was nothing to hope for, and everything had become quite dark around. With the installation of the bolsheviks, it became evident that war would end soon, and therefore the character of the officers' service in the Navy would be quite changed. Everything was going on very badly; the results of the operations, which generally show the fighting-capacity of a fleet, clearly denoted its decay. In addition to the surrender of the Riga Gulf and of Moonound and the loss of the battle-ship "Slava" and of the squadron-destroyer "Grom", we also lost during this campaign eight more ships; a total number, if the mine-sweepers are not counted, equalling our entire losses during the whole three years of war.

In October another new submarine "Gepard" sank. She had just completed repairs and was making her first cruise; the principal parts had been built during the revolution, and therefore the work had been very negligently performed. At the first trial many defects were discovered, as, in one of the cylinders of the motor, a forgotten nut of a screw was found. Generally, so as to avoid such occurrences, the crew themselves superintended the work; but now everybody was occupied elsewhere, and they preferred to go to meetings, or to stroll about town, to staying on board. After the faults had been made good, the Captain decided upon a cruise, but he never came back from it.

Finally, on November the 27th the destroyer "Bditelny" was lost, having struck an enemy mine in the region of the town of Raumo; she sank in half an hour's time; there were not enough life-boats, and all the officers remained

on the sinking destroyer. Among them was the Chief of the 7th Flotilla, Captain V. K. Kedroff.

With the loss of the "Bditelny" ended the tale of losses in 1917; as there were no further operations undertaken, and winter was already setting in.

In the middle of November the Naval Ministry was reformed and the "Naval College", which consisted of representatives from the sailors of all the seas was made the governing body. To decide technical questions, an officer, Captain Modeste Ivanoff was appointed, who had responsibilities approximating to those of a Minister for the Navy.

On December the 2d Ivanoff arrived at Helsingfors and hoisted the flag of a Minister for the Navy on the "Grajdanine" (form the "Tzesarevitch"). He reckoned upon the C. C. coming to present himself immediately; but he was mistaken. Admiral Razvozoff sent word that he did not recognize his authority, and would not submit to him as the representative of the commissaries power; a controversy ensued, and the Centrobalt, of course, was on the side of Ivanoff and decided to dismiss Admiral Razvozoff from his post for having refused to acknowledge the power of the Soviet of the people's commissaries.

Then the C. C. assembled a council of all the flag-officers, at which it was decided that they would all resign, if Admiral Razvozoff was set aside. The tension became more acute, which was very unfortunate at that moment; as it was important to keep A. V. Razvozoff in his post for the time being, as there was a faint hope that in eight days, with the opening of the Executive Assembly, the bolshevist power would come to an end.

Taking these circumstances, into consideration the president of the officers' alliance, the Captain of the battle-ship "Sevastopol" P. V. Vilken, went on the "Grajdanine" to Ivanoff to try to persuade him to arrange matters. Ivanoff consented, for he was very discouraged and did not know what he was to do next. P. V. Vilken advised him to go immediately on board the "Kretchet" where the flag-officers, assembly was held, and there explain the situation.

On board the "Kretchet" Ivanoff gave a detailed explanation, and announced that he was not a member of the bolshevist government, and that he had not been appointed by them, but elected by the naval assembly in Petrograd. On hearing this the flag-officers consented to acknowledge him as being duly elected, but not as a representative of the soviet of the commissaries. The incident was closed upon this, and Admiral Razvozoff remained Commander in Chief of the Fleet.

After the bolshevist revolution, all sorts of democratic reforms were speedily enacted. At the beginning of December, the naval college decreed the abolition of the post of Commander in Chief of the Fleet, and conferred the power of that office on the Centrobalt.

The officers were very agitated, for it seemed incredible; that rough, ignorant sailors were to be at the head of all, whilst Admiral Razvozoff, their defender and last hope, was to leave the Navy.

On December the 17th, the C. C. assembled all the flag-officers to consider the matter. All, except Admiral A. Rujek, were decidedly against the new proposition; as for Rujek, he was in sympathy with Ivanoff.

The same evening a general assembly of the officers was held in the Naval Club, to decide upon what was to be done, and how to prevent the carrying out of this "reform". The assembly was very numerous and very stormy; many of the officers proposed to protest openly; they were becoming gradually

more excited and at last it was decided to send to the Centrobalt a warning, to the effect that if the post of Commander in Chief of the Fleet were abolished, all the officers would resign.

The state of affairs was immediately made known to the Centrobalt and thereupon two representatives were sent to the Naval Club; they arrived when the resolution had already been passed. After an unsuccessful attempt to frighten the officers by telling them that the men, having heard about their resolution, were becoming excited, they began to explain and defend the new reform. It was idle talk and it could be clearly seen that the delegates from the Centrobalt did not understand anything of the matter; added to this, they appeared troubled and alarmed by the evident excitement of the great gathering of officers. Some of the bystanders even saw one of the representatives passing a revolver to another. Late at night the assembly dispersed quietly, having remained firm to the resolution.

Next day it got known, that under the pressure from Petrograd, the "reform" would be carried out. Admiral Rujek was to be placed at the head of the department of the naval fighting forces, which replaced now the operative department. The indignation of the officers fell upon him. Then to exonerate himself, he wrote a letter to the president of the assembly, in which he tried to prove, that the officers did not understand the situation, and that the only way of governing the Navy at that juncture, was by a collective command.

The Centrobalt was very anxious about this unexpected protest of the officers and tried to arrange matters; they invited them to come to a general meeting in the Marinsky palace.

Many officers went but they were then not of the same mind and the group of officers was also different. Some were afraid of the consequences of an energetic protest, others belonged to the kind of people who did not feel any scruple as to currying favour even with the bolsheviks; few of them, comparatively, remained firm to their decision of the day before.

The assembly however promised to be a stormy one from the very beginning. The members of the Centrobalt tried all the time to interrupt the speakers who were against the "reform", and to applaud loudly those who were partisans of it. It was sad to hear the speeches of some of the older officers who spoke in defence of actions which were bound to destroy the Navy utterly.

This dreadful meeting which seemed like a nightmare, lasted more than four hours. The Centrobalt used all possible means to make the officers change their resolution of the day before and to make them submit to the "reform". But they did not succeed entirely. The new resolution declared, that the question was not definitely decided by the assembly of delegates from all the ships, it remained open, and the present assembly had no right either to confirm or reject it.

As might be expected, nothing came out of this first, and last, protest of the officers of the Baltic fleet; they were too weak and too irresolute for such a serious struggle. They submitted, and they could not do otherwise, for they were not united closely enough and they were dependant on their profession for their livelihood. Perhaps their weakness is human and comprehensible enough but it is nevertheless sad.

Admiral Razvozoff left and the insolent, stupid commissary, blue-jacket Ismailoff took his place. He treated his assistant "comrade Rujek" in a very off hand way, though the latter tried to make himself agreeable to him and cringed before him.

Now the Navy which seemed already at its worst, showed that there were still lower depths of degradation. The sailors taking advantage of the entire lack of control, deserted with impunity whenever they pleased. On some ships only a few sailors remained, and they refused to do anything.

As to the officers, they also changed for the worse; few of them maintained their dignity, and in spite of the difficult circumstances in which they were placed, they often indulged in revels on shore and got involved in scandals. Quite young officers tried to get rid of the older ones, by arousing the prejudices of the men and then took their places; there were even three cases of officers disappearing with large sums of public money. It became clear that without any proper discipline, the officers were also falling lower and lower.

After Vice-Admiral Razvozoff left, Vice-Admiral M. K. Bakhireff went also and with him his popular Chief of Staff Commander M. A. Behrens and many other officers. The soul of the Navy was gone. . . .

On January 29th 1918 the Soviet of the people's commissaries announced the demobilization of the Navy and published a decree organizing a new "red Navy", no more under the flag of St. Andrew, but under the red flag. The decree ran thus: the Russian Navy, "through the crimes of the tzarist and bourgeois regimes and on account of the war, has been brought to complete ruin, and therefore that Navy, which existed on the foundation of the Tzarist laws and under the obligation of general military service, is demobilised and a new socialistic, workers' and peasants' Navy is to be organized."

"Through the crimes of the tzarist regime!" What a specific calumny, what profound hatred and cynical lying those words contain! God grant that all Navies may grow and develope as did the Russian Imperial Navy during the few years before the revolution. It had never attained such strength, never had such well trained personnel, and such strong bases. When the War began, we had only a few obsolete ships and some small batteries on shore; and in the short interval of years which were years of the hardest war fare, Russia had ever been engaged in our Navy obtained the most modern battle-ships, and the fastest destroyers in the world, and the latest submarines; it had also a number of batteries of the heaviest guns all along the coasts of the gulfs.

The revolution broke out; the "bourgeois regime" of Lvoff and Kerensky set in; the bolsheviks began their activities, and in less than a year nothing remained of the Navy. The new masters of Russia had brought it to utter ruin, step by step, by propaganda and the demoralisation of the men. They robbed the Navy of its brains, and killed its soul. . . .

The Imperial Government knew how to create, and it created our force on land and on sea and brought them to a flourishing state; the revolution destroyed all the results of many years of effort and brought to nought the whole might of the country.

The decree for the organization of the "red Navy" shows how incapable the bolsheviks are of creating anything; it shows also their ignorance in all military and naval matters. Having rapidly issued this decree, they did not even seek informations about the means, they would have at their disposal. The so called "workers' and peasants'" Navy was to be free hired, that is, the officers and men were to be engaged, but bound by contracts, and they were to receive very high rates of pay. Evidently the bolshevist wise men who promulgated the decree took the organization of the English Navy before the War as a model and having somewhat modified it, they thought it

suitable to Russian needs. The result was that even for a much diminished Navy, the cost of maintenance was so great, that the government could never find the money. Even now the pay and food allowances are continually in arrear. In addition to these grave errors, a collective administration was adhered to though it had been so lately demonstrated to be entirely unworkable.

All the attempts of the bolsheviks to invent something new, have failed. Only the illiterate peasants who were suddenly placed at the head of the Navy and the Jewish commissaries, who had no knowledge of affairs, could think of such absurdities.

The news reforms made slow headway. The democratic members of the administration were quite unfit for the business of government.

In January a bolshevist rebellion broke out in Finland; the Centrobalt tried to support it by money and by men; however the sailors entered the Finnish red army reluctantly and there were only some individual cases of their being anxious to enlist.

At the end of February, alarming rumours of the failure of the Finnish "reds", and of the approach of General Mannerheim's army and of the expected German landing reached them and the crews on the ships began to be anxious and dissatisfied with the Centrobalt. On the initiative of the crews of the Destroyers-Force, meetings were held at which it was openly said that the return of Admiral Razvozoff to the post of Commander in Chief of the Navy, was necessary.

Disorder spread everywhere. Typical examples of this were the flight of the "Volynetz" (formerly "Tzar Michail Feodorovitch") and the "Sampo", which both passed over to the White Finns. In Helsingfors a brisk trade was going on everywhere: the property of the State was being taken from the ships and from the harbour and sold; food produce, materials, oil, fuel, furniture of the ward-rooms, pistols, rifles and machine-guns. There were even cases of boats being sold by the ship-committees. None of them were ever stopped by the idea that they were committing a crime; it seemed quite natural to them. "But it is all ours—the people's", they used to say, when an officer tried to stop the pillage.

The Destroyer-Force behaved best of all and on the initiative of the officers and men belonging to it a general assembly of all the representatives of the ship crews, as well as of the members of the Centrobalt, was held, at which it was decided to beg Admiral Razvozoff to come back to his post.

A difficult dilemma now presented itself to the Admiral: to accept or not to accept the proposition. It was clear that he could do nothing to better the state of the Navy, but his duty to his country obliged him to do all that was in his power to save the Fleet from being plundered and the ships from falling into the hands of the enemy. With heavy heart the Admiral consented but he warned the assembly that nevertheless he did not acknowledge the soviet power.

Such an unexpected change in the fleet, made Smolny very anxious, and he immediately sent commissary Raskolnikoff to get Razvozoff away by some means or other. Arriving at Helsingfors Raskolnikoff went on the "Standart" on which was the Centrobalt. Calling a meeting, he expressed his displeasure at their inadvertance and then he passed on to the "Kretchet" accompanied by several members of the Centrobalt. There he met the Admiral in the passage and going up to him, he asked abruptly: "Do you acknow-

ledge the authority of the people's commissaries?" The Admiral without hesitating answered: "Certainly not; and I have declared it at my election."

That same night, Admiral Razvozoff was arrested. The next day he was set free, at the request of the men, but he did not return to his post. Raskolnikoff obliged the Centrobalt to call another meeting to which were admitted only the crews who were against the Admiral and the armed guards of the Centrobalt. Under their pressure any resolution might be voted. The new resolution was for the dismissal of Admiral Razvozoff and for the transfer of all authority to the Centrobalt.

The direction of operations passed to Captain A. M. Stchasny, he being senior in the Staff of the former C. C. Owing to the complete incapacity of the Centrobalt to conduct the administration of the fleet, especially in so serious a crisis, Stchasny took practically all responsibility.

On March the 21st., the German fleet appeared before Hangö and landed a detachment. At their approach the submarines which lay there, "AG 11" "AG 12", "AG 15", "AG 16" and also their supply ship "Oland" and the patrol-boat "Jastreb" were sunk. Immediately a deputation, consisting of several officers and men, proceeded to Rear-Admiral Meirer's, who was in command of the landing party.

The order was given to this deputation that the Russian fleet was to leave Helsingfors by the 30th of March, and those ships which on account of their bad state of repair could not be navigated, were to hoist, at an agreed hour, the flag "Uh". That meant that a very small number of men would remain on the vessel, just enough for protection, and that they would take no further part in the struggle between the Germans and the Finnish "reds". In case of this order being disobeyed, the German Admiral threatened to use force.

On the return of the deputation, Captain Stchasny decided upon taking all the ships to Cronstadt at any cost. Paying no attention to the contradictory orders from Moscow, which insisted first upon the ships being taken away, then left; nor to the claim of the English, who wanted them to be destroyed, Stchasny proceeded in his endeavours to perform this difficult task.

Feverish preparations for the voyage were made. The ice was still thick, especially between Hochland and Cronstadt and therefore it was feared that some of the ships might not be able to struggle through and might sink on the way. But there was no choice; even the Centrobalt remained silent. It was decided to send all the ships to Cronstadt, even those which were under repair and some, whose engines had not been re-fitted; were to be taken in tow by the ice-breakers.

Everyone was at work, and the men, frightened by the rumour that the Germans would hang the sailors without judgment or enquiry, worked as they had never worked before, even in the good old times. One after the other the ships were got ready to put out to sea.

It was incredible what was going on in the harbours; barges were being loaded day and night; with provisions, coal, and all that could be taken on board. Everything was done without system or order; quantities of material disappeared being stolen and sold quietly to private people having nothing whatever to do with the fleet. All thought only of getting hold of as much as they could.

When our fleet was leaving, the English brought out their submarines "E 1", "E 8", "E 9" and "E 19" to the Grohara light-house and blew them up. They also destroyed their smaller submarines "C 26", "C 27" and "C 35".

The former deeds of the English submarines and the help they gave our fleet, come back to my memory. Whilst in the Baltic sea, and working with us, they accomplished many an exploit and did much harm to the enemy. The "E 1" had blown up the cruiser "Moltke"; the "E 8" had sunk the cruiser "Prince Adalbert"; the "E 9" sank the cruiser "Hela" and blew up the battleship "Pommern", and the "E 19" sank the cruiser "Undine". Some of them sank also some submarines and steamers. It was not their fate to return to their country; and they became the victims, not of the enemy, but of the Russian debacle.

First of all, long before the arrival of the Germans, the dreadnoughts departed; then came the other big ships: the battle-ships, cruisers, mine-layers and supply-ships; destroyers, mine-sweepers, the yachts "Standart" and "Poliarnaia Zvezda" with the members of the Centrobalt on board and the "Kretchet" with A. M. Stchasny—last of all. The members of the Centrobalt were the most agitated and desirous of getting away, for they feared that the Germans would not let the yachts leave Helsingfors and they would all be shot.

Only very few ships remained in Helsingfors, and those had fighting no value; at an agreed hour they hoisted a flag with "Uh" on it, as had been arranged.

On March the 30th the German squadron entered Helsingfors harbour and the troops at the same time took possession of the town.

The crossing to Cronstadt was very difficult for the smaller boats; breaking the ice with much difficulty, they proceeded very slowly. In normal conditions the crossing would have taken 10—12 hours, whereas now, many destroyers were 8—9 days on their way. However in spite of the difficulties, all the ships reached Cronstadt safely, and only some destroyers were damaged by the ice. Some ships arrived with a very small number of men, they were hardly numerous enough to relieve each other in working the ship; there were also few officers and in some cases only the Captain was on board.

It was a momentous, but at the same time a profoundly tragical crossing of the Russian fleet, so strong lately and in such a brilliant state, and now so ruined, so incapable to fight. During this last crossing, something of the energy and skill belonging to the old regime again seemed to manifest themselves and enabled the remnants of the fleet to reach their last base.

The principal merit in bringing the fleet to Cronstadt was due, most certainly, to Captain A. M. Stchasny. It was only owing to his energy that it was not left to the enemy, nor sunk as our allies wanted it to be.

On arriving at Cronstadt some of the ships passed to Petrograd and anchored along the Neva, and some of the destroyers and mine-sweepers were left in Schlüsselburg to protect the coast of the Ladoga lake.

Now the fleet was in the close neighbourhood of the principal authorities and under the closest influence and the vigilant eyes of Smolny. Nevertheless it was far from quiet, especially the Destroyer Force. At populous meetings, where officers also used to come forward, speeches against the power of the commissaries, and even appeals to open rebellion were heard; at the same time the plan for the taking of Petrograd after a revolution in the fleet, was worked out.

Smolny learned this immediately and arrests were directly made amongst the officers and men. The destroyers as being unreliable were sent farther up the Neva, away from the town.

One of the first to be arrested was A. M. Stchasny; he was sent to Moscow and charged with treason. A deputation of sailors who went there to request his liberation was not heard.

The accusation which was made against him was worded as follows: "Stchasny, in doing a heroic deed, rendered himself popular with the intention of using this popularity later against the Soviet power."

Such an extraordinary accusation cannot help striking every reasonable person with amazement the more so, that there was not a single fact, or witness against Stchasny, on the contrary, all testimonies were in his favour.

Trotzky alone was against Stchasny. He had no facts to mention, he spoke only of his suppositions; but still he insisted upon Stchasny having sought popularity in order to use it against the power of the Soviet.

A. M. Stchasny was defended by advocate V. A. Jdanoff, who made a brilliant speech; it was easy to defend Stchasny, for his exploit spoke for him.

There did not seem any doubt of an acquittal.

When the judges finally retired to consider their verdict, Trotzky, who was only a witness, also slipped into the room: he was afraid that the judges, under the influence of the advocate's speech, might acquit him.

The judges reappeared and the president of the supreme revolutionary tribunal read in a loud, clear voice sentence of death.

All were amazed, nobody believed their ears; though accustomed to much iniquity, still such an open, abominable injustice was expected by no one. The counsel for the defence asked: "Where can a complaint be lodged against the verdict?" To which the President answered: "Verdicts of the revolutionary tribunal admit of no appeal, but you may apply to the President of the Central Executive Committee"—and withdrew.

According to the statutes of the Supreme Tribunal only the Cik¹⁾ in a plenary sitting could repeal the verdict. But the president of the Cik, Sverdloff, stated that the Cik could not be assembled under twenty four hours and that it was useless for it to assemble later, for Stchasny would already have been shot. . . .

On May 22d at dawn, Stchasny was shot in the yard of the Alexander Military School. He was shot for having saved the Baltic fleet.

Disturbances in the Fleet and chiefly on the destroyers continued until the beginning of June. After a whole series of arrests of officers and men had taken place, the fleet ceased to exist as a force. It became but a collection of ships without leaders and personal. Cronstadt and Petrograd had become the cemeteries of its former power and glory and the ships themselves were now but living corpses. . . .

¹⁾ Cik = abbreviation for «Centralny Ispolnitelny Komitet» (Central Executive Committee).

XXIV.

The Naval officers. Their relation to the revolution. Officers-rene-gades. Why they recognized the Provisional Government. Mutual relations between officers and men. Struggle for the supremacy of the influence over the crew. The officers during the revolution. Type of the Russian blue-jacket. His education. Conditions of life and service on board. Propaganda in the fleet. Analogy of the French and the Russian Navy during revolution. Emigrant Lebedeff's speech. Opinion of the men about the revolution. Its influence upon them. Public opinion about the blue-jackets. Nagorny and Sedneff. Sapoun. Gelezniakoff. Type of the revolutionary sailor. The sailors as part of the nation.

The unexpected outbreak of the revolution which turned upside down the whole life of the Russian state, put the officers in very hard conditions, especially the Naval officers. They had grown and had been brought up in the traditions of monarchy, had taken the oath of fidelity to the Tzar and their country and had never been allowed to meddle in politics. Therefore the motives brought out by the revolution were quite foreign to them.

The provisional Government looked at them askance and with distrust, which manifested itself in the offensive way of treating them, and the inciting of the inferiors against them. This could not gain their good will and from the very first the officers found themselves in opposition with it. But soon, seeing that without officers no military force could exist and that it would only be a licentious gang, the government began to curry favour with them.

The mass of the naval officers was of a very homogenous nature. Most of them were officers by profession, who had finished the Naval school. The war did not effect this homogenoceness, as there were few losses. In consequence, all the principal posts, as, the Chiefs of the Flotillas, of the Divisions, of the detachments, the Captains of the ships, the senior officers and specialists, were filled by the officers by profession. Only the inferior personal on the ships was partly composed of the sub-lieutenants of "war-time", and the functions in the rear of the Navy were filled by officers of the reserve, sea-men of the merchant-fleet and warrant-officers.

Therefore, in general, the officers were monarchists and did not at all sympathize with the revolution. There were only a few partisans of it among the officers of "war-time", who were mostly students. By the way, the Sub-Lieutenant Ilyine (Raskolnikoff), who was one, turned out to have become a naval officer only for the purpose of leading revolutionary propaganda more easily.

But between the officers by profession there were also some who profitted by the revolution and immediately changed "colours", that is, they became ardent partisans of the new power. There were between these young and old officers, who had not been lucky in service during the former regime, and therefore considered themselves as offended. Now they all tried, disdaining no means, to make careers.

Most of the officers acknowledged the revolution and the provisional Government because they thought it had taken power lawfully, and they did not know at all what was going on behind the scenes.

They thought the Emperor had abdicated voluntarily and had given over the Power to the Provisional Government freely.

If they had known that the Power had been seized by the Provisional Government by force, most of them would have stood firmly for the Emperor.

The whole revolution was made in secret from the officers, who were entirely taken up by war and expected no revolution. They were sincerely devoted to the Emperor and loved him, and this alone was sufficient to make them consider the revolution without sympathy. The Commanders in Chief, the chiefs, and other authorities decided for them and those are the guilty and responsible. The officers played the part of mute figurants in this immense tragedy, played by the liberal circles of the Russian society with the amiable cooperation of the allies.

Those who think that the officers were so devoted to Monarchy only because it gave them a certain position and material advantages,—are mistaken. They were convinced monarchists, because, in addition to all the rest, they understood that in Russia, with her originality, nothing else but the Tzarist regime could and can give the possibility to the nation to develop and be strong. They understood the madness of carrying through the utopian ideas of socialism, of the denial of one's native country and the acknowledgement of a "universal 3d International".

Many of them would have left the Navy at the very beginning of the revolution if it had not been for the War. They remained because they felt it was their duty to fight with the external enemy of their country. But though remaining, they did not seem to remark what was going on around and tried to ignore entirely the revolution.

An eminent representative of that part of the officers was Rear-Admiral M. K. Bakhireff, who even during the revolution was solely Admiral of the service of His Majesty. All his acts, his conversations and his relations to the revolutionary regime were full of contempt for it. The crews understood immediately that it was no use arguing with the Admiral, that it would lead to nothing, in any case; so they gave up all hopes of changing him, especially as they knew that he had exceptional abilities for warfare.

Next to Admiral Bakhireff was all the time the former Captain of the "Novik", then—Captain of the "Petropavlovsk" M. A. Behrens; he could neither reconcile himself with the revolutionary tendencies.

M. A. Behrens was very much liked by the crew of his ship and enjoyed entire authority not only amongst them, but in the whole fleet. The agitators could do nothing, for the men would have stopped anybody who would have made propaganda against him. But suddenly, one day, the circumstances changed, and their liking changed to hatred. M. A. Behrens had admitted an officer on his ship without the knowledge of the crew. At this occasion, the ship committee, having asked explanations, declared that the crew did not desire to have this officer. Behrens quietly listened to the members of the committee and calmly answered: "I do not ask the crew; it is not their affair." That same day the committee arrested him. The chief-naval Staff, fearing sad consequences, then succeeded in transferring him on the "Kretchet"; later, M. A. Behrens received another appointment.

Amongst the young officers who could not brook the "conquests of the revolution", Lieutenant G. N. Lissanevitch stood out particularly. He stopped before nothing and was several times at a hair's distance from death; it was only through his valour and his presence of mind that he escaped.

On May 27th 1918, by command from Moscow, the commissaries gave the order to dismiss from the red fleet the "sea-man Lissanevitch". This remained on paper only: for Lissanevitch continued commanding the "Kapitan Isilmetieff".

Finally the bolsheviks decided to undertake radical measures against him and his adherents; an attempt to arrest them was made on July the 3d after the funeral of Volodarsky, but unsuccessfully. For this purpose, a detachment of Cronstadt sailors was to be made use of; they had arrived for an armed demonstration against the bourgeois and the white-guards; they all had rifles and hand-bombs. When it became known on the way that they were to arrest the "enemies of the people" Lissanevitch and his men the runaway sailors immediately informed the Destroyer's Force of this, and there it was decided to send the "Isilmetieff" from the Nevsky iron-works to the Oboukhoff works, where it was safer. Towards evening tugs came up to the destroyer which lay with its turbins taken to pieces. Lissanevitch was on the bridge. Passing near the adjacent destroyers "Isilmetieff" accidentally hooked into the anchor-chain of her neighbour with her screw. Just at that time the detachment appointed to arrest Lissanevitch under command of Gourkalo (form. midshipman of the naval school) was boarding the neighbouring destroyer. The crew of the "Isilmetieff" stood near the guns and the machine-guns. Gourkalo shouted to them that he wanted to clear-up a misunderstanding, jumped over on their ship and called to the gun-crew to come up to him; they, without thinking, left the guns and crowded round him. Suddenly Gourkalo lifted a bomb and called out: "hands up." It seemed that Lissanevitch would certainly perish; however an unexpected thing occurred: he disappeared so thoroughly, that Gourkalo had the destroyer searched three times without result. In vain did he threaten to shoot the eleven sailors who were arrested,—the crew, 92 men, did not betray their Captain. Two days later Lissanevitch and several sailors were hid by them in a safe place on shore, from where they fled to the Archangel front.

The above mentioned examples show clearly enough that the officers had not changed, and except a small number of renegades, they did not follow the revolution. As Bakhireff was a representative of the higher ranks of the Navy, so was Behrens a representative of the younger officers and Lissanevitch—of the quite young ones. From the Admiral to the Sub-Lieutenant, all felt alike, all had the same point of view, the same creed and passed by the same suffering. . . . It is not true, as some say, that the officers did not know the common people, that they were separated from them by the difference of birth and of social position. The public and revolutionary workers, especially those who had been emigrants, had not the possibility of knowing them as well as they.

Every year they saw the representatives of the people, the recruits, pass before them in endless series. They came from the villages, from the towns, the factories, from all the governments and provinces of the immense territory of Russia. During five years these men remained under the direct educational influence of the officers, who made thoroughly their acquaintance and learned to know them not only from the service point of view, but also as Russian people. The sailors used to confide to the officers all their troubles,

their sorrows and their joys, they used to communicate with pleasure the news they received from their villages, asked advise, asked them to write their letters or petitions and used to communicate their family affairs. Often, in free hours, they used to relate about their village life, their material conditions and their earnings. Owing to this, the officers had an exact knowledge of the people in the different parts of Russia, of their interests, character and aptitudes.

The officers were practically acquainted with the people as they were thrown together with them during all their service-time and they liked and appreciated them. They knew very well what was good and useful for them and what could do them harm. In this they were much nearer to the people than all the professors, advocates and in general the Russian intellectuals, who had put them on an unattainable pedestal, called them "the Godbearers" and believed in their particular mission. And now the people had spoken, but instead of words of wisdom, they only showed wild bestial instincts. Immediately all began to disown them and to hate them. But the people had remained what they always had been: coarse, undeveloped and often cruel, but not wicked, and very keen and capable.

The time when severity was used with the sailors had long passed away. After the Japanese war, when the renovation of the Navy commenced, the relations between officers and men were humane and just, and were founded on the basis of law. The case of the crew of a ship hating their officers for being badly treated by them, was very rare. The men were never beaten by anybody, and if such a case got known, the culprit was judged. Mostly, the officers were very liked by the crews of the ships; the relations during war-time were especially good on the "Sebastopol", the "Gangut", "Poltawa", "Andrei Pervozvanny", "Tzesarevitch", "Rossia", "Admiral Makaroff", "Bayan", "Bogatyr", "Novik", "Desna", "Grom", "Sibirsky Strelok", "Pogranitchnik", "General Kondratenko" and on the destroyers and submarines.

If the officers had more knowledge in politics, they would have known how to keep the crews in their hands, especially if they had more experience in oratorical art it would have been easy for them to wrestle with propaganda, which was often led by quite ignorant agitators. When the latter appeared before a crowd of sailors, they only could shout out a few sentences they had learned by heart as: "Comrades, I am a workman like you", "I have languished twenty years in the galleys", or "I was a victim to the persecution of the tzarist executioners", or "Comrades, don't believe your officers: they are bourgeois, they are goldenstriped and tzarist life-guards"; or "deepen the revolution, and aim at fortifying its conquests", and so on. The bystanders clapped their hands violently, and nobody thought of observing that the orator was very well dressed, well fed up, did not look a bit like a workman and that his typical nose and ears, reminded one more of the provinces where the jews were allowed to live, than of the galleys.

The officers did not decide themselves to step out at the meetings and before the assemblies of the crews; there were some exceptions certainly, and then the jewish orators had a bad time. During one of the meetings on the "Sebastopol", after the speeches of the Captain and of some officers in answer to the propagandists, the crew was ready to throw the latter over board. The unfortunate propagandists begged these same officers to protect them, and taking pity on them, they sent them on shore in the first boat they found, making them pass by a trap-door behind. The enthusiastic speeches of Commander N. Zouboff acted so strongly on the sailors, that they would

fall on their knees and swear to fight for Russia. The speeches of Commander P. P. Michailoff were cause of a group of men forming around him, which rebelled against the commissaries at the arrival of the fleet to Petrograd. Admiral A. V. Razvozoff had so much influence over the crew, that they generally voted for his propositions at the assemblies.

However these were exceptional cases, but most of the officers remained aside from all meetings and assemblies which disgusted them to the depth of their hearts; it is impossible to judge them for it, especially as now we know that the fleet anyhow would have come to ruin.

The revolution had brought out on the fore-ground the socialistic teaching which promised the people "liberty, equality and fraternity". This was the principal trump of the revolutionists, and the false but brilliant colouring of their promises intoxicated the heads of the simple people. The officers knew into what precipice this deceit pushed Russia and the people. But to be able to prove the falseness of the socialistic teaching, they ought to have studied it minutely, whereas, they knew scarcely anything about it, or about its history. Though they would not have been beleived perhaps, for the circumstances were such at the time.

There were cases when the officers themselves were carried away by socialistic teaching which seemed so ideal and so humanitarian, especially in the mouths of the leaders of the revolution. But in all these cases, the officers recovered their senses in about a month's time and then the brilliant speeches did not seem to them so beautiful and so interesting. The very first steps of the revolutionary leaders were so far from what they preached, that it could not help striking.

Finally the "revolutionary festival" ended, the illusions dispersed, and there remained but the cruel civil war, in which, of course, the officers had to take part also. They suffered most of all, and they were forced to fight in the bolshevist armies being threatened, if they refused to do so, of being shot as well as their families. Nevertheless a great number of them fled and entered the volunteer army. Others, though they obeyed, did it with heavy hearts and only because they could not do otherwise. Only very few of the naval officers (their names are all known), became faithful partisans of the jewish power, serving it not because they feared it, but for the advantages and the rewards it gave them.

Thus the naval officers were scattered all over the world. Some live in misery having found a refuge abroad, and some carry their cross in Soviet Russia where they are humbled and brought down to complete slavery. Others sleep an eternal sleep after having been tortured in the soviet torture-chambers, or have fallen during the hard fight of the civil war.

Will the time ever come, when the officers will assemble again on their own ships and make up the total of the outlived events? And will they be the same as formerly, will not their hard life and their privations they suffer, put their inexorable stamp on them?

Perhaps amongst them some will still love the Navy as before, and will find the strength and the resolution to undertake its rebuilding, when their native country will call them to this hard and responsible work.

Now let us pass to the examination of the men, and let us try to clear up the cause which created this negative type of "blue-jacket" who excited the disgust and the contempt of all Russia from the very first days of the revolution.

The Russian Navy was always scarce in innate sailors, who had been brought up near the sea, who loved it, and did not understand life elsewhere but on deck. The Russian sailor had never the type of a sea-man, like, for instance, the English blue-jacket. The latter really has all the qualities which characterize this calling, and loves the sea and his ship with all his heart. Whereas our sailor is only a peasant or a workman who has entered the Navy to serve his time of compulsory service.

Every year parties of recruits appeared in the Navy who had been appointed there quite accidentally. They were likewise distributed between the different specialities considering the degree of their literateness and their knowledge of some handicraft. After some drilling, they had to begin learning different theoretic sciences, as physics, electricity, electro-technics, wireless telegraphy and next to these—grammar and arithmetic. Under the influence of quite new surroundings, of the quantity of new impressions and sciences, the recruit felt quite lost and could understand little at first. After several months had passed, the young sailor became familiar with his surrounding and accustomed to his new life; and new studies. He developed rapidly and became a new man.

Amongst the recruits there were also some who had received some instruction before they entered service. It was amongst them that the petty-officers were chosen and they were taught their speciality during two years. These men received a fairly serious instruction, which in some branches was not lower than the middle-school teaching; in this way they became half-intellectuals.

However, though some sailors became good specialists it did not mean that they were real sea-men. And it could not be otherwise, for their acquaintance with the sea was confined to two or three crossings from Cronstadt to Reval, Helsingfors or Trongsund. Though sailors, they remained thorough land-men. They regarded even their speciality, which they liked very much in most cases, from the point of view of its usefulness after their service was over, in their private life, but not on the ship. That is the reason why all tried to become engineers, electricians or wireless telegraphists and did not like to become gunners, torpedo-men, signal-men etc. The thoughts of the Russian sailor were always concentrated near his native land and not the sea which was a stranger to him.

This must be noted, for it explains why the men found life on board the ships burdensome. However well they might live on them, they always longed after the shore and remained in their hearts the same peasants or workmen which they were before service.

The sailing, the instruction received whilst in service, the manipulation of complicated machines, and the sea itself, developed the sailors very much. After two or three years, the former simple peasant lads and workers were not to be recognized: they became fully developed people, who were capable of understanding the manifestations of life surrounding them.

At the same time, the sailors, who were very well fed, well dressed and who had, comparatively, plenty of pocket-money, acquired a certain external polish and assurance and thought themselves above their circle and especially above the soldiers from the same locality. And those who had had the occasion to go abroad and see more, and meet new people, were full of their importance and treated their village with disdain. During the last years foppery had set in amongst the crews as well as the love for theatres, dancing and social life. The chiefs encouraged the sailors in this, considering that it kept

them from evil underhand influences. They tried to develop their taste for sport: for sailing, for skating, for skirunning, for fishing, etc.; it was also allowed to arrange theatricals on the ships, and evening-parties and Christmas trees to which the friends of the men were invited. They appreciated this very much and the ships competed with each other for the arrangement of these parties. In war-time, when visitors could not be invited on the ships, special places and musicians were hired, and they used to dance. To these evening-parties the officers were always invited and they liked very much to go to them, as really it was interesting to see the genuine marriness of the sailors, their love for dancing, and their ingenious, somewhat rough courting.

The men lived in separate compartments, according to their speciality, which united them very much. They passed all their evenings and all their leisure time in their own circle, without the presence of officers. Technically, the supervision of all these different compartments was very difficult, especially on the large ships, where it was impossible to inspect all the spaces at once. A corner can always be found, where one can lead any conversation without being disturbed.

The nearest chief of every sailor was the petty-officer of his speciality, with whom he worked and lived. This created relations between them which were quite different from those between the sergeants and the soldiers in the army. The sailor specialist saw in his petty-officer not so much a chief as an authority in his speciality. The conditions of life and their same origine smoothed down entirely in the eyes of the man the difference of their position on the ship. Their relations were nearly always those of comrades with a tint of respect, if the petty-officer knew how to place himself on a due height.

The young sailors who had formerly been workmen in factories, were generally appointed as mechanicians and stokers. Among them were often members of socialistic parties, who during their service-time kept up secretly their old relations with the party. It is they who made propaganda amidst the crews.

There was much time for it and plenty of place. The sailors, who annoyed themselves on board, listened at first because they had nothing to do, and afterwards they got interested by the charm of the speeches about land, freedom, equality and other socialistic benefits. At the same time they excited them against their chiefs, saying that they were cause of their being oppressed.

It was nearly impossible to stop this propaganda for one would have had to look after the crew unceasingly, which was difficult in the conditions of naval life, and spying was quite against all naval traditions. Spying might also demoralize the men, as one would have to use for this office men of the same crew. They would have had to be paid extra, to be exempted of some works and exceptions made for them, and as the worst elements of the crew would only have taken part in this spying, they could abuse of their situation. And if the slightest suspicion had arisen the relations between officers and men would have been immediately spoiled and would have occasioned mistrust and hatred and would have served as a new trump in the hands of the agitators. But it did not mean that the crews were not at all watched: the senior officers paid great attention to their state of mind. Sometimes they succeeded in finding out home agitators, but, of course, he had already had time to do much harm.

On the ships where there were about 800, 1000 or 1200 men, such an agitator could easily find a certain number of adherents and expand in that way his propaganda. It is therefore not astonishing that at the beginning

of the revolution there were already small groups of men who had a revolutionary disposition.

Another strong reason which augmented the success of the propagandists was, that the war had lasted nearly three years. The crews were tired, especially morally. They could hardly bear the severe regime of war-time and the limitation of freedom which it occasioned. Most of the battle-ships did not see the enemy during the whole war and lay at anchor in Helsingfors, Reval and in the skerries. The men ate and slept and were dreadfully annoyed by the monotony of their life. Owing to the war, many men who had just finished their five years service, were again summoned to actual service. The recruits of 1909—1912, instead of five years, were already toiling hard since six, seven and even eight years.

If patriotism had been as strong in the Russian people as it was in Germany and England it would have been possible to make them have patience; but love for their native country, as a whole, scarcely existed, "What Russian are we? We are from Viatka, the Germans will not reach us", said the peasants; "why should we go to war; let those where the Germans are, make war." Such reasoning on the part of all these "Viatka", "Kalouga" and "Pskoff" philosophers clearly show the point of view of the Russian people on the war and the way they understood their duty.

The idea of the unity of nations, their mutual-relations and the political object of Russia, were only a senseless sound to them. With such a psychology they could not make war in the name of an idea, but did it only out of fear and by order of their chiefs. They were quite apathetic and submitted to the orders of the latter, being persuaded that they were right; the chiefs, in their opinion, knew better what to do,—since they were chiefs. But they were displeased to be disturbed in their quiet life, to be separated from their families, they were displeased with the difficulties and dangers of war. Therefore each word, each hint which spoke of the aimlessness of the war and the necessity of ceasing it, were agreeable to them.

Besides the sailors of the general type, who were simple and good, on each ship there was always a criminal element. Though one tried to get rid of it, but still, one could always find on the ships, especially on the big ones, about 10—15 men who were capable of everything. The revolutionists had no difficulty in drawing them that way in promising them money, the right of plundering and entire impunity.

From the aforesaid reasons and the characteristic of the sailors as well as the conditions of their life on board, it is clear why they let themselves be so easily influenced by propaganda, especially during such a prolonged war. It was the same on the others fleets, not only in the Russian Navy, and the secret leaders of all revolutions discounted this fact perfectly. Their principal attention was always paid to the Navy. For instance during the French revolution; this is what says Oscar Gavard in his studies:

"Not a single country in the world had such a Staff of officers as France. They were the representatives of the best French families, descendants of whole generations of sea-men, devoted to their branch, incomparable in their knowledge, and loving their Country and its Glory above everything. From 1676 to 1782 the French Navy had 21 Naval actions, out of which they lost only three.

As soon as the revolution broke out, its heaviest blow was directed against the Navy. At Toulon the work of dissolution advanced rapidly; but in Brest, where the Navy was composed of Bretons, who were united to their officers

"When we had decided that it was time to raise a mutiny in the Navy, our leaders used to turn up suddenly and the sailors often recognized in them their old acquaintances, whom they had met abroad.

"During the war we did not break off our relations with the sailors, though, of course, while they were at sea there was no communication with them."

"But on the other hand, the 1th Division of battleships in the Baltic Sea („Petrovavlovsk", „Gangut", „Poltava" and „Sevastopol") and part of the 2d Division („Andrei Pervozvanny" and the „Imperator Pavel I"), which did not take part in the actions, lay at Helsingfors and were under our direct influence. It was there that we gave the last instructions to our strugglers for freedom, who may well be called the beauty and the pride of the revolution."

That is how the famous "lieutenant" Lebedeff ended his speech.

If the reader remembers that at the time when this meeting took place, the "strugglers for freedom" had already killed in Cronstadt the heroic Viren, in Helsingfors—Nepenine, and had brutally tortured to death many of their officers, he will agree that M. Lebedeff, in calling these scoundrells the pride and the beauty of the Revolution himself as well as the revolution a testimonial of their worth.

It is clear that in the Navy, apart from the question of nationality, there are elements always susceptible to revolutionary ideas which are, so to say, native to the sailor. The conditions of life and even the sea itself contribute to this end and to the accumulation of stores of energy from whence arise longings, which, when not completely satisfied, or not directed rightly become material for secret and evil influences to work on.

That is why, even good sailors used to fall sometimes into the nets of propagandists which were so cunningly set for them. They were like the moths attracted by light fluttering ever nearer and nearer to fall at last victims to the flame. All means and ways were used to demoralize them. To that end, not only the ordinary common agitators, but also the future "lights" of the Revolution worked incessantly. As Kerensky himself owned, he had continual contact with the fleet when he used to live in the Sanatorium of Grankulla near Helsingfors, where he used to pass long period of time for his health.

That is how propaganda was carried on, and that is how the men were taught to hate the officers.

And most of the latter would not have escaped during the revolution, if it had not been for the good relations that existed in many cases between them and the men and to the exemplary discipline of the Navy.

It is due entirely to this that the hopes of the leaders of the revolution were not fully realised, they thought that as soon as the Revolution broke out, the Imperial officers would be systematically murdered.

The first days of the revolution showed how the masses of the people looked upon it. All, from the leaders to the workmen and the peasants, hastened to satisfy only their material interests; the theoretical side of it was forgotten. Least work and most pay — that was the principal motto of that time.

The greed for money was especially marked in the Navy. The men began immediately to devide the money which had been saved from the every day expenses and which was destined to improve their food. If in spite of their hopes, no such sums were found, they accused the captain and the pay-

master and held them in prison for long periods having no proofs whatever against them. At the same time they revised the accounts for past years, but all their efforts to find out something wrong here, also failed.

On some of the ships there were sums which had been given by the shipyards where the vessels had been built or repaired. They were usually spent in buying gramophones, musical instruments, skis, skates, etc. for the men. The larger the ships were, the larger these sums were also; the men seized them immediately, and endless discussions, quarrels and even fights ensued during the deviding of these sums. Delegates from the ships which had no such resources, were sent to the corresponding shipyards with requests for certain sums. Such delegates rarely met a refusal, as the administration of the yards fearing them, preferred getting rid of them as soon as possible.

When at last all was devided and the safes were quite empty, the men began to think of new sources of revenue. In consequence, the provisional Government was requested, with threats, to augment the pay. This question became a continual source of discussion in all the soviets, on the ships and amongst the men on shore. Never were discussions so animated and endless, as when this subject was in question. No demonstration of the impossibility of the State to pay such immense wages would be listened to. Even the most moderate sailors, when the question of money was touched, lost their heads entirely and nothing could persuade them they were wrong. They were astonished and very displeased that the officers did not think it also possible to ask — for higher pay; they thought it only natural and legal, and the behaviour of the officers seemed to them suspicious; "they don't wish to accept anything from the revolection", thought they. . . .

When they got money, the sailors, first of all, began to spend it on clothes and became foppish. High patent boots appeared, or even simply, india-rubber ones with tops which looked like mirrors; short jackets taken in at the waist, with buttons like the cavalry wore; flannel shirts tight or loose; cocked hats and in summer even straw hats. . . . Particular attention was paid to the hair which it was considered improper to cut. It was chic to have a high tuft of hair on the head, and insolently twisted up moustache, all this produced an appearance of self-confidence and boldness but in the dispassionate onlooker aroused feelings of pity.

With plenty of money appeared also other desires: they wanted to go to restaurants, cafés, theatres and cinemas. This required more money than they had been able to obtain. They would not do without amusement, and did not care by what means they got the money, and so their morality rapidly declined.

Everyone feared the sailors. The revolutionary authorities tried to curry favour with them and accorded them all sorts of privileges; they had the best rations, they travelled free by rail and went to the state theatres without paying, etc. All this turned their heads; and the result was, that they became quite perverted: idlers, robbers and murderers. The worst elements among them gradually corrupted the rest.

That is how the type of revolutionary sailor, so odious to all, was formed.

And really he was formed, for he was not such by nature. The revolutionists chose the sailors as their instruments, and used them cleverly to further their aims. The bolsheviks utilized them also, understanding very well the impression which the Cronstadt and Helsingfors atrocities had produced on society. Continuing to keep them well in hand, they incited them no

more against the officers only but also against the "bourgeois". When there were not sailors enough, they used to dress up the rabble ready for any crime, as blue jackets. The fault lies not so much with the men, as with those who perverted, and who continued to pervert them, and who brought them down to the lowest degree of degradation. *Il n'y a que le premier pas qui coûte — la fin couronne l'oeuvre*: the social-revolutionists began, the bolshevists only continued. . . .

The Russian sailor had been different before; he had more than once shed his blood for his native country, had shewn valour and heroism. Sebastopol, the Danube, Port-Arthur and many other names bear witness to the exploits which he has written down in History. Let us not forget in nearer times how many courtiers who had been the objects of the Imperial favours, turned away from the Tzar and his family in the fatal moment, and those simple sailors, Nagorny and Sedneff, remained devoted and faithful to the last.

When, owing to the general treachery, His Majesty the Emperor and his family were made prisoners of the revolution in the group of those who remained loyal until the end, were these two sailors. Tzarskoe-Selo, Tobolsk, Ekaterinburg . . . they invariably continued to serve them, forsaken by a revolted people.

Surely those who have read the reminiscences of the noble P. Jiliard about the Imperial family and seen there the photo of the giant-sailor with his truly Russian, goodnatured face, have felt involuntary sympathy towards this plain man who gave his life for his Tzar. He fulfilled his duty to the Tzar without reasoning, just as his conscience made him.

In my imagination I see Tobolsk, the Tzesarevitch Alexis is walking with his faithful Nagorny. The latter does not lose the Tzesarevitch a moment out of sight, always ready to meet the first danger, to receive the first blow so as to save the Future Hope of Russia. I was told that when it was proposed to Nagorny to leave the Imperial family, as it was astonishing that he, a sailor, should continue to serve them, Nagorny answered proudly, full of dignity: "I shall never forsake my Tzesarevitch". . . .

Helas! He had to leave the Tzesarevitch, not of his own will, but through wicked force.

On the 23-rd of May at 2 p. m. the Imperial children arrived from Tobolsk at Ekaterinburg. When they were leaving the train, a thin spring rain was falling. The people around were rough with them; they had to carry their luggage themselves. The Princess Tatiana could no longer carry her travelling-bag; she was breathing heavily and could hardly get along. Nagorny seeing this, hastily stepped forward and said: "Your Imperial Highness, let me carry it." . . . The next moment Nagorny fell under the blow of one of the soldiers of the escort. . . . He got up silently his eyes, flashing but in a moment, calmed down; the sailor understood that he had not the right to do anything to this red-guard, that he had to bear the blows and the insults and everything for Those with whom he was. . . .

On May the 25th, Nagorny was taken from the Epatieff house with the rest of those who had remained with the Imperial family during their exile, and thrust into prison. When he was led away he sent a last blessing to the Imperial family: he made the sign of the Cross over the house where they were lodged.

He was shot on the 2-nd of August together with other hostages. While on his way to the place of execution he encouraged the others who were like-

wise, condemned to death. One knows nothing of his last moments, but most likely he died as anyone might desire to die. . . .

Sedneff was shot together with him; he behaved also as nobly and as heroically.

When Ekaterinburg was taken by the white armies, the bodies of the murdered hostages were found behind the town in a place where all the refuse of the town was heaped.

On August the 23-rd the funeral of these victims of the red terror took place with great solemnity. The streets were crowded, the sun shone down on the golden garments of the priests and on the simple wooden coffins, surrounded by the relatives of the dead heroes. Behind marched a guard of honour from the troops. The solemn singing of the church choirs, and the melancholy sound of the funeral march alternated. Rustling in the breeze the yellow leaves of autumn fell.

Two coffins especially attracted the general attention, they were covered with flowers, more so than all the others. "Whose are they?" was asked in the crowd. "Nagorny's and Sedneff's, the servants of the Imperial family, formerly sailors of the "Standard", answered those who followed the coffins. . . .

It is these, we say, who sealed with their blood, the oath of loyalty they had once taken.

But besides Nagorny and Sedneff, there are some others, till now unknown who were slaves to their duty, amongst the simple sailors. They are in sharp contrast on the dark back ground of the revolution and prove that not in all the hearts and consciences of the Russian people has God died out. . .

I should like to write down several names, to fasten them in the grateful Russian memory but . . . it is not time yet.

I have heard from people who were at Perm in June 1918, the story of the rescuing of the Grand Duke Michail Alexandrovitch; they said a sailor was amongst the valiant conspirators and that he played an important part in keeping secret the route followed.

Such exceptionally faithful sailors were, of course very few; as few as there were really loyal subjects in Russia. There were also such sailors, who though they did not stand out in any way from the general crowd of their comrades, were still good, honest Russian people. I remember an incident which took place in the Destroyer division. A sailor, whose name I will not write, had tattooed an immense Imperial monogram on his chest with the words: "God save the Tzar" around it, he had done it some time before the revolution. Of course, afterwards, the "comrades" gave him no peace, and mocked and tormented him in every possible way. The man held his tongue sullenly and only tried to cover his chest more. When the first period of enthusiasm for the revolution passed, and when many sailors, from being adherents of the soviet power became its avowed enemies, the man saw he had not been mistaken, so he held up his head and did not try anymore to hide the monogram. In 1918 a sailor with the Emperor's monogram on his chest was seen walking along the Nevsky¹). He did not at all try to hide it and walked with great dignity. A short time ago, somebody who had seen him, asked me who this man weighed be, I immediately asked about his appearance and when he had been seen. It was just at the climax of the bolshevist terror, after Lenine had been wounded and Uritsky killed. From

¹) The Nevsky is the principal street of Petersburg.

the description, I had no doubt of its being the man I had known alive, or has he fallen a victim to the chamber of tortures — I do not know, but he remains in my memory as one of the most characteristic types of the ordinary sailor.

There was another sailor, not an exception, but a typical representative of his class, his name was Sapoun. It was a fair man, not very tall, rather square shouldered with a wide intelligent face. In former times he had been a clever sailor. Having finished his compulsory service, he remained on for a further period and served honestly, and fought well. The revolution broke out and with it fell to pieces all that formerly seemed so simple, so comprehensible, and so firm; there were no guides. The officers whom they had believed in formerly, with whom they had been through fire and water, themselves did not understand what was going on, and could not satisfy the desire for information of such men as Sapoun, who asked them to explain the meanings of new words, notions and manifestations. Sapoun was enthusiastic over the meetings, and the beauty of the revolutionary ideas. Notions of Faith, the Tzar and the Native Country were in the back-ground, they were replaced by words, unknown before: conquests of the revolution, democracy, proletariat, etc. Finally Sapoun became a real bolshevik and thought that the only way of saving the country from ruin was in the victory of the soviet power. Full of faith in himself convinced of the righteousness of the cause and his knowledge of leadership, he took upon himself the command of one of the battalions of the detachment of the well known Dybenko, during the advance of the Germans on the Narva front. And here happened a tragedy: in spite of his personal bravery as well as that of his sailors, the Germans completely defeated the detachment. Having been thoroughly beaten, Sapoun seemed as if stunned by the shock, but when he began to recover his senses: "but I cannot even command a platoon, much less a battalion" he said in despair, and from that day he hated the soviet power. At the meetings where the bolshevist stepped out to speak, Sapoun and his friends would not allow them to be heard, drowning their words in cries of: "shame, enough, get away." . . . The soviet authorities could not ignore Sapoun's influence over the men. On May the 27th he was discharged Lissanevitch whose right hand he had become. Lissanevitch he remained on his destroyer of the 7th Destroyer Flotilla, and after an unsuccessful attempt at their arrest, they ran away together to the Archangel front. It was difficult to meet a more intolerant or more ferocious enemy of the bolsheviks than Sapoun: he paid them with usury for their deceit, their treachery, the injuries they had caused Russia, and the blood which had been shed. He seemed to be the symbol of the future vengeance of the people against the foreign oppressors.

In passing from one group of sailors to another, it is impossible not to mention another remarkable man but this time representative of the type called "the beauty and the pride of the Revolution". His name is indissolubly associated with the dispersing of the famous Constituent assembly. It is that of Gelezniakoff. He played a very prominent part in the destruction of one of the most stupid dreams of our intellectuals, who thought they could rebuild Russia after their desire, by founding it on the "four liberties". Instinctively, but very truly did Gelezniakoff express the negative opinion of the people as to way of showing "their" will. Let us remember how the elections took place, how much forgery was tolerated, how much fraud and petty cheating there was. The late provisional Government of "blessed memory" tried by

all right and wrong ways to put off the convocation of the Constituent assembly, finding that "the inhabitants of the villages were not yet quite ready". Though they worked hard to influence them in the way they desired, still they did not succeed in time, for the bolsheviks came to relieve them. The latter did not either make any ceremony about pressing upon the electors men of their own nomination and the result was, that the Constituent assembly was mostly composed of the worst criminals, or of individuals of very doubtful character a former minister of the Kerensky government — Tchernoff was elected president, the same Tchernoff who had one day taken an active part in a notorious robbery in the Fonarny Street. No less "fortunate" was the choice of the assistant of the president, who happened to be the "popular" Maroussia Spiridonoff. This representative of the underhand revolution owned herself that during the "ancient regime" she carried out most energetic propaganda amongst the soldiers and sailors, to whom, in addition to her speeches, she offered, for the benefit of the cause, — herself. . . .

In the very heat of the session of the Constituent assembly, a detachment of sailors appeared in the hall with Gelezniakoff at their head and proposed to all present to disperse immediately. The indignant Tchernoff jumped up on the platform and began saying something about violence used against the representatives of the people, but he could not finish his speech. "You are no representative but simply a scoundrel!" interrupted Gelezniakoff "out with you!" . . .

The perplexed Tchernoff hastened to execute this demand and the members of the assembly left the hall in a hurry leaving even their out door clothing and otherthings. Amongst the trophies, which were afterwards found, was the note-book of one of the representatives of the "people", which gives a very good notion of its owner: here were medical prescriptions of "specialists", very intimate correspondence, and poetry of a very piquant kind. Nevertheless, Gelezniakoff gave a splendid lesson and an excellent estimation to all this "cream" of the Russian revolution, and showed that there was no need to be ceremonious with them. In that is his merit, and that is why I have mentioned him as an original type of sailor. . . .

In the last days of the defence of Moonsound, when the sailors, preferring captivity to action, refused to fight, a small number of men, from different ships, continued to defend the strait between Oesel and Moon islands. Though they were quite free, and had all volunteered, still they not only did not surrender, but refused to retire, and the whole detachment fell, not a man escaped.

After the civil war broke out, the south of Russia was entirely involved in the various faction fighting. The spring of 1918. Armavir. The hard time of the Volunteer Army. Surrounded by the ring of bolshevist armies, it had to repel convulsively the continual attacks of the latter. The bolshevist lines of soldiers marched one after the other, and in front of them upright with rifles on their shoulders and clad in their white summer clothes, came the sailors. They fell as if mown down by the machine-guns, but the remainder continued to advance. None of them escaped, and the volunteers themselves owned, that had the sailors arrived, they would have had a bad time of it. I was asked to explain why they had been so madly brave and what gave them that extraordinary courage in the face of death. I could only answer: "It is inherent to the sailor's nature. The danger on land compared to danger on sea, seemed to them nothing at all."

By whatever cause inspired, or by whomever it may be shown, true courage will always be appreciated by everyone, and the Volunteer army paid its due to the sailors, though they hated them and killed them without mercy. It is timely to quote here the opinion of one of the leaders of the Volunteer Army, General Dragomiroff, who said that the greatest danger for the Volunteers in the bolshevist army lay with the sailors, for everything depended on them.

Judging rightly of the importance of the sailors, the Chief command of the Volunteer Armies could not however give up their prejudices against them even on those occasions when, from a military point of view, it would have been more advantageous to think and act differently. The naval officers who were then in the Volunteer army, proposed to test the sailors' goodwill as fighters, but received the answer that it was quite impossible, as the "blue collars" were too much hated everywhere. This hatred can only be explained by the fact, that many generalise all the sailors, and refuse to believe that amongst them there are also good men. In any case, the naval-officers, had more reason for hating the sailors than anybody else; well, they are not at all blinded by feelings of vengeance and judge carefully every separate case.

Roudionok, Diutchkoff, Ismailoff, Dybenko and others, if they are still alive, must pay in an exemplary way for their crimes; for they are old sailors; but of such criminals there were few. As for the murderers in Helsingfors and Cronstadt, as well as the Petrograd "heroes", they were mostly "make believe" sailors, young fellows who had no connection with the Navy.

To these latter belong also the crew of the "Hivinetz", who were chosen by Smolny. The bolshevist revolution and demobilisation happened when the "Hivinetz" was in the Neva and her sailors played an important part during the first days of the new power. From them were chosen the sailor-patrols that were sent by the bolsheviks to make searches and arrests, the latter always accompanied by pillage and violence. The "Hivinetz" was even connected by a field telephone to the Gorohovaia No. 2¹⁾ and received orders from there. The crew was well provided for, they received from Smolny extra wages, unlimited rations and white bread. But among them was not a single real old sailor.

Of this same kind were also the sailors of the "Rurik" who served as executioners in the Cronstadt chamber-of-tortures, receiving 125 roubles per head for each victim.

But what relation had they to the Navy all these men who had not only done nothing in the war, but had not even seen the sea? They were mostly recruits of the 1917—1918 years.

There was also quite a special kind of sailors: the "red sailor". When part of the Destroyer Division was brought over to the Oboukhoff and Nevsky iron-works, within range of the "Hivinetz", because they were considered as "unreliable" from the bolshevist point of view, a certain Bush was appointed commissary to the Division. He had never been a sailor, he put on the sailor's shirt and cap for the first time in February 1918. His past was unknown and dark, and as for the present, there was no doubt that he was an agent from Smolny. Always foppishly dressed, polite and correct in an exaggerated way, he reminded one more of a student than of a plain sailor. Is he also to be counted as belonging to the sailor class, and can one deduce anything from his case? . . .

¹⁾ It is there that the principal police office of the bolsheviks is.

The repulsion which society feels against sailors, springs from such examples. It is easy to generalize, but one ought to be more particular in one's judgment.

Are the sailors a sad exception among the Russian people? A great number are indubitably, deeply criminal, but, are there not as many such villains among the soldiers, workmen and peasants? The revolution demoralized the whole population. The sailors being of the same flesh and blood as the rest of the nation with all its good and bad points was bound to be affected by the same influences; why then stigmatize the sailors alone, and not the whole Russian people?

When the nation was healthy, the separate parts of it were good, but when revolutionary poison entered into that Grant Russian body, every atom became affected. The sailors were among of those atoms. It is impossible to criticise the effects of poison, they must be fought against, and if possible be localized in order to stop further harm. The sailors will again be worthy when Russia, as a whole has recovered health.

XXV.

State of the Black Sea fleet from the moment of the Revolution up to the 1st of August 1918.

A murmur is audible in the language of the Black Sea waves. The events it has been a witness to, appeal to Heaven; for there is little to hope from a human tribunal, and besides much remains hidden. . . .

Russia's former power is no more over it.

Part of the Black Sea fleet has found its grave in the depths of those waters over which it had but so recently ruled, the other lies maimed in its base; a third part has sought a shelter in a foreign harbour. A short sketch of the state of the Black Sea fleet after the Revolution written by Commander N. R. Goutan will enable us to describe the events in succession.

"From the very first days of the Revolution the Black Sea fleet walked with big strides down the path leading to a complete *débâcle* and ceased to exist altogether as such in the month of December 1917. Up to that moment disorganisation was already complete and both the Soviet, the "Centroflot" and various commissions gave orders to the fleet, but nevertheless from time to time destroyers were being sent to the enemy coasts. Through sheer inertness the men when at sea remained obedient and even the appearance of something organised prevailed which however vanished at once as soon as the fleet returned to the harbour.

In December 1917 owing to various decrees and orders the last old sailors were definitively discharged into the reserves. About this time bolshevism had finally succeeded in creating a centre in Sebastopol; to this had contributed the fact that many people had flocked into this town, German agents as well as special commissaries and agitators sent from Moscow and Petrograd.

A certain Spiro begins to play an important part in Sebastopol; later on he was even appointed Commissary of the fleet; he was the type of a gifted international adventurer who, as certain rumours maintained, was connected with the Austrian General Staff.

Still in the Destroyer's division the men were demoralised more slowly than on the big ships: here they dealt only in meetings, in the voting of "resolutions" in accordance with the spirit of the day; in searches and taking weapons from the officers and the civil population. A very strong agitation was led in November against the Don Cossacks and chiefly their leader the late Ataman General Kaledin.

Thanks to this agitation the sailors began to form land detachments, these being sent as expeditions against "the Don"; men from the Destroyer's Division also being included in those detachments. The latter melted away on the way, most of them dispersing over towns and villages for the sake of plunder; the remaining minority when reaching the front were defeated. Irritation against the officers grew from day to day.

It was obvious that massacres were being prepared. Arrests began at first of persons who it was alleged, had been a party to the suppression of a rebellion intended to break out in the Black Sea fleet in 1912. On the commissary Romanets, a sailor, giving orders, the following were arrested: Admirals Novitsky, Kaskoff, Alexandroff; General Ketritz; Captains Kouznetsoff, Svinin; Commander Saloff and several other officers. At the same time, on account of their refusal to proceed against "the Don" with their men, Commander Kallistoff, Captain of the destroyer "Pronzitelny" and almost *all the officers* were arrested. The murder in broad daylight on board the destroyer "Fidonisi" of sub-lieutenant Skorodinsky, when walking on the deck, was the first signal of the shooting of officers. Skorodinsky was shot in the back from the engine room.

On those same days the Fleet Commander Admiral Nemitz with Commander Maximoff and a flag-lieutenant urgently left for Petrograd to take part in some deliberations; but on their way they all disappeared — no one knew whereto. One day before Commissary Romanetz too had left for Petrograd. Before leaving Nemitz had left in his stead the chief of the Staff Admiral Sablin.

On the 15th of December in the evening, on the day of sub-lieutenant Skorodinsky's burial, the crew of the destroyer "Hadjibey" arrested and then shot on Malakhoff hill their captain, Commander Pyschnoff and all the officers of the destroyer but one. During this very night the sailors, among whom a prominent part was played by those who had returned from the Don, shot in the naval barracks all the other arrested officers, with Admiral Novitzky at their head. On the next day almost whole all arrests of officers took place, out of whom were shot during the nights that followed: Captain Klimoff, Commander Orloff, senior Lieutenant Pogorelsky, Lieutenant Doubitzky and others. In most cases the shootings were an act of personal revenge. Two or three days later various revolutionary organisations took measures to stop the shooting; these measures should certainly not have helped, had not the murders ceased of themselves. But isolated cases of murder in other ports occurred after. From 35 to 40 officers were murdered in all. It was then Spiro was appointed Commissary of the Fleet.

In the month of January it became clear that in spite of the notorious Brest-Litovsk treaty, the Germans were pursuing their offensive and that the aim of that offensive was the taking possession of the Black Sea fleet and the Black Sea ports. Among the so-called revolutionary democracy the usual slogan of "war to the end, to the last shell" appeared; and in words the firm desire was manifested to defend the Crimea by creating a Perekop front.

This idea was propagated with peculiar ardour by Commissary Spiro, it even provoked a rupture with the Sovnarkom.

Instructions were meanwhile received from Moscow, on the one hand—not to open hostilities, as the Germans would not go into the Crimea; on the other hand—as was secretly prescribed—to prepare Novorossiisk for the fleet to go there; as for the fleet itself, all the old ships included, which for a long time had been staying motionless without men, it was to be prepared for evacuation. The Sovnarkom abstained from directly answering the question whether Sebastopol and the Crimea were running the risk of being seized by the Germans.

In the middle of January an offensive against Sebastopol of some non-existent "Crimean troops" was personated. The fact is that after the December events a great many navy officers had fled from Sebastopol. Some of them remained at Sympheropol; a great many officers of the army had at the time assembled there under the fanciful protection of the Crimean Government which had just been formed. A General Staff of the Crimean troops was formed, but of troops there were none with the exception of two or three Tartar squadrons for the whole of the Crimea. This General Staff managed the whole match very thoughtlessly; there may even have been on his part some sabre-rattling at times. Of course this was a sufficient motive; and to on January 11th at night it was announced that the Tartars were advancing on Sebastopol. Sailors and workmen were urgently called in and armed; and a detachment about 7000 strong marched on Sympheropol. Meeting with no resistance the detachment entered the town and began to massacre those officers who had had time to escape and the inhabitants who were well off. Some of the officers fled to Yalta, some to Eupatoria, where they determined to make a stand.

Detachments were sent into those ports in consequence, also destroyers, chiefly of the "Hadjibey" class. The destroyers went with one or two officers, sometimes seizing may be the first the men had met in the street. A few hundred shots were fired against Yalta and Eupatoria; and some 200 men, chiefly officers, shot and drowned.

About the same time we had also to evacuate the shore of the Danube where (the Sovnarkom considering themselves at war with Rumania) the Rumanian monitors in the last analysis compelled by artillery fire our Danube flotilla to withdraw — the latter attempting to "advance", as was the rule in such cases.

In January too Spiro, senior Lieutenant Levgovd and a sailor were sent to Moscow to obtain from the Sovnarkom a direct answer as to the political situation; this — in connection with the German advance in the South of Russia there perrons were entrusted with the task to get money for the maintenance of the fleet, the latter having about the time passed over to the Volunteer régime. In Moscow Spiro who called himself a Social-Revolutionist of the left wing was arrested for not recognising the Brest treaty, for disobeying the authority of the Soviet and for making propaganda for the defence of the Crimea.

After Spiro had left Romanovsky (a non-commissioned officer from the "Panteleimon"), president of the "Centroflot", and Commander Bogdanoff, who had been appointed by the Soviet chief of the revolutionary General Staff, whose chief aim was to fight counter-revolution, began to play a prominent part. A revolutionary tribunal was sitting all the time at Sebastopol which examined the cases of officers who had been denounced by sailors. Captain

Karkaz was sentenced to hard labour for life for having, it was alleged, behaved insultingly to Lieutenant Schmidt in 1905; Admiral Lvoff to ten years and Commander Zwingmann to twelve years hard labour for having aided to suppress a fleet mutiny in 1912. Many other officers were sentenced besides to different periods and for various reasons. They were all imprisoned in the town-prison.

Nearly the whole month of February passed off under the slogan of "Defence against the Germans" — at meetings; the union of all parties for the sake of defence was trumpeted about every-where. Officers too were asked to participate. In the middle of February it was persistently rumoured and was also stated in the newspapers that an English fleet under Admiral Koltchak was present in the Dardanelles. These rumours were invented and spread about in every possible way.

In the night of February 23th—24th the first massacre of that part of the town population who were well off took place rather unexpectedly though the murders were not directed specially against the officers, many officers too were murdered besides a series of house-owners and merchants; among them Lvoff, Karkaz, Zwingmann, Vakhtin and others who were in prison. This massacre was organised by Romanovsky, President of the Centroflot, with the knowledge of the President of the Soviet Pojaroff, a Baltic fleet sailor, and obviously of Commander Bogdanoff. The very first night about 250 men were murdered and their bodies taken away; the murders went on through the two following nights, though in a much lesser degree. Then they ceased, only incenant searchings taking place.

March was paning off rather quietly: but under the influence of the approach of Ukrainian troops ("Haidamaks") and German troops, the necessity of defending Perekop was still more trumpeted about and at last the newspapers announced that a Perekop fortified front had been created. As a matter of fact, a few hundred Chinamen and a few hundred soldiers of the Red Army, coming God knows from where, had assembled there and were plundering the adjacent farms and villages.

From the beginning of March disreмиens between sailors and workmen of the harbour appear. Under the impression produced by plunders, murders and searchings from which the workmen's families too were beginning to suffer; chiefly however on account of the sailors' unwillingness to recognise the justice of some additional salary for some months backwards, on which the workmen insisted—the workmen revolted against the sailors almost openly. They began to arm themselves and having formed a powerful and well armed detachment took the protection of the town at night into their hands. And justice must be rendered to them: plunders and thefts disappeared almost entirely. This detachment which protected the town together with a town-militia which the inhabitants had formed about this time, brought some calm, and did much to hamper more "St. Bartholomew nights". Besides all those disreмиens between sailors and workmen, one more reason appeared for them to quarrel. Oftener and oftener did the workmen say that there was no need of defending themselves against the Ukrainians; that to the "front" they would not go, etc. And this could be easily undertood, for Sebastopol being cut off from everywhere took all the information about events in Ukraine and the rest of Russia out of bolshevist newspapers, as other newspapers had been closed. All thought therefore that the Ukrainian troops were advancing against the Crimea with German support exclusively in order to liberate the Crimea

from the bolsheviks. And there were many sailors among the workmen of the harbour.

Having absolutely no other information as to what was actually taking place in the Ukraine; which troops were advancing on the Crimea and with what an aim—the Fleet Commandment secretly cherished the thought of saving the ships and the Fleet material under a Ukrainian guise.

In the middle of April the Ship-Captain and Admiral Sablin were invited to a sitting of the "Centroflot" and of the S. D. and S. R.¹⁾ parties in the Naval Club. Admiral Sablin stated he saw no salvation for the fleet in a passage to Novorossiisk which is no naval base and absolutely unfit to be one; also that from the moment the fleet woved leave the harbour, it was doomed to perish. Still to meet all emergencies, Admiral Sablin sent to Novorossiisk on board the seaplan-carrier "Troyan" a commission of naval-officers presided over by Captain Lebedeff in order to prepare the Novorossiisk harbour as a station if only for ships apt to fight.

Between the 3rd and the 13rd of April the German-Ukrainian troops, meeting with no resistance whatever from the "Perekop armies", entered into the Crimea and marched on Sympheropol. The soldiers of the Red army who had attempted to resist the vanguards of the German troops near Sympheropol, fled to Sebastopol and under Commander Bogdanoff's command began in haste to embark on the supply-ship.

From this moment panic begins at Sebastopol and chaos also begins. Meetings take place ceaselessly on the ships and also on shore, even—at night. All are seeking for a power capable to save them. On one and the same day the following decisions are taken: Admiral Sablin who had retired to be called back to power and dictatorial powers to be given him; then—Sablin to be dismissed and a commission with a sailor at its head to be appointed; then—the "Centroflot" only to be obeyed; then—the "Centroflot" to be abolished and the "Volia" Captain Tikhmeneff to be entreated to save the situation etc. etc. All these decisions which had the most categorical character, abolished one the other. The mob had gone mad and was agonising. The Sovdep was preparing to put to flight.

On the 12rd of April (the ships apt to fight were all the time staying in the first position) enemy patrols appeared in the Sebastopol region. All grew quiet and waited for the dreadnoughts to act. But then the men of the "Volia" and the "Svobodnaia Rossia" for the sake of urgency and without even inviting the representatives of other ships and destroyers decided as follows: Captain Tikhmeneff and a delegation from the dreadnoughts elected in haste to be requested to find out Admiral Sablin and request him as the only man who could now save the situation alone to assume the command over the fleet; anything the Admiral would order to be carried out incontrovertibly; as for disobedient ships there, the sailors declared, would be forced to submit by the 12" guns of the dreadnoughts—so did the crew of the latter swear to the Admiral.

Captain Tikhmeneff with these crews' representatives went on shore, called on Admiral Sablin and commenced to persuade him to consent. After a short hesitation the Admiral did consent and left, for the "Gueorgui". About 4 p. m. the signal was raised on the "Gueorgui": "Raise the Ukrainian flag". This the dreadnoughts did at once, but the other ships, chiefly the destroyers, hesitated. At the same time Admiral Sablin telegraphed to the

¹⁾ "Social-Democratic" and "Social-Revolutionist".

Ukraine and to the German commandment stating that the Black Sea fleet had become Ukrainian; that he was sending bearers of a flag of truce and that he requested that the advance on Sebastopol be stopped. Rear-Admiral Klotchkovsky, Captain Tchernilovsky-Sokol and a diplomatic official named Toukholka were, he said, to go to Sebastopol as bearers of a flag of truce.

At this moment the following occurred on the Destroyer's Division: part of the destroyers hoisted the Ukrainian flag, most of them (the flag had been already hauled down) determined to wait until morning; and the "Pronzitelny" alone declined to haul down the red flag and prepared to put out to sea. The C. C. declared to Lieutenant Begsmertny, Captain of the "Pronzitelny", that, if the destroyer did not wish to obey, it must leave for the open sea, not later however than 11.30 p. m. and without the right to return into the roads and as soon as this became known to the crews of other destroyers an irrepressible desire to run away overtook all the Division. Almost all the destroyers, the "Derzky", "Gnevny", "Zvonky" and "Zorky" excepted, prepared to put out to sea. The pretence alleged was—the desire to save the ships from the enemy, the real reason—the wish to save one's skin. Most of the captains and officers of the destroyers explained to the men the necessity of obeying and awaiting the C. C.'s orders; having however no success in this, they put out to sea on board the destroyers; they hoped by crossing over to Novorossiisk to postpone the loss of the ships if only provisionally, for but few of the officers believed in the fanciful possibility of saving the ships through a Ukrainian sign-board.

At midnight the following destroyers proceeded into the offing: "Kaliakria", "Kertch", "Hadjibey", "Bespakoiny", "Pronzitelny", "Pylky", "Gromky", "Pospeshny", "Lieutenant Schestakoff", "Baranoff", "Jarky", "Jivoy", "Stremitelny" and "Smetlivy". Simultaneously three or four supply ships with the Red army in flight and its "chiefs" also left for Novorossiisk. The "Gnevny", the "Derzky" (flag-ship of the chief of the Division, Captain Lebedeff), the "Zvonky" and the "Zorky" proceeded into the roads and anchored by the dreadnoughts; these remained obedient to the C. C.

The passage of the destroyers to Novorossiisk led to a crisis in the state of mind of the men. Almost immediately after leaving there began on some of the destroyers to ask their officers for advice. Was it right, they inquired, that the ships had left for Novorossiisk? Was it too late to return into the harbour? What were the ships that had remained at Sebastopol doing? Had they all raised the Ukrainian flag?

A definite tendency also appeared, which the men no more feared to express aloud: that of joining General Korniloff after their arrival at Novorossiisk. Unfortunately nothing at all was then known at Sebastopol about the Volunteer army; and that army itself was at the time passing through the most painful period of its existence, the period which followed on General Korniloff's death: the army which included hardly more than 1000 fighters in good health was then retreating from Ekaterinodan northwards. Were it otherwise, the fleet might possibly have been saved. And now one comes to the conclusion that such a result was very possible.

The crisis of the men who were ill with bolshevism was beginning to reach a positive solution. The men were beginning to recover. This was due to the circumstance that nearly all the men connected with the shooting of officers had fled before. And the majority of those remaining behind were an indifferent mass and had by painful experience learnt what was the result of the fleet being ruled by a committee of many persons such as "Centrofлот".

The men had seen *de visu* where they had been led to by idolized revolutionists; the latter abandoning the fleet at the moment of danger and hastily taking to flight, naturally with state and public funds! The men had now convinced themselves that regular German troops were advancing, not "gangs of international white-guards and counter-revolutionists". A comparison of ships which had experienced several evacuations with ships without such an experience will prove that this view is justified. The men of the destroyer "Derzky", who had witnessed how under the pressure of German troops we had evacuated not only Sebastopol but even the Danube and Trebizond, became the most loyalist of all and were foremost in preaching about the need of joining General Korniloff. On the other hand the destroyer "Fidonisi", which had witnessed no evacuations, nor the bacchanalia connected with them, remained in a chaotic state to the end. The latter destroyer joined the fleet on its way to Novorossiisk, having left Theodosia where she had been staying for a long time.

The destroyers entered Novorossiisk on the 14th of May in the morning.

The following events were at the time occurring at Sebastopol: Admiral Sablin learnt that the Germans had left the Ukrainian troops beyond Perekop and were marching further. Information came from our bearers of a flag of truce that the German commander in the Crimea, General von Kosch, had declined to receive them, requesting that they should make their statements in writing. And he warned them that he must send this statement to Field-Marshal Eichhorn at Kieff, whence an answer could not be expected before a fortnight; and that in any case he could not stop his advance.

Two other delegations had proceeded to Sympheropol with our negotiators: one from the town of Sebastopol, the other from Ukrainian organisations. The former was received by General Kosch very affably, the latter drily.

Having received this intelligence the Admiral commander the negotiators to return, and all the ships that could put out to sea, to prepare for a campaign. Rear-Admiral Ostrogradsky was ordered to blow up the remaining ships after the departure of the fleet; for that purpose an explosive party, 100—120 men strong, had already been formed before. The ships were to weigh anchor at 10 p. m. Before that the "Derzky" had been ordered to put out to sea and stay at a turning of the channel near the Kherson light-house. The night was a very dark one.

The Germans had already occupied at the time the Severnaia Storona and had placed their field-artillery and machine-guns on the Constantine battery, facing the booms and the Bratsky Cemetery. However the ships did not succeed in weighing anchor in time, for it was ascertained that all men in the harbour had run away, there remaining neither boats nor men to open the boom-defence at last between 11 p. m. and midnight the booms were opened by Rear-Admiral Klotchkovsky, Tchernilovsky-Sokol, Commander Pogojeff, Protasoff and several other officers going thither on the Admiral's motor-boat "Poulemet" and another boat.

As soon as the "Volia" had moved off, the Germans opened fire against the ships point-blank. After the "Volia" (C. C.'s flag-ship), the "Svobodnaia Rossia" (Captain Terentieff) weighed anchor. The ships had at once to proceed at full speed in the roads, this—in total darkness and under enemy fire; it must also be noted that the speed, shown by them, very probably exceeded the contract speed. The "Svobodnaia Rossia" was hit by a few shells which caused insignificant damage in the superstructures, five men being also slightly wounded.

It had been forbidden to answer the enemy's fire as the Admiral did not wish to provide the Germans with an additional reason for maintaining that we were not executing the Brest treaty; and on such grounds they might juridically have continued the operation and seized our ships for themselves. But one gunlayer was unable to restrain himself and fired a shot.

The destroyer "Gnevny" weighed anchor after the ships. Under the impression produced by the enemy fire a panic ensued among the men and having lost their heads in the engine room, at the moment of unfolding directions were given to the right machine "forward" instead of "backward". Having noticed this the Captain, Lieutenant Kreitschmann, gave the direction "full backward", but again in the engine room "full forward" was spelt out; and so the destroyer ran ashore near Apollonova balka. All attempts to get off failed, and so the Captain blew up the stern.

Owing to the explosive party to whom the blowing up of the ships remaining in the harbour and of the edifices had been entrusted having dispersed, everything remained undamaged. The destroyer "Zavetny" alone which was being repaired was blown up and sank by her captain senior Lieutenant Krasnopolsky.

The Ukrainian flag was again raised on all the ships which had remained at Sebastopol, Rear-Admiral Ostrogradsky assuming the commandment; he also informed the Ukrainian Government and the German commandment, that all the ships that did not wish to "Ukrainize" had put out to sea and that all the others had raised the Ukrainian flag and remained at Sebastopol.

Having come to Novorossiisk on May 1st, in the morning, the destroyers found there the following situation. Novorossiisk formed part of the Kuban-Black Sea Soviet Republic where the bolshevist power was flourishing almost all the chief leaders of bolshevism in the South had concentrated at Novorossiisk, having fled thither in due time from Odessa and all the Crimean towns. Gaven, Pojaroff, Commander Bogdanoff, Alexakis, Bassoff, Scheretneff, Romanets and the wellknown Mme Ostrovsky, who had come to Novorossiisk a month before, were there. Several supply ships stayed in the roads with refugees from all Crimean ports and with soldiers of the Red Army; not only did the presence of the latter terrorise the peaceful population but even inflicted panic on the local revolutionary committee.

Nor did the inhabitants expect any good from the Fleet's arrival; for quite rightly they had about the Fleet the most awful of opinions, owing to all its preceding criminal activity. They all remembered the arrival in January of the destroyer "Kertch" after which forty two officers of the Varnovinsky infantry regiment were shot for no reason whatever.

Hardly had the destroyers moored when the local revolutionary authorities applied to the Fleet for help, requesting that the Red troupes be made innoxious. At an extraordinary sitting of the ships' captains and of representatives of the ships' committees it was decided to disarm all the Red Army bands that had arrived and then send them out of Novorossiisk. Special misgivings were inspired by the supply-ship "Evfrat" with from 1500 to 2000 Red army soldiers on boards, the latter having stated they would rather blow themselves up than deliver their arms. On board the supply-ship there were about 2000 poods of explosives; also an enormous quantity of money, gold and silver which had been plundered on the Crimean South Coast. The destroyer "Pospeschny" was ordered to disarm the "Evfrat"; the "Pospeschny" coming up and presenting an ultimatum which insisted on immediate surrender; otherwise the destroyer threatened to sink the "Evfrat". The latter at once

hoisted the white flag, delivering over the arms and all the valuables; there were later deposited at the Bank of State—i. e., alas, were handed over to these same bolsheviks.

A little later the Captain of the "Pospeschny" (the oldest of the captains of the destroyers) received from Admiral Sablin a wireless message requesting him to meet the ships with all the destroyers that were in good order and watch over the ships that were already approaching the Novorossiisk Coast. Unfortunately there were no destroyers in good order; most of them were without either oil or water. Only the "Pospeschny" put out to sea; and having met the fleet, together with the Fleet and the "Derzky", entered Novorossiisk harbour at 7 p. m.

Here it may be appropriate to point out that not once did the enemy attempt to present our ships from making the passage; and this though when the Germans were entering the Crimea, the German command had forbidden the Russian ships to come out of the ports and had stated that orders had been given to the German submarines to sink all ships that would come out. All the time did enemy submarines appear off Sebastopol, even showing themselves above the sea-surface. It was most easy to sink the destroyers, for there were proceeding but slowly and on some of them midshipmen who had but recently left the Naval Corps were Captains. And speaking generally these destroyers were no military force of any kind. Apparently the enemy either overlooked the coming out of the ships, for in both cases the ships left the harbour at night, or thought the ships to be in such a state that they could not put out to sea. According to some information the Germans when entering Sebastopol, said, they did not think it possible for the ships to come out, as they had taken all possible measures in this connection.

On May 14th, in the evening, all the ships, apt to fight, had assembled at Novorossiisk. Besides the destroyers a detachment of eight high-speed cutters in good order had come from Sebastopol together with the dreadnoughts. A day later the destroyer "Letchik" also came from Kertch. In the night of May 14—15 a bolshevist offensive and also that of some Southern anarchists was expected to take place at Novorossiisk. Two companies of sailors had been prepared to present this one—from the Destroyer's Division, the other from the big-ships. The night passed off quietly. From the very first moment all ships apt to fight—rather all ships of modern construction had concentrated at Novorossiisk, the men manifested the desire definitively to establish a concrete organisation of the Fleet administration and command. The fact is that as stated before Admiral Sablin had on May 12th, at a critical moment for the Fleet, assumed alone the command at the dreadnoughts' request, only the Destroyer's Division had not been informed thereof. Therefore the destroyers' crews (feeling themselves reighted, so to say) also manifested the wish to join in electing the C. C. A general meeting was summoned of captains, committees and five men to each one hundred of the crews. At this meeting the general situation in the South was depicted; Senior-Lieutenant Levgovd and a sailor who had, together with Spiro, journeyed to Moscow to fetch some money for the Fleet and had returned directly to Novorossiisk, also describing the Moscow situation. The sailor who had been Levgovd's travelling companion and whose surname did not unfortunately recollect at the moment, specially stigmatised the Soviet power. All speeches insisted on the necessity of single command without either committees or commissions and on Admiral Sablin being the only man who ought to be appointed to fill such a post. The old affection and respect towards and faith in Admiral

Sablin which had existed among the men long before the war were apparently manifested themselves. It is characteristic that at this meeting two anarchist-sailors came forward: Schellstoun (a former member of the "Centroflot") and Kedroff (from the "Pylky"). Both began by stating that as anarchists they recognised no authority whatsoever, but that in view of the present extraordinary moment authority was necessary; and both declared they were in favour of entrusting with full power Admiral Sablin.

And thus as C. C. with such a power Admiral Sablin, was unanimously elected by the whole Fleet; and of this he was immediately informed by a delegation sent to him. The following answer came: The Admiral is too busy to be able himself to come; however he informs the meeting that taught by experience he does not believe in such an election; the only possibility for him to assume the command being the fulfilment of the following demands:

1. He must be elected not by a meeting of delegates but by a general referendum of all the men.

2. All those not wishing the Admiral to be elected with full powers must leave the ships, even if owing to this the number of ships had to be reduced to a minimum.

3. The Admiral must be given full personal power in accordance with the Naval Statute and the laws of War-time.

4. He is to have the right, should he wish to, to defer to a tribunal to be formed near the Staff any persons without exception who may be guilty in connection with their service duties or who have not fulfilled their chiefs' orders.

5. All elections to be abolished.

6. Should all such conditions be fulfilled, the Admiral will assume the command, but only if the Andrew flag be hoisted on all the ships.

The referendum gave the following result: out of some 3000 men 2433 voted for the power being entrusted to the Admiral and 237 against. The others either abstained or were for the Admiral though with certain restrictions.

After the result of the referendum had been communicated to the Admiral—the latter arrived on board the "Trojan", where all the captains, committees and representatives of the men were. The Admiral thanked for the confidence shown him and then said a few words which, though devoid of any oratorical effects, were energetic enough to impress deeply all those present:

"I accept power on such conditions and am hoping with the men's help, to bring the ships into a fighting condition, but do not undertake to save the Fleet nor can, for it does not depend on me. The Fleet could be saved only if we had even small but disciplined land-forces which could defend Novorossiisk from land, should the Germans advance. But there are no such troops, nor can they be got from anywhere. Now you have applied to me and to the officers, to those officers whom you shot, humiliated and insulted. And these officers, a little above a hundred in number, have forgotten all; and having left all and even their very families went with you in order to save the ships. Such is their love of Russia and their devotion to the Russian Fleet. So—do respect your officers and take care of them. Now you see yourselves where the red slogans and sentences of your beloved revolutionary leaders, your idols, have led you to. Hard moments have come and your idols are not with you where are they?"

"They have abandoned you; and now you again apply to me, an old man, sick and worn out, and beg of me to save you. I must again warn you that

an agitation will be led against the officers and me in particular; there are even now among you vile reptiles beginning this business; but these you must tear out of your midst yourselves. Long live our dear, tortured, unfortunate Russia! Long live the glorious Andrew flag!" Powerful "hurrahs" were the answer; and on someone exclaiming: "Long live the Fleet Commander Admiral Michael Pavlovitch Sablin", these hurrahs became quite an ovation.

On the next day, the 17th of May which was Easter-eve, at 8 a. m. the Andrew flag was ceremoniously hoisted and the Admiral assumed the command over the Fleet.

On the very same night (May 17th) a meeting of the local bolsheviks took place on shore in which also other men who had been mentioned above as coming from all Crimean towns took part with Mme Ostrovsky at their head. It was decided at this meeting to spread panic among the Fleet sailors, thus compelling the majority of them to leave the ships; and then—to get rid of those in command. At 4 a. m. the anarchist-sailor Kedroff came into the cabin of Captain Lebedeff, chief of the Mine Division, and gave information as to this meeting and this decision, requesting that measures be taken. However no measures whatever had to be taken any more, as the enormous majority of the men did not react on the agitator's speeches at all; and so all the activity of the bolsheviks in this direction led to forty men out of the whole Fleet taking to flight and to the sailors seeing their extra-uniforms.

The town denizens who had viewed the Fleet with tenor after its arrival and who were in the expectation of the hardest trials, saw with undisguised astonishment the Fleet take the protection of the town into their hands. Two companies of sailors were appointed every day to maintain order, one being from the ships and the other from the Destroyer's Division: the ships undertook to protect the town and the Destroyer-Division-Standard. The Fleet also undertook to fill all sentry-ports in town; patrolling detachments being sent at night which did not allow any one not even the revolutionary authorities free passage after midnight; the parole being communicated but to the Captains of the ships on duty, to the sentries and patrolling detachments. All illegal searchings, also burglaries, thefts and murders, which had been an every-day occurrence at Novorossiisk before, ceased at once. The Red Army soldiers disappeared from Novorossiisk chiefly moving to Ekaterinodar.

The "Volia" sailors having becoming aware through a solicitor that forty nine Korniloff officers were in prison since the 17th of January, who were expecting death with certainty in connection with the Fleet's arrival—sent representatives to the local Sovdep inquiring whether it was true that such officers were imprisoned and whether they were being occurred of anything. The Sovdep also hoped much from the support of the Fleet and so declared with joy that such officers were in prison in fact but that as yet no accusations had been brought against them. And much to the Sovdep's amazement it was announced to them that the "Volia" requests that all those officers be urgently set free; should however it be otherwise she will take measures of her own and liberate all the prisoners herself. So on the very same night the Sovdep urgently determined to set the officers free: and this was done on the next day. Then the "Volia" men proposed to those of the officers who should like to to enth their ranks as volunteers. So six of the officers engaged as gun-layers and sailors, the "Volia" men treating them most kindly; they were not even permitted to do dirty work. Simultaneously with this men began talking louder and louder that it would be right to shoot down all the leaders of bolshevism who had arrived from the Crimea. Mme Ostrovsky

in particular was much spoken about in this connection. It is true that deeds did not follow the words; but if a man had been found who might have headed the movement, those plans would have been executed. Unfortunately it was premature then for the officers to act as leaders. Nevertheless these rumours reached the bolshevist leaders; and all the *clique*, including even, I think, the local bolshevist committee, left Novorossiisk and moved to Ekaterinodar, the centre of the Kuban-Black-Sea Republic.

The Fleet began to put itself in order and brace itself up. It was forbidden to go ashore before the end of the work and occupations; an order of the day was drawn up: all the war time tables were composed a new and verified; meetings and sittings were forbidden during hours of duty. Under the presidency of the Admiral a Committee of the senior officers and N. C. O.'s was formed, to work out some alterations in the routine. Gunnery- and torpedo-practice were performed as well as all the other exercises.

Keen competition to set their ships in good order began among the crews of the destroyers. The boilers were cleaned and washed in lye, the engines were tested as they had been very neglected during the stay at Sebastopol. The destroyers were cleaned and painted from end to end; some of the men did not even seem to want any rest; it was a time when they seemed to be really recovering and their spirits rose accordingly.

Only one thought continually tormented everybody, especially the officers: would the Germans leave the Fleet in peace in Novorossiisk, or would they begin an offensive along the coast as far as this harbour also, as they had already taken possession of Rostoff at Easter. It was also feared that they might land troops at Taman from Kertch. Against this event the Admiral had formed a staff of the officers who were in Novorossiisk with, as Chief of Staff, Commander Lebedinsky, who planned the land defences. Gun pits were dug in which it was decided to place some of the ship's guns. Artillery General Taratchkoff was appointed Chief of the land defence. In addition to this, the Admiral telegraphed to the Sovnarkom in Moscow to send guns and munitions from the north, as well as two regiments, at least. Of course the Admiral received no answer to his request. A certain Avtomonoff (a cosack officer), who was commander of the soviet troops in the Northern Caucasus presented himself to the Admiral in the early days after his arrival. He offered his troops to the Admiral, and hoped to be able to mobilize 20 000 men. The Admiral did not believe in the help of such troops, however he made use of Avtomonoff's scouts for reconnoitring. Along the whole coast, and along the Kertch strait in particular was established a naval line of communications; agents were sent to the Crimea and to Sebastopol. Measures were taken to prevent the landing of the enemy in Taman or somewhere near Novorossiisk, and one Destroyer Flotilla (generally the 2d as it had a better supply of oil) was always in readiness in the second position.

A week after the arrival of the Fleet at Novorossiisk Admiral Sablin received from Fieldmarshal Eichorn a telegram as follows: "Novorossiisk. General Sablin. The ships of the former Black-Sea Fleet, which are just now in Novorossiisk, have violated more than once the Brest-Litovsk peace-treaty and have taken part in fighting against the German troops in Ukraina. Therefore no further negotiations can be thought of until the ships return to Sebastopol. If this condition is not fulfilled, the German supreme command in the East will be forced to continue its offensive along the coast. Signed Eichorn."

In answer to this, Admiral Sablin sent the following telegram: "Kiew. To the Commander in Chief of the German armies in the East. The Black-Sea Fleet, which lies at Novorossiisk is under my personal command, and flies the Russian Flag; the ships of this Fleet have not violated the peace-treaty and have never taken any part in any fighting against the German troops in Ukraina. I must request you to send more concrete notions about this, otherwise I shall be obliged to consider your accusations as unfounded. At the same time, if you consider this course desirable, I ask you to let me know when and to which harbour I could send my representatives on a destroyer to talk this matter over with your representatives and ascertain the actual facts. Signed: Admiral Sablin."

It should be noted that, as was known at the time by the Naval Staff, the Germans considered the ships which lay at Novorossiisk only as a well organized gang. The Admiral received no answer to his telegram. After the exchange of these telegrams, it was obvious that the Germans watched Novorossiisk. Every morning a German seaplane flew over the town and the fleet, and every day came lower and lower until at last it nearly touched the topmasts of our ships. At the same time, near the Soudjunsy isthmus, a big German submarine appeared daily and stayed on the surface at a distance of about 50—55 cables from Novorossiisk. The character of these observations was clearly that of mockery, especially if it be remembered that the Admiral had forbidden our ships to fire at the enemy on these occasions. But the Admiral could not well do otherwise, although the behaviour of the Germans was very provocative, and they evidently wished to force us to open fire first. Under this provocation, the men became very restive and their spirits fell gradually. At last the Admiral sent a wireless message to Fieldmarshal Eichorn in which he said that the German chiefs in the different areas, most likely did not understand the peace treaty of Brest, as a German submarine had lately opened fire against one of our submarine-chasers which was carrying the mail to Anapa, and that the every day appearance of seaplanes seemed to indicate a hostile spirit and gave rise to great irritation even among the peaceful inhabitants; therefore some day, if these demonstrations continued, possibly some irresponsible persons might open fire, for the consequences of which neither the Admiral nor the fleet could be answerable. Besides this the Admiral warned Fm. Eichorn that near Novorossiisk harbour and the Caucasian coast, there were mine-fields, and requested him, in order to avoid accidents, to give instructions that neither the ships of the German Navy, nor those of Germany's allies should come nearer than 10 miles from our shores, or if obliged to do so in exceptional circumstances, a pilot should be asked for from the Admiral's Staff. These telegram also were not answered; but the submarine's manoeuvres were not so noticeable and the seaplanes, though they continued flying, kept at a very great height.

About the middle of May, news from Moscow was received quite unexpectedly that a certain Gleboff-Aviloff was appointed commissary of the Fleet. He had formerly been commissary of the post and telegraph services and had already lived for some time in Novorossiisk. This news incensed everybody and even amongst the sailors the exclamation of "we have had enough of commissaries" could be heard. However it was impossible to ignore this individual, or to send him away for then the fleet would have been declared outside the law. There was no fuel, no money, no materials in Novorossiisk, everything was expected from Russia and sub-lieutenant Poliakoff, when sent to Tzaritzin, had only succeeded by irregular methods in sending

off to Novorossiisk three or four trainloads of oil; later trains were stopped. Nevertheless, owing to this energetic action on the part of sub-lieutenant Pollakoff, the destroyers received a full provision of oil when some had no more than 5—6 tons left. The Admiral declared to Gleboff-Aviloff when he presented himself, that he himself did not meddle at all in the political life of the fleet, and that he, Gleboff, was also requested not to interfere with the private life of the personnel. From that moment, Gleboff-Aviloff scarcely ever showed himself on the ships and eventually assembled the presidents of the committees on shore, but they also soon ceased to visit him. Gleboff reappeared again at a later stage and played a notorious part during the liquidation of the affairs of the fleet. As to the ship-committees, though they were not abolished, they played only, a secondary part and occupied themselves exclusively with the economic life of the crews. There were even cases when the men asked for the Committees to be abolished. Soon after the 2d of Juni, a telegram from Gleboff-Aviloff to Trotzky in Moscow, was intercepted by employers of the Naval Staff; in which he said that the Black-Sea fleet, owing to the activity of Sablin and Tikhmenieff, was making rapid progress in the right direction. At that time the commander of the soviet troops in northern Caucasia, Avtomonoff, was dismissed as a declared enemy of the people and the soviet government and summoned to Moscow to give an explanation of his conduct. The following fact may serve as characteristic of the state of mind of the men: A certain Keremetchi, who was head of an Armenian militia arrived from Transcaucasia where he had gone from Sebastopol to defend the Armenians from the Turks. This Keremetchi, a social-democrat, "menshevik", who had saved more than one officer's life in Sebastopol at the time of the murders, became in Novorossiisk a bolshevik.

Owing to his intercession assemblies of the crews of the Destroyer-Division were permitted, at which Keremetchi reported the state of things in Transcaucasia. The whole report was of quite a bolshevist character. Keremetchi said openly that now he himself was of the opinion that the officers ought to be looked after. He ended his report by saying that formerly his views were different from the sailors', but that now he was entirely of their opinion. After that Keremetchi proposed to the assembly a resolution quite in the bolshevist spirit, and requested the destroyers to be sent somewhere near the Caucasian coast. The result was rather curious: nobody supported him and only some isolated suggestions were heard: "If you wish it, address yourself to the Commander in Chief of the fleet, he can give the order; but it does not concern us." And the president of the assembly, the anarchist Kedroff, said, he could not even put this request to the vote for the sending of the destroyers depended entirely on the Commander in Chief of the fleet. He therefore proposed that the meeting should be closed. It was a strange phenomenon this change of front on the part of Keremetchi and the sailors.

The relations of the men to their officers at the various ports, where the fleet was stationed, were most friendly, though it is true there was no great show of discipline; but orders were fulfilled without demur. The cutting of the booms in Sebastopol by the officers undoubtedly made a deep impression on the sailors; they openly admitted that the officers had saved the fleet. There seemed some possibility of saving our new ships; events appeared to be taking a favourable turn; but the officers and most likely some of the men did not consider these promising conditions as likely to continue, but were firmly convinced that the Germans would not allow the fleet to be saved

and by an alliance either voluntary or otherwise with the Sovnarkom¹⁾, they would endeavor to destroy it or at any rate to render it harmless if they did not succeed in its destruction. This state of tension effected the C. C. to such an extent that his nervous system was quite shattered.

The revolution in the Ukraina was known in the fleet in the last days of May. A little later the bolshevist papers (for there were no others) published the news of the proclamation of General Krasnoff as Chieftain of the Don cossacks. All these items were reported in a specific bolshevist spirit. But nobody knew the real state of things beyond the Novorossiisk region. As to the Volunteer Army also nothing was known. The only thing of which there was no doubt, was, that at Kertch the Germans were concentrating forces, that some ships of the German-Turkish fleet were there, and that some of the Kuban cossacks desired very much to call in the aid of the German troops in order to be freed from the bolsheviks. All this was a great strain on the nerves of the men and still more so as even the most unconcerned among them began to appreciate more clearly the hopelessness of the situation.

There was no support to be expected, either material or moral; there were no harbours whither the fleet could go in case of Novorossiisk being seized by the Germans, for Touapse could not be counted, as big ships were not able to enter there. In addition, it became known that Georgia, which had declared its independence, was in sympathy with the German and that the German troops were spreading along the coast from Poti and Batoum as far as Sochi and even farther north.

In these circumstances an unexpected solution took place. On June the 15th or 16th there arrived at Novorossiisk from Petrograd, a member of the naval College Bakhrameieff, (a former sailor on one of the submarines which had operated in the Baltic sea, a half educated man); he brought Admiral Sablin very secret documents. After the Admiral had made himself acquainted with the documents, and having divulged their contents only to the Chief of the General Staff and the captain of the "Volia", the C. C. of the fleet informed Moscow urgently, that it was necessary for him to go there for explanations.

The Admiral had raised the question of his going to Moscow several times before on different pretexts, for, not receiving any answer to his numerous requests for arms and munitions and other materials for the fleet and the fortified region, the Admiral hoped to obtain all these from the north by making a personal application.

Next day, the Admiral hurriedly started for Moscow, taking with him his flag-sub-lieutenant Goursky, senior Lieutenant Levgood, and a guard of 30 sailors with an officer in charge. Before starting, the Admiral ordered the captains of the ships, the committees and representatives of all the crews to assemble on the "Trojan". At this assembly the Admiral announced that it was necessary for him to go to Moscow, and that he hoped still to be able to save the fleet. "I leave the gallant captain of the "Volia", Alexandre Ivanovitch Tikhmenieff in my place; I have known him for a long time, he has served much with me, and his views on service are the same as mine." Visibly agitated the Admiral went up to Tikhmenieff and embraced him.

After his departure, Gleboff-Aviloff thought it a good opportunity to come forward. He said he thought the journey of the Admiral very important, though he considered that events were moving so rapidly that the fate

¹⁾ Sovnarkom council of the people's commissaries.

of the fleet might be decided before the C. C.'s arrival in Moscow. Immediately from all sides came the request: "give us all the details of the Brest-Litovsk peace-treaty, let us see all the points". Such utterances were inevitably heard whenever Gleboff-Aviloff was present at meetings. He tried to evade making a direct reply and hastened to retire.

After the meeting, it was decided to ask an officer and a sailor to go on board the "Volia" to the Admiral, and to express to him in the name of all ranks their deep gratitude for all his activities on behalf of the fleet, their thanks for bringing them out of Sebastopol, and their best wishes for his success in Moscow, together with their desire that he should come back to them as soon as possible. The Admiral said to these representatives that he had only a faint hope of being able to ameliorate the situation, and promised to return to Novorossisk. At 2 a. m. the Admiral departed.

Next day the provisional commander in Chief, Captain Tikhmenieff, invited the Chief a. i. of the Battle Ships Squadron, Captain Terentieff (who was also the captain of the "Svobodnaya Rossiya"), the Chief of the Destroyer division, Captain Lebedoff, and the Chief of the Naval Staff, Captain Lebedinsky, to come to him, and then read to them the document which had been brought by Bakhrameieff. It was the report of the Chief of the Naval General Staff addressed to the supreme military College, or the High Council of the republic. It stated, that on different pretexts, the Germans continued to advance along the Baltic coast as well as on the Black sea shores, although guarantees to the contrary had been given, evidently they intended to seize the ships, docks, works and supplies. Having regard to previous experience the Naval General Staff considered it necessary, if a German offensive began against Novorossiisk, that precautionary measures should be taken to ensure the destruction of the fleet there, so that it should not fall into the enemy's hands. To this report was appended Trotzky's opinion in two parts. In the first, he approved the measures to be taken for the destruction of the fleet, if it seemed likely to fall into the enemy's hands, later, he advocated its immediate destruction. Finally the report ordered the C. C. of the fleet to destroy immediately all the ships, and was signed by Lenin, Trotzky and by the Chief a. i. of the Naval General Staff, Altfater. In all this correspondence there was not a hint of the political situation, and no explanations were given as to why the sinking of the fleet had become so suddenly necessary.

On the premises, the situation was at the time comparatively favourable. The Germans, after having entered Rostoff, did not go any farther; and from the Kertch side, nothing threatened either, on the contrary, according to information received, part of the troops had left and therefore the order "to sink immediately all the ships" seemed more than strange, and aroused general indignation.

At the same time it became known that at Moscow Captain Stchasny had been shot for not having obeyed a similar order and for having brought out the Baltic fleet from Helsingfors to Cronstadt.

Captain Tikhmenieff, in the presence of the flag Captains, declared to Bakhrameieff and Gleboff-Aviloff, that he would not destroy the ships before it became necessary, because he was sure, that if he gave such an order then, the men would throw him, the officers, and Bakhrameieff and Aviloff, over board rather than they would obey. Both commissaries seemed to agree, that local state of things did not warrant the execution of Moscow's orders; but they added, that it was impossible not to fulfil them either. Then Tikhmenieff proposed to the commissaries to tell it all themselves to the men,

which they of course immediately refused to do, saying they would not be obeyed, and that it was contrary to the principle of single command which was accepted by the Navy. The commissaries asked that an answer be given the next day.

Next day the assembly of Flag Captains composed the following telegram. "Moscow. Lenin and Trotzky. The Flag Captains having assembled on June the 20th on the battleship "Volia", and having made themselves acquainted with the secret report of the Naval General Staff No. and the order No. have decided: that as no real danger is apprehended from the advance of the German troops from the direction of Rostoff, or the Kertch strait towards Novorossiisk, it is premature to sink the ships. The attempt to give such an order, will be considered as open treason. Signed: Captain Tikhmenieff, Captain Terentieff, Captain Lebedinsky and Commander Gutan 2d." The latter was at the assembly as the senior of the captains of the destroyers instead of the Chief of the Destroyer-division who was ill. This telegram was read also to the commissaries who had arrived and they were asked to sign it, if they were of the same opinion. Both consented and signed it. One of the copies, with all the signatures on it, Tikhmenieff kept, and the other was given to the commissaries, who decided to put it in cipher personally, though they had been asked to do it together with the rest. However, on account of some "technical reason", this telegram was not sent until the next day, that is, the 21st of June, and even then only after Gleboff-Aviloff had declared that he would repudiate his signature. Evidently Bakhrameieff and Aviloff had sent a telegram to ask why the destruction of the fleet was immediately necessary.

On the 23d a whole series of telegrams was received amongst them one in cipher. From these it was learned that between the Sovnarkom and the German command there were negotiations going on in Kiew about the fleet. Before it had only been known that there was a council being held in Kiew, where the question of the fleet was also being discussed, as one would make out from the fragments of wireless messages which had been intercepted. The member of the Naval College Bakhrameieff also had not said anything about it.

Besides this the fleet learned from the telegrams of June the 23d, that Germany had presented an Ultimatum to the Sovnarkom about the return of the ships to Sebastopol, where the ships were to be interned for the whole duration of War. The enemy had fixed the 29th of June as the limit of time, but afterwards prolonged it to the 2d of Juli. Further it was said, that if the fleet did not return to Sebastopol by the 2th of Juli, the German command would be obliged to cease all negotiations and to continue the offensive along the whole front.

In consequence of this ultimatum, it was ordered urgently to destroy the battle ships as well as all the other ships which were in Novorossiisk, and all the personal were ordered to go to Saratoff, where naval battalions were being formed.

As to the telegram in cipher, it surpassed in its duplicity all that one could conceive. It ran as follows: "You will receive an open telegram treating about the execution of the ultimatum to go to Sebastopol, but you are not to fulfil this order, but on the contrary, to destroy the fleet, acting as the order brought by Bakhrameieff tells you."

When the cards of the Sovnarkom were all thus laid on the table by this telegram, and its duplicity was discovered, the C. C. summoned on the

"Volia" the first meeting of captains, presidents of the committees, and representatives from the men. At this assembly were also Bakhrameieff and Gleboff-Aviloff. The C. C. announced that he had received documents of extreme importance from Moscow, which he asked the assembly to listen to with great attention for the fate of the fleet depended upon them. Then he proposed to both commissaries to read aloud the documents and the telegrams in the order in which they had been received. The commissaries tried to refuse asking the C. C. to do it, but the latter insisted, and the Commissaries after having spoken together, decided that Gleboff-Aviloff should read the documents. The reading was interrupted several times by exclamations of indignation. Having made public the ordinary telegrams, Gleboff however concealed the contents of the one in cipher. Then the C. C. told him that he had not read another telegram which, in his opinion, was the most important. Becoming very confused, Gleboff murmured something as to secretness of the telegram and of it not being timely to announce it. In answer to this, Tikhmenieff told the whole assembly that there was a telegram which the commissary for some reason or other had concealed from them, and taking the document out of Gleboff's hands, read it aloud. The reading of this telegram quite stunned the assembly, their indignation had no bounds. Voices were heard saying: "Those traitors want to throw the responsibility for the sinking of the fleet upon us, they want to put us outside the law," etc. After a long series of disputes and differences, the assembly decided to take preliminary measures for the sinking of the ships. For this purpose a special detachment was chosen on each ship, they were chosen from among the most reliable sailors, and they were to sink their ships, under the direction of their captains and officers, at the moment of danger. This decision, however, was only of a preliminary nature, as many considered that the crews ought to be fully informed of everything before any definite decision could be taken.

With this object in view the sitting was interrupted and blank shots were fired (this was a signal agreed on by the Squadron from the beginning of their stay at Novorossiisk) to gather together the officers and men who were absent. On each ship the entire crew was informed of the situation and the documents which had been received from Moscow. Not on a single ship was the crew in favour of sinking the fleet, but neither were they in favour of returning to Sebastopol. Nearly all voted for remaining in Novorossiisk and at the same time the sayings: "fight till the last shell", "fight till the last drop of blood", etc; were heard again. But many, hearing these sentiments were convinced that they were only words and that when real danger drew near, the majority would run away to the mountains and the ships would be left to the enemy.

At midnight the sitting, which had been interrupted on the "Volia", recommenced and lasted until morning, but again it ended without a definite decision being taken it was only evident that nobody would sink the ships immediately. The other suggestion of: „war till the end", was heard more and more. There was talk of it being desirable to enter into negotiations with General Krasnoff, but still this question was mostly avoided. It was decided to ask Moscow which order was to be executed: the open one, or the one in cipher. Meanwhile the hatred and the threats against the two representatives of the soviet power who were present, grew so visibly, that both commissaries preferred to run away on shore in the middle of the meeting.

At this sitting appeared for the first time the representatives of the organisation which looked after the interests of the merchant marine with a cer-

tain Kremliansky, an engineer of the merchant marine who had been appointed to this post by Lenin himself, at their head. Lenin had laid out two million roubles for the business of the transport and Kremliansky used this money at his own discretion. At first it was not wished to admit the representatives of the merchant marine to the sitting, but afterwards they were admitted for the reason that in the instructions received the sinking of the merchant ships was also ordered. Kremliansky, by his ultra-bolshevist declarations at all the following sittings, played a considerable part in bringing about the sinking of the ships in Novorossiisk, agitating as well against Admiral Sablin, Captain Tikhmenieff and in general against the whole command. It must be said, that at the beginning of all this discussion about sinking the fleet, positive propaganda was carried on in the town to the effect that the destruction of the ships would be advantageous only to the officers and that this plan had been conceived by them alone. On the day, when the ships were really sunk, the agitators said that the officers did not wish to destroy them, but had decided to take them to Sebastopol. All this propaganda had no influence on the sailors, but had great success among the population.

Next day again a sitting was fixed on the "Volia" which the commissaries promised to attend, but they did not turn up; the men became excited and it was decided to summon them the commissaries by telephone. As they were not at their lodging an escort was sent to find them and bring them, by force if need be. The escort returned and said that Bakhrameieff and Aviloff had fled to Ekaterinodar in Bakhrameieff's special train. There was no bounds to the sailors' indignation and they began thinking of means to overtake the fugitives and arrest them.

Soon a telegram was received from one of the intermediate stations, in which Bakhrameieff declared, that as he had not been able to fulfil his mission, he considered that a longer stay in Novorossiisk was unnecessary, and therefore had left with Gleboff-Aviloff, to report in Moscow all that had taken place.

On the morning when he had promised to come to the sitting, Gleboff-Aviloff, while conversing with Tikhmenieff, said: "The opinion of the crews being mostly for fighting to the end, and consequently, that the ships should not be sunk, it would be better, in that event, to bring them to Sebastopol." Also when answering a question addressed to Aviloff as to how the last telegram was to be understood, as to going to Sebastopol, and was that the telegram mentioned in the cipher-wire, saying the order was not to be executed, Aviloff answered that he himself did not know and that this telegram might be a new instruction. These were his last words before his flight.

At the sitting at which the disappearance of the commissaries was discovered, the first report was received of the landing of the Germans at Taman and that it was intended to land 20000 men. This news destroyed the last hope of remaining in Novorossiisk.

From that moment began the death-agony of the fleet. The officers and men were quite demoralised; they left off eating and sleeping and the men ran about doing nothing but holding meetings; there were several cases of desertion and also of suicide.

The day after Bakhrameieff's and Aviloff's flight, two trainloads of red-army men arrived from Ekaterinodar, who behaved very insolently towards the sailors. They took the place of all the sentries in town.

A meeting of all the townpeople was appointed to be held on the town square for the fate of the fleet to be decided by them. Many sailors went also

to listen out of curiosity. To this meeting was brought a detachment of armed Red soldiers carrying handgrenades, who surrounded the whole place. At the same time on the support-cruiser "Trojan" a meeting was held at which the representatives of the Kubano-Black-sea "republic" were present. The fact was, that somebody had had the mad idea of being able to save the fleet by the aid of the Kuban-Black-sea republic, which had, as was pretended, troops enough for defence against the Germans. At this meeting the representatives of the "republic" stated that they had broken off all relations with Moscow, that it was a crime to sink the fleet, and that they were ready to defend Novorossiisk in conjunction with the sailors. To the questions, as to what number of rifles and guns they had at their disposal and what financial means they had, these representatives, with Rubin at their head (the commissary for finances) could give no answers, but proposed to send representatives to Ekaterinodar, where, as they said, all would be cleared up.

The C. C. refused to come to this meeting but was represented by Captain Terentieff, who described the hopelessness of the situation of the fleet and that he thought that the ships ought to be sunk, or taken back to Sebastopol, but that no other alternative unfortunately could be suggested.

During the meeting, one of the sailors suddenly put the question: "Why, and by whose order had the red-troops arrived at Novorossiisk and were behaving so insolently towards the sailors?" The chief of the red-soldiers, (he looked like a former officer), who had turned up on the "Trojan", nobody knew why, replied that they had been sent to guard the town. Later it was found that they had been sent in consequence of Gleboff-Aviloff's complaint against the sailors, who, so he pretended, had rebelled. Here the mistake of the bolshevist-chiefs was directly noted, for they had sent only 600 men. It was announced immediately to the Commander of these soldiers that he had better disappear as soon as possible from Novorossiisk with all his men, for the town was guarded by the fleet and if a red-soldier touched a single sailor, their comrades, to the number of two thousand five hundred men would sweep the red-army soldiers off the surface of the earth. The Commander of the red-troops said, he had only just learned the truth, and that he would, without delay, quit Novorossiisk with his men.

At the end of the meeting, it was nevertheless decided to send to Ekaterinodar representatives, in the persons of two or three officers and two sailors, to find out what the means of the local "republic" were.

The a. i. C. C. scarcely ever took part in the meetings and had never declared his point of view to the men. Knowing the disposition of the sailors, who had again taken up their meeting catchwords, and knowing also by experience, that it is impossible to influence, in the right direction, men in that frame of mind, he waited for the moment when they would, after having tried all, come and say: give us orders, tell us what we are to do.

During that short but difficult time of waiting the C. C. tried to find out some way of saving the fleet, but unfortunately without result. There was no place to take the ships to, as no harbour remained where they could find shelter even temporarily; to take them somewhere and sink them in shallow water was impossible, as most of the men would not set out to sea, but would desert. Besides, it was not to be expected that the enemy would let the fleet go farther than 10—20 miles, with minimum crews on board, some of the ships being towed, and all in an unfit state for action.

The only thing the C. C. could do, was to try to enter into negotiations with the Don and to let the Ataman of the Don, General Krasnoff, who lately

taken up this post, know the tragic situation of the fleet. With this in view, he sent engineer sub-lieutenant Poliakoff by a round-about route through Kertch and Taganrog, on a schooner to report to the Ataman. The messenger arrived safely and was received by General Krasnoff and General Bogaewsky. The opinion of the Ataman was, that there was nothing else for the fleet to do, but to return to Sebastopol, where there was still hope of saving the ships for the future. This advice of the Don Ataman, sub-lieutenant Poliakoff transmitted to the C. C., as I have heard, through a school-girl, who crossed the territory occupied by the bolsheviks, and who arrived at Novorossiisk a few hours before the time fixed for a final decision to be taken.

There remained only two alternatives either: to sink the ships, or to take them to Sebastopol. Everybody, of course, will find it strange, that the officers who were on board the ships at Novorossiisk took into account the orders of the Sovnarkom, that is, the power which none of them acknowledged, but considered as monstrously criminal; and besides this, they considered also a reported German ultimatum. To understand a little the psychology of those few officers whose fate until the end was bound up with the ships which they navigated and to which they had devoted themselves especially during War, one must be acquainted with the circumstances in which they had to decide the hard question of the fate of the fleet. No help was to be expected from anywhere. To remain in Novorossiisk was impossible, for such a decision would be equivalent to giving the ships over to the Germans undamaged, for the men would have fled at the last moment and there would have been nobody for the work of destruction.

And so, only two alternatives were possible; the first, to sink the ships so that they should not fall into the hands of the Germans and be used by them against our allies. From the strictly military point of view this was the only correct thing to do; but another consideration arose if the fleet were sunk and the demand of the Germans to return to Sebastopol was not complied with, and that was, Russia gave by this action and excuse to Germany to continue the offensive, that is, to occupy new areas rich in corn, the Kuban among them. The desire of the Germans to occupy the Kuban and to export the corn from there, was clear to most people and it seemed that they were only seeking a pretext to bring in their troops. If this had really happened, the fault would have been laid on the remainder of the fleet personal. Besides this, the questionable attitude of the Sovnarkom towards the fleet, and the very contrary orders that had been given, gave rise to the supposition, that if it was not important, so far as Germany was concerned, to destroy the Black-sea fleet, and so leave Russia, in case of a disastrous termination for her (Germany), of the world War in a defenceless state on the Black-sea for many years, it was in any event, very desirable to the Sovnarkom.

The army through systematic demoralisation and propaganda was destroyed. The strength of the fleet had also been brought to naught by the same insidious means, but the ships themselves remained which might be made good and be used against the revolutionists in case the people recovered their senses and order was again established. This desire of the Sovnarkom to destroy the fleet, may at first appear increbut if one recalls a similar attempt to destroy the Baltic fleet which was in a much less helpless situation than the Black-sea fleet, it will not only seem possible, but even probable.

The second alternative, to take the Fleet to Sebastopol to be interned by the Germans, from the point of view of old naval traditions and of history, was quite an unacceptable course, but at the present time, when all the tra-

ditions o. history, military valour and national feeling were trodden into the dirt, it was only possible to view the matter in its relation to the state. Giving no guarantees, except on paper, the Germans might certainly at any time use our ships, or, in case of an unfavourable termination of the war, destroy them. But it was not probable that this could be advantageous to them, and this is why: on the Black-Sea, as there was no enemy, the Germans did not need an armed naval force, the more so, as they had the "Goeben" and the Turkish fleet. They could not either use our ships against our allies, as although they had augmented their forces by two dreadnoughts and ten destroyers, they were not strong enough to do battle with them. Even if the advantage had not been on the side of Germany, still the destruction of our fleet would have been very unfavourable to her, for when peace discussions were going on, the states of the Entente would have held her responsible for the destroyed ships. In any case, we should not have sunk them prematurely but only when the last hope of receiving them back after the end of War had disappeared. In considering all the circumstances "far" and "against" destruction one comes to the conclusion, that if there remained yet a slight hope of saving the fleet, it was only in the event of its return to Sebastopol.

These are the thoughts and the combinations which guided the responsible officers during the last moments of the fleet's existence. In that same spirit did the C. C. publish on the 27th of June an order of the day to the crews. In it Tekhmenieff said that their were only two issues: to sink the ships, or to take them back to Sebastopol for the 2d of Juli. There was very wide divergence of opinion as to the course to be followed among both officers and men and therefore the C. C. having once more endeavoured to make the situation clear to them, ordered the question to be decided by secret ballot.

The fleet was to execute the decision of the vote; all other alternatives were ruled out by the C. C. The result of the vote was as follows: for the sinking of the ships 450 votes, for the return to Sebastopol more than 900. About a thousand men did not vote of whom, many wished to struggle until the last shell had been made use of. This thousand was not of any account as they had not answered the direct questions on which the vote was taken. It is necessary to note that most of the crews of the dreadnoughts had voted for the return to Sebastopol. In this way did the ships' crews decide the question as to the fate of the Fleet on the 28th of June n. st.

When the votes were counted, those who were for the sinking of the ships tried to prove that those in favour of the third course suggested, and those who had obtained from any expression of opinion ought to be counted as being on their side. The representative of the merchant-marine, Kremliansky, supported this opinion very hotly, and also the captain of the destroyer "Kertch", Senior-Lieutenant N. Koukel who spoke out openly for the first time.

The proposition was categorically rejected, and the captains of the ships and the representatives of the crews, except Koukel and a few others declared that they would submit only to the decision of the C. C. The latter declared that as the majority had decided to return to Sebastopol he confirmed this decision and would take the fleet thither in the hope that our ships would be returned to us some day. From that instant he claimed full obedience to his orders.

Unfortunately, however the dissension, which had broken out amongst the crews, continued to the end. The position which some of the officers took up, with the senior lieutenant Koukel at their head, helped very much to foster this dissension. Koukel spoke warmly against the proposed return to

Sebastopol and said his honour and dignity as an officer would be compromised by the return to Sebastopol and said his honour and dignity as an officer would be compromised by the return to Sebastopol. Expressing all the time highflown sentiments, Koukel influenced some five or six young officers who believed in the sincerity of his convictions reality "the honour and dignity of an old officer" did not hinder Koukel, dressed up as a sailor, and with a black ribbon with the inscription "Kertch" upon it (instead of the ribbon of St. George — of the Black-sea fleet), going stealthily to the lower deck and speaking in favo of the sinking of the ships, on quite new grounds. He advocated his views especially among the sailors of the dreadnoughts. At that time those who listened to Koukel did not yet see in him a bolshevik, although his behaviour ought to have aroused their suspicions. The position taken up by the officers who followed Koukel's example and who had left off obeying the Commander of the fleet, could not be allowed to continue without increasing the dissension among the men—especially on the destroyers. Nearly half of those who wanted at first to go to Sebastopol, decided at the last moment to sink their ships. Near the climax of the tragedy, the fleet was definitely divided in about equal parts. Perhaps, if there had been no dissension among the officers, a unanimous decision would have been arrived at and the fleet would have been saved for the future Russia, but as there was no unanimity its fate was sealed.

At the last meeting when the majority of votes had been cast for the return to Sebastopol, the crews had requested, in view of the liquidation of the fleet, that they should receive their wages for several months in advance, especially as the sums of money on board might easily fall into the hands of the bolsheviks, or be taken by the Germans. The C. C. declared that he would not meddle with money matters and left that to be decided by the financial committee, attached to the Intendant of the Naval Staff. This committee in which were several officers, and also representatives of the men, decided to hand to all ranks their pay for five months in advance and besides that, also a sort of bonus calculated on the number of years of service. It was ordered that the ships paymasters should receive these sums from the Intendant of the fleet on presentation of claim papers, and the distribution lists with the receipts were to be sent to the Naval Staff.

Towards the evening of June the 28th, the C. C. had ordered the ships to the first position (the position No. 1 supposes an hour's notice readiness) at 9 a. m. But in reality only the two dreadnoughts, the destroyers "Dersky", "Pospeshny", "Bespokoyny", "yivoy" were preparing to put out to sea and some destroyers, whose men hesitated, but also were preparing for the voyage. On the other ships, particularly on the 3d, so called "Oushakoff Flotilla" ("Kertch", "Kaliakria", "Hadjibey" and "Fedonici"), meetings were being held all the time, with the participation of outsiders. The same Senior Lieutenant Koukel distinguished himself by his inflammatory speeches at these meetings. However it seemed that at the last moment, all the ships would be ready to weigh anchor, for in such cases the principle of going with the crowd generally obtains the upper. Remembering their experience of Sebastopol, the Chief of the Destroyer-Division and the captains of the "Pospeshny", "Bespokoyny" and "Dersky", decided to go into the outer harbour early in the morning without waiting for orders, and to wait there. The principal thing was to make a start and set an example. During the whole evening of the 28th and the next night, the sailors who had not consented to return

to Sebastopol were carrying ashore their things. These were mainly men, whose records were not very good.

The news of the fleet putting out to sea, flew round the town and all the yards and factories. Next morning, after a series of meetings, thousands of people with posters and red banners went towards the wharves to dissuade the fleet from leaving.

Towards the morning of the 29th, both the dreadnoughts, and the "Dersky", "Pospeshny", "Bespokoyny", "Jivoy", "Pylky" and the auxilliary-cruiser "Troyan" were getting up steam. On the other ships the sailors were running about and did not know what to do: they went ashore, come back on board the ships ready to put out, then returned to their own vessels and began to get up steam, as for instance, the "Pronsitelny", "Fidonici", "Hadji-bey", and others. Towards that time the crowd of protestants came alongside the destroyers and again meetings were held. Many of the sailors who had been undecided and hesitating, began leaving the ships. It became evident that if the destroyers did not immediately get away, not one of them would be able to depart for lack of men. Meanwhile the crowd came on board the vessels which were nearly entirely abandoned by their crews and began plundering. The moment was most critical, therefore the "Dersky", "Pospeshny", and the "Bespokoyny" weighed anchor, and followed by the shouts, curses and the threats of the thronging furious crowd, steamed into the inner roads and anchored near the flag-ship "Volia".

Whilst half of the crowd surged about the destroyers which had remained in harbour with the "Kertch" at their head, and on which, under the direction of Koukel, signals such as: "Death and shame to the ships which go to Sebastopol" "traitors and betrayers, bethink y ourselves", were being all the time hoisted, the remainder, consisting of several thousands of people, went their way by the external piers towards the dreadnoughts. On the "Volia" the leaders of this mob were met by the executive officer who said that he could allow no meeting, as the sailors were at work; he escorted them to the ladder and sent them off in a boat. Unfortunately the gang-way of the "Svobodnaia Rossia" had not been taken up in time and therefore the leaders of the mob and some workmen penetrated to the lower deck. On the "Rossia" the crew were less steady than on the "Volia" and they succeeded, through meetings, in creating dissension amongst them. Nearly the entire engine-room staff declared that they would not go to Sebastopol.

Affairs looked dark in the harbour and the men who had thrown off the authority of the C. C. were already visibly showing their animosity towards those who had decided on going to Sebastopol. From them as well as from different revolutionary organisations deputies were continually arriving on motor-boats, who tried to force the men from the other destroyers to return to the shore. The crews were very excited.

There was no doubt that if the ships remained some time longer in the inner roads, most of the men, if not all, would desert, and if only a few remained, it would be impossible to put out to sea. But still the C. C. hesitated to make a start, for he hoped all the time that finally the rest of the ships would follow him. Besides it was necessary to wait for the "Svobodnaia Rossia" which was taking in coal and oil from the supply-ships.

About 1 p. m. the Commander a. i. had the signal hoisted: "Weigh anchor and go to the outer roads." The "Pospeshny", the "Bespokoyny", the "Dersky" and the "Jivoy" immediately followed the flag-ship, taking with them in tow, the "Jarky" which had been forsaken by her crew. These two destroyers

had been together all through the war and the crew of the "Jivoy" to which the few remaining men of the "Jarky" came over, did not wish to abandon the "Jarky" to her fate. Besides these, the auxiliary-cruiser "Trojan" and a little later the "Pylky" came into the outer roads. All these ships were anchored at a distance of about five cables length from the entrance light-houses.

At the moment the ships were leaving the harbour, the revolutionary organisations made a last attempt to keep them back: a handful of men tried to come up to them in a boat, saying that new telegrams had been received in which it was announced that the whole question of the fleet going to Sebastopol or being sunk, was a German machination, and they asked the men not to listen to their officers, etc. etc. To all this the sailors answered by abuse. In general, it was enough to start the engines, for the men to calm down visibly.

The ships left the harbour followed by the wild shouts and curses of an immense crowd which had assembled at the ends of both piers; this irritated the sailors very much. The ships were not left in peace either in the outer roads, as people of doubtful character in boats and motor-boats kept coming alongside until late in the evening and trying to persuade the men to return.

As the "Pospeshny" had the largest supply of oil, the Commander a. i. ordered her to come up to the "Volia", and to pump part of her supply over to the "Volia". About the same time, Gleboff-Aviloff and Bakhrameieff arrived quite unexpectedly from the shore; they also asked the Commander not to go, but to sign the order for the sinking of the fleet. The Commander categorically refused this proposition. Then the commissaries decided to address themselves to the crews, but being afraid to do so themselves, they sent a former president of the ship-committee of the "Volia" to speak; he was also for sinking the ships and had left his ship when she went to the outer roads. As soon as he began to speak, the crew commenced shouting that he himself and both the commissaries ought to be thrown over board. After this reception, he and Bakhrameieff and Aviloff hostilely went down the rope-ladder into their motor-boat and departed. From them it got known that the Sovnarkom had sent urgently a member of the Naval college Raskolnikoff to Novorossiisk to see to the execution of the order for sinking the ships. Towards evening the destroyer "Gromky" was brought to the outer harbour, but having only few men on board, they did not intend to take her to Sebastopol, but came out of the port with the intention of sinking her.

A little after the "Gromky" had come out, a deputation from the crew of the "Svobodnaia Rossia" went on board the "Volia" and asked the crew of the "Volia" not to act independantly and to give a final answer as to whether they were going to Sebastopol or not, for if the "Volia" went, the "Svobodnaia Rossia" would join her. To this, one of the engine-room staff of the "Rossia" remarked immediately that it was useless to count upon them, as they did not intend to go to Sebastopol. The men of the "Volia" answered that they would abide by their purpose anyhow, and would go to Sebastopol even if their ship went alone.

Weighing anchor and putting out to sea were postponed until 10 p. m. as the Commander a. i. still hoped to take with him the "Svobodnaia Rossia".

At 10 p. m. the "Dersky", the "Pospeshny", the "Bespokoiny", "Pylky", "Jivoy" and "Trojan", having the "Jarky" in tow, put out to sea. In answer to the proposal of the Chief of the Destroyer division (whose flagship was the "Dersky") to take the "Gromky" in tow, her men thanked him for the offer,

but replied that their ship would be able to go herself to the place they had decided upon. The "Volia" remained some time yet in the roads waiting for the other ships to come out of the harbour.

The Chief Engineer of the Staff Major General Berg (who was on the "Dersky") was sent on board the "Rossia". When it was definitely ascertained that the engine-room staff of the "Svobodnaia Rossia" did not want to go to Sebastopol, but to leave the ship, the Commander a. i. made a last attempt to save her by ordering the remainder of the crew to get up steam and the captain of the supply-ship "Herson" Rodzianko, to take the "Rossia" in tow.

However this order could not be fulfilled, as the crew of the "Herson", influenced most likely by Kremliansky, refused to obey.

It is necessary to note that a short time before this, Kremliansky had ordered all the supply-ships and merchant ships to haul down their St. Andrew flags and to hoist red ones with the inscription in gold letters: "the Russian Socialistic Federative Soviet Republic". This flag had been recognized lately by the Germans as the Russian flag both for the Navy and the merchant-marine, but so far there had been no suggestion about raising it on the ships of the Fleet.

On the night before the 30th of June the battle-ship "Volia", the oil-driven destroyers "Dersky", "Pospeshny", "Bespokoiny", "Pylky", the coal-driven destroyers "Jivoy", "Jarky" and the auxiliary cruiser "Trojan", flying the flag of the Provisional C. C. Captain Tikhmenieff, made for Sebastopol. A little later the supply-ship "Kresta", attached to the detachment, of submarine chasers joined the detachment.

The battle-ships "Svobodnaya Rossia", the oil-driven destroyers "Kaliakria", "Hadjibey", "Fidonici", "Kertch", "Pronsitelny", the coal-driven — "Leytenant Shestakoff", "Kapitan Lieutenant Baranoff", "Stremitelny", "Smetlivy", the supply-ship "Liotchik", and about eight submarine chasers remained to be sunk in the Novorossiisk harbour. Besides there, a great number of supply-ships and steamers remained.

After the departure of some of the ships for Sebastopol, Raskolnikoff arrived at Novorossiisk, and together with Gleboff Aviloff, Bakhrameieff and Koukel, directed the blowing up and the sinking of the ships in the harbour. In visiting the ships Raskolnikoff made violent demagogical speeches, to the effect that it was the officers and the nobles who had brought Russia to this most disgraceful peace-treaty of Brest. The crews were obliged now to destroy their ships, entirely owing to the officers. All this talk did not make a great impression on the sailors, and not a single officer was touched at Novorossiisk. Only Major General Berg was to be arrested by order of Raskolnikoff, because during one of Raskolnikoff's speeches on the "Rossia", he called out: "it is not the officers that have brought Russia to shame, but such scoundrels as you, and the rest of the commissaries." Fortunately, General Berg escaped in time to Kertch on a motor-boat.

The destroyers were sunk in very deep water, in the outer harbour, by means of opening the seacocks and by exploding the boilers. One or two destroyers sank too slowly, so were blown up by the destroyer "Kertch". "Svobodnaya Rossia" was towed out into 26 fathoms of deep water and blown up by a torpedo from the same destroyer.

The "Kertch" herself, after all the ships were sunk, went to Tuapse under Koukel's command, where she was sunk, after which he and the crew departed by the Almavir-Tuapse rail-way. There are reasons to suppose that the "Kertch" went to Tuapse, because the population of Novorossiisk was incensed

by the deeds of her crew in January 1918 when they shot the officers of the Varnavinsky infantry regiment and many robberies and acts of violence were committed by them.

Besides the Russian ships, in the Novorossiisk harbour, by desire of their respective consuls, the foreign steamers, which war had overtaken in the Black-sea, and which had been enrolled in the supply-ship flotilla, namely: the French "Oxus", the English "Trevorian", the Belgian "Elborus" and the Italian "Generosa" and "Serbia" were also destroyed.

As to the submarine-chasers, they were nearly all sent by railway to the north to be transported later to the Volga.

The detachment of ships which went to Sebastopol informed, by wireless, the German command of the time of their arrival, and also the number and names of the ships. The message also stated that the rest of the ships, for technical reasons, shortage of men and the absence of sugars, had been left at Novorossiisk.

During this crossing, owing to the insufficiently number of hands, especially the want of engine-room staffs, nearly all the destroyers had to be taken in tow, and only the "Dersky" and the "Jivoy", went under their own steam. Owing to this, the voyage was very protracted. Fortunately the weather was dead calm and all arrived safely at Sebastopol".

The Russian fleets in the Baltic sea and in the Black-sea had each separate problems to face.

At the moment when war was declared and during the first months, our Baltic fleet was in a very critical situation. Very weak numerically, without any fortified bases, it could not have made any serious resistance to the enemy if the latter had attempted to penetrate the Gulf of Finland. At that period it would have been easy for the Germans to master the situation, they had only to come to Cronstadt, to land troops and they would have been at the door of the Capital of the empire. That this did not happen, was only because the German fleet was hampered in its movements by the war with England. During the second year of war our fleet was strengthened by the new battle-ships, destroyers, and submarines that were built, and fortified naval bases, owing to the rapidly completed batteries and the mine-fields, were already very superiour. The fleet was becoming a bulwark for Petrograd.

In connection with the retreat of our armies the removal of the front to the Duna emphasised the importance of the Gulf of Riga to the first of defence. Throughout the whole later period of the War the struggle was concentrated in this Gulf. As for the Finnish Gulf it could be foreseen that the enemy would attempt to enter it only in case our armies should retreat still further. In this event the Fleet would have opposed to the enemy the most stubborn resistance first on the foremost position (Dago island—Hangöudd), then—on the Central (Nargen island—Porkalaudd). Besides that, everything had been prepared on the Lavan-sari—Sommers line for the establishment of a last line of defence.

The Baltic Fleet achieved its task very successfully, an enormous amount of work being done during the war in connection with its development and the increase of means of defence. No doubt it would have done its duty to the end, but for the Revolution which destroyed at once all the results of three years of work.

The Black-Sea Fleet had somewhat different tasks before it. It ruled over its own waters and was bound whilso maintaining this rule, not to permit the enemy to make use of the Black-Sea as a means of communication.

This fleet, too, successfully achieved its mission and whilst in the beginning of the War the enemy had dared to invade our shores, later on he was compelled to awe up there raids altogether; also each time he sent ships to Zunguladak or some other place, such attempts invariably resulted in failures. Besides its chief aims the Black Sea fleet most energetically supported all the time the right flank of the Caucasian Army.

The Russian Navy's losses during the war were insignificant; still as a fighting force it existed no more.

What would Russia's Great Reformer have thought, could he have foreseen two centuries ago the end of the famous Navy which he had created and for which he opened out a broad way of honour and progress.

He well understood all the importance of sea-force for a Great Power, and so he began creating a Navy. New, strongly built ships began one after the other to enter service; these were the first-born of Russian Sea Power. A little later, in 1714, the young Navy had already defeated the Swedes who were experienced in Naval warfare, thus earning for its Imperial Chief and for itself Hangöudd's immortal laurels.

To the navy created by his Imperial will Peter the Great gave St. Andrew's flag; this was to be the emblem of Russia's Naval power and at the same time the ship's flag. Time went on. Russia grew wider and stronger; her Navy was growing and developing, a glorious array of Naval Chiefs passed through Russian history; non will ever be erased from Russian memory the names of Apraxin, Greigh, Tchitchagoff, Spiridoff, Oushakoff, Seniavin, Lazareff, Korniloff, Nakhimoff, the Grand Duke Constantine Nikolaevitch, Boutakoff, Makaroff, Koltchak and many others.

Many victories whe won; and more than once, in smoke and fire, whilst the guns whe thundering, the shells hissing and bombs exploding, did St. Andrew's flag proudly wave at the mart heads, recalling the signals of the Great Founder of Navy. Hangöudd, Hogland, Reval, Tchesma, Kaliakria, Korfu, Tenedos, Athos, Navarin, Sinope — what bright and beautiful pages of history these are! . . .

It is impossible to count all the heroic deeds performed by the Russian Navy, and by which that Navy acquired an honourable place among the Fleets of the great Powers: the brig "Mercury", the ships "Azov", "the Empress Marie", "Paris", the steamship "Vladimir", the Danube cutters, the cruiser "Novik", the destroyers "Stereoustchy" and "Straschny", the cruiser "Rurik", the battle ships "Souvoroff", "Borodino", "The Emperor Alexander III", "Admiral Oushakoff", the cruisers "Dimitry Donskoi", "Svetlana", the destroyers "Bouiny" and "Gromky"; finally, in the last war, the gun-boats "Sivoutch" and "Khrabry", our "Novik"; a whole series of other examples of heroism — all these do the Russian Naval annals preserve.

But St. Andrew's flag witnessed many painful moments too: Admiral Seniavin's squadron confined in Lissabon; the Black Sea Fleet sunk by Russian hands in Sebastopol roads to prevent the enemy from entering; the First Far-Eastern Squadron finding its grave in Port-Arthur; the Second perishing in the fatal Corean straits.

But after such painful commotions ever did come a period of restoration of the Navy's moral and technical power. The Navy rose as it were from the dead, in order that it might, in this new life regain all it had lost and more. After the Tsushima tragedy our Navy was able to make rapid progress on the way of regeneration and development. The conditions under which it had to achieve this work were by no means eary. However humi-

liating this admission may be, we Russians, were unable to understand the importance of Naval Power for us; we could not grasp the idea of the need of creating a strong Navy. The impression produced by the recent disaster enhanced this conviction still more. But when the world's war broke out and great danger seemed to threaten Petrograd, the eyes of all turned to the Navy. And for three years did the Navy defend with honour Russian waters and shores against enemy invasion, ever ready to encounter the enemy in order to drive back his attack.

The fatal 1917 year came. Revolutionary anarchy overtook Russia and deprived her of much that had been thought holy for many centuries; and the glorious flag of St. Andrew was taken from the Navy. Unheard and frightful acts took place and on many ships was the blood of their officers shed. These first victims tortured in the name of the Revolution were the precursors of an endless series of other victims of the terrific catastrophe which befell a great country. Viren, Bakhireff, Koltchak, Nepenin, Kourosh, Boutakoff, Rein, Razvozoff, Ploehn and many hundreds of other Naval officers, whose names thou knowest, O Lord, all sanctified with their blood their devotion to the cause of duty and honour. In the regenerated Russia of the future let no one walk by their graves without piously baring this head.

And so St. Andrew's flag is no more. Where it once waved now the red flag flies: it has the colour of blood, of civil war, of torture and treachery; our ships, the pride of our former days, have been dishonoured, as the whole of Russia has been. How painful when "Sebastopol" becomes "the Paris Commune", when "Petropavlovsk" becomes "Marat", the "Ameer of Bukhara" and "Finn" — "Jacob Sverdloff" and "Karl Liebknecht" etc.


Is it death then? For these skeletons of ships — it is death; but for the idea of a Navy it is but a long sleep. The time will come when Tsarist Russia rises from the dead and the Navy will revive. And then will on the masts of its new ships wave again in the wind St. Andrew's flag: white with a blue transversal cross.

H. Graf,


Commander of the Russian Imperial Navy.




1. The Commander in Chief of the Baltic Sea,
Admiral N. O. Essen.




2. The battle-ships and cruisers divisions at sea.




3. Wreck of the "Magdeburg" on the ridges of Odenholm island.




4. The cruiser "Pallada" blown up on October the 10th 1914.




5. The cruiser "Friedrich Karl" wrecked on Russian mines November the 17th 1914.



6. The Baltic fleet in winter 1914—15 in Helsingfors harbour.




7. The guns and the bow of the destroyer covered with ice after a winter expedition.




8. The torpedo apparatus of the destroyer covered with ice after a winter expedition.




9. The "Novik" anchored at Runo island.




10. The cruiser "Rurik".




11. The smoke-screen of the enemy destroyers.




12. The mine-layer "Albatros" after action on June 2d 1915.




13. The naval forces of the Gulf of Riga concentrated near the Zerk light-house before the enemy's attempt to break through the Irben position on the 8th of August 1915.




14. The battle-ship "Slava" in the position. Explosion of a big enemy shell in the vicinity.




15. The gunboat "Sivoutch" sunk during an action on the 20th of August 1915.




16. The enemy mine-sweepers at work.




17. The destroyers of the 6th Destroyer Flotilla in heavy sea.



18. The "Novik" with a seaplane on deck.




19. The destroyer "V 99" cast on shore after action with the "Novik"
(phot. of Finke).




20. The destroyer "V 99" after having been blown up by her crew on the 19th of August 1915.




21. The C. C. of the Baltic Fleet,
Vice-Admiral A. J. Nepenin.




22. Attack of the seaplanes in Kuivast-harbour.




23. The Division of battle-ships on the external harbour of Helsingfors with anti-mine-nets.




24. The battle-ships "Petropavlovsk" and "Gangut" during an expedition.




25. Salvo from all the guns of the battle-ship „Gangut“.




26. The battle-ship "Andrei Pervozvanny".




27. The English submarine "E 18".



28. The bow of the destroyer "V 100" torn off by a torpedo from the submarine "E 18" on May the 26th 1916.




29. The destroyer "Pobeditel" in an ice-field.



30. Return of the destroyers after the defeat of an enemy convoy of steamers off Landsort.




31. Naval staff of the C. C. of the Baltic-Sea fleet, with the C. C. Admiral V. A. Kanin, at their head and the C. C. of the Black-Sea fleet, Vice-Admiral A. V. Kolchak, the day of the appointment of the latter to this post.



32. Group of the "Novik" with her Captain M. A. Behrens.




33. The destroyer "Donskoy Kazak" after having been damaged.




34. The mine-layer "Priyat" on its way to lay mines.




35. An enemy destroyer tries to take the sinking "Grom" in tow
(from a phot. of Finke).



36. The enemy forces at the entrance of Moonsund in action with the detachment of Admiral Bakhireff (from a phot. of Finke).



37. The "Slava" after action and damaged (from a phot. of Finke).



38. The destroyer "S 64" blown up by a Russian near Schildau (from a phot. of Finke).



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