

IMPRESSIONS OF
SOVIET RUSSIA

CHARLES SAROLEA




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IMPRESSIONS OF SOVIET RUSSIA



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IMPRESSIONS OF SOVIET RUSSIA

BY
CHARLES SAROLEA

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PREFACE

ALTHOUGH there has been a veritable deluge of political literature on the Russian Revolution and on Bolshevism, I believe that this is the first book in the English language which attempts to give a dispassionate account of Soviet Russia based on a first-hand knowledge of the subject. There have been many interesting and suggestive publications, such as those by Mrs. Snowden, Mrs. Clare Sheridan, Miss Buchanan, Mr. Wells, Mr. Bertrand Russell and Mr. Brailsford. But each one of those books not only starts from a preconceived idea, but, what is much more serious, the writers are perfectly innocent of any previous knowledge of the Russian language or of Russian history. What would we think of a Russian publicist who would presume to write a book on British politics without being able to read an English newspaper or to talk with the man in the street?

Whatever may be the shortcomings of the present Impressions of Soviet Russia, the writer may at least claim that ever since, thirty-five years ago, he frequented the University of Liège, he has been a constant student of the Russian language, of Russian literature, and of Russian conditions; he may also claim that, having made several prolonged stays in Russia before the war, he is in a position to compare the Russia as she was with the Russia as she is to-day.

I have tried not only to give the facts as I was able to

see them; I have also attempted to give an interpretation of the facts. I quite realise the difficulty of making intelligible to a British reader the present confusion and chaos of the Russian Soviet Republic. But having submitted my manuscript to some of the highest European authorities on things Russian and Slavonic, I have received from them the comforting assurance that my description of Russian realities is essentially accurate, and that the interpretation goes to the root of the problem.

The substance of the book originally appeared in the columns of the *Scotsman*, of the *New York Times* and of *Current History*, the excellent American monthly on foreign policy, published by the New York Times Company. Most of the chapters were immediately translated into French, German, Polish, Tchech and Russian, and were simultaneously published in the *Flambeau*, in the *Nation Belge*, in the *Prager Presse*, in the *Rul*, the Liberal organ of the Russian colony in Berlin, and in the *Rzeczpospolita* of Warsaw. The mere fact that in all those countries these Russian Impressions have evoked widespread attention, may justify the hope that they will also find a wide circle of readers in this country. It would be passing strange, indeed, if the British people, who are even now embarking for the first time on a fateful Socialist adventure, failed to be interested in the most far-reaching, the most instructive, and the most tragic Socialist experiment which has ever been tried in the history of civilised humanity.

*University of Edinburgh,
March 1924.*

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IMPRESSIONS OF SOVIET RUSSIA

CHAPTER I

MOSCOW : THE CAPITAL OF COMMUNISM

It is now over eighteen years since I first visited Moscow. In 1905 I saw the sudden collapse of the first revolution. In the year of grace 1923 I witnessed the lingering decline of the second. In 1905 Moscow was only a provincial city. To-day she has become the capital of the Bolshevist International, and the population has grown to two millions and a half. Bismarck, who was an excellent judge of things Russian, and who very narrowly escaped entering the Russian public service, proclaimed Moscow to be the most beautiful and most original of the world's cities. I am inclined to agree with the Iron Chancellor. Moscow still retains her striking personality, even in her present state of degradation. She is still a city of golden churches and gigantic palaces. She is still the Metropolis of Holy Russia and the Mecca of the Orthodox Faith. She is still the meeting-place of East and West. She is still one-third European and two-thirds Byzantine and Asiatic.

To outward view there has been little change. The very eagles of the Romanovs still adorn the spires of the churches. You still meet the same familiar types

in the streets. You still strike your bargain with the same Isvoschiks, dressed in the same ancient garb, and by carrying on the comedy of friendly haggling you still manage to bring down your fare from three shillings to ninepence. It is a remarkable fact, by the way, that the Moscow Isvoschik, who generally remains a simple-minded, conservative peasant, has not managed to enlist the interest of the Soviet Government, and that the eight thousand summer cabmen and the twelve thousand winter sledgemen are not grouped in a Trade Union, and are still left to the tender mercies of the law of supply and demand and to the most uncontrolled competition.

UNIVERSAL POVERTY

There are still as many soldiers as before the war, although their long trailing coats and uncanny headgear make them look more formidable and more Oriental. There are far more officials than before the war. And there are even more beggars in the streets. Poverty is universal and dismal. The enormous majority of the people are in rags. In Germany the tourist has to look out for evidences of poverty, because poverty is ashamed of itself and tries to hide its face. Here in Moscow misery and squalor obtrude themselves everywhere. Obviously the ruin of the upper classes has not brought wealth to the lower. All classes have been brought down to the same dead level of poverty. In the overcrowded tramcars you will hardly meet a man in a decent suit of clothes. Returning from the theatre at midnight you will find the dark streets lined with thousands of little

children and old women selling bootlaces, cigarettes, bread and apples.

I was always trying to discover some point which might tell in favour of the present system. Indeed, I would have been only too pleased to be able to play the part of a "Devil's Advocate." One point apparently in favour of the Government was that the streets in the central parts of the town seemed rather more tidy than before the war. The Government has turned a great many of the unemployed to cleaning the main thoroughfares frequented by foreigners. This means no additional burden on the authorities, as the cleaning is done at the expense of the householders. A second point in favour of the Soviet Government seemed to be the comparative security of life and property. As the Soviet Government is dependent for its continuance on a large and efficient police force, one would naturally expect the police to discharge its primary duty of maintaining law and order. And as the Government are themselves the supreme masters of life and property, they are not disposed to stand any nonsense from the competition of private burglars. The Russian evening begins at midnight, and I generally returned home in the short hours of the morning through dark streets and through outlying suburbs. I was never once molested. It would be rash, however, to infer that the security is greater than it was, or even as great as it was, before the war. The foreign Legation, in which I happened to be staying within the last eighteen months has been five times invaded by burglars. In the last attempt one member of the Legation was wounded and one burglar was killed. Even to-day every night one official of that

Legation is taking his turn to keep vigil. The international train from Warsaw to Moscow in which I travelled has been twice attacked in the last few months by bandits, and all the travellers have been relieved of their money and their belongings.

It is also worth mentioning that, whilst there is comparative security in the streets of Moscow, the methods of administering justice do not quite tally with ours. I did not visit the Law Courts, but I got some striking glimpses of the administration of justice merely by reading the Soviet papers. Whilst I was in Moscow a sensational case was being tried. Twenty employees of the most popular and most luxurious baths of the capital were accused of having introduced prostitutes into the establishment. As the baths are being used by tens of thousands of citizens, the scandal could not be hushed up. Most of the accused were condemned to terms of imprisonment, running from three to five years. But in consideration of the fact that the accused were of unimpeachable Communist principles, in consideration also of the fact that the accused were of proletarian origin, and that this was their first offence, the condemned men were given the benefit of the First Offenders' Act, and they were immediately released.

THE DRINK PROBLEM

There was one other aspect of Russian life where I had hoped that I might record a point in favour of the Soviet authorities—I refer to the drink problem. It is true that the prohibition of vodka had originally been enacted by the Tsarist Government, but the Soviet

authorities are at least entitled to the credit that they maintained that prohibition. So far as the sale of vodka is concerned, Russia is still to-day a "dry country"; and certainly there are very few drunkards visible in the streets. I was struck, however, by the enormous number of public-houses. I am told that there are more than two thousand of them in Moscow. In some streets every other house was a "pivnaia," or beer-house. Foreign tourists are reluctant to cross the threshold of those places, for the surroundings are repellent and the atmosphere is nauseous. I tried to overcome my repugnance, and I was a frequent visitor of the "pivnaias," as nowhere else could one have a better opportunity of observing the Russian proletariat. I never saw so much drunkenness in my life. Only the drunkards are wise enough to stay in the beer-house until they have worked off the effects of drink and until they can face the policeman with impunity. That is the reason why one sees so little drunkenness in the streets. When one considers that hundreds of thousands of workmen are visiting those places every day, that beer is more expensive in Moscow than in London, that one glass of strong beer costs from eightpence to ninepence in British money, one begins to understand why there are so many thousands of children and women lining the streets of Moscow at midnight.

SUFFERINGS OF THE MIDDLE CLASS

I have emphasised the dismal squalor of the proletariat. Even worse is the position of the middle class. I do not know whether the new Communist bourgeoisie, the one

million and a half employees who constitute the Bolshevik bureaucracy, are better off than they were before. But the old middle class is infinitely worse off; they certainly have no superfluous shillings to waste on their drinks. I visited a great many University colleagues and members of the old aristocracy. I invariably saw them at night, in order that my visits might not compromise them with the powers that be. Most of them lived in destitution in one or two rooms. The average University professor earns three pounds per month. He ekes out his income by selling his household goods and by doing odd jobs for the Government. Such is the suspicion of the old University professor that it is very difficult for him to get his children admitted as students into the very University where he is himself teaching. Most of the places are reserved for boys and girls of approved Atheist and Bolshevik principles. It is thus that in Moscow University 80 per cent. of the medical students are Communist Jews.

The majority of the middle class and of the aristocracy are thus reduced to beggary or menial service. On the day of my arrival in Moscow, while motoring through the centre of the town I had noticed in the dense crowd a military gentleman of striking appearance. He seemed a typical Colonel or General of the old régime. The next day I found him begging in one of the main streets. Again and again I met gentlewomen serving as waitresses in public-houses or proletarian restaurants. One day I found one beautiful young woman with a pathetic expression struggling with a drunkard "C'est à devenir folle ici," she remarked to me. On another occasion I congratulated a very distinguishing-looking waitress on

her perfect French accent. "I have no merit in speaking French well," she replied, "as I spoke no other language in the nursery." I found out that this distinguished-looking waitress was a Countess X . . ., one of the great names in the Russian aristocracy.

AT THE THEATRE

"Panem et Circenses" ("Bread and games") was the watchword of the Roman Cæsars on the eve of the fall of the Roman Empire. Less fortunate than Tiberius or Nero, the Bolshevist rulers cannot provide sufficient bread for the workers. But they can at least still supply the "Circenses" which were provided by the old Tsarist régime. As so often happens, to the people of Moscow the luxuries have become more necessary than the necessities of life. The theatres go on in the old way. The Russian Ballet can be seen in Moscow twice a week in all its glory. The Théâtre d'Art, with its many understudies, continues its daring experiments. In the Grand Opera I saw Wagner in an entirely new setting. The Dramatic Theatre was simultaneously playing Shakespeare, Bernard Shaw and Oscar Wilde. An orchestra stall costs from ten shillings to fifteen shillings. But if the foreigner has to pay high prices for his seat, the bulk of the audience pays little or nothing. A large number of free seats are reserved for Bolshevist officials. When one thought of the subjects of most of the operas, ballets and the dramas, one could not help being struck by the curious paradox that the audience were transported every night from their Bolshevist surroundings into an aristocratic world of heroic kings

and gallant knights of romance and chivalry. One night the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Cicerin, had invited me into his box to witness a remarkable performance of "Lohengrin." I remarked to him that most of the plays performed in the Bolshevist theatres seemed to me to be unwittingly carrying on an anti-Bolshevist propaganda. Mr. Cicerin courteously remarked that, after all, one could not condemn a musical masterpiece merely on the plea that the author had not anticipated Bolshevism. I quite agreed with the distinguished statesman, but the paradox remains that the whole atmosphere of most of the dramatic performances is out of harmony with the Communist system.

The fact is that the Bolshevist rulers have long realised the need of using the theatre for their own purposes. But hitherto all their propaganda efforts have proved a failure. I went to see one of the special Bolshevist theatres—the Theatre of the Revolution. They were acting a Cubist drama—"Spartacus." From a Communist point of view, the performance was most disappointing, and was defeating its own purposes. Spartacus, the leader of the social war, perishes in the attempt; the Roman slaves sink deeper in slavery. The Bolshevist leaders, however, are not discouraged. A strong committee has been recently considering the means of utilising at least the cinema to confirm the citizens in the true faith. I am afraid that the cinema will not prove a more serviceable instrument than the theatre. Even if the public could be brought to attend Bolshevist films, the production of such films would cost a great deal of money. And the Government exchequer is empty. In the meantime the cinemas of

Moscow are only giving cheap and sensational American films.

On arriving in Moscow I did not at once go to a hotel, but was privileged to enjoy the hospitality of one of the Legations, occupying in his absence the apartments of the Foreign Minister. On his return, I moved to a big Soviet hostelry, with two hundred rooms. Most of the old hotels have been commandeered as Government offices. The few remaining hotels have been nationalised. Here, again, as in the case of the theatre, the charges are calculated on the principle that the foreigner has to pay for the Soviet officials, who pay nothing. The price of my room was about one pound per day. I cannot say that the comforts of this Communist palace were commensurate with the high prices. I had to wait twenty-four hours before I got a washstand in my room. For ten days I was restricted to the use of one towel, and I had to do the cleaning of my boots. There was no restaurant, and I had to buy my own supplies. The strange thing was that the numerous Soviet waiters, who were above giving menial services, were not above demanding tips. When I left, the head waiter asked me whether I was not going to give him any gratuity. I told him that as he had done nothing for me I did not see why I should tip him. It is true that in the Bolshevik paradise "workers" are often paid without doing any work.

SOVIET AND RELIGION

Before the war the visitor to Moscow would pay his first visit to the Kremlin. The Kremlin still remains the

most wonderful sight in Holy Russia. It is an epitome of four hundred years of Russian history. It is a city within a city, it is a citadel and an arsenal, a jumble of palaces and public buildings, of shrines and monasteries. To-day the Kremlin, being the seat of the Government, is jealously guarded by the Soviet soldiery, and is not open to the general public. I was, however, permitted to visit the place with some members of the British Mission, under the guidance of two Jewish officials.

I may mention, by the way, that whether in Moscow or in Petrograd, my escort invariably belonged to the Hebrew race. One day I would be taken round by a French Jew, the next day by a cultured Swiss Jew from Lausanne who had read all my Nelson editions. On subsequent occasions I made excursions with a Jew from Berlin who spoke Russian with a German accent. In Petrograd I enjoyed the company of a young American Jew of the Foreign Office, a pharmacist by trade, who spoke English with such a strong Bowery accent that I had great difficulty in understanding him.

We spent fully two hours in the Kremlin, but we were not allowed to see one single church, although the old churches are the one thing worth seeing in the Kremlin. It was a curious confirmation of the fact that when one travels in Russia on a personally conducted tour one is only allowed to see what the Soviet authorities want one to see. In the Republic of Anti-Christ, where even schoolboys have to make a public profession of Atheism, Christian churches are taboo.

On this occasion, however, there was probably an additional reason for not admitting strangers to a view of the churches. The Kremlin churches contained some

of the most wonderful treasures in Christendom. There was not an Ikon which was not bedecked with priceless jewels. All those treasures and jewels have been stolen. And one can understand that the Bolshevist Government, from a sense of decency, was not very anxious to advertise those robberies to unsympathetic and critical foreign visitors.

In this connection it is interesting to recall another very significant fact. Outside the Kremlin there is a famous sanctuary, the shrine of the Iberian Virgin, which no Orthodox Russian would pass by even to-day without crossing himself. In front of the shrine the Soviet authorities have printed in huge letters the following inscription: "Religion is the opium of the people." This is not a mere phrase. It is the official doctrine. In a remarkable recent book, Mr. Trotski recommends the cinema as the most efficient antidote to the Christian poison.

I ought not to close this chapter without referring to what was last summer the great attraction to Moscow—namely, the All-Russian Exhibition. It must be conceded that the completion of the vast exhibition buildings within a few months was a triumph of rapid and efficient organisation. It was only a national and only an agricultural exhibition, and very few foreign firms, and these mostly German, had participated. But as Russia is above all an agricultural country, the Exhibition gave one a very good illustration of the life and resources of the Russian Empire. Its erection was characteristic of the methods of the present Government. I was told that all the timber and all the raw material of the buildings had been commandeered.

I was also told that the contractors had not been paid, and that those who had been clamouring too loudly for immediate payment had been imprisoned. The truth remains that the Exhibition was a miracle of propaganda.

Russians have always been great experts in the art of official propaganda. Historians tell us that when Catherine the Great decided on a journey to the Southern Province of her Empire, her favourite and lover Prince Potemkine, arranged to erect smiling villages, so that his august mistress might everywhere be pleasantly impressed by the prosperity of her subjects. The Exhibition buildings in Moscow were as striking as any Potemkin village under the old régime. In order to attract foreigners, the stringent passport regulations had been relaxed. On my diplomatic passport it stands recorded that I was admitted into Russia as a guest of the Exhibition. It is true that very few foreigners actually did visit the Exhibition. It nevertheless achieved one main purpose. From every part of Russia, cities and villages had been compelled to send, at their own expense, hundreds of thousands of children and peasants. To these hundreds of thousands the Exhibition was held up as a tangible proof of the prosperity which had been achieved under the new régime, and of the enlightened policy of the rulers.

CHAPTER II

PETROGRAD : A DYING CITY

THE most comfortable train service of the Soviet State Railways takes you in one night from Moscow to Petrograd. Whereas in the international train running three times a week between Warsaw and Moscow there was only one sleeping carriage, with half a dozen travellers, notwithstanding the attraction of the Exhibition, on the contrary, on the Moscow-Petrograd train there were three sleeping-cars, which were mostly filled with Bolshevik officials. And this train is not only the most comfortable, it is also the quickest. In a few hours you seem to be transported into another social world. Some readers may be inclined to think that I have drawn too gloomy a picture of Moscow. But compared to Petrograd, Moscow strikes one as a land of promise. Only in Petrograd can you observe to the full the catastrophic effects of the Bolshevik upheaval.

Petrograd is to-day the capital of the so-called Northern Commune. The autocracy of the Romanov has been replaced by the stern dictatorship of Comrade Zinoviev-Apfelbaum, one of the ablest and most influential of the Jewish leaders of Bolshevism. Petrograd, which was once the stronghold of tyranny, became in 1917 the cradle of Russian liberty. There in the fateful Ides of March the revolt of two disloyal regiments settled the fate of Tsarism. Sentimental reasons and a

sense of historical gratitude might have induced the Government to retain Petrograd as the capital of Soviet Russia. But a Bolshevist Government, whatever else may be urged against it, cannot be accused of being swayed by sentimental considerations. Petrograd had to be sacrificed. Urgent political as well as strategic reasons demanded the removal of the capital to Moscow. In the first place, it was necessary to keep a firm hold over the southern city, whose allegiance was doubtful and precarious. Moscow in the past, as the home of the Slavophiles, had often shown national and reactionary proclivities. In the second place, Petrograd occupied too eccentric and too exposed a situation. On the contrary, the central position of Moscow made her invulnerable. It is strong for offensive purposes, as was proved by the Napoleonic campaign. It is equally strong for defensive purposes, as was proved by the recent war against the Ukrainians and the Poles.

The removal of the capital to Moscow meant a sentence of death against Petrograd, for Petrograd was an entirely artificial city. Without any geographical or economic advantages, built on a marshy swamp, periodically devastated by floods, she only owes her existence to the fiat of Peter the Great.

It is interesting to note that nearly a hundred years ago the Marquis of Custine, in a prophetic book, foretold the inevitable fate of the capital, destined to perish in a political cataclysm. Custine foresaw, with the penetration of a religious visionary, that Petrograd could only survive as a city of luxury and pleasure, as a centre of the Court and of Society, of the Bureaucracy and of the Army. Other European cities, after the war, like Trieste,

Riga, and Vienna have seen the currents of commercial life diverted from them. But their prosperous days are sure to return. On the contrary, Petrograd, once she has lost her political importance as capital of an Empire, can never recover it. She can neither be revived nor transformed. She can never adapt herself to the new conditions. In the near future tourists will view the ruins of Petrograd as our forefathers would contemplate the ruins of mediæval Rome. After six years of Soviet rule Petrograd is already a dying city.

And the death of Petrograd is the death of one of the world's most wonderful cities, for Petrograd was built on an even more colossal scale than Moscow. Even more than Moscow she is a city of palaces and granite embankments, of spacious parks and treasures of art. Her cyclopean monuments were the expression of a despotic will which controlled the labour of countless slaves. Think of the Winter Palace, the largest Royal residence in Europe. Burnt down in 1837, it was rebuilt within twelve months at a cost of a hundred millions of money and of thousands of human lives. In Tsarist Russia, even as in Soviet Russia, human lives were always held very cheap.

PICTURE OF DESOLATION

Whereas the population of Moscow has vastly increased, the population of Petrograd is to-day little over one-third of what it was before the war. Except for the main avenues, the streets are deserted, the grass is growing between the cobble-stones, tramcars are running half empty, most of the shops and restaurants

are closed. There are still a great many public-houses, although not nearly so many as in Moseow, probably because there is much less money. The harbour is lying still. A drive through the town is a melancholy experience. The stately mansions of the aristocracy are tumbling down either because, being built on piles like the houses of Venice or Amsterdam, the foundations are collapsing, or because the basement has been flooded, or because the roofs have been torn down and the wood-work of the window-frames has been removed by a mob which was desperately in need of timber and fuel; the owners of the houses not being there to prevent the ruin of their homes. The parks are turned into wildernesses. The villas and the "Datchas," which were once the scenes of the gayest life in Europe are but a heap of ruins. The factories in the suburbs of the town have shared the fate of the palaces in the centre. The hives of the proletarian workers have fared no better than the abodes of aristocratic luxury.

Even more dismal than Petrograd by day is Petrograd by night. The greater part of the city is plunged in obscurity. To visit a friend living in the outskirts is quite an adventure. You have to feel your way through the darkness, and, as the pavement is no longer repaired, in rainy weather you have to wade through pools of water. And if you happen to lose your way there is nobody in the desolate thoroughfares to put you right.

Before the war Petrograd had an evil reputation for its insanitary conditions. One might have expected that in its present state of decay and neglect its mortality should have enormously increased. It is true that immediately after the revolution the death-rate was

appalling. Hundreds of thousands were carried away by disease, as well as by hunger. But, curiously enough, to-day, as a foreign diplomat informed me, Petrograd enjoys almost complete immunity from epidemic diseases. The reason may be that all the weak have been killed, and that only the very strong have been able to survive, or the reason may also be that the whole population has been inoculated.

Even as in Moscow, the pleasure haunts and the theatres are kept going. Petrograd was ever proud of its reputation as a centre of all the arts, and it still keeps up a keen rivalry with the Soviet capital. It is a much debated, and it remains an open, question which of the two Grand Operas is the better one. Moscow can afford to pay more brilliant stars, but Petrograd has a more distinguished *corps de ballet* ! I shall not venture to decide between those competing claims. But certainly Petrograd may boast that it is more loyal to the Communist ideal of providing free entertainments for the proletariat.

One is almost carried back to the halcyon and heroic days of Communism three years ago, when for a short time the worker could get anything he wanted without having to pay for it, when he had free rides in the tram-cars, free seats in the theatre and free rations in the shops. Even to-day the happy few still have free entertainment.

Twice a week in two of the main theatres the general public is excluded from the performances, which are strictly reserved for the Communist "workers." During the week which I spent in Petrograd the Bolshevik theatres on those occasions were playing "Cæsar and

Cleopatra " of Bernard Shaw, "The Ideal Husband" of Oscar Wilde, and the "Bourgeois Gentilhomme" of Molière. I wondered why the Bolsheviks should have wanted to revive the least witty and the more obsolete of Molière's farces. The apparent reason was that the "Bourgeois Gentilhomme" is a caricature of the infamous "Bourgeois." But although designed as anti-Bourgeois propaganda, the famous French farce could not be described as a "draw." The performance was free, yet the house was only half filled. An even more remarkable fact was that in this so-called proletarian audience I could not detect a single bona-fide "worker." As far as one could judge, the public was composed almost exclusively of Bolshevik officials. It would thus seem, as if in Russia the Bolshevik régime, like the Socialist party in Germany, is rapidly evolving a new Bourgeoisie. The Dictatorship of the proletariat means in effect the Dictatorship of a bureaucratic officialdom over the proletariat.

FATE OF THE INTELLECTUALS

When one happened to talk with patriotic Petersburgers, one discovered that a certain civic pride still survived in the dying city. Even in her present degradation Petrograd would still like to be considered as the centre of Russian culture. This may be due to the circumstance that Petrograd has retained her scientific academies, her learned societies, her special schools. It may also be due to the fact that housing conditions are easier, and that life is rather cheaper than in Moscow. But that cheaper and easier life is none the less a life

of starvation and insecurity. Amongst the thousands of intellectuals who represent "the liberal professions," there are very few who can be sure of what the morrow may bring. Every Professor is liable to being expelled, and expulsions actually do take place every week. When I think of the appalling conditions under which the Petrograd intellectuals are carrying on their work I am ashamed that our Universities should have done so little to come to the rescue. It is right that we should relieve the starving millions of the Volga peasantry. But the hungry intellectuals of Petrograd are perhaps equally deserving of our sympathy. The German Government have established a Russian University in Berlin. Gallant and far-sighted little Tchechoslovakia has found the means of providing, in Prague, for six thousand students and three hundred Russian Professors, a magnanimous deed of international charity and an excellent political investment. British Universities have done little or nothing to help their Russian brethren in their hour of direst need.

Whilst in Petrograd I stayed at the Hôtel de l'Europe. It was once the most ambitious hotel on the Continent, and one of the most expensive. It still remains the only good hotel in Soviet Russia, and still remains very expensive, where luxuries are concerned. If, like myself, you happened to have vegetarian and frugivorous propensities, you would have to pay seven shillings for two apples. In the course of my wandering life I have been in many queer places, but I have never found myself in a queerer place than in this international Caravanserai. It beat the Grand Babylon Hotel of Mr. Arnold Bennett. In the first week of October there were perhaps half

a dozen tourists in the place. For the benefit of our humble selves there was a large staff of waiters, an excellent orchestra, a band of gypsies, and a score of artists and ballerinas from the Grand Opera. It was difficult to understand on what financial basis the hotel was being run. Obviously the few guests present could not be a paying proposition. One possible explanation was that, as the Hôtel de l'Europe was the only reputable hotel in the Northern Commune, it had to be kept up at all costs, if only for propaganda purposes. A more probable explanation is that the small band of foreign visitors were merely a respectable façade and a pretext, and that this large staff of servants and entertainers was mainly kept up for the benefit of the large Casino which was attached to the establishment, and which was visited every night by two hundred gamblers.

One night, or rather one morning, I was sitting reading in the vast, vacant restaurant and dancing-room of the hotel, and between two chapters I was observing the uncanny scene, whilst listening to a wonderful musical programme. At two o'clock in the morning I was joined by a foreign diplomat. After supper my friend suggested that before leaving it was my duty, as a political investigator, to see what he considered to be the most interesting sight of Petrograd. My curiosity was roused, and I followed my cicerone. At four o'clock our cab halted before a huge building in the Vladimirska. We entered a colossal gambling den, with spacious rooms extending in every direction. In this proletarian Monte Carlo there were from one thousand five hundred to two thousand gamblers, in a nauseous atmosphere, playing every kind of game—*petits chevaux*, baccarat,

trente et quarante. It was a sinister crowd, of every class except the aristocracy, of both sexes, rich and poor, officials, working men, profiteers, sharpers and criminals.

There are a great many similar elubs in Petrograd, as there are in every Bolshevist city. If I draw the attention of the reader to these institutions, it is not in any pharisaic spirit; rather is it because of their profound political and moral significance. Three years ago both gambling and drinking were denounced and punished in Soviet Russia as "bourgeois vices." Citizens were frequently imprisoned simply for playing a game of cards. The Puritanism of the Soviet authorities has long given way to a laxer morality. To-day not only is gambling not forbidden by the Government, but the authorities are responsible for the gambling houses, and share in their profits.

It is indeed a sign of the times, and it is also an interesting illustration of a universal law of history. In every revolution there are two extreme phases. The first phase is the phase of enthusiasm and fanaticism; the last phase is the place of corruption and dissolution. It was thus in England at the close of the Puritan revolution and on the eve of the Restoration. It was thus in France after the fall of Robespierre. In vain does the Incorruptible and Implacable Djerjinski, who is the Robespierre or the Saint Just of the Russian Revolution, wage a war against the present demoralisation. He is fighting a losing battle. The revolutionary fever and the fanatic fervour have burnt themselves out. The inevitable reaction has set in. Scandals are of every-day occurrence. In the hideous gambling den of the Vladimirska I seemed to read the writing on the wall.

CHAPTER III

THE CASE FOR BOLSHEVISM AS STATED BY THE BOLSHEVIKS

IN the two preceding chapters I have stated some of the facts of Bolshevism as they relate to the life of the two greatest Russian cities. Those facts tell their own tale and convey their own meaning. In the following chapters I shall try to explain the working of the Soviet system. I shall show how that system is challenging both the permanent laws of economics and the eternal laws of human nature. I shall show how the leaders themselves, frightened by the catastrophic consequences of their policy, have been compelled to repudiate their own principles.

But before entering on my subject I think it only fair and fitting that the reader should be able to form his own judgment, and that, therefore, he should also hear all that can be said in defence of the Soviet system. There is a sound British political instinct which warns us that there are generally two sides to every complicated question; and there is a British sense of fair play which demands that an opponent shall receive an impartial hearing. Even a murderer is entitled to counsel. It is all the more important to know what the Bolshevik leaders have to say in their own defence, because we have already resumed commercial and semi-diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government. It is well to

remember that in our dealings with Russia we have suffered too often and too grievously merely because we failed to calculate the forces which were opposed to us, or because we misunderstood the mentality with which we had to deal.

The Bolshevik leaders are acutely sensitive to foreign criticism, all the more sensitive because for the last six years no public criticism whatsoever has been allowed in Russia. They are continually complaining that they are being maligned by their European enemies. As the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Cicerin, once bitterly remarked to me : " We have made such cruel experiences with you journalists and publicists." My Bolshevik opponents did their best to convince and to convert me. I am afraid that they have not succeeded. But they will at least recognise that if they have failed to convert me it is not because I have deliberately tried to shut my eyes to their side of the problem.

The following argument may be taken as a brief summary of the Bolshevik case as it was continually pressed upon me by every one of the many Bolshevik representatives with whom I came in contact in Moscow and Petrograd :—

" We are accused of carrying on a subversive propaganda in Europe. As we proclaim the gospel of Internationalism, we naturally desire to bring over to our own way of thinking the proletariat of other nations. ' Proletarians of all nations, unite ! ' remains our battle cry. But our propaganda is at least open and honest. It is the reactionary Governments who are dishonest, and who carry on a slanderous campaign against us. Before the war the French democracy was always con-

cerned to hush up the crimes of Tsarism. To-day no slander is base enough to discredit the Bolshevist Government. It is made responsible for all the calamities which have befallen the Russian people. We are made the villains and the demons of a revolutionary melodrama.

“ We do not want to enter any special plea on behalf of our political system. Bolshevism; indeed, does not require any defence. Bolshevism justifies itself by its continued existence. Events have proved us to be right. They have shown us to be strong. You have been expecting and prophesying our collapse for the last six years. But all the politicians who predicted our downfall have themselves vanished from the scene. President Wilson, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George have been overthrown one after another. Erzberger and Rathenau have been murdered. The Communist leaders alone survive. The Communist régime alone has shown continuity and stability. The spirit of Lenin still inspires his disciples. Cicerin still controls our foreign policy. Trotski still organises our Army. Djerjinski still metes out a stern justice to all counter-revolutionaries. Radek is still the indefatigable missionary of our creed. Zinoviev is still the omnipotent ruler of Petrograd.

ATTITUDE OF FOREIGN POWERS

“ And to-day we are stronger than in 1918. The Orthodox Church, led by Patriarch Tikhon, has tried to wage an insidious counter-revolutionary propaganda against us. But Patriarch Tikhon has now submitted and recanted. The foreign Powers have sent armies

against us. But those armies have been defeated on every front. After being defeated, those foreign Powers continued to excommunicate us or they tried to boycott us. But they have now resumed diplomatic relations. Even those who oppose us must admit that there is nobody who can take our places. They begin to realise that if the Bolshevik Government were to be overthrown, the Russian continent would once more relapse into chaos. Europe would see once more a recurrence of bloodshed and pogroms. Is that the desirable consummation which the politicians of the Entente are aiming at?

“The Russian Revolution, which delivered the world from an oppressive autocracy and a mediæval theocracy, could not have triumphed except for the Bolsheviks. But we did not bring about the Russian Revolution. Tsardom died of its own internal corruption, and not one hand was lifted to save it from its ignominious fate. A sinister triumvirate—an Imperial weakling, a hysterical woman, and an abject scoundrel—were allowed to control the destinies of one hundred and eighty million people. The Church kept those millions in abject ignorance. A greedy bureaucracy did not hesitate to send whole armies to the shambles without guns or ammunition, because the officials diverted into their own pockets the sums which had been appropriated for national defence.

“Just as we are not primarily responsible for the Russian Revolution, we cannot be held responsible for the terrible catastrophe which followed. The Russian chaos is not our doing; it is the result of five years of slaughter and wholesale destruction. You cannot carry on a destructive war for five years, you cannot

withdraw from productive labour eighteen million soldiers, without disorganising the economic life of a nation. The industrial system and the transport system of Russia were dislocated long before the advent of Bolshevism. It is their very dislocation which precipitated the Revolution of March 1917. Nor can we be made responsible for the famine and the plague which devastated the country. We have no power over droughts and harvests; no more than Japan has any power over earthquakes. We have no control of the Russian climate. The famine of 1920 and 1921 has nothing to do with Bolshevism, as Mr. Nansen has again and again told you. Did Russia not have periodical famines under the Tsarist régime? Have you had no famines in the Indian Empire?

“No doubt if we had been able to concentrate on the work of reconstruction we might have arrested the economic disorganisation of Russia; we might have minimised the sufferings of the people. But the foreign Governments did not allow us thus to concentrate on peaceful work. They wantonly attacked our democracy, which was fighting for its existence. We were not allowed to work out our own salvation. We were tracked like wild beasts on every frontier. The organising genius of Trotski had to call big armies into being. We had to spend on the unproductive task of military defence the scanty resources which were urgently needed to rebuild the shattered fabric of our economic life.

“Having made the Russian confusion worse confounded by their disastrous and futile intervention, the Allied Governments left us to our fate. Having been

crushed in the field, they carried on against us a merciless economic blockade. Being a young industrial country, Russia had been dependent even in normal and prosperous times on foreign capital and foreign credit. Before the war that capital had been poured without stint into Tsarist Russia. But the help which had always been ungrudgingly extended to Tsarist Russia was withheld from Soviet Russia. Nor did you stop there. Instead of helping us, you boycotted us. Instead of lending us money, you claimed money from us. You had the impudence to demand from us the recognition of public debts which had been contracted by the Tsarist Government for its own wicked ends, as well as the recognition of private debts which had been automatically wiped out by the depreciation of the rouble.

THE COURAGE OF A MINORITY

“ You are hypocritically denouncing our methods of terrorism. You are perfectly aware that no revolution has ever triumphed merely by smooth words or gentle persuasion. In your own Parliament your own Socialist parties have persistently preached the same methods of violence. The only difference between your Socialists and ourselves is that we have had the courage, as your Bernard Shaw has shown, to practice what they were only preaching. We were but a small minority. Our enemies held all the trump cards. We fought with our backs to the wall. But we took our lives in our hands; we did not mind the cost. And, above all, we believed in our ideals. And because we believed in our ideals, and because we showed indomitable courage, we

triumphed over the power of numbers, over the power of intrigue, and over the power of money.

“We are practical idealists, but we are not doctrinaires. We are prepared to put our ideals to the test of reality. If our ideals cannot be realised for the time being, we are content to wait. We have concluded a truce with capitalism. We have accepted the compromise of our new economic policy. In doing so we are acting in accordance with the theories of our master, Karl Marx. We had hoped immediately to convert the Russian peasant to our principles. But experience has shown that the Russian peasant, who has been kept in darkness and subjection, is not ready to receive our message. We are educating the people. Until they are educated we are biding our time, because we know that time is on our side.

“You are denouncing our methods of political dictatorship. Our answer is—first, that dictatorship is the form of government best adapted to the temperament of the Russian people (the Russian people have been governed by dictators for one thousand years); second, that we are living in a state of war. Whilst there is war, dictatorship is the only method to ensure victory. We are compelled to have our own official Press because we do not believe in the so-called freedom of a capitalist Press which is being run by a Mr. Hearst or a Lord Rothermerc. We had to dismiss the Russian Constituent Assembly because we do not believe in the parliamentary comedy. If we had tolerated a caricature of parliamentary government in Russia it would have meant further anarchy and chaos.

“You accuse us of persecuting religion and of inter-

fering with the existing University system. We had to put down the Priests and the Professors, because both were instruments of the counter-revolution. The Church denounced the Soviet as the Government of Anti-Christ. No Government struggling for its life can allow its enemies to wage war against it without doing its utmost to suppress those enemies. The Orthodox Church has to-day submitted. Let her prove her sincerity and we shall not interfere with her activities. Although we consider the Church as the enemy of the workers, and although we consider the Christian religion as the opium which poisons the minds of the people, we shall remain impartial as long as the Church keeps to her own sphere. Even at present there is more religious freedom in Soviet Russia than there ever was in Tsarist Russia. Every day you may attend religious meetings and debates where priests of every sect are allowed to give expression to their convictions and to defend their superstitions. No such meetings or debates would have been tolerated for one moment under the régime of Pobedonostseff whilst the Orthodox Church was all-powerful.

BOURGEOISIE DESTROYED BY THE WAR

“ You accuse us of having brought about the ruin of the aristocracy and the middle class. Believing, as every Marxist does, that all history is made up of class wars, we had, in accordance with our principles, to wage war against those classes which were opposed to us. But in fact it is not the Bolshevists who destroyed the landed aristocracy of Russia; it is the peasants who,

in the first months of the revolution, spontaneously rose against their oppressors. Nor is it Bolshevism which destroyed the Russian bourgeoisie. The Russian bourgeoisie has been destroyed by the war. It has committed political suicide. In Germany the middle class has been ruined by the depreciation of the mark. In England it is even now being taxed out of existence.

“ Our enemies are trying to persuade the world that Bolshevism is a conspiracy of the Jews, and that the Russian people are being tyrannised over by a small band of Israelites. Even if the Jews had tried to seize power they would have had a good excuse. They would only have retaliated against those who for centuries did ill-treat them. But there has been no such conspiracy on the part of the Jews. There exists, no doubt, a large proportion of Jews in the Bolshevist Government, and there are good reasons for this predominance. First, there is in Russia, as there is everywhere, a greater proportion of able brains amongst the Jews; and, second, the Russian intellectuals have themselves declared an organised sabotage against the Soviet Government. The Jews have naturally filled in our Civil Service the positions which the Russians refused to fill. But, apart from this historical accident, it is not true that we are favouring any single national section. There are Jews and Armenians in the Soviet Government, just as there are Bulgarians and Poles, and just as there are Frenchmen and Germans, Caucasians and Georgians. We are not nationalists, but internationalists.

“ It is true that we rule with an iron hand, and we shall continue to do so as long as it is necessary. Our form of government is not yours. Russians are not

Englishmen. Our conditions are not your conditions. Our difficulties are not the same as yours.

“ In conclusion, we only claim that Russia shall be left to work out her own salvation. It is not necessary to be a Bolshevik in order to accept the Bolshevik Government. It only requires a little historical sympathy and imagination to understand our policy. The greatest French reactionary thinker, Joseph de Maistre, summing up his judgment of the French Revolution, proclaimed that France in 1793 could only be saved by terrorism. The present German Ambassador, Count Brockdorff Rantzau, has paid glowing tributes to our statesmanship. Are you going to be more reactionary than de Maistre or than Count Brockdorff Rantzau? If you accept the philosophy of de Maistre and the testimony of the German aristocrat, you will admit that Russia and Europe, after the world war and the revolution, could only be saved by Bolshevism.”

CHAPTER IV

THE GREATNESS AND DECLINE OF COMMUNISM

IN the previous chapter I have stated, with an impartiality which I trust those Bolshevik critics who sent me anonymous comminatory letters will duly appreciate, all that can be said on behalf of the Soviet régime. But both the ordinary reader and my indignant Bolshevik critics ought to realise that neither the question of the relative share of responsibility of the Soviet Government in the Russian catastrophe nor the personal character of the Soviet leaders are relevant to the main issue which is before us. For practical purposes it matters comparatively little whether a particular murderer or forger committed his crime from malice prepense, or whether he committed it under irresistible provocation, or whether he did commit it in a fit of madness. The only difference will be that in the first two cases the criminal will be locked up in a prison, whilst in the third case he will be locked up in a lunatic asylum. Similarly, it is a matter of little political concern whether the Soviet leaders are wicked men, guilty of cruel crimes, or whether they are good and honourable men who are actuated by the noblest intentions. Indeed, it will be found that the good Bolsheviks—for instance, Djerdjinski, the incorruptible—are apt to be infinitely more dangerous and infinitely more cruel than the wicked Bolsheviks, for the good

Bolshevists have been, almost without exception, uncompromising fanatics, idealists gone mad. It was even so with those Saints of the Guillotine, Robespierre, Marat and Saint Just. The problem which is before us is neither the metaphysical problem of responsibility nor the moral character of the Soviet leaders; the real political issue before us is the incurable stupidity and the inhumanity of the system. The whole case against Bolshevism, as I stated before, can be summed up and dismissed in one sentence: It is in contradiction with every law of economics; it is a challenge to the eternal laws of human nature.

At the outset of the Revolution in March 1917, Bolshevism might claim for itself that it was an emanation of the Russian people. The very word "Soviet," which is the Russian word for Council or Assembly, suggests the idea of a representative government. Based on this idea, Bolshevism originally evolved an elaborate Democratic Constitution. The Bolshevists seemed so convinced of the intrinsic virtues of the elective system that they were determined to apply it even to the army. Even officers had to be elected by the soldiers. Under the Bolshevik constitution, local Assemblies send delegates to a National Congress. The National Congress elect its body of Commissaries. From beginning to end the rulers are supposed to be the servants and the mandatories of the people.

Even if the Bolshevists had been sincere, such a constitution would probably have broken down in practice. In a vast continent like Russia, where 90 per cent. of the electors are illiterate, a freely elected All-Russian Parliament or Congress is almost an impossibility. But

in fact the Bolsheviks were not sincere. The Bolshevik constitution has never existed except on paper. The election of the autumn of 1917 proved that the enormous majority of the Russian population were against Communism. From the beginning the Bolshevik leaders were therefore determined on seizing political power regardless of any constituent assemblies, regardless of the will of the people. In January 1918 Lenin dismissed the National Assembly as unceremoniously as Cromwell dismissed the rump Parliament or as Bonaparte dismissed the Council of Five Hundred.

AN EMPTY PHRASE

In order to disguise the brutal facts Lenin called his new tyranny by the high-sounding name "Dictatorship *of* the Proletariat." But the words "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" are an empty phrase and a contradiction in terms. The régime established in November 1917 is not a Dictatorship *of* the Proletariat, but a Dictatorship *over* the Proletariat, and the dictators themselves are neither proletarians nor workers. In almost every case they are intellectuals, they either belong to the higher nobility, like Cicerin, or to the small landowner class, like Lenin, or to the Jewish middle-class, like Trotski, Bronstein, or Zinoviev-Apfelbaum, or Radek-Sobelsohn. In nine cases out of ten they are writers and journalists.

The Dictatorship over the Proletariat once established, there was bound to happen what always happens in times of revolution, namely, an ever-increasing concentration of political power.

Readers of Carlyle's "French Revolution" will

remember that in 1789 political power rapidly passed from the National Assembly to the Jacobin Club, from the Jacobin Club to Committees of Public Safety and to Revolutionary Tribunals, and from Committees of Public Safety to small gangs of demagogues, culminating in the reign of the virtuous Robespierre. Exactly the same law has been verified in the Russian Revolution. A dozen men appropriate to themselves all the powers of the State. And all those men belong to the same type. They are all strong men of action. They are all characterised by an indomitable will-power, by a total absence of scruples. They all profess a fanatical belief in the principles of "Marx." They all possess an even more absolute belief in themselves. They are all demagogues, and possess the art of manipulating mobs. They have all been hardened in the iron school of persecution and poverty.

For the last six years those dozen men have distributed amongst themselves their several revolutionary tasks. Trotski is the organiser of the Army, Radek is the Director-General of propaganda, Djerdjinski is the Inquisitor-General, Zinoviev is the Dictator of Petrograd, Kamenev and Kalenin, Rikov and Stalin are the manipulators of the party machine. Cicerin is the great specialist in foreign policy, and he is assisted by the Bulgarian Rakowski, the Armenian Karakhan, and the Jew Litvinov. Krassin is the commercial adviser. Seheinmann is the financial expert. Bucharin is the theorist-in-chief, the exponent of the true faith, and the director-general of the Press. Above them all was Lenin, the Superman, the stage manager and the genius-incarnate of the Bolshevik idea.

All those strong men have behind them a strong party. And that party owes its strength not to numbers, but to an iron discipline and to a wonderful organisation. Judged by mere numbers, the Communist party is indeed insignificant. The total numbers of the party never exceeded five hundred thousand. In Petrograd, which is even more Bolshevik than Moscow, and even in the year 1920, which marks the zenith of Bolshevik rule, the total number of registered members of the Communist party was only seven thousand. Those numbers might no doubt have been artificially increased, and have actually been increased on paper. But let it be noted that the party has no interest in artificially increasing its numbers. On the contrary, the Communist party has as vital an interest in keeping down its numbers as British parties have in adding to their membership. For the Communist party partakes of the nature of a Secret Society, of an exclusive Freemasonry. The larger the numbers, the greater would be the danger of disintegration, of divisions and sectional schisms.

GOVERNMENT BY ARTIFICIAL MEANS

It may be said with literal truth that the Communist party never represented more than an infinitesimal fraction of the electorate. It never reached $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the aggregate population of Russia. Being therefore only an infinitesimal minority, the Dictators, and the Communist party which supported or tolerated them, were bound to govern by resorting to those artificial means by which a minority has always managed to

impose its will on the majority. The minority was kept together by discipline and fanaticism. The majority was kept down by brute force and terrorism, by intrigue and corruption.

The first instrument of the Bolshevik Dictators was the Red Army. In May 1917 the Bolsheviks appeared before public opinion as the anti-militarists who wanted peace at any price. Within twelve months they had built up a most formidable army, which defeated one after the other all the European or Russian armies which were sent against them. Trotski has been glorified as the organiser of the Red Army, as the Carnot or Napoleon of Bolshevism. I do not want to depreciate the organising abilities of this extraordinary man. But it must be admitted that he had a comparatively easy task. He had only to perfect the military machine which he inherited from the old régime. He had at his disposal unlimited man power. He had only to pick and choose from the millions of soldiers who were left over of the Tsarist armies. In the terrible conditions of starvation which began to prevail from the end of 1917, the simplest way to escape starvation was to join the Red Army. Hunger was the best recruiting sergeant for Trotski.

The chief merit of Trotski was that he knew how to adapt appropriate means to definite political ends. In order to prevent disaffection in the new army, he knew how to place trustworthy commanders in all the responsible positions; he knew how to keep strict control over each unit by an elaborate system of espionage, of Communist "cells" established in every part of the Soviet Empire. In order to destroy the old regimental esprit

de corps he knew how to mix the various racial elements. Letts, Armenians, Jews, Georgians and Tartars, each race was given its allotted task in the new army. In order to provide for critical emergencies he formed "crack" regiments and "shock" divisions. For the dangerous duty of punitive expeditions, of penal reprisals, he recruited his Bodyguard on the same principle on which Cromwell recruited his Ironsides, or the Sultans of Turkey formed their Janissaries from amongst the savage mountaineers of Albania.

THE ILLUSION OF FORCE

But brute force was not enough to ensure victory. For brute force in the end might be on the side of the strong battalions. As the Dictators could not have numbers, they had to produce the illusion of force. They had to strike terror into the hearts of the population by a continuous display of ruthless revolutionary energy. They established their incomparable secret police, their implacable revolutionary tribunals. They never recoiled before the most drastic punishments. Any counter-revolutionary movement was immediately met by wholesale massacres. Moses Uritski and Djerdjinski made the "Tcheka," or Extraordinary Commission, the most sinister and efficient instrument of oppression that the world has ever seen.

Having seized supreme power, having created in their party organisation, in their army, in their revolutionary tribunals the instruments which were necessary to retain and to expand that power, the dictators were now in a position to apply their Communist Gospel. In the spring

of 1918 the Dictators enter on their glorious task of establishing a new heaven upon earth. The State monopolises all the means of production. Private factories and private shops are abolished. All services are nationalised. A huge Communist Bureaucracy, comprising millions of employees, instal themselves in the palaces of Tsarism, in the mansions of the aristocracy, in the convents of the Church. They become the ubiquitous agents of the new Communist State, the ministers of the new dispensation. Henceforth the State shall be the universal Providence and the universal Provider, distributing in equitable rations the manna of Communism to one hundred and fifty million Russian Comrades.

Unfortunately for the Bolshevik Dictators, scarcely had they issued their sovereign decree that all the national wealth was to be nationalised, when, by a kind of black magic, all the national wealth suddenly and immediately vanished. The Communists had concentrated their resourceful brains on the problem of distribution, being convinced that the problem of production would solve itself. But the problem of production did not solve itself. Production suddenly stopped. There seemed to be more consumers than ever. In the Government offices alone there were seven million mouths to feed. But nobody wanted to or was in a position to produce. The only things which were being produced without difficulty or interruption were the innumerable laws and regulations of the new Government and the countless billions of paper money. In consequence, the Communist decrees remained a dead letter, and the value of the paper money rapidly fell to vanishing point.

And yet to the enthusiast the problem of Communism in Russia would appear to be ideally simple, so much more simple than in the backward capitalistic countries of Europe. For in Russia there did exist one class—namely, the peasant class, comprising 85 per cent. of the population—which seemed to be in a position to produce more than it consumed. And that class produced exactly the food supplies and raw materials which were most urgently needed by the Soviet workers. Moreover, that peasant class had received the land for nothing, and had enormously benefited by the revolution. Was it not fair, therefore, to demand that they should serve the revolution to which they owed everything? Let them work for the Government which had liberated them. Let them till the land. Let them sell their produce to the Communist State. Then all would be well, and the Bolsheviks would have no difficulty in realising their lofty ideals.

SOVIET POLICY FRUSTRATED

But, alas ! the peasants realised neither their obligations nor their blessings. The obdurate yokels refused to sell. In no country is the peasant inclined to be a philanthropist. The Russian Mujik considered that the workers of the cities were holding a revolutionary carnival at their own expense. They had to pay an extravagant price for anything which the workers produced. And they were receiving ridiculously inadequate prices for their agricultural products. Why should they, the peasants, do all the hard work in order to maintain a class of town parasites, or of privileged industrial workers who did not work? Why should they accept worthless

money which, within a month after they had received it had depreciated a million per cent.? And thus the unregenerate and selfish peasantry refused to sell their food supplies, and frustrated the policy of the Soviet.

To defeat the opposition of the peasantry, the Soviet Government had at their disposal a simple and obvious remedy. If the peasants refused to obey, if they refused to sell their agricultural produce, the Government had only to send out punitive expeditions, they had only to apply against the *Mujik* the same methods of terrorism which had proved so efficient against the aristocratic landlord and the bourgeois. The remedy seemed all the more advisable because, with the peasantry, terrorism would be even more likely to succeed than with the other classes. First, they had always been accustomed to obey; second, having been the first to join in, and to benefit by, the revolutionary orgy, having appropriated the land and massacred the landowner, they had become the accomplices and the co-partners of the Bolshevists. Their fate was bound up with the ultimate success of the revolution.

COSTLY EXPEDIENTS

The Bolshevik Dictators therefore took action against a recalcitrant peasantry. The methods of terrorism, the burning of villages and the taking of hostages, succeeded for a time, but only for a time. Punitive expeditions, after all, were desperate and costly expedients. Russia is too big a country and the villages too widely scattered. Moreover, even if the peasantry ceased to make any active resistance, they could still oppose a passive resistance. And such passive resistance

was far more likely to be efficient. The Dictators might confiscate the food supplies of the Mujik. They could not compel him to cultivate his land if he did not want to. And the Mujik did not want to cultivate more land than was necessary to supply his own needs. Moreover, the mental attitude of the peasantry had changed. It was the proud boast of the Bolsheviks themselves that they had created a new Russian humanity which would never again submit to oppression. The very propaganda of the Bolshevik agitators was now operating against them. It was not in vain that the serf had become a free man. It was not in vain that he had drunk deep of the new wine of liberty.

The peasantry therefore persisted in their policy of passive resistance, in their ca' canny methods. The inevitable result was that the area of cultivated land shrunk with alarming rapidity. Agricultural production decreased to such an extent that very soon there were no food supplies left to export to the hungry populations of the cities. To add to the dimensions of the catastrophe, the stoppage of agricultural production coincided with a succession of bad harvests and with severe drought. The end was that all over Russia the population died in their millions. The civilised world looked on in blank and bewildered impotence at one of the most ghastly tragedies of modern times.

The Soviet Dictators had crushed the aristocracy. They had decimated the middle class. And now, on the very eve of their political and military triumph, they were beaten by the peasantry.

EXPERIMENT FAILS

This was just what might have been expected. It was inevitable that in an agricultural State the peasant should have the last word. As happened almost everywhere in the world war, the Country was to triumph over the City. The Bolshevik Dictators had to capitulate. In March 1921, Lenin sprung a surprise on his fanatical followers. He proclaimed his New Economic Policy. He recognised that Communism was premature, and that it could only be introduced by gradual steps. Private production and private trade were restored. Shops were reopened. The many solemn decrees of excommunication launched against Capitalism were revoked. Ambassadors of the Soviet, led by M. Krassin, were sent in every direction, inviting European and American capital to come to the rescue of starving Russia. And not only was capital invited to return, it was promised extensive privileges and monopolies such as it had never received before. Huge concessions would be granted to the syndicates which would be willing to invest their money in Russia or Siberia. The workers' paradise was to become a millionaires' paradise, a new South Africa or California.

Such was the strange ending of the great Russian experiment in Communism. The experiment had been made under the most favourable auspices. It had been tried *in anima vili* on the most patient and the most passive of peoples. Yet the experiment had failed. It failed at the cost of ten million human lives—an appalling object lesson, and an eternal warning to Socialist Utopians in every country.

CHAPTER V

THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY

THE proclamation by Lenin of the new Soviet policy reopening Russia to private trade, and inviting the concession hunters of every country to join in the exploitation of the Soviet Empire, was widely denounced by Socialist critics as an opportunist compromise, as a cynical betrayal of Communist principles, and as a surrender to Capitalism.

I do not think that those naïve Socialist critics understand the meaning of the Marxist Gospel. The Marxist Gospel does not care a brass button about first principles, and teems with compromises. Like his master, Lenin had the wisdom of the serpent. Compared to him even Machiavelli was a sentimentalist. When you engage on a long and dangerous war such as the war of the Proletariat against the Bourgeoisie, you cannot afford to be a doctrinaire, you must be prepared to retrace your steps as circumstances dictate, and to use any means to attain your end. No doubt you may describe Lenin as a cynical opportunist, as long as you remember that his cynicism was true to the spirit of Marxism, and that it was of the very essence of Marxian materialism—to eliminate from human affairs all moral considerations.

Nor can it be said that Lenin's appeal to the European and American concession hunters was in contradiction with the doctrines of the master. It ought not to be

forgotten that in the queer and tortuous casuistry of Marx Capitalism is often welcomed as an ally. The really dangerous enemy of Communism is not the capitalist, but the small, peasant proprietor and the small bourgeois tradesman. Capitalism is a necessary stage in the economic and political emancipation of the worker. Lenin required a strong Capitalism as an essential condition of a vigorous Class War. The stronger the Capitalism, the stronger also would be the proletariat and the more bitter also would be the conflict between the classes. The main cause of the temporary set-back of Russian Communism is that Russia has not yet emerged from the agricultural stage and that her infant industries had not developed a sufficiently numerous proletariat.

It is a curious paradox that whilst Lenin caused bitter disappointment in the Socialist camp, he was hailed in the Conservative business world as the herald of better days and as the possible saviour of British trade.

Nowhere, indeed, did the new economic policy, or the Nep as it is called in Russia, evoke keener interest than in England. Commercial circles in the City opened their arms to that very acute Ambassador, Mr. Krassin, the millionaire of Sovietism. Amidst the general depression of trade and industry, here was at least a reasonable chance of recovering the finest potential market in the world. The present prospects of Russian trade might be small, but the future prospects were boundless. It was impossible to overrate the commercial possibilities of a nation of one hundred and fifty million peasants, assuming improved methods of agricultural production, a higher standard of living, and an increased purchasing power.

The fact that the Russian Government was bankrupt and did not recognise its pre-war debts was no argument against the reopening of our trade with Russia. After all, the bankruptcy of Russia was the result of a world cataclysm. The loss of Russian pre-war investments ought no more to affect the credit of the Russian people than the fire of Chicago or the earthquake of San Francisco affected the credit of American business men.

Amongst the European colony in Moscow and Petrograd I found that a small minority, especially those who had recently arrived in Russia, professed to believe in the new policy. They thought that for the last eighteen months conditions had already materially improved; that, in consequence, the Soviet régime had been given a new lease of life, and that one might probably expect a gradual and peaceful evolution. They argued that both a common-sense view of the situation and historical analogy might justify a reasonable optimism, and ought to induce us to support the Soviet Government. After all, the Bolsheviks had learnt their lesson. It was for them a question of personal security, a question of life and death, to make the new policy a success. Whatever their previous crimes and blunders, they were strong men and able men. And strong and able men were exactly what the Russian people wanted in the present emergency. When Napoleon assumed supreme power after the 18th of Brumaire, he chose his two chief Ministers from among the Terrorists, and he kept them in office for ten years. Why should the Russian people be more scrupulous than Napoleon? Trotski is an abler man than Fouché, and Cicerin is a far more honest man than Talleyrand.

On the other hand, I found that a large majority in the foreign colony, especially those who had spent a long time in Russia, did not think that there was sufficient ground for any optimistic forecasts.

They are convinced that any hopes which we might still entertain were based on delusions. No doubt there seemed to be a revival of trade, and such revival must necessarily strike those who, two years ago, had gone through the Communist hell. For instance, if you visited the Smolenski bazaar or the Sucharewski bazaar in Moscow, you might find a dense crowd of fifty thousand people indulging in an orgy of petty trading. But such symptoms were entirely misleading. Such petty huckstering was no more evidence of a healthy condition of trade than the tens of thousands of women and children who were selling match-boxes and cigarettes at midnight in the streets of Moscow.

STAGNATION OF INDUSTRY

Between those two extreme attitudes of optimism and pessimism, where lay the truth? I submit that the body of evidence seems to support the pessimists rather than the optimists. Any revival of economic life which reveals itself seems to be largely superficial, artificial and temporary. There are some broad facts which cannot be lightly brushed away. Industry remains stagnant. The factories remain closed. The Government for three years have been discussing gigantic schemes of electrification. But those electrification schemes are now generally derided as "electrifications." The Government have organised, at enormous expense, a magnificent Exhibition

as wonderful as any Potemkin village. But the Exhibition has attracted no foreign visitors. The cost of production is rising steadily. The prices are increasing by leaps and bounds. A suit of clothes costs £40. A pair of shoes costs £5, and a pair of boots costs £10. There are no indications of a restoration of public confidence. Above all, the economic position of the peasants, which is the essential factor, shows no signs of improvement. There is a terrible disproportion between the prices which the peasant has to pay to supply his needs and the prices which he receives himself for his agricultural produce. The conditions of the workers in the cities are bad enough, but every traveller agrees that conditions in the provinces and in the country are very much worse.

Before the war the volume of business transacted at the Summer Fair of Nijni-Novgorod was considered as a pretty accurate index of the general trade of the country. The fair was one of the sights of Russia. It drew merchants of every race from all parts of the Russian and Asiatic continent. At the end of my stay in Moscow I had therefore intended to proceed to Nijni. An American politician who had just returned strongly dissuaded me from undertaking the journey. "Don't let yourself be tempted to go. You would waste your time. The Nijni Fair is a fraud. I have just been there. There is absolutely nothing doing."

The fact is that, notwithstanding the pronouncement of Lenin, there has been no fundamental change in the Soviet system. No doubt the delusions of the Communist Utopia have had to be given up, but the delusions of State Socialism remain. And with all deference to

those illustrious champions of State Socialism, Mr. and Mrs. Sidney Webb, the Russian experiment in State Socialism is proving almost as disastrous as Communism itself. The Soviet State still remains the Universal Providence and the Universal Provider. A monstrous bureaucracy still survives. There are still swarms of officials and parasites devouring the substance of the people. In vain are hundreds of thousands being dismissed because of the desperate financial straits of the Soviet Treasury. But millions remain, discouraging all initiative and enterprise.

RED TAPE SOCIALISM

The Russian Giant in the shackles of officialdom reminds one of Gulliver tied to the ground by the little men of Lilliput. It would indeed require the pen of a Swift to describe in detail the red tape Socialism of the Bolshevik régime. If the consequences were not so tragic, the methods of the Soviet bureaucracy would be an admirable subject for high comedy, in the style of Gogol's immortal masterpiece, the *Inspector-General*.

During the war one of the new industries of the Russian Empire—alas ! a very busy industry !—was the manufacture of artificial limbs. A few of those orthopædic factories managed to survive and were nationalised. In one of them there are to-day sixty-eight Soviet officials for every hundred workers. A friend of mine had to order an artificial leg. He was informed that he would have to wait six months before the leg could be delivered.

A German captain of industry, the head of big electrical works, attracted to Russia by the glowing accounts of the

Soviet propaganda Press, told me that he had wasted a month trying to carry through a contract. After spending most of his time in countless Government offices, he had managed to obtain all the trade licences and export licences which he wanted. When at last he thought that he had got to the end of his troubles, one Government bureau unexpectedly opposed its veto, and the German manufacturer had to leave Russia with his business undone. He was telling me his sad story, boiling over with indignation. I tried to console him by reminding him that he had many companions in misfortune, and that the identical story had been told me both by an Italian and by an American manufacturer.

Some readers might raise the objection that those particular captains of industry have been unlucky in their experiences or unreasonable in their demands, or that perhaps they have been rubbing the Soviet officials the wrong way. Unfortunately the objection does not hold. Indeed, one does not require to go through the experiences of a captain of industry negotiating a large business transaction in order to observe and to understand the working of the huge, unwieldy, bureaucratic machine. Even a modest tourist like myself could form his own conclusions from his most casual and most trivial observations. There was not a day when I had not presented to my meditations some striking object lesson of the sinister meaning of Russian State Socialism.

I referred in a previous chapter to the administration of the Soviet hotels. I would have no difficulty in writing an elaborate and illuminative special chapter describing various incidents that occurred during my brief stay in the various Bolshevist hostelrys. When I

complained to the manager about the scandalous service or lack of service of the personnel, I would find that this manager did not dare to reprove the delinquent servants. Apparently they were not servants, but "comrades" of unimpeachable Bolshevist principles, and their real duty was not to serve me, but to spy on me. When in another hotel, after settling my bill, eighteen billions of roubles, I ventured to ask for a bill and for a receipt, the director explained that it was not the custom to give any bills or receipts. Considering that in any case the hotel did not pay, and that the Government did not verify its accounts, the convenient custom of not giving receipts had probably a great deal to commend itself.

HOW ROADS ARE MENDED

Or shall I comment on the administration of public roads and transports? I have no time to refer to the regulations for the river transport of Petrograd, which until last year was controlled by some twenty different Boards. (By the way, this may be one main reason why there is no river transport left.) But perhaps I may mention one little street incident. When I arrived in Petrograd I found that the tramway lines were torn up in several of the main streets, including the Newski Prospect, which is the rue de Rivoli of the Metropolis. In any other country the work would have been done in small sections gradually and systematically. It would also have been completed very quickly and at high pressure, in order to avoid any serious dislocation in the traffic. In Soviet Russia miles and miles of streets were being broken up, regardless of any inconvenience to the

public. They were only broken up, but not repaired. Here and there you might see half a dozen workers doing their job in a casual and leisurely way, talking politics, or gazing at the sky. And this important piece of road-mending had apparently been started at the beginning of October, a few days before the coming of the frost; with the result that very shortly the work was going to be interrupted, and that the main avenues of Petrograd would remain in a shocking condition during the seven long winter months.

Or shall we turn a moment's attention to the administration of public buildings? Almost every day I had to call at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Soviet Foreign Office will always remain associated in my mind with a mysterious lift in the entrance hall, which must have tantalised and exasperated thousands of visitors like myself. Week after week one would find this lift out of order, and apparently refusing to take us up to the exalted regions of Soviet diplomacy. Week after week weary diplomats would have to climb up five flights of stairs. One evening I was ascending the staircase in the company of a New York journalist. I asked him how long it would take to repair such a lift in a New York office. My American friend remarked with a twinkle in his eye, "Why, I guess, in my New York office this elevator would have been repaired in a couple of hours. But I presume that these people here must have some conscientious objections against using elevators. And who can say that from their point of view they are wrong? After all an elevator is a bourgeois invention, and it is used mainly by fat and lazy capitalists." "How those young Bolshies above must

laugh when they see you old people trudging up a hundred steps ! ”

Or shall we take the administration of public printing ? Most of the printing and publishing in Soviet Russia has been nationalised. Most of the booksellers are Government booksellers. This is considered part of the very important work of Bolshevist propaganda. In no city of Europe have I seen so many bookshops as in Moscow. But all the bookshops seemed to be empty. Nobody appeared to be buying books. The reason was obvious. The people bought little, not only because they had no money to buy, but because Government publications were extravagantly expensive. And the publications were expensive because labour was unproductive and the administrative expenses prohibitive. “ You must understand ”—so a Soviet manager explained to me—“ that our eight thousand workers are working but six hours a day.” And he added with an expression of discouragement, “ if only they would honestly work their six hours a day, things would not be so bad ! ”

I may conclude my illustrations with one other significant little personal experience. Just before leaving Petrograd I discovered that I had got to the end of my resources, and that I would have to exchange an English cheque for one hundred pounds. I had a diplomatic passport, I was well known in Government circles and half a dozen friends were ready to endorse my cheque. I tried one Government bank after another, but I found it impossible to cash my cheque. I expressed my amazement to the various bank managers. “ Isn’t yours a topsy-turvy world ! You are always telling us that you want foreign capital. Yet when a foreigner

brings you a hundred good English pounds and offers to exchange them against your depreciated currency, you refuse those good English pounds." One candid bank manager was kind enough to elucidate the mystery. The Soviet Government are making desperate efforts to stabilise the currency. With that object, six months ago they established their new monetary unit, the "cervonetz." The new monetary unit is supposed to be worth ten gold roubles. With the old depreciated paper currency you pay your charwoman or your cabman; with the appreciated new currency you pay the taxes and the public officials. The Government has used every means to maintain the rate of the "cervonetz," with the result that at present it will fetch twenty-two shillings in a Government bank, although in the open market I could exchange a "cervonetz" for one pound sterling. One of the artificial means used to keep up the rate of the "cervonetz" is to give it a monopoly, to maintain its compulsory circulation and to discourage the circulation of good foreign currency such as English cheques. If once the English pound were accepted freely, the good money would very shortly drive out the bad, and the life of the "cervonetz" would come to an untimely end.

A ROTTEN FOUNDATION

I have given those apparently trivial facts from my own personal observation, because they all seem to me to point to the same moral—namely, that the whole economic life of Soviet Russia is on a rotten foundation. Intermittent Government orders may keep up the illusion

of any improvement in the economic situation. But the system itself is hopelessly wrong. There is one thing which is essential to any permanent revival of trade—namely, the life-giving principle of freedom of competition, of private enterprise of responsibility. But enterprise, freedom of the Press, freedom of criticism, freedom of trading, freedom of travelling are exactly the things which the Soviet Government cannot afford to give to the people.

One night, at the Ballet in the Moscow Opera, a high official told me in a confidential whisper that probably next spring might see the publication of a non-official free newspaper. I confess that I am very sceptical about so daring a new departure. Freedom of criticism and freedom of trade would let loose political and moral forces over which the Government would have no control. Freedom of criticism would mean the end of the Dictatorship. Freedom of trade would mean the end of State Socialism, and, consequently, the dismissal of two million supporters of the Government.

And let us add that it would also probably mean the beginning of a new civil war. A peaceful evolution under the leadership of the present Dictators may be a consummation which we would all devoutly desire. But a peaceful evolution is a most improbable contingency. Unhappy Russia is not at the end of her troubles. Too many vested interests are involved. Too many parasites are profiting by the present system. Also, too much blood has been shed. Too many crimes have been committed. Too many wrongs have to be avenged. Too many passions have accumulated. The economic difficulties of Russia might possibly be

overcome, but the economic difficulties are bound up with formidable political and moral problems. And it is extremely unlikely that those political and moral problems can be solved by the present Dictators on Bolshevist lines. The Russian stage will have to be vacated for new actors, and it may be for the enacting of a new Russian tragedy.

CHAPTER VI

THE KINGDOM OF ANTI-CHRIST

WHEN one attempts to make any forecasts about Soviet Russia one has to remember that the Bolshevist régime is not only defying the elemental instincts of human nature, but that it is also challenging incalculable spiritual forces. And if the history of other European nations does teach any lesson, those forces must ultimately prove too strong for the Dictators. Just before the war that distinguished pacifist leader, Mr. Norman Angell, would often tell his audiences that religious wars had become a thing of the past, that they were unthinkable in our enlightened age. In view of such statements, which were quite current before 1914, there is a grim irony in the fact that we are witnessing to-day the greatest religious war in modern history. For the struggle which is going on in Russia has to be considered primarily as a struggle between two opposite religions and two contradictory ideals.

It may almost seem a misrepresentation to speak of ideals in connection with Bolshevism, because it is of the very essence of Bolshevism that it denies all ideals. Idealism and materialism are mutually exclusive. And is it not the proudest boast of Marxism that it provides us with a strictly materialistic interpretation of all human history? And, similarly, it may seem a misuse of words to call Bolshevism a religion. If it is, it is surely a

religion of a strange and novel kind. All other religions have been distinguished by two main characteristics. In the first place, they have tried to strengthen the bonds of human society. And, in the second place, they have tried to discover some moral purpose in the governance of the universe. The characteristic traits of Bolshevism are exactly the opposite. Instead of seeking to strengthen the bonds of union which bind men together, it puts an uninterrupted and relentless class war in the forefront of political life. Instead of preaching a gospel of love, it preaches a gospel of hatred. Instead of discovering any moral purpose in human affairs, it deliberately banishes all moral law from the destiny of man. Students have frequently compared the historical mission of Robespierre and that of Lenin, and no doubt there are many common traits between those two arch-terrorists. But there is also this vital difference—Robespierre was a fanatical Deist, whereas Lenin was as fanatical an Atheist. Robespierre sent his opponents to the guillotine merely because they did not believe in God. Lenin considered that it was the duty of all his followers to eradicate any belief in God, and to extinguish all the lights of Heaven.

COMMUNISM PROMULGATED BY THE SWORD

For the reasons just stated I am quite prepared to grant that the Bolshevik faith is a religion of a unique and of a sinister kind. And yet we shall understand little of Bolshevism unless we clearly realise that Communism is much more than an economic doctrine or a political system; that in strict and literal truth the

Communist sect is an organised religious community, provided with all the organs and the characteristics which distinguish other institutional religions. Communism has its Holy Scriptures—namely, the writings of Karl Marx—which are revealed, inspired and infallible. It has its commentators and scholastics, its prophets and its martyrs. It has its body of dogmas, its orthodoxies, and its heresies. It has its Œcumenical Councils and International Congresses, its rituals and its symbols, its processes of initiation and excommunication. It has its promises of salvation, its millennial hopes, its schemes of rewards and punishments, its paradise and its hell. Like Christianity, it claims a universal character, it inspires its followers with a fanatical devotion, and, like Mahommedanism, it promulgates its doctrines with the sword.

Foreign observers who study the Russian Revolution may have difficulty in visualising this aspect of Communism. But that aspect is certainly accepted and emphasised by the majority of the Russian people. Almost every Russian, whether he is a believer or an agnostic, will first draw your attention to the religious side of Communism. To the average Russian Bolshevism is primarily a demoniac and Satanic conspiracy. It is the Church of Anti-Christ. At this very moment, throughout the length and breadth of the Russian Commonwealth, the opponents of Bolshevism are anxiously and reverently poring over the Book of Revelation. They are trying to find in the Apocalypse a mystical explanation of the horrors which are happening to-day, and an anticipation of the Judgment Day which shall come to-morrow.

SURVIVAL OF CHRISTIANITY CHIEF BOLSHEVIST OBSTACLE

Sober common-sense will at first look upon any such mystical interpretation as the delusion of superstition and as a gross misrepresentation of the aims of Bolshevism. To a closer view, however, this interpretation contains a large element of truth. A Russian Orthodox is surely justified in calling the present régime "the Kingdom of Anti-Christ," if it be, indeed, the aim of the Bolsheviks to wipe out the Christian religion from the face of the earth. And let it be noted that the Bolsheviks themselves do openly proclaim that such is their chief purpose, that in their opinion the survival of Christianity is the chief obstacle in their triumph. They are never tired of reminding their followers that all Christians are necessarily counter-revolutionaries and reactionaries. In front of the most revered sanctuary of the Orthodox Church in Moscow, the Chapel of the Iberian Virgin, the Dictators, as I pointed out in a previous chapter, have inscribed in huge letters the defiant inscription that "religion is the opium of the people."

And here, again, it has to be pointed out that the Bolshevik revolution is absolutely unique in modern history. All other revolutions have tried to enlist the support of Christianity. They have tried to emphasise the affinities between Christianity and Socialism or Anarchism. Even the French Terrorists claimed Christ as an ally: they hailed Him as the Patron Saint of the "Sans Culottes." On the contrary, the Bolsheviks are deliberately, fanatically anti-Christian. They have not been content to expropriate the churches, to close

monasteries and nunneries, to massacre the priests. Those things have happened before, and may be explained away as the inevitable accompaniment and as the passing phase of a great social upheaval. The originality and the singularity of Bolshevism lie in this, that it emphasises the absolute incompatibility between Christianity and Communism, and that it sees in Christianity its one dangerous competitor. A Communist as such shall proclaim himself the enemy of Jesus Christ.

PENALTIES ON CHRISTIANITY

To show disrespect to any minister or to any symbol or monument of the Christian religion is regarded as the duty of every true "Comrade." During my stay in Petrograd, under the guidance of a young Jewish official I one day visited the Cathedral of Saint Peter and Paul, which is the Westminster Abbey of Russia. It is one of the most impressive shrines in Europe. There, in the body of the church, stood, deserted and desolate, the serried rows of Imperial tombs; there lay the dust of every Tsar and Tsarina of the Romanov family, who for two hundred years had ruled over the Russian people, from Peter the Great to Alexander III. The young Jewish Bolshevik, out of mere courtesy, would no doubt have taken off his hat if he had taken me into a grocer's shop. But he would not take off his hat in this Christian sanctuary, nor could he abstain from making cynical remarks. He would have acted against the spirit of his fanatical creed if he had bowed to the majesty of death, to the haunting memories of centuries, and to the

most poignant of all human tragedies. For any Bolshevik to be seen worshipping in a church is ground sufficient to be solemnly excluded from the party, and such exclusions take place every day. In the schools the Soviet's boys and girls are compelled to make an open profession of Atheism, and they also, if they refuse, are summarily expelled. On the very day of my visit to one of the big schools of Moscow one of those sentences of excommunication had been pronounced by his comrades against a child of thirteen who had been attending a church service to please his mother.

Until a few months ago the Government had persisted in the ruthless persecution of the Church which started in 1918. Quite recently, however, there has been a remarkable change, partly for reasons of domestic policy, partly for reasons of foreign policy. The world-wide indignation which was called forth last summer by the trial and murder of Mgr. Budkiewicz revealed to the Dictators that they could not with impunity continue to defy the moral sense of all civilised nations.

But although the leaders decided at the eleventh hour to give up their methods of terrorism in their dealings with the Church, their purpose remained the same. Only henceforth they resorted to those arts of intrigue, of bribery and corruption, of which they are such consummate masters. They reduced the priests to beggary. They encouraged every schismatic movement. They subsidised a body of seceders called the "Living Church." They induced the Patriarch Tikhon to compromise himself by making his peace with the Soviet Government, hoping that they would thereby finally discredit him. It would seem as if none of those political

attempts has hitherto been successful. The "Living Church" is already a dying sect, and its supporters are decried as traitors and apostates. The Patriarch Tikhon is no Cardinal Mercier. He has not challenged the might and majesty of the Bolshevist rulers. In accordance with the spirit of the Russian Church, his resistance has been passive rather than active. Yet he is more than ever the object of universal veneration. When he happens to officiate in any part of Moscow he is followed by such huge crowds of worshippers that the tramway services have to be suspended.

STRIKING REVIVAL OF RELIGION

There can be no doubt that we are witnessing to-day in Russia a striking revival of religious life. The Bolshevists will tell you that the revival means nothing, that it is only the galvanising of an old superstition. But when you consider the perilous conditions under which the Church carries on a precarious existence, you cannot help feeling that the present manifestations of religious life are signs of the times, and ought to make the Dictators pause and ponder. Surely no one to-day in Russia is likely openly to profess his allegiance to the old Church merely to court favour or to seek worldly advantages, and unless prompted by the deepest convictions. The religious revival, therefore, must be taken as the spontaneous working of the vital instincts and needs of the people. One day, visiting a Bolshevist office, as I happened to refer to the religious crisis, a lady employee could not refrain from telling me : "After all, sir, do you not think that in these terrible times the

people do require something to fall back upon? ” I was astonished to hear such an open expression of opinion from a Communist employee. Obviously the influence of the Christian opiate is poisoning the atmosphere even in the Government offices.

Whereas one could not help observing the outward manifestations of religious life, it was much more difficult, for obvious reasons, to observe the revival of religion in the privacy of domestic life. I was invited several times by mutual friends to the family circle of noted leaders of the Church. But I reluctantly declined these invitations, because I anticipated that the families which I would visit might afterwards get into trouble if I came to publish the results of my studies. I therefore had to content myself with moving largely in the society of the so-called “ intelligentsia,” a class of men who before the war had been almost without exception, agnostics or aggressive anti-clericals. When I came to talk about religion with those pre-war anti-clericals I was impressed by the fact that their attitude towards religion had completely changed. I found that each and all had become passionate supporters of the National Church.

But quite apart from the public worship in the churches, quite apart from the attitude of the intellectual classes, I had occasion to study one very striking and unmistakable evidence of the revival of religious life—namely, the extraordinary popularity of religious disputations. One’s mind was almost carried back to the early days of Christianity, or to the beginnings of the Reformation. In one week I attended three such religious disputations in the big hall of the Polytechnic Museum in Moscow. I am quite sure that even in

Edinburgh, even in the most palmy days of the General Assembly, I could not have witnessed such impressive scenes as I saw in the capital of Atheistic Communism. The entrance fee for each disputation was about one shilling and sixpence, a large sum for a pauperised Russian to pay. Yet the meetings were attended by huge gatherings, and hundreds failed to get admission. Proceedings would begin at 8.45 p.m., and would last without interruption, until midnight or one o'clock in the morning. There were generally dozens of speakers to take part in the discussion, both laymen and priests, working men, peasants and intellectuals. The audience would listen with a rapt attention, which was now and then interrupted by violent protests or frantic applause, when feelings could no longer be repressed. Notwithstanding the presence of the Red police, the overwhelming majority openly showed itself in favour of the National Church. One evening Mr. Vladimir Lvov, a former Procurator of the Holy Synod, under Kerenski, ventured to speak after Bishop Hilarion, in order to defend the Soviet Government. Again and again Mr. Lvov was hooted down, and at the end of the meeting I saw him making a hurried escape, as he was being followed by an angry mob.

FAILURE OF CRUSADE AGAINST THE CHURCH

If my judgment does not mislead me, there can be no doubt that in their crusade against the Church the Dictators have been hopelessly beaten. The consequences of this defeat will only reveal themselves in the near future. But they are very far-reaching. When the

Dictators proclaim that the Church is a counter-revolutionary force, in a sense they are quite right. The Church may, indeed, promise to abstain from taking any part in political life. She may honestly try to keep her promise. She may act on the principle that her kingdom is not of this world. She may even abstain from offering any resistance to persecution and violence. But no Christian Church can conscientiously recognise or morally support a Government which proclaims as one of its chief aims the suppression of Christianity. The Orthodox Church can only wait for the advent of better times. She knows that those times are coming. For, after the terrible ordeal of the last five years, she is stronger to-day in the affections and in the allegiance of the people than she has been for centuries. In the past the Church had discredited herself by her alliance with an oppressive Tsarism. To-day she is purified by the blood of her martyrs. For generations she had been the instrument of political servitude. To-day even non-believers declare that the Church is destined to be the instrument of national liberation and regeneration.

The Russian people are a people of wonderful endowments, and their historical mission is still to come. But they have shown themselves to be devoid, to an almost incredible degree, of those qualities of character and will-power which are necessary to the moral health, both of the individual citizen and of the State. The concordant experience of Latin and Anglo-Saxon nations proves that only the stern discipline of organised Christianity can contribute certain vital nutritive and formative elements to the composition of the Russian body politic. For that reason it is not too much to say that a strong

Russian Church, which shall be free from the Cæsaro-Papism of the past, and which shall be restored to the plenitude of her spiritual independence, is an essential condition of the lasting recovery of the Russian Commonwealth.

CHAPTER VII

TERRORISM THE RED HARVEST OF MARXISM

I HAVE tried to show in my previous chapters, largely from personal observation, how the Marxian principles of nationalisation and State Socialism, which are more or less accepted by all Socialist parties, brought about, in an incredibly short time, the ruin and starvation of one hundred and fifty million people. For the full understanding of the Russian Tragedy, I shall attempt to show, in the present chapter, with equal detail and precision, how the Marxian doctrine of the class war, which is also implicitly accepted by most Socialists under the camouflaged name of direct action, led to a system of terrorism and to a saturnalia of bloodshed to which there is no parallel in the history of civilised man.

When in the spring of 1917 Lenin was smuggled by the German military authorities from Switzerland into Russia, in his mythical armoured car, even the German Government did not realise that this trivial event in the world war was to deflect the destiny of all European nations. There was a symbolical significance in the incident. It was not only a dangerous agitator who was imported under the protection of German bayonets. The explosive ideas which the agitator was introducing into Russia were also a German importation. The ruthless methods which he was about to impose were also German methods. Prussian militarism was the policy of

blood and iron applied to the struggle between nations. Prussian Marxism may be defined the policy of blood and iron applied to the struggle between the classes.

Lenin, who could not be suspected of undue humility, never ceased telling his followers that he was only the testamentary executor of One greater than himself. Bolshevism does not appear before the world as a new doctrine. Lenin was the Prophet, but in Marx alone are to be found the Law and the Gospel. The twenty ponderous volumes containing Lenin's Works do not profess to be anything more than a running commentary of the truths contained in "The Capital" and in the "Communist Manifesto." The British and Continental Socialists who before the war paid lip service to Marxian doctrines, may to-day denounce Bolshevism as a betrayal or repudiation of Socialism. But this does not alter the fact that there is the closest possible correspondence and affinity between the theory and practice of Bolshevism and the theory and practice of orthodox Marxism. Marx, like Lenin, is a demagogue, a superman inspired with the Nietzschean will to power. Marx, like Lenin, has a sublime contempt for democracy and for Parliamentary institutions. Like Lenin, he proclaims the dictatorship over the Proletariat. Like Lenin, he is a cynic, a materialist, and an opportunist. Like Lenin, he believes in ruthless violence. We are told that as far back as 1848, at a memorable meeting with his great rival and enemy Bakunine, Marx boasted that he could command the unconditional and servile allegiance of his Janissaries. "Do you know that at present I find myself at the head of a Communist society which is so perfectly disciplined that if I said to one of its members,

Go and kill Bakunine, he would kill you there and then ? ” This power of life and death which in 1848 was only an idle boast on the part of Marx, was made by Lenin into a hideous reality. By virtue of this power he sent one million seven hundred thousand Russian victims to their doom, in addition to the twenty millions who died of starvation. Karl Marx, the grandson of the Rabbi of Trèves, did not himself enter the Promised Land. But his commands and his creed have become the law of the new Russia. Bolshevik terrorism is the red harvest of scientific Marxism.

INFLUENCE AND METHODS OF MARXISM

“ The Capital ” of Karl Marx must rank as one of the half-dozen books that have made modern history. And its influence has been wider and deeper than any of them. It may be very difficult to account for that influence, even as it is very difficult to account for the influence of the Koran. We may not understand how it is that so tedious and so uninspiring a book as the Koran can have magnetised for one thousand years hundreds of millions of Mahomedans. But it is an even more baffling mystery how so dreary, so mediocre, a treatise as “ The Capital ” should, for the last two generations, have held the working classes of Europe under a magic spell. At least the Mahomedans may claim that they can read, and that they do read the Koran. On the contrary, the gospel of Marx is inaccessible to the Socialist proletariat, and even to the Socialist “ intelligentsia.” Even Bernard Shaw admits that he alone amongst all his Socialist friends has had the

courage to read the whole of it. Karl Marx probably knew what he was doing when he took such infinite trouble, not to reveal his thought, but rather to disguise it. He realised the political advantage of organising his Communist party into a secret society, of reserving the full exposition of his system for a small band of initiated. If he had expressed that system in language intelligible to everybody, the world would have been repelled by its platitude, its absurdity and its immorality. If he had thrown the ranks of his party open to all, the majority would have had their eyes opened, and would have turned away in disgust.

But however difficult it may be to account for the influence of Karl Marx, there can be no doubt whatsoever as to its depth and extent. The Socialists of Europe may not be able to penetrate into the mysteries of Marxism, but they have imbibed its spirit and its method. Its insidious doctrines pervade the political atmosphere. Its catchwords, its very vocabulary have become part of the language of international Socialism. The three cardinal tenets of Marxism, namely the materialistic interpretation of history, the idolatrous cult of the State, the theory of the class war, have become a constituent part of the mentality of the worker. Even Liberals are found to accept, unconsciously, the necessity of "direct action." Even Conservatives have fallen under the spell of a bureaucratic Slave State.

A DEGRADING MATERIALISM

And just as there can be no doubt about the extent of the influence of Marxism, so there can be no doubt as to

the mischievous nature of that influence. The materialism of Marx has demoralised the worker, the doctrine of the inexorable class war has embittered him, the belief in a State bureaucracy has enslaved him. The old Socialism exercised, on the whole, an influence for good. It appealed to the higher instinct of this worker. It was a wholesome ferment which leavened the social thinking alike of Liberals and Radicals. Almost every great thinker, even those who, like Carlyle and John Stuart Mill, opposed it, went through a Socialist phase, and were the better for the training which they thus received. With the advent of Marx, European Socialism underwent a complete change. All idealism and all sentiment were banished from social science. First principles gave way to the most cynical opportunism. The appeal to the nobler side of human nature was replaced by an appeal to all the baser elements. Both Machiavelli and the Jesuit Casuists declare that the end justifies the means. But at least in their theories, although the means might be criminal, the end pursued was noble and holy. In the philosophy of Marx the end is even more odious than the means. For it is the final purpose of Marx to establish the tyranny of a class, the reign of brute force and the despotism of a servile State. One must have waded through the vast scholastic literature of Marxism, one must have followed the sordid quarrels of the Marxian sects, in order fully to realise to what an extent for the last fifty years Marxism has sterilised, paralysed and degraded the Socialist mind all over the world.

But however mischievous the influence of Marxism may have been on Socialist thinking, hitherto it had been

extremely difficult to prove its baneful effects in such a way as to convince the unbiassed outsider. For Marxian theories had never been put to the test. They could not be found in any unadulterated and undilute form. The Socialists thought of Europe was indeed a very complex thing. Many heterogencous elements—Christianity, the French Revolution, Luther, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel—entered into its composition. Marxian principles, even where they did find acceptance, were neutralised by other forces. Even those leaders who did profess allegiance to Marxism were unconsciously influenced by their political surroundings, by the traditions they inherited, by the education they received. The great French Socialist leader Jaurès might preach the Marxist gospel in international congresses, but this did not prevent him from being married before the Catholic Church and from educating his daughter in a Catholic convent. Hyndman might profess to be a fanatical Marxist, but in fact he always remained a Conservative at heart, and during the war he proved a patriotic Englishman.

FIRST REAL EXHIBITION OF MARXIAN PRINCIPLES

For the first time in contemporary history Marx found in revolutionary Russia a soil which was favourable for his revolutionary experiments. For the first time his influence was unchecked by other human influences. The Russian people are a primitive people who are much nearer to the soil than other Continental nations. Also in Russia the Conservative tradition was much weaker. On the contrary, the revolutionary tradition was much

stronger. And the Russian national temperament is much more impressionable and much more impulsive. Above all, owing to the world war, the power of the workers had enormously increased; the industries had been largely centralised. And owing to the revolutionary upheaval, all authority had been undermined. Because of those favourable conjunctures the Marxian gospel found in the Russian continent a unique opportunity.

It is because the Bolsheviks have been enabled by a combination of circumstances to carry the Marxian gospel to its extreme logical consequences, it is because in Russia we may observe the working of Marxism in all its hideous nakedness, that the Russian Revolution may claim a sinister pre-eminence over all the other upheavals of history. The chief characters of the French Revolution are men like ourselves, obeying their natural instincts, accessible to pity and remorse. In the Russian Dictators there is no sentiment, there is no pity or remorse. De Quincey and Oscar Wilde have written two of their most ingenious essays on "Murder as one of the Fine Arts." With the Bolshevik Dictators collective slaughter is something more than a fine art: it has become an exact science. Professor Bergson described Prussian militarism as scientific barbarism. Even more aptly we might describe Marxism as scientific terrorism.

COLLECTIVE MURDER A CALCULATED BUSINESS

When we contemplate the appalling deeds perpetrated by the Bolsheviks, when we consider how they turned

the Russian continent into a vast lunatic asylum, we may have some justification for looking upon them as homicidal maniacs. But let it be noted that there is method in their madness. Crimes have been committed in every revolution, but those crimes, like the massacres of September, in the prisons of Paris, were generally the animal outbursts of an infuriated mob. The terrorism of Bolshevism is of an entirely different kind. It is of a cold-blooded, calculating character. It pursues collective murder like a business. It carries out a carefully-thought-out system. It has its tactics and its strategy. The practice of killing hundreds of thousands of innocent hostages whenever an attempt is made against a Bolshevist official may be a hideous return to savagery. But it is wonderfully efficient, and is based on a profound knowledge of human nature. The Soviet authorities admit to having shot eight hundred hostages to avenge the attempt on the life of Moses Uritzki, the chief inquisitor and executioner of the Tcheka. After a few such hecatombs the Dictators, guarded by Lettish and Chinese Janissaries, might sleep safely in their beds.

STATISTICS OF MASSACRES

That system, those tactics, and that business-like character of Soviet terrorism are reflected in the very statistics of Bolshevist massacres. In those statistics of a novel kind we find that the Dictators killed 28 bishops, 1219 priests, 6000 professors and teachers, 9000 doctors, 54,000 officers, 260,000 soldiers, 70,000 policemen, 12,950 landowners, 355,250 intellectuals and

professional men, 193,290 workers, 815,100 peasants. We notice that the numbers of murdered priests are proportionately much less than the numbers of murdered officers, which again are much less than the numbers of murdered professional men or business men or other representatives of the middle class. The reason is an obvious one. However much the Bolsheviks may hate and dread the Christian priest, it is very much more risky to massacre a priest than to massacre a teacher or a lawyer. For the death of a priest may rouse the feelings of a superstitious people; it may give rise to a popular outburst. When in 1918 the Bolsheviks tried to invade the Monastery of Saint Alexander Newski, they found a mob of a hundred thousand to oppose them. And they had to desist from their attempt. The members of the Church, therefore, have to be slaughtered very carefully, and, if necessary, very sparingly. If Mgr. Budkiewicz, who was shot four months ago, had been a Russian instead of being a Pole, he would have been released. The fact was implicitly admitted by Mr. Radek, as he said to me, in the course of an interview : " It is not our Government which killed the Prelate; it is the Polish Government. We could not tolerate their impudent interferences." On the other hand, officers must be suppressed, whatever the cost, as the greatest danger to the Bolshevik régime may arise from a military counter-revolution. As for the ordinary " bourgeois," he can be exterminated with the least amount of risk. Hence the appalling proportion of the middle class in the statistics of murder. It seems as if the Bolshevik executioners, like the highwaymen of a darker age, before they embark on a massacre first ask themselves how far they can afford

to go, and what profit the murder will bring them. Once they are convinced that the crime will pay, that it can be undertaken without peril to themselves, no consideration of humanity will be of any avail.

It is this cold-blooded cruelty, culminating in the wholesale butcheries of the hostage system, which makes the Bolshevist régime a unique phenomenon. It is this which raises the Extraordinary Commission, or the *Ve-Tche-Ka*, to a lofty pinnacle of infamy. Compare the excesses in the French Revolution with the massacres of Kronstadt or Kiev, or the executions of the Crimea, or with the slaughter of my friend Dr. Shingarev, murdered in his bed in hospital! Or compare the judgment of Charles I. or of Louis XVI., who were tried with all the pomp and circumstances of the law, with the wholesale slaughter by Jankel Yourovski of the Tsar's family and servants in the dark cellar of Yekaterinburg. Such a comparison will make you realise the demoniac originality of organised and scientific terrorism.

DEVOTEES OF AN INHUMAN CREED

It has been objected that the peculiar horror of Bolshevist terrorism is due to a combination of extraordinary and accidental causes; that it is due to the five years of war, which had brutalised the population; that it is due to the revolution, which had emptied the prisons of their thousands of common criminals; that it is due to the age-long persecution which had accumulated in the Jewish people irrepressible passions of hatred and revenge. Unfortunately there is very little in any of those objections. The war conditions of Russia were

not essentially different from what they were in other countries. Other revolutions had released common criminals, and the fact is that in Russia, as I explained before, the worst crimes have not been committed by common criminals, they have been committed by "honest maniacs," by "ascetic puritans." As for the Jewish Bolshevists, it is quite true that they have played a dominant part in some of the most cruel acts of terrorism. But the Bolshevist Jews did not commit their crimes because they were Jews, but because they were Marxian fanatics. They had cut themselves loose from their own people, and they proved the worst enemies of their race.

The sinister truth is that the Bolshevists belong neither to Russia nor to Palestine, neither to Lettland nor to Poland. The Bolshevists, whether Jews or Poles, whether Letts or Russians, immolated their victims to a system in the name of a principle. As was said by Lenin himself, "What does it matter if ninety per cent. of the Russian people perish, provided the surviving ten per cent. be converted to the Communist faith." And it is because from the very beginning the Bolshevists were the devotees of an inhuman creed and the slaves of a machine, that we are fully justified in our conclusion that their crimes are the logical outcome of their principles, and that organised terrorism may be called with literal truth the "Red Harvest" of Scientific Marxism.

CHAPTER VIII

THE BANKRUPTCY OF BOLSHEVIST EDUCATION

ON my way to Russia I paid a brief visit to President Masaryk, who is the highest living authority on Russia, and whose masterly book "The Russian Revolutionary Mind" has become a classic of European political literature. On my departure, his farewell message to me was: "Above all things, try and make a special study of the Soviet schools. There is the secret of the Russian problem." The "Wise Old Man" of Central Europe realised that I would find in the schools of the Soviet Government the clearest expression of their political purposes, and also the most convincing test and measure of their success or failure. I did my utmost to follow President Masaryk's advice. I visited all the schools which I was allowed to visit, and although I did not see all that I wanted to see, still I saw enough to enable me to draw definite conclusions.

There can be no doubt that in the two first heroic years of the Communist régime the Soviet Dictators started with boundless educational ambitions. They seemed to be inspired, at least in their speeches, with the visionary enthusiasm of the pedagogues of the Renaissance. They were to introduce "the new learning" of a proletarian civilisation. The Soviets were to wage a holy war against ignorance. Education was to be

compulsory and universal. Even working men were to attend school for two hours a day up to the age of fifty. Books were to be scattered broadcast all over Russia like bread, and the bread of the mind, like the bread of the body, was to cost nothing. Maxim Gorki, that erratic and incalculable spiritual adviser of Bolshevism, was commissioned to draw up the prospectus of a magnificent proletarian library of world literature, which sent Mr. Wells into raptures of admiration, and which would have been wonderful indeed if it had ever been published. Above all, the Soviet schools were to be the pet institutions of the Soviet Government. On the schools all the hopes and efforts of the Bolsheviks were centred. They understood, like President Masaryk, that the new Utopia was going to succeed or to fail in proportion as they would succeed or fail in training the youth. They might indeed fail in converting the old generation, which was poisoned with bourgeois prejudices, but they were, at any rate, going to build up a new generation, with new ideals, new methods and new men.

Unfortunately those high ambitions were not to receive fulfilment. The Dictators were to discover that it is even more difficult to form or to transform the soul of man than to build new factories. It had been a standing and a well-deserved reproach against the Tsarist State and the Tsarist Church on the part of Socialist critics that they had done so little for popular education, and that they had left the bulk of the Russian people in abject ignorance. It must, therefore, be a matter for the most grievous disappointment to find that after five years of an omnipotent Soviet régime there are to-day fewer schools in the Russian Commonwealth than there

were in the days of obscurantist Tsarism. There is a universal shortage of teachers, and their quality has deteriorated, if we are to believe the lamentations of the official Press. Most of the old teachers voluntarily resigned, or died of hunger and disease, or have been dismissed as counter-revolutionaries. There is no money to build new schools. Even the old schools cannot be kept in repair, nor can they be heated during the long winter months, as fuel is too scarce and too expensive. Above all, there is no money to feed the starving children. It is difficult to carry on intensive education in a country which is devastated with famine. It is difficult to fill the mind when the stomach is empty, or when every limb is shivering with cold in an arctic atmosphere. Scotsmen may boast that they can cultivate science on a little oatmeal, but in Russia even the oatmeal is sadly wanting.

No doubt if the original enthusiasm had still been inspiring the educational authorities, the financial resources might have been found somehow. After all, money was actually found to feed millions of parasitic officials. Unfortunately the missionary fever had subsided after the first difficulties revealed themselves, as is often the way with the missionary enthusiasm of politicians. The exalted Soviet official and philanthropist, Lunatcharski, who, according to Mr. Wells, was to regenerate the Russian schools, is to-day a mere figure-head in the "Narcompros" or Education Department, and he is generally said to be far more interested in ballets and in ballet girls than in starving children. His place has been taken by Mme. Yakovleva, who hitherto has been more concerned with suppressing the counter-revolution by acts of terrorism than with spreading the

educational gospel of sweetness and light. During my stay in Moscow it was a common rumour that Mr. Trotski, who for the last few months has kept himself strangely in the background, was going to be transferred from the War Office to the Ministry of Public Instruction, and that the great organiser was going to stir the stagnant waters of the Education Department. It was said that he at any rate realised that the problem of the schools was a question of life and death for the continuance of the Soviet régime. Mr. Trotski, however, may soon discover that the reorganisation of the Red Army is not the best possible preparation to the training of little children, and that the battle of the schools cannot be won with the sword.

It is the peculiar paradox of all problems of education that, in tackling them, one must generally begin not from the bottom, but from the top; not with the primary school, but with the University, for the simple reason that it is the Universities which have to educate the educators. This primacy and precedence of higher education we must apply even to Russia. In Soviet Russia there are to-day on paper many more Universities than there were in Tsarist Russia. In Moscow alone there are six Universities, not to mention the countless Rabotchi Faculteti, or Rab-facs or Working Men's Universities. But most of the Soviet Universities are Universities only in name. A University implies, in the first place, the teaching of all the essential branches of human learning, and it implies, in the second place, a competent staff and an adequate laboratory equipment. With regard to the teaching subjects, we shall see presently that most of the essential subjects are

mercilessly suppressed, and that the Soviet Universities are but mutilated professional schools, which supply only what the Government seems to be most urgently in need of—namely, engineers, chemistry and Jewish doctors. With regard to the staff, the majority of the Professors, like the schoolmasters, have been shot, or dismissed, or expelled. We are told that when the founder of modern chemistry, Lavoisier, was sent to the guillotine, the Terrorist who condemned him made the cynical remark that the Republic was in no need of scientists. In 1919 the Russian Bolsheviks seemed to share the opinion of the French terrorist on the subject of theoretical science, and especially on the subject of University scientists. I met many Russian Professors, both in Russia and on the Continent, but I probably did not meet a single one who was not hostile to the régime. Most of those who were left in Russia did not venture to say one word against it, but their silence was more eloquent than words. With regard to the buildings and the equipment, conditions were lamentable. A distinguished British Socialist visitor informs us, as a proof of the enlightened policy of the Soviet authorities, that their first concern, notwithstanding their poverty, seemed to be for the restoration of their University buildings. I saw no evidence of such restoration. Every tourist can see for himself that even the frontage of the old University of Moscow remains until this day in a pitiful state of dilapidation.

In Moscow I visited both the old and the new Universities. I saw the Chemical Department. It was full of students—chemistry seems to be a favourite subject with revolutionary students—but the laboratory was

insufficient and obsolete. I saw the Anatomical Department. It was equally full of students, and there seemed to be no lack of corpses in the dissecting-room. It is apparently cheaper to supply corpses than to supply microscopes. In the Zoological Department the Professor had devoted the very scanty resources at his disposal to collecting the material for a very interesting Darwinian Museum, on the lines of the South Kensington Museum, and his wife was making very suggestive experiments in the psychology of monkeys. I shall not easily forget that Professor and his wife. It struck me that those two enthusiastic zoologists, absorbed in the study of mimicry and of monkey psychology, were the happiest-looking pair that I happened to come across in the Russian Empire. The explanation might be that Professor Kotze (or Coats) is, as he informed me, a Scotsman by origin. In the Library of the second Moscow University (the Old Women's University) I found few readers and few books. The Chief Librarian remarked to me that the new generation had almost ceased to read. They either had to earn their livelihood or they were too poor to study. At any rate, they took no interest in pure science or pure literature. Any interest which had survived was reserved for the applied sciences or for political controversy.

The Russian Universities might be more flourishing if only they knew what they had to teach. But all the old subjects have been discarded. Latin and Greek have ceased to be taught in all the schools and in most of the Universities. Oriental languages are only tolerated because they are found useful to carry on an anti-British propaganda in India and in the Near East. The

old Faculties have also been suppressed, or they only exist on paper. And that suppression is logical and inevitable. You cannot have a Faculty of Law in a country where all the old laws have been superseded and where the very notion of law has ceased to exist. You cannot have a Faculty of Theology where Atheism is the official creed. You cannot have a Faculty of Philosophy or of Letters in a country where all the humanities are taboo, and where all philosophy is despised.

As for the historical sciences, not only is the Soviet Government making new history, but it is compelled to rewrite the old history in the light of the materialist interpretation of history which is the foundation of Marxism. The Vice-Minister of Education, Professor Pokrowski, was good enough to send me a few elementary text-books of history, which have been rewritten in the Communist spirit. Those text-books are very suggestive reading. In the manuals which have been composed by Professor Pokrowski himself, we find an entirely novel explanation of Russian history: the magic key which unlocks the secrets of the past are the variations and fluctuations in the price of wheat. Future school-boys will not have to bother about the evil deeds of the Romanov rulers, they may content themselves with studying diagrams of prices. Soviet officials, by the way, are very great on the subject of diagrams and statistics. In the Soviet Exhibition there were whole acres of ingenious diagrams, which are spread on every wall in every hall of the spacious buildings.

Not only are the old subjects taboo, not only are the old Professors expelled, not only are they replaced by new Professors who are mainly of Jewish origin, but the

University itself is established on strict proletarian lines, and it is reserved for proletarian students. It is more difficult, say, for the son of a Professor to enter the University where his father teaches, than for a camel to pass through a needle's eye. The great innovation of the Soviet educationalists is to combine manual labour with intellectual labour. In this regard they claim that they are only applying the theories which have been expounded by Rousseau, in *Émile*, by Prince Kropotkin in fields and workshops, and especially by Tolstoy in all his pedagogical writings. The Soviet authorities glorify Tolstoy as the prophet of the new pedagogy. They are subsidising one Tolstoy Museum in Moscow and another one in Petrograd. They have a Bolshevist school at Tassnaia, Poliana. I had the honour of meeting twice the daughter of Tolstoy. I did not venture to ask her to throw any light on her father's opinions. For obvious reasons she scrupulously abstained from trespassing on a rather dangerous topic. But, having repeatedly discussed educational subjects with Count Tolstoy himself on my visit to Tassnaia, Poliana, in 1905, I can emphatically state that the grand old man would have indignantly repudiated the Bolshevist application of his ideas, and that he would have protested with horror against the unscrupulous use which Bolsheviks are making of his name for propaganda purposes. My Soviet guides, however, informed me that the "Tolstoyan" combination of manual labour and intellectual labour has given wonderful results. I would have liked very much to verify for myself, but apparently the authorities did not want me to see. On two occasions a young Jewish official started taking me to see a Rab-fac, or a Working

Men's Faculty, merely to discover that inadvertently he had taken me to the wrong quarter of the town. I could only infer that the new proletarian experiment was not sufficiently successful to impress favourably a foreigner who might be critical.

It may be premature to formulate a final judgment on the Soviet experiments in education. But some consequences are revealed in the official statistics, and they have again and again been emphasised in the official Press. The Communist party paper, the *Pravda*, has to confess that only 25 per cent. of the pupils are frequenting the school in Moscow. In Petrograd, in the year 1920, only eight hundred completed their studies. Comrade Zelikson, a high educational dignitary, admits that the majority of the children of school age evade all supervision, and that they prefer to loaf about and to engage in speculation. In the heroic year of Bolshevist—namely 1920—most of the illicit trading in the streets was carried on by children. In the same year at a Government Commission called together for the purpose of reporting on juvenile criminality, Professor Gribojeslow stated that in Petrograd, in a population of six hundred thousand, there were eight thousand cases of infantile crime for 1918, and ten thousand cases for 1919. Those semi-official figures do not require comment, and they throw a lurid light on the moral results of Soviet education.

CHAPTER IX

THE SCHOOLS AS NURSERIES OF BOLSHEVISM

ALTHOUGH I was not able to see a working-man's University, I was more fortunate with the secondary schools. I succeeded in persuading a Communist official to take me to one of the new schools, and having seen this first school, I managed to see three others of the same high quality. The institutions which I saw were all so-called model schools or experimental schools, and they were indeed most daring and original experiments. The head master of the first establishment which I visited was a very able young Jew, who, in order to make both ends meet, had to combine his position as head master with the duties of a mathematical lecturer in the University. He revealed to me the new pedagogy in all its glory. The watchword of the "model school" is liberty, and it is a liberty such as even Jean Jacques Rousseau would not have dreamt of in his wildest visions. Whereas the parents were living under an iron despotism, the children were allowed to live in a state of blissful anarchy. My first "muster schule" or reform schule (they preferred to use the German designations, although they claimed to imitate the model of some English public schools) was like every model Soviet school, it was a mixed school, where boys and girls were co-educated. There were about one hundred and fifty pupils. In another model school which I visited

there were over six hundred. The children were running about in corridors, playgrounds and dormitories. In one dormitory I saw a solitary little girl crouching on her bed in an attitude of despair. The head master asked her what was the cause of her distress. She did not reply, and we left without waiting for an answer. Generally, there existed free-and-easy relations, not only between the boys and girls, but between teachers and pupils. The pupils obviously were not over-worked. According to the programme there generally were in the morning two hours of formal teaching and three hours of liberty. In the afternoon there was work in the workshop, which was combined, if possible, with work in a neighbouring factory. I was only present at two lessons. One was a German lesson. The teacher complained that he had only one text-book for the whole class: he explained that text-books were so scarce and so expensive. The second lesson was a gymnastic lesson. A group of boys were doing athletic exercises before an admiring group of girl comrades.

The school was run on the principle of self-government. It was a miniature Soviet Republic, a Bolshevist microcosm. The most important part in the activities of the school were obviously the social meetings or joint assemblies of pupils and teachers, where all matters of school interest were being discussed. I was present at four such assemblies. On one occasion the assembly was sitting as a tribunal in order to try a boy who had been caught stealing apples. What made the offence more serious was that the apples had been stolen at the great Communist Exhibition. The unanimous verdict was that the boy should be expelled. The young head master

made an appeal on behalf of the accused. Whilst he was speaking I noticed that he was affectionately stroking the dark tresses of a beautiful girl of about sixteen who was listening with rapt attention. As far as I could make out—for the head master was speaking Russian with truly Russian volubility and rapidity—he pleaded that the verdict was far too severe; that the offence was, after all, far less serious than the stealing of surplus rations of bread, which had been such a very common offence and such a bad example two years ago; that the boy, moreover, had not realised the seriousness of his offence; and finally, that if he were expelled, the stigma would attach to him for ever and that he would not find admittance in any other school. He therefore urged the school to reconsider their judgment. The pupils did reconsider their judgment, and they reconsidered it in truly Russian fashion. English schoolboys would have been content merely to reduce the penalty. But the Russian pupils, after adopting the extreme of severity, at once rushed to the other extreme of leniency. For those unbalanced little minds there were only two possible alternatives: either to expel the boy or to grant him complete pardon. And in the end the boy was granted complete pardon.

It was a beautiful summer afternoon, and the boys looked mostly keen and happy. I was immensely impressed by their extraordinary faculty of self-expression. It may have been partly the precocity produced by revolutionary times, but it was amazing to hear those boys and girls of fourteen and fifteen delivering little speeches with perfect ease and clearness. I wish my mature Scottish honours students had been trained to

express their thoughts as lucidly as those raw young Communists. I certainly do not desire Scottish students to acquire the terrible precocity of the budding Communists. But the Russian educational experiment proves that the most valuable power of self-expression can be imparted and acquired in an incredibly short time. Nor do I see why that formidable weapon of public speaking should be left to Socialist propaganda. At any rate, one conclusion forced itself upon me: however much they may have failed in imparting education or instruction, the Soviet authorities had succeeded in the one object which was nearest to their hearts, they have trained young political agitators for the cause.

This juvenile trial led me on to discussing the subject of discipline and punishment with the head master. I asked him: "The boys seem to have the right to punish their comrades. Did the teachers enjoy and exercise the same right?" The answer was: "No; we never punish."

I asked him: "But what if the pupil tells a lie?" The reply was: "If the pupil tells a lie he shall be left to the judgment of his comrades."

I asked him: "But what if the pupil is lazy?" The reply was: "A pupil is never lazy. If he is lazy the fault lies with the teacher. If the teacher cannot make his subject interesting, then it is proved that he has failed. If the pupil is lazy he must be mentally deficient, and that is a case which calls for special treatment."

From the question of discipline and punishment I passed on to the more delicate subject of the mixed

classes. I asked the head master : " What if the boys do not behave, or merely if they fall in love ? " The reply was : " We do not object to their falling in love, as long as the love affair is frank and open. As a matter of fact love affairs do not often happen. The sex instinct is restrained, and, in conformity with the well-known Freudian Law, it is 'sublimated' by the social and political instinct. The pupils are too much in earnest. They are too keenly interested in politics to care about anything else."

I could not, of course, verify the statement of the head master about the Freudian "sublimation" of the sex instinct. But a few days afterwards I mentioned the matter to the wife of an eminent man of letters. She informed me that a friend of hers, a nurse in a large infirmary, had recently written her that for the last eighteen months more than a hundred girls had been sent to the maternity hospital from the neighbouring schools.

It is not necessary to remind the reader that in Soviet schools the Christian religion is excommunicated. In the schools which I visited teachers were invariably careful to boast to me that all the pupils were declared Atheists. No one can enter the Soviet School Club unless he renounces Christianity. Those Soviet School Clubs or Communist cells are scattered all over Russia. They are an integral part of the school. Their aim is to initiate and to confirm the boys and girls in the true faith. The members combine the double duty of spies and agitators. It was in the Radicheva School that I saw the little boy I mentioned in a previous chapter who had been expelled from the school because he had been caught visiting a church. Here again the teacher volunteered the explana-

tion, as an illustration of the intolerable and unscrupulous tyranny of parents, how a bigoted mother had coaxed her boy to go to church with the bribe of a new pair of boots. The boy, after making due apologies, and after giving the necessary pledges, was eventually reinstated in his dignity and status of a Communist Comrade.

The experimental schools which I visited were model schools in more senses than one. The head master explained to me that his school was constantly being visited by teachers from every part of the country. Moreover, the model schools are under the special protection of the Education Department. In summer the pupils are taken for three months to the country and receive the hospitality of one of the countless castles which have been taken from the old nobility. I spent one afternoon in one of those country castles. It was a palace in the Renaissance style, surrounded by a magnificent but deserted park, about twelve miles from Moscow, and it had been built by an Italianised Russian millionaire tea merchant, Mr. Ruperti. The palace had only been finished in 1910, and was already in a tumbledown condition. The pipes had got choked, and for five years the foundations had been under water. This particular country school was established for the double purpose of providing a summer residence for the model school of Moscow and of serving as an agricultural college.

I do not know whether the little peasant boys and girls who are being educated in the Ruperti Palace will become better farmers or agriculturists than they would have been if they had served their apprenticeship on an actual farm or with a market gardener. But the truth probably is that this college was not in the least

intended to train better farmers, but rather to train efficient agitators in country districts. The pupils were children of peasants. They would therefore be better qualified as peasant propagandists. The same purpose may be held to apply to every educational experiment which has been made in Russia for the last five years. In our benighted bourgeois countries education is usually intended to serve a general human purpose, and on the whole a disinterested purpose, the training of the mind and character of the children. Subsidiarily we try to prepare them for their various professional avocations. In Soviet Russia all education is primarily made subservient to political purpose.

In this connection there is one striking scene which is haunting my memory. I spent several days in the grounds and buildings of that wonderful Agricultural Exhibition of Moscow to which I have already referred. I still see in my mind's eye little groups of peasant children sent from the extreme ends of the Russian Empire under the conduct of their teachers, docile flocks of little sheep led by a Bolshevik wolf in sheep's clothing. Invariably those teachers would take their charges to one particular building called the "House of Lenin." That "House of Lenin" had been very cleverly arranged as a historical museum of the Communist Revolution. The large rooms were covered with huge pictures representing the annals of the Communist party, the great events of the Bolshevik Revolution, and the portraits of the leading Communists. The rooms were invariably packed, and you would always see teachers explaining the heroic deeds of the Dictators to those peasant children, and preaching to them the gospel according to Saint Marx.

Of all the perplexing questions which a student of Bolshevik Russia is bound continually to ask himself, perhaps the most perplexing is the question as to how far this Communist training has struck root in the minds of those little peasants whose pathetic faces I was observing in the House of Lenin; and, further, what is to be the future of all those millions of children who have received the same kind of education. It certainly is by far the gravest issue which has been raised by the Bolshevik catastrophe. From our bourgeois point of view, the systematic demoralisation of those millions of children may be the most terrible legacy left by the Bolshevik régime. On the other hand, from the Bolshevik point of view, the training and drilling of those children may be the greatest and the most enduring achievement of the Soviet Government. The boast of the Soviet Dictators may yet come true. It may turn out that, after all, they have succeeded in building up a new type of humanity. But if they have indeed succeeded, may Providence save Russia and Europe from that coming generation whose minds have been poisoned by the sordid Marxian materialism, and whose characters have been brutalised by the fratricidal and suicidal Marxian gospel of the eternal and inexorable war between the classes.

CHAPTER X

HOW THE BOLSHEVISTS ARE ENGINEERING THE WORLD REVOLUTION

I WOULD have conveyed an entirely false notion of the Soviet régime if I had misled my readers into believing that the Bolshevists have imposed and maintained themselves only by brute force or terrorism or by demoniac will-power and revolutionary energy. The truth is that they have maintained themselves by superior brain power and by transcendent statecraft. I am not sure that I could mention any other European Cabinet which contains half the aggregate intellectual endowments possessed by the present Soviet Government. To interview Cicerin, the Admirable Crichton of diplomacy, the slave of duty, whose favourite working hours are said to be between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m., a fascinating and a tragic personality, a tool of men less honest than himself, was a stimulating lesson in high politics. To listen to the arch-agitator Radek, the representative of Poland on the Executive of the Third Internationale; to hear him profess his loyalty to his native Polish country which, in fact, he is bent on deleting from the map of Europe; to hear him denouncing, hour after hour, in torrents of fervid eloquence, the folly of Capitalist Governments, and glorifying world revolution, whilst all the time Mr. Davidson, the American sculptor, was quietly finishing his bust, was an exhibition of histrionic

art and a journalistic treat such as does not often fall to the lot of a publicist. If the Russian situation could be saved by sheer intellectual ability and by resourceful ingenuity, apart from moral character and sound political principles, the Soviet Dictators would be the men to save it. As it is, that very small band of extraordinary personalities has performed the astounding miracle of imposing their iron will on a reluctant majority of one hundred and fifty millions. Without a single exception, every one of the supermen who seized power in October 1917 has managed to remain in power in November 1923.

The Dictators have often been praised as they often have been denounced for the wrong reasons. Trotsky is still glorified in the European Press as the wonderful creator of the Red Army, as a Russian Carnot, the organiser of victory. That praise is entirely undeserved. The Bolsheviks are not, and never will be, organisers. Organisers are always constructors, and the Bolsheviks can only destroy. The sinister efficiency of the Dictators in the work of demolition is only paralleled by their impotence in the work of reconstruction. They have not been able to organise or restore a single industry. Even as mere bureaucrats they have not shown themselves capable of running tolerably one single Government office. The widely-advertised, so-called creation of the gigantic Red Army is no exception to my general rule. In a country like Russia, which was devastated with hunger, and where old Generals can be seen begging in the streets, it did not require any magic gifts to attract millions of recruits to the Army, as that Army provided the only chance for starving men being well fed and well

clad. As I said before, hunger was the best recruiting sergeant for Mr. Trotski. We know that even in the pre-war British Army the figures of recruiting always went up automatically in times of industrial distress.

MASTER PROPAGANDISTS

On the other hand, if the Dictators do not deserve their reputation as good organisers, it would be impossible to give them too high praise as agitators and propagandists. Even Lord Northcliffe was a mere dilettante compared with Trotski-Bronstein, Radek-Sobelsohn, and Zinoviev-Apfelbaum, the three Jewish politicians who for the last two years have been the most powerful personal factors in the Soviet, especially after Lenin was struck down with paralysis. In all the arts of intrigue and conspiracy those three amazing characters have never been equalled in European history.

It is my purpose in this and in the following chapter to throw fresh light on the methods by which the Dictators have carried on their destructive propaganda. I may claim to have had unusual opportunities, not only in the course of my recent Russian visit, but for the last three years in the course of my European wanderings, of following up the red trail of Bolshevik activities in Lithuania and in Poland, in Tchechoslovakia and in the Ruhr, in Germany and in Scotland. In all those countries I found the agitators busy engineering the coming world revolution. Previous publicists have concentrated their attention too much on sensational and melodramatic Bolshevik crimes. It is much more interesting and profitable for the educated reader to try to understand

the plan of operation of the Dictators, their tactics and their strategy. It is a fascinating Sherlock Holmes story of subterranean politics, and it is a subject which at any future moment may acquire a portentous and sinister actuality.

In the early phase of the Soviet régime there can be no doubt that the Bolshevik propaganda was inspired by genuine missionary enthusiasm, and that it was strengthened by almost naïve delusions about the coming millennium and the inevitable world cataclysm. In those glorious and hungry days, every morning Russian readers of the *Isvestia* or the *Pravda* at their empty breakfast table would be treated to the exciting story of a general strike, of a successful proletarian rising. Even to-day the first question which a Bolshevik will ask you in Russia is: "When is the revolution breaking out in England?" Even Mr. Cicerin expressed to me the confident belief that shortly Mr. E. D. Morel was going to succeed Lord Curzon at the British Foreign Office. Even during my stay in Moscow, every day the whole front page of the Government newspapers was taken up with elaborate accounts of a triumphant German Communist revolution. Although I happen to be of a hypercritical turn of mind, I was so completely taken in that in order to escape from the German Communist revolution I decided to take a difficult and circuitous return journey *via* Finland and Sweden.

TO FAIL IS DEATH

To-day most of the sober-minded Soviet statesmen have ceased to believe in the prospects of an immediate world revolution. Some of them probably feel that they

are fighting a forlorn battle. All of them know that it is going to be a long and terrible struggle. But they are compelled to continue the struggle, driven on as they are by the instinct of self-preservation. They know that they have let loose forces over which they have no control. They know that for them there is no going back. They know that if the revolution fails they are all doomed men. The sword of Damocles is suspended over the head of every one of the Dictators. To fight to the bitter end is, for each and all, a question of life and death.

In this protracted and desperate struggle it is inevitable that all the collective activities of the Soviet State should be subordinated to agitation, conspiracy and propaganda. They all have the one object of furthering the world revolution. We saw, in previous chapters, how even the theatres and cinemas are used in the interest of the cause, how the schools and the Universities are made nurseries of Bolshevism, how the Dictators have secured a monopoly of all printed matter, of books, pamphlets and newspapers. Similarly, every political event is made use of to bring grist to the Bolshevik mill. If they organise a great military parade such as I witnessed one Sunday afternoon in Moscow, it is not in order to exercise their troops; rather is it to give to the population, and incidentally to the Diplomatic Corps, an opportunity of admiring the fighting qualities of the Red Army, and to show them that the goose-step of the Soviet soldier can be as perfect and as impressive as the goose-step of a Prussian regiment. If the Dictators organise an agricultural exhibition at a terrible cost for the depleted Treasury, they do not expect any economic return for

the hundreds of millions which have been sunk in the undertaking. Their only object is to advertise themselves to the countless peasant crowds who are sent to the metropolis at the expense of their starving villages. If a British Labour mission visits Russia on a single journey of investigation, the Russian workers are made to believe that Mrs. Snowden and Mr. O'Grady have been sent to Moscow for the sole purpose of paying a tribute of sympathy and allegiance to the Bolshevik Government. Every foreign visitor is indeed represented to the credulous Russian as an ardent sympathiser with the system. He is supposed to come to Russia to do homage to the rulers. Whilst I was in Moscow, Mr. Gray, member of Parliament for Oxford, and a body of American Senators, were made to give public expression of their appreciation of the Soviet Government in glowing interviews, which appeared in every newspaper. Even a humble publicist like myself was described in the Soviet Press "as an eminent British scientist who had come to study Soviet institutions," and was expected to give the usual certificate of good conduct to the Soviet Dictators. I only managed to wriggle out of the difficulty by stating to the gentleman who came to interview me that I had only recently come to Russia, and that I would not dare to abuse the hospitality of the Government by expressing any premature and therefore incompetent opinions.

The methods of Bolshevik agitation and propaganda are a poisonous mixture, in varying doses, of the new methods of American yellow journalism with the old methods of Tsarism. And those two different methods are represented by two different types of men. The first type, which is the dominant one, is the type of American-

Russian Jew who has learnt his trade on the other side of the Atlantic. The second type, who prefers to keep discreetly in the background, or even more discreetly to work underground, is the former Tsarist official, the "Agent Provocateur," or the spy, who has transferred his services from the pre-war Intelligence Department to the Soviet Foreign Office.

METHODS OF PUBLICITY

What I call the American methods of propaganda are the well-known devices of the Hearst Press and of Tammany Hall. The Soviet politicians are incomparable *Virtuosi* in the arts of the party Boss. They know the psychology of the mob mind. They know how to sprinkle their speeches with the catchwords and the phraseology of the demagogue. Above all, they understand all the stunts of astute and sensational advertising. No American vendor of quack medicines who has made millions of dollars out of a credulous public has devised more ingenious tricks than the Soviet propagandists. If the figures of the Soviet secret funds (all their funds are in a way secret funds) were published, it would be found that more money has been spent directly or indirectly on publicity than on education.

I might give many concrete illustrations of the Bolshevist methods of publicity. I shall confine myself to two or three typical examples. Although the transport system is sadly disorganised, and although there is a great scarcity of railway carriages, the Government place at the disposal of their demagogues special propaganda trains. Itinerant stump orators travel about in

those trains holding meetings and distributing leaflets. Although the cost of printing has long been prohibitive, the Soviet Government have mobilised hundreds of artists to design posters, generally of blazing colour, of huge size, and of an inflammatory character, for the benefit of the millions of peasants who cannot read. The poster and the wall picture were found to be so efficient an instrument of propaganda that it was even more widely used in organising the Red Revolution in Hungary than in Moscow. One of the original features of the Agricultural Exhibition was a vast mosaic of flowers arranged on a slope, and representing a gigantic portrait and a striking likeness of Lenin. During the war, the unimaginative Germans both advertised Field-Marshal Hindenburg by erecting to him a wooden statue, and exploited him by driving silver nails into his body for the benefit of war charities. The Bolsheviks have discovered a more ingenious way of advertising their Communist hero than such a hideous and stupid wooden statue. They have made Lenin into a flower-bed; they have made Nature herself an accomplice in his glorification.

LIES AGAINST BRITAIN

What I have called the Tsarist methods of propaganda are the methods of bluff, blackmail, bribery, duplicity and espionage. The Dictators have organised all over the West a systematic campaign of lies against England, and in the East they have engineered an equally systematic campaign against Poland. They are all things to all men. They are fellows of infinite wit, they are actors who can play every part and assume

every disguise. To the Hindus, Persians, Afghans and Turks the Dictators appear as the Allah-sent saviours who are to liberate the Mahommedan world from British tyranny. To the ingenious Soviet worker they appear as the uncompromising enemies of Capitalism. To the British Socialist they appear as the victims of Lord Curzon's Imperialism and of Polish militarism. Whilst I was in Moscow I found that a distinguished member of Parliament from one of the Dominions had been converted to that Bolshevist view of the then British Foreign Secretary. On the other hand, to the American capitalist the Dictators hold out the promise of boundless concessions of oil wells on the Caspian Sea and of gold mines in the Ural. To the English pacifist they proclaim that the only obstacle to the peace of the world is the greed of the Entente Governments. To the Russian fanatic they preach that it is their duty to spread the Bolshevist gospel with the sword; they ridicule the bourgeois idea of a citizen militia; they preach the need of a big army. To one journalist Lenin declared that Russian industry cannot be restored without outside help; but to Mr. Wells, Lenin expounded magnificent schemes of electrification which would make Russia the first industrial power of the world. To a philanthropic journalist the Soviet Minister of Health lamented that their stocks of quinine were reduced to a few pounds, and that the inhuman British blockade made it impossible to supply medicine to a suffering population. The journalist apparently did not see that the blockade had nothing to do with the supply of quinine, as quinine is a German import, and as the Soviet had been at peace with Germany for two years.

During my Moscow visit the Soviet Treasury was especially concerned to maintain the rate of exchange of their new currency, the "eervonetz," which is equal to ten gold roubles or one English pound sterling. This new currency was guaranteed to the extent of 25 per cent. by a gold reserve. I had the honour of being invited with the members of the Diplomatic Corps, to visit the Soviet Treasury. The gold safes were thrown open, and the diplomats were given every opportunity of verifying for themselves that the gold was actually there. One would think that such a conjurer's trick could have deceived no one. Yet I discovered that several of the diplomats were taken in. As I said more than once, the Bolsheviks have made a profound study of the psychology of the crowd.

I have tried, in this chapter, to give the reader a clear and concrete idea of the Bolshevik methods of political agitation for domestic and internal use. In the next chapter, which, from a practical point of view, is the central chapter of this book, I shall show with what terrible effect and with what amazing success this weapon of agitation has been used against Europe in general and against the British Empire in particular. We shall see how the Bolsheviks have followed one consistent, systematic, world-embracing policy, whereas all other Governments have pursued wavering discordant and contradictory policies. We shall see how, at the Congress of Baku, one thousand eight hundred Oriental Delegates, with swords uplifted, vowed eternal hatred, and declared an implacable war against the English oppressors. We shall be able to follow the bloody trail of Bolshevism from the West of Scotland to the Far East of the Asiatic

Continent. We shall see how they succeeded in spreading White Terrorism in Finland, Bavaria and Hungary, how they fanned the flames of war in the Near East, how they stirred up nationalist troubles in India and Egypt, and labour troubles everywhere. And from the facts which I shall have revealed, my readers may perhaps draw the conclusion that the subjects which are treated in these pages are of somewhat more than academic or theoretical interest, and that the Soviet Government as long as it survives must continue to be a menace to the security of the country and to the peace of the world.

CHAPTER XI

PREACHING THE HOLY WAR AGAINST BRITAIN

I HAVE tried to explain by what methods the Soviet Dictators have attempted to convert the illiterate masses of Russia. But the distribution of the Bolshevist poison is not confined to internal use. Domestic propaganda is supplemented by propaganda abroad. It might be difficult to say which of the two propagandas is the more active and the more unscrupulous. Probably inasmuch as the foreigner is more difficult to convince than the gullible Russian, the foreign propaganda has to be even more subtle, more inventive, and even more intensive. Soviet politicians are always denouncing the wickedness of Great Britain and France, who never cease interfering in the domestic affairs of a sorely troubled Soviet Russia, which only asks to be left in peace and to be allowed to mind its own business. The truth is that foreign Governments would only be too happy to let the Russians achieve their own salvation. For the last three years, at any rate, none of the Powers has shown the slightest inclination to intervene in Russian affairs. It is the Soviet agitators who are obstinately pursuing that very policy of interference of which they accuse other Governments.

When I tried to bring this fact home to them they either flatly denied it or, with the casuistry and duplicity which are characteristic of Bolshevism, they made a

hypocritical distinction between the Soviet Government, which abstains from any kind of propaganda, and the Communist party, which has the right to make any propaganda it pleases. Whatever the reader may think of this casuistical distinction, the fact of a seditious world-embracing agitation cannot be denied.

REVOLUTIONARY PROPAGANDA

Every Soviet Legation in Europe has become a centre of revolutionary Bolshevik propaganda against the existing order. Every Legation has a huge staff of officials running into hundreds. Those representatives of the proletariat are generally established in palatial buildings. In London Mr. Krassin has acquired huge offices, manned by agents with many aliases. In Berlin the sumptuous residence of the Soviet representative in Unter den Linden is known to every tourist; and there are many overflow premises. In Kovno I found that almost the only monumental building of the little Lithuanian capital was the residence of the Soviet Ambassador. In Warsaw the Russian Legation, occupying the vast premises of the Hôtel de Rome, has been duplicated by a Ukrainian Legation, although the Russian Legation and the Ukrainian Legation represent one and the same Government, and although the Ukraine has become a mere satrapy of Moscow. Each of those Soviet Legations may be described either as a revolutionary rookery or as a beehive or a hornets' nest. I saw more movement and more business transacted in the Hôtel de Rome than in all the other Legations together. In this connection I may mention that

at Warsaw I was myself the beneficiary as well as the witness of the lavishness and liberality with which the Dictators carry on their propaganda. I was not able to get from the Bolshevist plenipotentiary, Mr. Karakhan, a diplomatic visa to proceed to Russia, but when I expressed a desire to obtain some political literature for my private study, I received, to my great delight and surprise, a whole boxful of more than a hundred revolutionary books and pamphlets, and I was further presented with such a beautiful collection of seditious posters and inflammatory pictures that I was able to hold a special exhibition in Edinburgh.

PRINCIPLES OF BOLSHEVIST POLICY

Several ingenious writers, like Mrs. Norah Webster, appealing to the popular interest which is always available for anything secret and mysterious, have recently represented the Bolshevist Revolution mainly as the work of a Hidden Hand, as the plot of international secret bodies, such as Freemasons and Jews. And they have based their assumptions on documentary evidence of more or less doubtful authenticity, such as the famous "Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion." No doubt there has been a great deal of secrecy in the Bolshevist activities, for the very simple reason that criminals cannot always afford to show their hand and to work in the open. There have been many dark intrigues, there has been a great deal of subterranean diplomacy; but if the execution of the Bolshevist policy has often been underhand and underground, the policy itself has been openly proclaimed. It is quite unnecessary and

entirely misleading to represent Bolshevik activities as a secret plot. We must even give the Bolsheviks credit for the cynical frankness with which they have stated their aims. The Bolshevik policy is indeed a conspiracy, perhaps the most gigantic conspiracy which is known to history; but it must be admitted that it is cynically open conspiracy. Nor is it necessary to read the doubtful "Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion." We have only to read the protocols of the various Bolshevik congresses, the speeches and proclamations and manifestoes which are accessible to any one who can understand the Russian language. Above all, we only have to remember the fundamental principles of Bolshevik policy in order to satisfy ourselves as to the existence of a Bolshevik conspiracy whose one aim is to bring about a world revolution.

And not only is the conspiracy openly and boastfully proclaimed, not only is it preached as a holy crusade, but the very important fact has to be realised that the Bolshevik conspiracy has already met with a very large measure of success. The following survey of the history of Soviet diplomacy for the last six years, rapid and superficial though that survey be, ought to be sufficient to reveal to my readers the formidable menace which threatens every civilised Government in general and the British people in particular.

When one compares the foreign policy of the Entente with the foreign policy of the Soviet Government, one cannot help being impressed by the incontestable superiority of the latter. The foreign policy of the Entente is full of incoherences and contradictions. It has fluctuated from year to year, according to the

interests of the party in power and according to the varying moods of individual politicians. Not only did each member of the Entente pursue a different objective, but in each country each politician followed his own separate line. In Great Britain Mr. Lloyd George had one policy, Lord Curzon had another, which again was different from the policy of Mr. Winston Churchill. Successive Cabinets have been in turn pro-German and anti-German, pro-French and anti-French, pro-Turkish and pro-Greek. On the contrary, the foreign policy of the Soviet Government has been, from the beginning, absolutely consistent, it has been inspired by one inflexible purpose. The European drama of the Entente reminds us of one of the Histories of Shakespeare, which contain no plot and which are a procession of heroes appearing on the stage in a succession of disconnected scenes. The political drama of Russia is rather like a Shakespearean Tragedy, where the characters are driven on by inexorable forces and work up to a predestined end. Or it may be compared to a mystery play in which Lenin is the Satan and in which the protagonist, as well as the other Bolshevist demons, are invested, as in Milton's "Paradise Lost," with a sombre and sinister grandeur.

BRITAIN THE CHIEF ENEMY

Like the Germans in 1914, so the Bolsheviks, when they started the world revolution in 1917, had to wage war on two opposite fronts. They had one theatre of operations in the East and another in the West. Each demanded a different strategy. In both the Dictators were following the same aims, but were pursuing different

enemies. In the East the offensive was mainly directed against England. In the West the offensive was directed against every civilised Government.

At first it seemed as if, for the Bolshevik Government, the Eastern theatre of operations was destined to be the more important, and that the Eastern war was the line of least resistance. It has to be remembered that Russia always was a semi-Oriental Power. She understands the Oriental mentality; she is a better expert in Eastern warfare. Also, the East seemed to contain more inflammable material, and, above all, it was in the East, it was in India, Afghanistan, and Egypt, that the chief enemy of the Bolsheviks, namely, England, could be hit with the most deadly effect.

It was therefore only to be expected that in 1920 and 1921 the Bolsheviks should concentrate their efforts on their Eastern theatre of operations. As was the case with the Germans in 1914, the initial campaign of the Bolsheviks was a startling succession of triumphs. The active intervention of the Soviet Government produced in almost every Eastern country changes of so dramatic and so far-reaching a character that even the Oriental imagination of Lord Beaconsfield could not have imagined their possibility. Bolsheviks stirred up the religious fanaticism of every Mahomedan people against Great Britain, who was represented as the common enemy of Islam. They succeeded in rousing up nationalist feeling in Egypt and Syria, in Persia and Afghanistan, in India and China, and they certainly helped the nationalists to victory.

ALLIANCE WITH TURKEY

As an essential condition of the success of the Oriental policy, it was necessary that the Bolsheviks should enter into a political and military alliance with Turkey. Under Tsarism Turkey had been the hereditary enemy of Russia; now she was to become the accomplice. From the beginning the Turkish-Russian alliance produced momentous results.

In the first place, it brought about the destruction of Greece. But for the military support of the Bolsheviks Greece would not have been so easily crushed, Turkey could not have achieved her spectacular victories in Asia Minor.

In the second place, the Turkish-Russian alliance brought about the destruction of Armenia. Accustomed as we are to Armenian horrors, there are few more odious incidents in recent history than the Russian crime perpetrated against the people of Armenia. And, as if he wanted to provide an unanswerable proof that the Bolshevik Internationale can rise superior to any national prejudices, the Armenian, Karakhan, the Assistant Foreign Secretary, the trusted lieutenant of Mr. Cicerin, was jointly responsible for the suppression of the Armenian nationality.

In the third place, the Russo-Turkish alliance brought about the revival of Turkish political power. The Conference of Lausanne was a striking demonstration of that revival. For six months the Unspeakable Turk challenged Lord Curzon, and seemed to be in a position to dictate terms to the Powers of the Entente.

The culminating point of the active Oriental policy

of the Bolsheviks was the Congress of Baku in the summer of 1920. The stage management of that Pan-Asiatic Congress, like most of the staging of the Bolsheviks, was truly wonderful. More than one thousand eight hundred self-appointed delegates from all parts of the Oriental world gathered in the oil city, which had recently been evacuated by British troops. Zinoviev-Apfelbaum, the Dictator of Petrograd, who presided over the Congress, made a fiery opening speech. He was supported by Enver Pasha, the son-in-law of Sultan Mehmed V., who claimed to speak in the name of the revolutionary organisations of Morocco, Algier, Tunis, Tripoli, Egypt, Arabia and India.

BRITAIN TO BE ATTACKED

The burden of Zinoviev's speech was that England could be most effectively beaten in her Eastern possessions, that a boycott of British trade in India, as the result of Bolshevik agitation, would be the best reply to the blockade of Russia by Great Britain, and that if Great Britain could be cut off from her Eastern markets a death-blow would be dealt to British Capitalism and Imperialism. At the conclusion of the conference the Bolsheviks arranged a dramatic scene. All the delegates rose to their feet, brandishing their scimitars, and pledged themselves by a solemn oath to preach undying hatred and to wage eternal war against the English, the oppressors of the human race, and the enemies and persecutors of all Mahommedans.

The Congress of Baku was followed up by an appeal, calling upon all the nations of the East to carry out this pledge, and to wage the Holy War against England.

The first two signatures under the manifesto are those of Radek-Sobelsohn, the Director-General of Bolshevik Propaganda, and of Bela Kun, the ex-Dictator and the butcher of Hungary. The last signature is that of the President of the Congress, Zinoviev-Apfelbaum. The appeal extends to about three thousand five hundred words. It was translated into every Oriental language, and distributed in pamphlet form all over Asia. The copy which I have before me has a picture representing two Turks affixing the revolutionary manifesto on the walls of a public building in Bukhara (Turkestan). I am giving a few extracts from that extraordinary document, although, in order to form an idea of the violence and diabolical cleverness of the manifesto, it ought to be read in its integrity.

A BOLSHEVIST PICTURE OF BRITISH POLICY

“Great Britain, having emerged the only real victor of the war, and being the omnipotent mistress of one half of the world, is now proceeding to fulfil the purposes for which she made the war—namely, to secure for herself all the lands of Asia, and finally to subdue all the nations of the East.

“Peoples of the East, you know what England has done in India. You know that she has transformed the countless millions of Indian peasants and workers into dumb beasts of burden. The Indian peasant has to surrender to the English Government so large a part of his harvest that he can scarcely feed himself for a few months with what remains to him. Every year millions of Hindus are dying of hunger. . . . The Hindu dares

not sit at the same table with the Englishman, or live in the same house, or travel in the same compartment, or visit the same school. In the eyes of the English bourgeois every Hindu is a beast of burden. The corpses of his victims fill the streets of rebellious Indian villages, and those who survive have to creep on their bellies for the gratification of English officers and have to lick the boots of their oppressors.

“ People of the East, do you know what England has done with Turkey? In Constantinople the English have transformed all schools and Universities into barracks. They have suppressed all teaching in the Turkish language. They have prohibited all Turkish newspapers. They have filled prisons with Turkish patriots.

“ Peoples of the East, what has England done with Persia? English capitalists have first suppressed the rebellion of the peasants against the Shah and against the landowners, and then executed thousands and thousands of Persian peasants.

“ Peoples of the East, what has England done in Palestine? In order to please Jewish-English capitalists she has deprived the Arabs of their land, to sell it to Jewish colonists, and then, in order to divert the hatred of the Arabs, she has stirred up those Arabs against the Jewish colonists whom she had herself introduced. She is thus sowing enmity and hatred amongst the different races. She thus plays off the one against the other in order that she may the more easily oppress them.

“ What has England done with Egypt? She has brought Egypt under a yoke which is more cruel and more destructive than the yoke of the Egyptian Pharaohs,

who, through the toil of their slaves, erected the gigantic Pyramids.

“What has England made out of China? Together with her accomplice, imperialist Japan, she has transformed this mighty land into an English colony. She exploits a population of three hundred millions and poisons them with opium.

“What has England made out of Korea, this beautiful land with its ancient culture? She has delivered over that country to be tortured by Japanese capitalists, who now suppress the Korean people with fire and sword.

“The oppression and the ruin, the misery and the ignorance of the nations of the East are the source of the wealth of imperialistic England.

“Peoples of the East, the richest and most fruitful and most extensive lands of the world belong to you. Those lands, once the cradle of the human race, are capable not only of feeding their own population, but the population of the whole world. Yet dozens of millions of Turkish and Persian labourers and peasants cannot earn their daily bread, and are compelled to leave their native country.

“Europe is getting too small for English capital. That capital has enormously increased, and it cannot find any further outlets. The English capital therefore needs new lands and new workers, dumb slaves deprived of all human rights.

“Those new lands the English capitalists have found in the countries of the East. Those dumb slaves they have found in the nations of the East. English capitalists desire finally to proletarianise all the nations of the East, to ruin all peasants, all hand-workers, all tradesmen,

and drive them as hungry slaves to toil on their plantations, in their factories, and their mines.

“Such is the future which imperialistic England is preparing for the nations of the East.

“We call on you to wage a Holy War for your freedom and your life.

“England, the last powerful imperialistic bird of prey which remains in Europe, has spread her black wings over the Mahomedan countries of the East, and makes a last effort to bring the nations of the East under her claws.

“Arise, men of India, who lie prostrate from starvation and slave labour.

“Arise, peasants of Anatolia, groaning under taxation, bled white by the usurers.

“Arise, men of Arabia and Afghanistan, lost in your windy wastes and cut off by the English from the rest of the world.

“Arise against the enemy of the human race, against imperialistic England.

“Arise to fight the Holy War against the last bulwark of Capitalism of Europe, against the nest of sea-rovers and land-rovers which for centuries has been the oppressor of all the peoples of the East.”

Those few examples can only give an inadequate idea of the violence and perfidy of the manifesto of the Congress of Baku. When we consider that this manifesto appeals to the fanaticism and ignorance of hundreds of millions of Asiatics, that it is addressed to the passions of a simple-minded and illiterate people, when we consider that it has been circulated in millions of copies in every Asiatic country, there is some reason to apprehend

that it is not likely to conduce to the pacification of the troubled East.

Whatever we may think of the methods employed, we are compelled to admit from the evidence of the fact that the Oriental policy of the Bolsheviks achieved an extraordinary amount of success in an incredibly short time. Four such positive results as the revival of Turkish power, the crushing of Greece, the suppression of Armenia, the nationalist risings in India and Egypt, are results of which Mr. Cicerin may well be proud. And yet even those results could not satisfy the world-wide ambitions of the Soviet Dictators. Those diplomatic and military triumphs were more spectacular than substantial. At best, they could only be a means to a bigger end. Any achievement of Bolshevik foreign policy must ultimately be judged by one test : to what extent will it assist in precipitating the World Revolution. Judged by that test, the Bolshevik victories were a mirage rather than a reality. The final victory could not be won in the East. The one aim of Bolshevik policy, the world revolution, could only be attained in the West.

CHAPTER XII

THE RED TRAIL OF BOLSHEVISM IN EUROPE

IN the preceding chapter we have shown how the Soviet Government had been stirring up against Great Britain the nations of the East; we shall try in the present chapter to follow up the red trail of Bolshevism in the West. We shall attempt to make a brief survey of its activities, first, in the Baltic States; second, in America; third, in Central Europe; fourth, in Great Britain; fifth, in Germany; and sixth, in Poland.

1. One might have expected that the Bolsheviks would have started their European offensive by regaining a foothold in the new Baltic Secession States, Lithuania, Lettonia and Esthonia, and especially that they would have tried to secure a sea base in Riga or Reval. But obviously a sea base would be of no use to them without sea power. And Russian sea power had ceased to exist through the destruction of the Russian Fleet. Since 1917 the Russian Navy had covered itself with infamy. The only active services which the Russian Fleet could boast of were the crimes of the Cronstadt sailors, which for fiendish cruelty have never been surpassed even in Soviet Russia. As long as Russian sea power was not restored, all that they could hope for was to retain an open window on the Baltic. Hence the importance of Reval and Riga as the only means of access to and of intercourse with Western Europe. In order to keep that

access open, it was absolutely necessary to maintain peaceful relations with the new border States. The trade of the Northern ports had been destroyed. Riga was a deserted city. The once-proud Queen of the Baltic was degraded into a repository of the treasures which had been looted from the mansions of the Russian nobility. In the meantime, pending the recovery of Russian trade, the Baltic Ports could serve a very useful purpose. They might be for Soviet Russia what Stockholm and Christiania during the war had been to the Germans, a political base of operation, neutral meeting-places for all European supporters of Bolshevism. And that is exactly the service which Riga and Reval are unwillingly rendering to the Soviet Government. They are observation posts and centres of agitation. In the fulness of time and after the success of the world revolution, Lettonia and Esthonia, together with Lithuania, are expected automatically to return to their Russian allegiance.

2. If no offensive could usefully be taken against the impotent States of the Baltic, the prospects of an offensive against the United States of America were even less promising. At first, in 1918, the Bolsheviks had hopes that they might utilise the difficult economic conditions in America and bring about a new Civil War. Bolshevik emissaries did succeed in engineering a great many strikes. The strike movement spread like an epidemic all over the American Continent. But the agitators overreached themselves. They underrated the forces of law and order. The temper of the easy-going American was roused by such a flagrant abuse of American hospitality. The American Government made

short shrift of the Bolshevik agitators. They were ruthlessly suppressed and most of the Bolshevik leaders were imprisoned or expelled. Bolshevism very soon ceased to be a factor to be reckoned with in the United States.

3. Although the Bolshevik agitation may be said to have been a complete failure in the New World as well as in the Baltic States and in Italy, unfortunately it proved a complete success in Finland, in Hungary, and in Bavaria. I have no space at my disposal to enlarge on the terrible story of the three Bolshevik upheavals in Helsingfors, Budapest and Munich. There can be no doubt that those three upheavals must be looked upon as integral chapters of the Russian Revolution. In every one we find the same methods, the same leadership, the same influences, the same murderous strategy, the same combination of honest fanatics, furious madmen and common criminals. In every one we find the same Dictatorship of the Proletariat. We even discover that the same posters which had served their incendiary purposes in Moscow were also used in Budapest, only the letterpress being translated into the Magyar language. Bela Kun, the butcher, perpetrated in Budapest the horrors which at a later date he repeated in the Crimea on a much larger scale. The massacres of the hostages in the prisons of Munich was only a repetition of the countless massacres of hostages in every part of Russia.

FASCISM UBIQUITOUS IN CENTRAL EUROPE

But even as in America, even as somewhat later in Italy, so in Central Europe, the Bolsheviks, intoxicated

by success, did overreach themselves. Neither Bavaria nor Finland nor Hungary was ready for the Bolshevik Millennium. All three countries were mainly peasant communities, and in every one of them the Red Terrorism was very soon replaced by a White Terrorism. To-day in all three countries reaction is supreme. And that reaction has been primarily a reaction against Bolshevism, and has resulted in the spontaneous formation in all three countries of large citizen armies. Even in Bavaria, as I was able to ascertain in the course of a visit to Munich in 1922, the Escherich and the Hitler organisations were not, as the French Press would make us believe, militarist and nationalist organisations; they were in the first instance established as a protection of the Bavarian middle class and peasantry against the Bolshevik peril. They were essentially "fascist" movements. Fascism, the potent weapon which the ex-Socialist leader Mussolini wielded against the Italian Communists, is not only an Italian phenomenon; Fascism has become an ubiquitous Central European phenomenon. It is the instinctive, inevitable and salutary reaction of the body politic against the disintegrating forces of revolutionary Socialism.

BOLSHEVIST ACTIVITY IN SCOTLAND

4. Having been beaten in Central Europe, the Bolsheviks directed their energies to England. There, also, after the Armistice, the political conjuncture seemed to favour a social upheaval. The high cost of living, the dislocation of industries, the loss of foreign markets, the increase of unemployed, the unsettlement of opinion, were so many causes of chronic unrest. Moreover,

according to the Marxian gospel, England, with its concentration of capital and industry, was to be the country where a Communist upheaval had the most serious chances of success. In the West of Scotland, especially, the industrial situation seemed to have assumed an ugly complexion. And it was to the West of Scotland that the Moscow Dictators transferred their activities. The Communist agitators in the Clyde from 1919 to 1921 were in close touch with Moscow. I took a special interest in tracing the relations between Moscow and Glasgow, because in 1920 and 1921 I was challenged by the Communist leaders to a succession of public debates in Leith, Edinburgh and Greenock. Edinburgh citizens may remember an exciting meeting in the Leith Picture Palace, where I had to address two thousand workers, many of whom were Communists. At another mass demonstration in the Usher Hall, which was openly organised in order to celebrate the fourth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, Mr. James Maxton, M.P., did me the honour to single me out for special attack. I have in my possession the voluminous reports of the Congresses of the Third International in 1919 and 1920. In the published report of the Moscow Congress of 1920 there are no less than twenty-four speeches delivered by British delegates. Mr. Gallacher especially played an important part in that Congress. The interesting point in Mr. Gallacher's speeches is that the Scottish Communist proved even more uncompromising than Lenin. The controversy between Gallacher and Lenin also enables us to understand why the Russian statesman was so much more dangerous than the Scottish demagogue. Mr. Gallacher pleaded that the British Communists

should have nothing to do with a cowardly bourgeois Labour party. On the contrary, Lenin declared himself to be strongly in favour of the British Communist party and the Union of Shop Stewards joining the Labour party. True to his opportunist and realistic strategy, Lenin argued that the British Communists could make themselves much more formidable to the capitalist régime and could be much more useful to the Bolshevik movement if they remained inside the Labour party than if they stood outside. If they stood outside, they would remain an impotent minority. If they remained inside they might eventually, at a critical moment, impose their policy on the majority, because in a crisis it is always the extremists who carry their point. Until that crisis arose, it was obviously the best Bolshevik tactics for the British Communists to work unceasingly to leaven and to inspire the present evolutionary British Socialist party with the revolutionary Communist spirit.

The confident hopes of Lenin and his Scottish associates were not destined to be realised. The unrest of the Clyde in 1920 did not develop into an acute crisis. Although there is still a great deal of inflammable and explosive material spread about, there is no immediate prospect of a Communist upheaval. The agitators claim, however, that they have already achieved a very considerable measure of success in the West of Scotland, that they have sown the seeds of future Labour troubles, that they have enormously strengthened the anti-capitalist forces in Scotland, as is sufficiently proved by the formidable Scottish Labour representation in the House of Commons.

GERMAN COMMUNISM

5. Being temporarily defeated in Great Britain, the Bolsheviks had to fall back on Germany. Here again they utilised the favourable political conjuncture: the occupation of the Ruhr, the collapse of the mark, the industrial distress and the presence in Germany of large Russian colonies of refugees. It is an open secret that the Communist movement in Germany for the last five years has been entirely directed from Moscow, that Comrade Radek is the wirepuller who is behind every riot and every strike, and that it is the Moscow Government which supplies the German Communist parties with the sinews of war.

In their dealings with Bolshevism the German Government find themselves in a specially difficult position, and they have played a curiously ambiguous game, and, in my opinion, a very dangerous game. The political and economic conditions in Germany are such that the Government is almost bound to become the tool and the accomplice of the Moscow agitators. In the first place, there is an irresistible temptation for the Berlin Government to use the bugbear of Bolshevism for the purpose of frightening the Powers of the Entente and of keeping their own middle classes in order. In the second place, a feeble German Government which depends on the support of the Socialists has to be extremely careful in its dealings with the extreme wing of the Labour party, which itself lives in constant terror of the Communist party. In the third place, through the Treaty of Rapallo, Germany has become the political ally of Russia. Mr. Lloyd George once said to me that Rathenau proved

himself an incompetent Foreign Secretary because he made the Treaty of Rapallo. But Rathenau made the Treaty of Rapallo, even as Von Kuhlmann made the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, because he hoped to obtain definite economic advantages for Germany, and because he saw in Russia a rich potential market. I have frequently discussed with Rathenau the foreign policy of Germany. Even before his advent to power he was obsessed with the necessity of that Russo-German alliance which was to be his main political achievement. Being the head of the A.E.G. (the General Electricity Company), he was also probably allured by the grandiose electrification schemes of Lenin.

BERLIN AND MOSCOW

The outcome of this very complicated political situation is that to-day we may observe the paradoxical fact that even a Conservative German Government cannot afford to break with the Bolshevist Government. Even Baron von Maltzan, the moving spirit of the German Foreign Office, is compelled to favour a Bolshevist policy. In 1917 the German Ambassador, Count Mirbach, was brutally murdered in Moscow with the connivance of the Bolshevists. The German Government did not dare to break diplomatic relations, but immediately sent Dr. Helfferich to take the place of the murdered Ambassador. To-day his successor, Count Brockdorf-Rantzau, obeying directions from Berlin, does not hesitate when occasion arises to sing the praises of the Dictators, and to dance to the Bolshevist tune. We may point out once more as an extenuating circum-

stance for this Machiavellian policy of the German Government, that Germany finds herself in a desperate position, and may be justified in thinking that a desperate situation requires desperate remedies. The alliance of Germany and Russia may be described as an alliance *in extremis*.

POLAND A BARRIER AGAINST BOLSHEVISM

6. And here it has to be emphasised, what is so generally forgotten, both in Britain and in America, that, in view of the present ominous alliance between Germany and Bolshevik Russia, Poland is to-day the only insuperable obstacle to a future Bolshevik offensive. Poland, of all countries, is the worst possible conductor of Bolshevik electricity. And Polish peasants are, of all peasants, the most refractory to a Bolshevik propaganda. In establishing Poland as a bulwark against the forces of disorder, the Plenipotentiaries of Versailles builded better than they knew. Earl Balfour, in a striking statement which he made in my presence, when, a year ago, I introduced to him my young Polish University assistant, gave utterance to his conviction that a strong Poland is essential to the preservation of the new European order. To all those who are familiar with the conditions of Eastern Europe, this statement of Lord Balfour expresses an elementary truth of international politics. But precisely because it is an elementary truth, Poland is bound to be in the West exactly what Britain is in the East—namely, the one enemy whom the Dictators most desire to destroy. And looking at the Bolshevik plan of campaign, there is the explanation of the indefatigable propaganda, of

the conspiracy of lies which the Soviet Government has been conducting, and is still conducting, all over Europe against the Polish Government and against the Polish people. That campaign of calumny has been so successful in Britain that even Conservative leaders like Lord Robert Cecil very unjustly and very ungratefully have come to represent Poland as the "Enfant Terrible" of Europe, as a permanent cause of unrest in the East, whereas, on the contrary, Poland is the only bulwark against the forces of disorder and against the Bolshevik advance.

And not only have the Bolsheviks been pursuing against Poland a campaign of calumnies, but they are also pursuing a systematic policy of provocation. They are constantly sending out agitators who are engineering frontier incidents, who are stirring up labour troubles and racial trouble in Eastern Galicia, in Silesia and in Lithuania, and who are preaching a war against Poland as the Holy War of Bolshevism. Their preaching was only too successful. In 1920 war actually did break out between the two countries. Both sides accuse each other of being responsible for the outbreak. But even if we accept the Bolshevik version of the origins of the Russo-Polish war, even if we reach the conclusion that Pilsudski anticipated a Bolshevik attack which he knew to be inevitable, he only fell into a trap which the Bolshevik Government had set for him with their usual Machiavellian cleverness. In that Polish-Russian war of 1920 the Bolsheviks advanced to the very outskirts of Warsaw. Although the Poles were left in the lurch by the British Government owing to Bolshevik pressure on the Radical party and on the Labour party, the Bolshevik

armies were repelled in the end, and the Dictators were compelled to sign the Peace Treaty of Riga. It is not too much to say that the Polish victory proved to be in literal truth the salvation of Europe. There can be no doubt that in that critical moment, if it had not been for the resistance of the "militarist" Poles, the Dictatorship of the Proletariat would be established to-day from the shores of the Pacific to the frontiers of Belgium.

WAR POLICY OF BOLSHEVIST RULERS

And let us keep in mind that the menace of 1920 may arise again. It must be obvious even to an optimistic student of Eastern affairs that the peace of Riga can only be a precarious peace. It is a mere suspension of hostilities. During my Moscow visit a new war with Poland had almost become an obsession with the Bolshevik rulers. It was the daily subject of conversation. So far as the Russians are concerned, the wish is father to the thought. Poland will certainly not begin another war, but she may not be able to avoid it. Disquieting signs are not wanting. Trotsky to-day is repeating the identical methods which succeeded so well in 1920. Only a few weeks ago he made an inflammatory speech in which he put forward with regard to Poland the same monstrous claim which Germany put forward in August 1914 with regard to Belgium—namely, the right of marching an army into Germany, and to join forces with the victorious Communist Revolution. Unless Poland allows the Bolshevik armies to march over her prostrate body—that is to say, unless she surrenders her independence, unless she commits suicide—Russia will declare war against her. If the speech of Trotsky has

been accurately reported in *The Times*, it can only be described as the speech of an "agent provocateur" who is determined to drive things to extremities. It is quite true that from his own point of view Trotsky is perfectly right. Bolshevism can only maintain itself in Russia if there is a Communist revolution in Germany. And the Communist revolution in Germany can only win if it is supported by Bolshevik Russia. And Bolshevik Russia can only give effective military support to Germany if she is allowed to send her armies through Poland. But it is no less true that the provocations and menaces of Trotsky, if they are to be repeated, may at any future time bring about the inevitable war.

It ought to be specially noted that Trotsky seems to have intentionally chosen the present juncture for his provocative harangues. A nationalist Government has just assumed the reins of government in Warsaw, in the face of terrible internal difficulties. He, therefore, may hope to succeed more easily in his purpose of rousing Polish national feeling. I earnestly trust that my distinguished friend, Mr. Roman Dmowski, the new Polish Foreign Secretary, will be able to restrain the patriotic sentiment of the Polish people. But even if he succeeds, it still remains true that the Bolshevik Government continues to be a terrible neighbour for the Polish people.

The present perilous situation recalls to one's mind the political prophecies of Edmund Burke on the eve of the war of 1795. In his immortal "Letters on a Regicide Peace," Burke expresses his conviction that a peace with Terrorist France could only be of short duration. The event proved that Burke was right, and French

Terrorism did eventually bring about a European war which was to last for twenty years. Similarly to-day there is good reason to believe that there can be no permanent European peace until the Bolshevist fever has burnt itself out, until new men and a new Government replace the fanatics who have turned Eastern Europe into a military camp, whilst at the same time they turned unfortunate Russia into a lunatic asylum, a hospital and a prison.

CHAPTER XIII

RUSSIAN BOLSHEVISM AND THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY

THE new Prime Minister, like the author of this book, has been trying hard to educate the British public on Russian affairs. A few weeks ago, he delivered in the House of Commons a speech on Russia, and that speech was supplemented by articles in the *Sunday Times* and in various other papers. But it may justly be said of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald—what cannot be said of the present writer—that he has been speaking and writing in the interest of a party. As is often the case with political leaders, his duty is not to lead, but to follow. And, like many other leaders, he is inclined to follow the more noisy and the more extreme section of his party.

It is quite natural that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and the Labourists should take a special interest in the fortunes of Bolshevism, for the difference between Bolshevism and extreme Socialism is only a difference of degree, it is not a difference in kind. Both Bolshevism and Socialism believe in the principle of nationalisation and in State bureaucracy, which is to apply the principle of nationalisation. Both believe in a class war, and in that materialistic conception of life which is called the “economic interpretation of history.” That programme of Marxian Socialism, which is common to all Labourists, has been tried in Russia, and it has proved a tragic failure. It has been a failure because, as

has been abundantly shown in foregoing chapters, it is in flagrant contradiction with the fundamental laws of economics and with the even more fundamental laws of human nature. The poison of State Socialism, when it is absorbed in very small and homeopathic doses, may act, and has often acted, as a stimulant. It may even be administered as a medicine. But common-sense and experience prove that when it is taken in strong doses the Socialist poison is invariably mortal. Thus it has proved to be in Russia. So it will prove in this country if we refuse to learn our lesson from the Russian experiment.

STATE SOCIALISM THE RUIN OF RUSSIA

Because of the solidarity and identity of doctrine between Bolshevism and Socialism it was to be expected that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and his party should try and do their utmost to mislead public opinion as to the causes of the failure of Russian Bolshevism, and that he should attribute that failure to every conceivable cause except to the one true cause—namely, the Bolshevik system itself. His line of argument is a very simple one. It may be summed up in the one dogmatic proposition that the ruin and starvation of Russia have nothing to do with Bolshevism, that Russia has been primarily ruined by Tsarism and by the world war. We submit that the proposition is based on false interpretations of the facts. And we would, indeed, have written to very little purpose if we had failed to convince our readers who were not already convinced of its radical and absolute falsity.

1. It is quite certain that Tsarism was a bad system of government, and it is equally certain that the world war has been destructive; but neither Tsarism nor the world war can be said to have been responsible for the starvation of the Russian people. It is a very remarkable and illuminative fact that at the very end of the war the agricultural production of Russia had only decreased by 6 per cent.; and as fifteen million Russian peasants had been withdrawn from the cultivation of the land, we are driven to the conclusion that agricultural production in Russia, so far from having been ruined by the war, had relatively increased during the war. On the other hand, neither Tsarism nor the world war can be made responsible for the destruction of Russian trade or industry. The war has not destroyed the trade and industry of other nations, although the trade and industry of those other nations, being much more complicated, much more sensitive, and much more artificial, were for that very reason much more vulnerable than the trade and industry of Russia. Here again common-sense teaches us that Russia, being an agricultural country, ought to have recovered much more quickly than any other; that, in fact, it would have recovered much more quickly but for the triumph of Bolshevism, and that eventually it will recover much more rapidly once the incubus of Bolshevism is finally removed.

To any impartial student of the facts the causes of the collapse of Russia are not as they are stated by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. The collapse is entirely due to the causes which we suggested. It is entirely due to State Socialism, which has killed trade and industry at

the very root, and which has paralysed all commercial enterprise. It is due to a parasitic bureaucracy, which, like a swarm of locusts, has devoured what little there was left of the wealth of the country. It is due to a hideous class war, which has destroyed millions of human lives. It is due to an odious creed, which has destroyed the Russian soul.

MR. RAMSAY MACDONALD'S VISION OF RUSSIAN TRADE

2. It is precisely because the Bolshevik system is mainly responsible for the ruin of Russia that I do not believe in any permanent revival of trade and industry until the Bolshevik system is removed. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald would make us believe that an immediate resumption of our trade with Russia would be one of the most efficient cures for our present unemployment. This is a typical example of the kind of quack medicine which Socialist politicians are in the habit of selling to their credulous supporters. Either Mr. MacDonald deludes himself or he deludes the electors. It is quite true that Russia is a potential market of unlimited commercial opportunities. But when we speak of Russian trade we can only speculate in futures, and it may be a long time before the possibilities are translated into realities.

For we have to bear in mind the distressing basic fact that at present Russia is in every sense of the word a bankrupt country. A few journalists or politicians who are taken round a personally conducted tour, or a few business men who have succeeded in driving a profitable bargain with the Government, may give us glowing accounts of the improved conditions of Russia. But those accounts are emphatically contradicted not

only by the evidence of competent and impartial witnesses, but by unanswerable official documentary evidence. Only a few weeks before I arrived in Russia, Trotski himself, at the Twelfth Congress of the Communist party, made a long speech, in which he indiscreetly revealed all the defects which are inherent in the very organisation of the Soviet economic machinery. Making due allowance for the desire on the part of the Dictators to justify their new economic policy, the speech is a startling confession. According to the report which appeared in the *Pravda*, the organ of the Communist party, he stated, "that nationalised industry was working at a loss, that the cost of production exceeded the value of goods produced." And, examining some of the reasons for this alarming deficit, he had to admit that "in the first place our Russian industry is overloaded. Factories and plants which are intended to turn out 100 per cent. of goods are only turning out 17 per cent., or at the most 20 per cent. In the second place, we have no system of keeping accounts. This is a direct inducement to theft, and it is a demoralising training for Communists who are engaged in the management of economic enterprise."

TROTSKI'S ADMISSION

Trotski summed up his candid criticism in the following terms: "If we take the light and the heavy industries and the transport industry, we are driven to the conclusion that to-day we are poorer than we were a year ago. Our industry is existing at the expense of the State Budget, and the State Budget is existing mainly at the expense of peasant economics."

Mr. Trotski's statement was supplemented and confirmed by Mr. Vladimirow, the Under-Secretary for the Commissariate for Finance, and a Soviet economic expert. At this same Twelfth Congress of the Communist party he stated: "I believe that the situation is more serious than Comrade Trotski has just said." It will be sufficient if I quote to you the information which is supplied by the All-Russian Council of National Economy, namely, that the industrial output of 1922 and 1923 is only 10 per cent. higher than in the previous years (when it had reached its catastrophic minimum). But this 10 per cent. increase has involved a loss of two hundred and twenty million gold roubles (twenty-two million pounds sterling). The All-Russian Council has come to the conclusion that the Soviet industries continue to eat up its basic and floating capital.

FACTORIES STILL BEING CLOSED

It is not to be wondered that under such conditions the Russian Government, as we are told by the *Economitcheskaia Jisn*, a semi-official journal, is obliged to close up factories and plants by the hundreds and by the thousands. This process began at the end of 1922, and it is still going on. The *Economitcheskaia Jisn* again informs us that on the 1st January of last year the number of industrial enterprises in operation in the whole country was 9858, whereas on the 1st May the number had fallen to 5438. For the months of June, July, August, and September 1923 the *Economitcheskaia Jisn* quotes another series of closings. Thus in July the Government closed twenty-one textile factories, in August they closed twenty-eight and over 23,000 workers were dismissed.

RUSSIAN INDUSTRY A BANKRUPT CONCERN

These official figures do not require any additional comment. They unmistakably prove that Russian industry is, in fact, a bankrupt concern. And let it be remembered that we are not only dealing with a bankrupt nation, we are also dealing with a particular bankrupt Government, called the Soviet Government, whose methods hitherto have not been calculated to inspire unlimited confidence. I do not for a moment suggest that one ought never to trade either with a bankrupt individual or with a bankrupt Government under any circumstances. It may be quite profitable to trade with a discharged bankrupt who, after bankruptcy, has started again in business, provided that the bankrupt is an honest man who has had a stroke of ill-luck, and provided also that his business is sound. On the other hand, it would be extremely dangerous to trade with a bankrupt if it is proved that his bankruptcy has been a fraudulent one, and that his new business is built up on the same rotten foundation. But most dangerous of all would it be to deal with a fraudulent bankrupt if that bankrupt has on principle repeatedly refused to pay his debts; if, moreover, the new business is found to be from the very beginning in a shaky condition, or if the business happens to be conducted in a country which does not recognise any bourgeois law of bankruptcy; and last, but not least, if the business may at any moment have to be transferred to another concern, which would probably repudiate the contracts entered into by its predecessors.

WHAT DOES THE SOCIALIST LEADER MEAN?

I do not want to discourage in these difficult times any enterprising Scotsman from doing business in Russia. Nor do I suggest that the individual trader cannot do a remunerative trade even under present conditions. A gambler who has a spell of luck may certainly win a fortune either in the aristocratic gambling saloons of Monte Carlo or in the proletarian gambling dens of Moscow. Nor do I suggest that individual traders might not succeed in driving a most profitable bargain with the Soviet Government, especially if they would agree to help the Soviet Government in its foreign propaganda, and if they would assist in giving it a good character abroad. I am sure that even to-day a great deal of money can be made in Russia out of the Soviet Government. I am sure that the Soviet can be, on occasions, a very good paymaster, and would be only too glad to make a deal on terms mutually advantageous to both parties. The Soviet Government continues to be the greatest employer of labour and the greatest captain of industry of the Russian Empire. It still is the universal provider and the universal providence. Every day the Government is placing large orders for agricultural machinery, for locomotives,, for motor-cars. Only a short time ago we were told that an order for one hundred and fifty aeroplanes had been delivered in Moscow. I know for a fact that a great many big fortunes are being made every day through private and corrupt dealings of foreign traders with Russian officials. A whole tribe of profiteers or "nepmen," has arisen for the last eighteen months. But surely Mr. Ramsay

MacDonald, when he speaks of a resumption of our trade relations with Russia as a cure for unemployment, is not thinking of our supplying the Soviet Government with aeroplanes or with the means of waging war against Poland, nor is he thinking of corrupt and illicit trading? He can only have been thinking of a resumption of licit and normal trade relations. But if we understand trade relations in that definite sense, I can only state, on the strength of my personal observations, and of my conversations with foreign traders who had been unsuccessfully trying to do business in Russia, that the present conditions do not justify any sanguine expectations. After all, Russia can only import our goods if she is also able to send us exports in exchange. And in the meantime, and for a long time to come, I am very much afraid that about the only Russian export of any importance will be revolutionary propaganda. And that kind of Russian export is not likely to be as welcome to the average citizen as it may be to a considerable section of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's party.

CHAPTER XIV

THE BOLSHEVIST EMPIRE AND ITS SLAVE STATES

WHEN the Bolsheviks assumed power in November 1917 they appeared to the world as uncompromising pacifists. It is in the pursuance of a pacifist policy that they tried to engineer a world peace at Stockholm, and that they succeeded in concluding a separate peace with Germany at Brest-Litovsk. It is in the pursuance of a pacifist policy that they secured the support of the peasantry, who were war-weary, and who were concerned, above all, to take violent and immediate possession of the land. Even to-day the Bolsheviks are represented by their Socialist friends as the opponents of militarism and imperialism. We are told by those Socialist supporters that if the Bolsheviks have not succeeded in living up to their noble ideals, the fault lies entirely with Great Britain and the other Powers of the Entente. It is the criminal and futile intervention of the Western Powers which has compelled a reluctant Soviet Government to wage war. And that Bolshevik war, we are told, has been only a defensive war. There would have been no war, there would have been no Red Army, if the Bolsheviks had not been prevented by their implacable capitalist enemies from devoting all their energies to the reconstruction of Russia.

This grotesque travesty of ruthless champions of violence into apostles of peace is another illustration,

and a very characteristic one, of that conspiracy of lies by which Bolshevik propaganda is constantly deceiving European opinion. The obvious truth is that no Tsarist Government of the past has ever been more consistently militarist and imperialist, both in spirit, in purpose and in practice. The whole record of the Soviet régime for the last six years has been one of continuous aggression.

A PHILOSOPHY OF FORCE

We might conceivably explain away some of the wars in which the Bolsheviks have been engaged, such as the war against Poland and the guerilla war against the counter-revolutionary generals. But we cannot explain away a dozen other wars with which neither Great Britain nor the Entente had anything to do. We cannot explain away the fundamental fact that Bolshevism, believing as it does in a philosophy of force, and following the logic of its creed, has consistently pursued an offensive militarist policy. We cannot explain away the fact that whereas the British Empire is an Empire only in name, and is in reality a Commonwealth of free nations, on the contrary, the so-called Soviet Republic is to-day the most reactionary, the most aggressive, Empire of the world.

If the Provisional Government which overthrew the old régime had remained in power, the Russian Commonwealth would have been reorganised broadly on the same lines as the British Empire. Some parts, such as the Ukraine, would have enjoyed complete self-government; others, such as the Asiatic possessions, would have remained Russian dependencies, with a large measure of

autonomy. In the spring of 1917 all the border States and all the Asiatic dependencies spontaneously proclaimed their autonomy or their independence. Even the Bolshevik Government was compelled solemnly to recognise and to ratify an accomplished fact. At the Conference of Brest-Litovsk Trotsky and Lenin appealed to and exploited against the Germans the principle of self-determination.

A HARSH IMPERIALISM

That principle of self-determination and the federal principle proclaimed by the first revolution were sacrificed by the Bolsheviks. Within a few months after their accession to power they had reverted to Tsarist Imperialism, even as they restored and improved upon the Tsarist bureaucracy and the Tsarist inquisition. Indeed, to compare Bolshevik Imperialism with Tsarist Imperialism is a gross libel on Tsarism. For Tsarism, at least, did stand for an ideal, and did exercise a civilising influence in the East. Rather ought we to compare Bolshevik Imperialism with the predatory Turkish Empire or with the Imperialism of the Southern States of America, whose main purpose before the War of Secession was to extend the system of slavery to the whole American West. Even thus the Bolsheviks have tried to extend their system of slavery to every part of the European and the Asiatic Continents.

There were many forces which were irresistibly driving on Bolshevism in the direction of Imperialism. First, there was the economic pressure of hunger. The Bolshevik Government could not have continued its

parasitical existence unless it provided land and food supplies and raw material for its supporters. Second, there were the political pressure and the lust of power. Openings had to be found for the hordes of bureaucrats which had multiplied like swarms of locusts. Third, there was the military pressure. The two million soldiers of the Red Army could not be safely kept in Moscow. Nor could they be eternally occupied on punitive expeditions, especially since the soldiers of the Red Army had to compete in those terrorist exploits with the Red Guards of the Teheka. Therefore, the territories of the Border States and of the Asiatic possessions had to serve as a training ground, as a playground, and, above all, as a feeding ground for the Janissaries of the Dictators. Trotski, the Napoleon of Bolshevism, believes, like his great Corsican exemplar, that war must pay for war. It must be self-supporting. To-day in Russia, it is indeed the only industry that pays.

It is difficult to say in what exact proportion those various factors operated. But they have all acted cumulatively; they all helped to strengthen the impetus of Bolshevik Imperialism. And their ultimate outcome has been that the Bolshevik Government since 1919 have been bent on suppressing one autonomous State after another. The Bolsheviks have suppressed Georgia, Azerbaijan, the Crimea, the Kuban, Armenia, Turkestan and the Ukraine. And in each case those States have been suppressed by the same methods of terrorism, and they have been suppressed under the same futile pretext of counter-revolutionary plots.

SELF-DETERMINATION DENIED—CRUEL CONQUEST OF
TURKESTAN

One of the first States which in 1917 proclaimed its independence was the vast territory of Turkestan. Turkestan was one of the last conquests of Tsarism. It was one of the richest countries of Central Asia, producing every kind of raw material. It grew nearly all the cotton which was produced in the Russian Commonwealth. The Dictators could not possibly surrender such a desirable prey. Although they were kept very busy elsewhere, on almost every frontier, although they were surrounded by a world of enemies, they decided to undertake a war of conquest against the peaceful and loyal peoples of Turkestan. About the deeds of horror which were perpetuated and about the devastation accomplished, all witnesses are unanimous. We shall only give the evidence of an unimpeachable witness, a medical man, who takes no personal interest in politics, who has no prejudice either for or against Bolshevism. The evidence I am quoting is that of an Austrian surgeon, Dr. Wilhelm Hahn, who for five years lived in Tashkend, the capital of Turkestan, as a prisoner of war. Compelled to serve in the Red Army, he had exceptional opportunities of studying the situation. The parallel which Dr. Hahn draws between Turkestan as he found it when he arrived in 1916 and as it was when he left in 1921 is an especially illuminative and damning indictment against the Bolshevik régime :—

“ When I arrived in Tashkend it was a garden city of striking beauty, with modern shops, carriages, motor-cars, with the life of a small European capital. The

ladies were dressed in the latest style, and in Tashkend I saw, for the first time, new fashions which I was to find in Vienna on my return. The display of goods in the shop windows might compete with the most luxurious displays in any European capital. Enthusiastic admirers of Tashkend would call it a little Paris.

“What has the October revolution made out of Tashkend? To-day it is a dead and filthy town, where nothing remains to remind us of her pristine beauty. The shops are all empty and closed, and they have been generally transformed into Soviet offices. The whole trade of the East has come to an end. One never sees those interminable caravans of camels, whose countless processions once filled the streets of Tashkend with their joyful bells. Hotels, restaurants and cafés are equally closed. The trams have ceased to run. There is no more lighting of the streets. Everywhere we have the same picture of destruction and devastation. In no city has the revolution raged as it did in Tashkend. Nowhere was the street fighting between Whites and Reds so terribly bitter. Every square foot was fought for. The trees were felled, barricades were raised, machine guns and field guns were put at every corner. Even foreign diplomats like the Swedish and Danish Consuls were imprisoned and ill-treated. The Reign of Terror was marked by veritable orgies. Until this day Tashkend has not been able to recover. She is still a deserted city; she serves merely as a springboard for the agitators of the East, who have gathered here to unhain the Holy War against England.

“Cotton growing in Turkestan for the last three years has almost ceased. Only wheat is being sown in order

to save the country from starvation. In all other districts in Bukhara and in Khiva the war with the rebellious native tribes continues without interruption. And thus this once so fertile country is reduced to utter ruin.

“And yet what might a capable Government not have made out of this land with its inexhaustible treasures, producing cotton, iron, ore, gold, silver, petroleum, timber—in short, everything which was necessary to build up a thriving industry and trade?”

TASHKEND AS A CONSPIRACY CENTRE

It speaks volumes for the cynicism and fanaticism of the Dictators that this very city of Tashkend was made the centre of the offensive campaign against the British Empire. The capital of Turkestan, the metropolis of Central Asia, with a population of over a quarter of a million, became the headquarters of the Bolshevik agitators, who spread over Persia, Afghanistan and India. In a previous chapter I have referred to the trains which were used for propaganda purposes. The same Austrian surgeon gives a striking description of one of those uncommon and uncanny propaganda instruments.

“The agitators had at their disposal their own train, the Vostotchni Agitationni pojezd (Eastern Agitation train). This train was one of the most extraordinary sights which I ever witnessed. It was made up of twenty carriages with a restaurant car, and with special cars for propaganda literature, for offices and theatricals. The general appearance of the train was grotesquely impressive, and in each stopping station it produced a colossal sensation. Each carriage was painted in a

different colour. The main pictorial motives were the struggle between labour against capital, and the liberation of the Mahommedans from the yoke of the English. The native population, Sartians, Kirghiz, Persians, Armenians and Hindus, would surround the carriages and supply an impressionable audience for the agitators and the inflammatory speeches delivered by the agitators. The Commissars of the train lived like Pashas. But even their style of living was a part of their calculated propaganda. If they had lived and dressed poorly they would have made no impression on those Mahommedan populations, which are accustomed to the pomp and wealth of the Shahs and the Rajahs. It goes as a matter of course that, in their speeches there was no question of Communism. The war cry was "Asia for the Asiatics! Away with the aliens! Arise to wage war against the English oppressors!" It is not to be wondered at that those emissaries should have found a ready hearing with those simple-minded Mahommedans. Certainly the success of the agitation ought not to be underrated. Executive Committees were formed even in the smallest places to stir up the native population. The movement spread from Turkestan to Khiva and Bukhara. Even the Amir of Afghanistan sent Lenin a special diplomatic mission to Turkestan.

"On the other hand, Bolshevik missions were also sent to all the States on the other side of Afghanistan. The Bolsheviks endeavoured from Peshawar to rouse the wild mountaineers of the borders. And those hill tribes gave the English a great deal of trouble all through the summer of 1920." (Hahn, "Streifzüge durch Sovietrussland.")

BOLSHEVIST AGGRESSION IN THE CAUCASUS

The aggressive imperialist policy which the Bolsheviks followed in Turkestan and in Armenia they also followed in the Caucasian Republics. I spent a month in Transcaucasia during the first revolution in 1905, and, like my Austrian witness, I am therefore in a position to appreciate by comparison and contrast the results of five years of Bolshevik rule. The Caucasian Republics are amongst the most interesting countries of the Old World. They are the cradle of the European race. They have produced some of the finest types of humanity. The sublime scenery of the Ararat and the Elbrouz surpasses in beauty the most gorgeous Alpine landscapes. The original civilisation of the peoples of the Caucasus has provided favourite themes to every Russian poet, from Puchkine to Tolstoy. The two voices of freedom of which Wordsworth speaks in a famous sonnet, the liberating voices of the mountain and of the sea, have inspired the populations of the Caucasus just as they inspired the mountaineers of Switzerland. Even the despotism of the Tsars respected the customs and the independence of the Caucasian peoples. But the Bolshevik Dictators could not afford to adopt the liberal methods of Tsarism, for, unfortunately for themselves, the Caucasian Republics, like Turkestan, possess boundless natural wealth and mineral wealth. An empty Bolshevik Treasury needed the oil wells of Baku. An aggressive Bolshevik army needed the Caucasus as a centre of military operations. The position of Batum gave them a sea base in the Black Sea. The position of Erivan and Erzerum enabled them to keep in counte-

nanee both the Turks and the Armenians. The position of Resht was an excellent starting point for the invasion of Persia. Therefore, one after another, every Caucasian Republic—Azerbadjan, Georgia, Armenia, together with the Kuban Republic—were brought, by the usual terrorist methods, under the Bolshevik yoke.

It must be conceded that the Bolshevik imperialists have done their job systematickly. They followed, indeed, a policy of thorough. Of all the independent border States which existed in 1917 not one has survived. To-day there is a brief respite of peace. But it is the kind of peace of which Tacitus speaks: “*Solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant*” —they make a desert and they call it peace.

And even this “peace” of frightfulness cannot last. It is only a brief respite. Once more we must revert to the leitmotiv of our argument. The Bolsheviks are driven on by their “demon.” Like Alexander, they must look out for new worlds to conquer. Yesterday they took the offensive against the independent border States. To-morrow they may have to start a new offensive against the Baltic States, against Finland and Poland. Or, most ominous of all European perils, let the present Conservative Governments in Prussia and Bavaria succeed in suppressing the Communists, and we may yet see the Russian Bolsheviks in self-defense making common cause with their German brethren. They will march an army into Germany. They will fight the last battle, which shall establish Bolshevism in the heart of Europe.

CHAPTER XV

BOLSHEVISM AND THE JEWS

I HAVE now come to the last, the most delicate and the most complicated aspect of my Russian argument—namely, the position of the Jews in relation to Bolshevism. I earnestly desire to avoid writing one single line which might tend to inflame a festering wound. But it is no use denying that the festering wound is there. And it is in the interest of the Jewish people themselves that we should make a close and impartial investigation of what must be admitted to be a painful and, indeed, a tragic problem. It would be both a dangerous, an unnecessary, and a futile policy either to ignore or to distort the truth. It would be a dangerous policy, because such a conspiracy of silence or a conspiracy of lies would amount to a confession of guilt. It would be an unnecessary policy, for the mass of the Jewish people cannot be made responsible for the crimes of a small minority. They can no more be made responsible for the actions of Trotski and Zinoviev and Padek than the French people could be held responsible for the actions of Robespierre and Marat. It would also be a perfectly futile policy. It would be as futile to deny the predominant part played by the Jews in the world revolution as it would be to deny the predominant part which the Jews played in the diffusion of Christianity. We have simply to admit the fact that the Bolshevist

Revolution has been largely engineered by men belonging to the Jewish race. We have to face the further fact that the deeds committed by those men have roused fierce vindictive passions in the hearts of the Russian people, and that those passions in the immediate future may threaten millions of innocent Jews with terrible reprisals. I seem still to hear ringing in my ears the gruesome prophecy made to me three years ago by the most illustrious Jew of Germany, himself a victim to anti-Semitic fanaticism. After many discussions with the late Mr. Rathenau, I asked him one night what would be, in his opinion, the end of the Russian tragedy. His reply was : " There can be little doubt that the end of the Russian tragedy will be the most appalling pogrom which has ever taken place in the history of the Jewish race."

POWER OF JEWISH LEADERS

That the Jews have played a leading part in the Bolshevik upheaval and are still playing a leading part in the Bolshevik Government is a proposition which no one will deny who has taken the trouble to study Russian affairs at first hand. I am quite ready to admit with Dr. Salis Daiches that the Jewish leaders are only an infinitesimal fraction, even as the British rulers in India are an infinitesimal fraction. But it is none the less true that those few Jewish leaders are the masters of Russia, even as the fifteen hundred Anglo-Indian Civil Servants are the masters of India. For any traveller in Russia to deny such a truth would be to deny the evidence of his own senses. When you find that out of a large number of important Foreign Office officials who

you have met all but two are Jews, you are entitled to say that the Jews are running the Russian Foreign Office. When you find that Trotski is both Commander-in-Chief and the organiser of the Red Army you are entitled to say that he is running the War Office. When you find that in the Congress of the Third International all the debates from beginning to end are directed by Zinoviev and Radek, you are entitled to say that those two Jewish Bolsheviks are running the Third International. When you find that the same Zinoviev is also the omnipotent Dictator of Petrograd, that he was also the Chairman of the Congress of Baku, which declared the Holy War against Great Britain, when you further find that the above-mentioned Radek is the ubiquitous agitator and the chief of the Bolshevik Propaganda Department, when you discover at the same time that the leaders in every other Bolshevik Revolution, in Budapest, in Bavaria, are invariably Jews, you are driven to the conclusion that men belonging to the Jewish race have been the protagonists of the Russian drama.

And, unfortunately, not only have men belonging to the Jewish race played a very large part both in the beginning and in the development of the Bolshevik Revolution, but they have also been the chief participants in some of the worst crimes of that Revolution. In the annals of terrorism there are four names which stand out in sinister isolation—Jankel Yourowski, the monster, who shot down the twelve members of the Imperial Family in the cellars of the Elpatinski House in Yekaterinburg, including the four young daughters of the Tsar; Moses Uritski, the first executioner-in-chief of the Teheka; Bela Kun, the butcher of Budapest and

of the Crimea; Djerdjinski, the present Inquisitor-General of the Tcheka. Of those four names there is not one who is a Russian. One of the four is a Pole; the three others happen to be Jews.

JEWISH PREDOMINANCE A HISTORICAL ACCIDENT AND TRAGEDY

When we are confronted with such formidable and incontrovertible facts, it would be merely childish to deny what must be obvious to the most superficial observer. The only wise policy is, in the first place, to dissociate the large mass of the Jewish people from the Bolshevik policy and the Bolshevik crimes; and, in the second place, to explain how it is that a small minority of the Jews should thus have happened to become the prime movers of the world revolution. And it is all the more necessary to follow such a line of defence because we are confronted with a dangerous tendency in many countries of Europe to make the whole Jewish people vicariously responsible for the outbreak, the diffusion and the ravages of Bolshevism. There is a growing conviction that Bolshevism has been largely a Jewish conspiracy, a diabolical plot to wipe out Christian civilisation.

It is our purpose in the following argument to demonstrate the falsity of the anti-Semitic argument. It is our object to establish that the political predominance of the Jews in Russia is a historical accident, that it forms part of the bigger tragedy of the Jewish people, that the Jews have been more sinned against than sinning, and that the participation of the Jews in the Bolshevik

movement has been the inevitable outcome of the insane policy of the late Tsarist Government.

If we are to understand the present Jewish problem in Russia, we must realise that the Jews, before the war, formed a compact mass, which was variously estimated at from five to eight millions, and which was located mainly within the so-called Pale of Settlement in the Western provinces of the Russian Empire. In the towns the proportion of the Jews to the Christian population often amounted to 30 or 40 per cent., sometimes even to 70 per cent. If one considers the statistics of literacy and illiteracy, one discovers the astounding fact that the total number of Jews who could read and write was almost equal to the total number of literate Russians. If one considers the statistics of the intellectual and liberal professions, one discovers that the Jews in the Russian Empire constituted a large minority, if not a majority, of the educated class. Taking all those facts into account, one would naturally expect the Jews to play a leading part in any Russian political movement.

We have further to note that not only were the Jews cooped up inside the Pale of Settlement, they were also placed outside the law, at the mercy of a corrupt bureaucracy, and an even more corrupt police. Owing to that illegal position, it might be said that every Russian Jew was born and bred a revolutionist. Therefore, even before the war, the Jews constituted a menace to every Government in power, especially as, by virtue of their superior education and their greater commercial abilities and opportunities, they possessed a considerable part of the wealth of the country. In order to protect itself, the Russian Government resorted to a systematic

process of Jew-baiting, which generally resulted in officially organised pogroms.

And not only was the Russian Jew an outlaw and a revolutionist through the policy of the Tsarist Government, he was also almost inevitably an internationalist through the diaspora of the Jewish race. He had close associations with revolutionary Jews in every other country. This fact again was bound to be of far-reaching consequence in an upheaval which, from the first, claimed to be a world upheaval. If the Bolshevik Revolution had happened to be either a French or an English or an American Revolution, it would have been controlled by Frenchmen, Englishmen or Americans. But in a Russian revolution, which was also a world revolution, the leadership must almost inevitably fall into the hands of the Jews. The Jews alone could act as liaison officers. They alone were in a position to provide the controlling brains to secure the necessary organisation and co-ordination.

WERE OTHER REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS AVAILABLE ?

But it is not enough to say that the Jews would inevitably exercise an intellectual and political leadership in the Bolshevik Revolution. Such a leadership was almost bound to give them an exclusive monopoly of power, for the reason that in Russia there were no other political groups who might have taken the place of the Jews. When you happen to discuss the future of the Bolshevik régime, you are constantly being asked : " However bad the Bolshevik Government may be, is there any other that could take its place ? " It would be

a much more pertinent question to ask: "If the Bolshevik Government decided to eliminate all its Jewish members, would it be possible to find other leaders to take the place of the Jews?" The answer would have to be in the negative. There is no room for the Russian aristocracy in the Bolshevik Government, even if the nobility had not been massacred or exiled. There is no room for the Russian bourgeoisie, for Bolshevism is essentially an anti-bourgeois movement. And even if it were not anti-bourgeois, there exists no strong middle class in the Russian Empire. Any Bolshevik Government must therefore fall back on the Jews and recruit its adherents from amongst the Jews. All sections except the Jews are counter-revolutionists. The Jews alone have the revolutionary tradition, the revolutionary temperament. They alone profess the Marxian creed, which itself had been established by two Jewish leaders, Ferdinand Lassalle and Karl Marx.

RECRUDESCENCE OF ANTI-SEMITIC FEELING

We have given the political and historical reasons which made it inevitable that the Jews should play the leading part in the Bolshevik Revolution, even as they were bound to play the leading part in the European Socialist movement. On the other hand, it was equally inevitable that the ignorant and embittered Russian masses should seek to make the whole Jewish people responsible for the crimes of the Bolshevik Revolution, and for the suffering and starvation it has brought in its train. Wherever there is widespread distress it is an invariable human instinct to try to find a scapegoat.

The Russian victims of Bolshevism have fastened on the Jew as the scapegoat. The result all over Russia and Central Europe has been an alarming recrudescence of anti-Semitic feeling. To-day it is about the only feeling which unites the Russians of all classes and of all parties. The peasantry hate the Jew because they make him responsible for the ruin of Russian agriculture, and because, as the peasants themselves in the early days of the Revolution have been guilty of many excesses, they would like to shift on Jewish shoulders the responsibility of their own crimes. The Church sees in the Jews the champions of Atheism. The aristocracy see in the Jews the instigators of the excesses committed by the peasantry, the receivers of stolen property, the chief profiteers as well as the authors of the universal spoliation. Even the Socialists, who realise that the Revolution has been a ghastly failure, make the Jews responsible for that failure. Anti-Semitism is rampant even in the ranks of the Communist party, of the Red Bureaucracy and of the Red Army. When the Day of Judgment comes, some of the worst enemies of the Jews will be found amongst their Russian Bolshevik accomplices. They will turn King's evidence; they will try to divert the anger of the mob from their own crimes and turn it against the Jews.

The most casual conversation with the "man in the street" will convince the traveller of the intensity of this universal anti-Semitic passion. Even educated, humane and Christian people again and again would tell you that the wholesale extermination of the Jewish race—men, women and children—was an essential condition of the recovery of Russia. When I protested

in horror against such monstrous sentiments, which out-Heroded the methods of Herod, my Russian friends would calmly reply, using the very same reasons as the wretches who slaughtered the Tsar's family, that if Jewish women and children were to be spared the whole thing would have to be done over again in the coming generation—that the only security for Russia was to make a clean job of it, and to extirpate once and for all the Jewish cancer from the Russian body politic.

HOW IS CATASTROPHE TO BE AVERTED ?

If I have rightly interpreted the present position of the Jews in Russia, it follows that the world is threatened in the immediate future with an appalling catastrophe, and the urgent problem which confronts civilisation and humanity is how that catastrophe can be averted. The Bolshevist fever will burn itself out; but the anti-Semitic passion will grow as Bolshevism decreases. Already signs of the coming storm are visible all over Central Europe. Within the last few weeks there have been anti-Jewish student riots in Vienna University; Jewish shops have been looted in the heart of Berlin. Whilst I was in Budapest the Jewish guests at a large political dinner were blown up in a restaurant by the bombs of anti-Semitic fanatics. What, then, must we not expect in Russia? For not only is the intensity of anti-Semitic passion infinitely greater in Russia than in any other country, but it also affects very much larger numbers. And because of the magnitude of the impending calamity, the Jewish question is one which cannot be solved by any single nation. Sooner or later it will have

to become an international issue. Nor is it a question the solution of which can be long delayed. Already pogroms are taking place in every part of Russia. Already tens of thousands of Jews are crossing the border every month into Central Europe. Nor is it conceivable that any mere palliative measures can possibly solve the problem. Obviously emigration, whether voluntary or systematically organised, cannot provide a solution. In view of the anti-Semitic feeling existing in most countries, it is not likely that any country will open its gates to the suffering millions of the Jewish proletariat. A home will have to be found for those suffering millions outside Europe and America. Such a home cannot be found in Palestine. Emigration to Palestine would only touch the fringe of the problem. Only a country which is sufficiently vast and fertile, and whose population is sufficiently sparse, will be able to give refuge to the countless swarms of the Russian ghettos. Such a country can only be found in Southern Siberia and Central Asia. A mass settlement, a far-reaching scheme of colonisation in Asia, a Jewish State under the guarantee of the League of Nations, seems to me to be the only means of saving the Jewish people from certain destruction.

CHAPTER XVI

THE JEWS IN EASTERN EUROPE

THE most interesting, the most picturesque and the most enigmatic specimens of humanity to be found in Lithuania, Poland and the Ukraine are not the Lithuanians, the Poles or the Ruthenians, but the Jewish people. The Kingdom of Israel is not to be sought for in Palestine, but in Eastern Europe. A study of the Eastern Ghettos introduces you to a new and strange world. It reveals a type of Jew whose existence you did not suspect in the West. I think I have visited most of the Ghettos of the world. I have visited those of Amsterdam and New York, of Odessa and Tiflis, of Cairo and Jerusalem. But only after wandering through the Ghettos of Poland and Lithuania, after frequenting their synagogues and their theatres, after reading their Yiddish papers, did I understand the infinitely complex character of the Jewish race, the baffling, the elusive and the tragic nature of the Jewish Problem.

We are apt to talk about the Jew as if there existed only one unmistakable and unchangeable type. But even anthropologists like Dr. Fishberg will tell you that there does not exist one Jewish type, that there are sixty different types, and that the difference between one type of Jew and another type of Jew, between the Jew of Salonika and the Jew of Vilno, between the Sephardim and the Ashkenazim is greater than the difference

between an Englishman and an Italian. And the moral, religious and political differences are at least as great as the ethnological differences.

The Western Jew is an internationalist and a cosmopolitan. He may be born in Russia or Germany, may spend his youth in Berlin, or Hamburg, and may settle in England or America in his triumphant maturity. I have in mind one famous American Jew who was born on the Rhine, was an employee in a German bank, moved to London, became a parliamentary candidate in the Conservative interest and is now one of the kings of American finance. On the contrary, the Eastern Jew is a confirmed nationalist. He is as passionately attached to his Jewish nationality as any Tchech or any Pole. He refused to be merged, and he looks with contempt on his fellow Jews who allow themselves to be absorbed in an alien population.

The Western Jew is a progressive and a modernist. He is in favour of every new development in philosophy, literature or politics. He is the revolutionary ferment in contemporary Europe. In Bavaria, in Hungary, in Russia, where Bolshevism has been especially virulent and where Red Terrorism has for a time prevailed, the majority of the Bolshevik leaders have been Jews. On the contrary, in Eastern Europe, the Jew is a conservative, one might even say a reactionary. A recent fascinating French novel by the Brothers Tharaud, "In the Shadow of the Cross," gives a vivid description of those Jewish communities of the Hungarian Puezta. Those communities are still lingering in the Middle Ages. The Eastern Jew lives in the grip of custom. He clings to his ancient traditions. He is a conservative even in the

cut of his beard and the cut of his coat. He wears the same headgear, the same gabardines which his fathers wore five hundred years ago.

The Western Jew is more often than not a free thinker and an uncompromising rationalist. He has cut himself adrift from every form of revealed religion. On the contrary, the Eastern Jew is rigidly orthodox. He is intolerant and exclusive. He draws his spiritual nourishment from the Talmud. He is to a liberal Christian—what a High Churchman is to the Protestant or to the Modernist. Indeed, he attaches even greater importance to ritual and form than any Roman Catholic ritualist. His religious ideal is still the theocratic ideal. And in that orthodox community the Rabbi has an influence which is even greater than that of a Roman Catholic priest in a Belgian or Spanish village.

The Western Jew is, in our minds, the proverbial successful trader, the moneyed man who is generally supposed to have acquired more than his proper share of the material goods of this world. The Eastern Jew is in the main a proletarian with an even lower standard of living than the proletarian of London or Glasgow. It is difficult to imagine the destitution of the bulk of the Polish Jews. They are miserably underfed; they are shockingly overcrowded; notwithstanding the many hygienic practices of their religion, all of them aiming at cleanliness, they are indescribably filthy; they are a prey to loathsome forms of skin disease. And that lower standard of living is true not only of the cities, but of almost every village. I stayed with a Polish magnate in a large village on the Russian frontier. The palace of my host was in the centre of a huge park. All round

were the spacious farmhouses of the peasants, and beyond, the infinite expanse of the Ukrainian plain. One might have thought that here at least, where land was plentiful, the Jewish population might have spread themselves out. But even here, two thousand Jews were huddled up in a few rookeries. And that borough was typical of every Ukrainian township.

If I have accurately described the contrasts and oppositions between the Western Jew and the Eastern Jew, it follows that, in all our appreciations or depreciations of the Jewish people, in all our discussions of the Jewish problem, we shall have to be very careful to discriminate between those two fundamentally different types. And yet, on the other hand, it remains true that, with all those differences, the Eastern Jew exhibits many of the characteristics which we also associate with the Western Jew, at the same time revealing those traits in a much more striking form.

In the first place, the Eastern Jew has the tribal instinct to a degree which is unintelligible to the ordinary Frenchman or Englishman. There may be many profound divisions, conflicting sects within the Jewish community; there are so many political parties that a special chart has been recently published to explain those parties to the uninitiated. But all these sects and parties combine against the Gentile whenever necessity arises.

The Ghetto itself may be considered as a striking proof and as a living symbol of that tribal instinct. The existence of the Ghetto has been deservedly described as a standing memento and reproach to the Christian persecutor. But the strange thing is that the Jew

continues to live in the Ghetto of his own free will long after he has ceased to be compelled to live within its precincts. It is now many generations since the barriers of the Ghetto have been taken down in England and America. In London and in New York the Jew is free to live as he likes and where he likes. Yet the Ghetto habit survives. The Eastern Jew is a gregarious animal. He has what Maeterlinck calls "the spirit of the hive," and he can only live and prosper in the atmosphere of the beehive.

And as every Eastern Jew obeys the tribal instinct, so he obeys the family instinct. He is far more domesticated than the average Christian. In the practice of some essential private virtues the Jew is superior and not inferior to the Christian. The Jewish family still has a stability and a cohesion which are very rare elsewhere. And I am convinced, by the way, that this family solidarity is one of the reasons for the worldly success of the Jew.

There is a third trait which strikes you in the Polish Ghetto, and which is common to the Jew all over the world. In the poorest village every Jew is trained to feel and to show reverence to learning. The same man who is described as a materialist believes in the triumph of mind over matter, of the ideal over brute force. In every Eastern Community, the Rabbi, the scholar learned in the Talmud, counts far more than the rich man, and, by the way, he often marries the daughter of the rich man. That respect for learning may be partly derived from the persistence of the theocratic tradition. It is also partly due to a recognition of the fact that only by using the powers of the mind, only by using his wits,

has the Jew any chance to rise in the world and get the better of those who despise him or persecute him. Hence also the Jewish partiality for the intellectual activities, hence the enormous proportion of Jews in every liberal profession—in the law, at the Bar, in medicine and in the Press. Hence also the regulations which were enforced as recently as 1914 all over the Russian Empire and which restricted the proportion of Jewish students in the Universities to 6 or 7 per cent. Without such regulations the majority of the lawyers or doctors of Petrograd, or Moscow, or Warsaw would have been Jews.

Last, but not least, we find in the Eastern Jew, as well as in the Western Jew, the universal predominance of the trading instinct. In a literal sense the Eastern Jew has secured a monopoly of trade. He is not a producer, but a middle-man. A casual walk through a Polish city on the Sabbath Day enables one at a glance to realise how completely commerce is in the hands of the Jews. The central streets of a modern city are mainly rows of shops, and in Poland every shop in every street in the centre of every city is closed on Sabbath Day. Commercial life is virtually suspended between sunset on Friday and Saturday night.

Hence the acuteness and bitterness of the Sunday controversy in Poland. The argument of the Eastern Jew is as follows: The Jews are strict in the observance of the Sabbath. The Christians are allowed to work on the Jewish Sabbath, why should the Jews not be allowed to trade on the Christian Sunday? Why should they be debarred from trading for two days of the week, and thus be placed at an unfair disadvantage?

The very social structure of the Ukraine may be given as another illustration of the same trading monopoly by the Jews. One might almost say that there are found castes in the Ukraine as there were once in India. The cleavage is racial as well as social. At the outbreak of the war all the landowners were Poles, all the officials were Russians, all the peasants were Ruthenians, and all the tradesmen, all the inn-keepers, and all the publicans were Jews.

But not only have the Eastern Jews a monopoly of licit trades, they have also a monopoly of the illicit trades. We ought not to judge them by our Western standards of morality. Why should the Jew be law-abiding? Laws and regulations in Tsarist Russia were so oppressive that the Jews may be excused for having lost any scruples as to evading the law.

Nor have the Jews learnt to be more scrupulous in the observance of the Polish laws under the new dispensation. One of the most far-reaching evils in Eastern Europe is the reckless speculation in a depreciated currency. And almost in every country the authorities have had to enact severe regulations to restrict some of the worst abuses in that speculation. But the Jews everywhere are evading those regulations. In Danzig, in Vilno, in Krakow you can see in the open street crowds of Jews carrying on their Black Exchange, their "Bourse Noire." At a certain hour of the day and in certain quarters of the city you will be accosted by miserable-looking specimens of humanity, and you will be asked whether you have any English pounds or American dollars to dispose of. The operations of the "Bourse Noire" are prohibited, under dire penalties, yet they

continue on a large scale. The explanation is a simple one. The Jewish trader is stronger than the law. Policemen are miserably under-paid, whilst they are generously bribed by the Jewish speculator. The policeman therefore pretends not to see, or he looks on at a distance without interfering. That is partly why the Polish mark stands to-day at forty thousand marks to the pound sterling, although the economic position of Poland has enormously improved.

CHAPTER XVII

THE TRAGIC CRISIS OF EASTERN JEWRY

THE Jews in Eastern Europe are passing through a severe crisis, perhaps the most acute, the most tragic in the millennial annals of the Chosen People. When the war broke out more than one-third of the total Jewish population of the world, estimated approximately at twelve millions, was still living under the penal laws of Russia, within the Pale of Settlement. Fate ordained that this Pale of Settlement should become one of the main theatres of the world war. For five years the German and Russian armies, the Polish and Bolshevist armies, advanced and retreated over the Ukrainian plains. The same fatality made it inevitable that throughout the war the Jews should be torn between their political allegiance and their national sympathies. They had no reason whatsoever to love the Russian régime. They had every reason to detest it. They spoke a German dialect. They were therefore necessarily suspected of being on the side of the Germans. In consequence they were subjected to every indignity on the part of the Russian armies. Hundreds of thousands were driven from their homes. Tens of thousands were hanged as spies.

The collapse of Tsarism liberated the Jews from the Russian tyranny, but their historical political unity

was broken up. Without their consent they had to change their political status. They had to become citizens of at least eight Succession States. They ceased to be Russians or Hungarians, they had to become Lithuanians, Lettonians, Finns, Esthonians, Ukrainians, Tchechs, Roumanians or Yougoslavs. They had a new nationality forced upon them, at the very moment when national feeling was roused in every Jewish community as it had never been roused since the days of the Maccabean Patriots.

In Western Europe and in America one hears it very commonly said that the Jews have come out of the war as the only real victors, that they are the only people who received a large accretion of wealth. They used a unique opportunity and they turned their unique gifts to the making of money. And they made the most of their opportunity. As war contractors, as traders, as bankers, a large section of the Jewish people in every country made colossal fortunes.

One ought to add that their political influence increased together with their financial influence. Their political influence was such that they prevailed on the largest Mahommedan power in the world to grant a national home to the Jewish people in a country which is inhabited by 80 per cent. of Mahommedan Arabs, and in which all the Christian Churches have a common interest. For the first time in history a Jew became Secretary of State for India. Simultaneously another Jew became Viceroy of India. Another Jew became Secretary of Foreign Affairs in Italy. Another Jew became Foreign Secretary in Germany. At the Congress of Versailles Jewish members played a decisive part.

Clemenceau, Wilson, Lloyd George, Orlando, were all surrounded by Jewish advisers.

But with the hour of victory also came the hour of supreme peril. Anti-Semitism is rampant to-day even where it never existed before. The Jews are made partly responsible both for the financial collapse and for the revolutionary upheaval of Central and Eastern Europe. The finances of Germany and Poland, of Austria and Hungary, broke down through the depreciation of the mark, and it was mainly the Jews who were said to have profited by that depreciation. Bavaria, Hungary and Russia witnessed a Reign of Terror, and it was mainly the Jews who were said to be the leaders of the Terrorists.

Whilst the feeling amongst the Jews is rising in Eastern Europe, their economic predominance is threatened in those countries where they had hitherto an undisputed monopoly—namely, the three agricultural states of Hungary, Poland and Roumania. The abnormal proportion of Jews in the towns of those countries has had one disastrous social effect, amongst many others. It has arrested their social and political development. Those three countries present one very striking feature in common which has not hitherto received sufficient attention, and which explains a great deal of their recent history.

It is the fashion to-day to attack the bourgeois. He is reviled by the social agitator and taxed out of existence by the State. Yet it is one of the safest generalisations of history that a sufficiently large middle class is essential to the welfare of any nation. There is no instance where any nation has been able to maintain its stability

or where any nation has achieved any conspicuous success without the assistance of any intermediate class of burghers.

Now it has been the misfortune and weakness of the three countries mentioned that no large middle class has ever succeeded in establishing itself. In all those countries there are only two strata—a peasantry and an aristocracy. In none of those countries is there what the French call a *tiers état*. And there is no middle-class mainly because the compact numbers of Jewish people and their monopoly of trade have prevented the emergence of such a middle class. To that cause more than to any other can we trace the downfall of the Polish Republic.

Now the Hungarians, the Poles and the Roumanians, as the result of the experiences of the war, are beginning to realise that if they are to survive they must evolve that intermediate class which at present does not exist. But if that new *tiers état* emerges in those peasant communities of Central and Eastern Europe, if a Polish, Hungarian and Roumanian bourgeoisie both becomes class conscious and economically self-sufficient, then the economic position of the Jews becomes untenable. They will be unable to make a livelihood. They will have to subsist by taking in each other's washing.

One remarkable incident which happened immediately before the war illustrates the economic antagonism between the Jewish population and the rising Polish middle class. About 1910 the National party declared an economic boycott against the Jews. It was an inopportune and a dangerous move, as Mr. Roman Dmowski found out to his cost. But the Christians were able to urge that they were only applying to the

Jews those very economic methods which the Jews were applying to the Poles. The Jews maintained the strictest economic solidarity and clannishness and exclusiveness amongst themselves. The Christians were merely retaliating. It was not a conflict between the nationalism of the Poles and the internationalism of the Jews. It was a struggle between two nationalisms. To the solid Jewish block, the Poles opposed their own block on equal solidity. Once again it was, I admit, a dangerous experiment, and one which could not lead to internal peace. But the whole relations between the Jews and the Christians on the present footing were themselves abnormal and unhealthy. And the fault lay neither with the Jews nor with the Poles—the original responsibility rested with the policy of the Tsarist régime.

Together with the economic issue the political issue has been raised, and it has been raised by the Jews themselves. The Poles are as intensely patriotic as the Jews. They are more intensely patriotic than any other European people. Their patriotism may be measured by their sufferings and by their sacrifices. For one hundred and thirty years they have lived and moved and had their being in an ideal Polish State. And now, when in the fulness of time that State has been restored, they discover with dismay that the Jews, on whose support they had a right to rely, are the secret or overt enemies of the State. They discover that the Polish Jew is primarily a Jew, that he is secondarily a German, but that in the majority of cases he refuses to be a Pole pure and simple.

In this connection there is one very important fact which is not generally realised, the fact, namely, that

95 per cent. of the five million Polish Jews speak a German dialect. It is almost universally assumed that what is called the Jargon or Yiddish is merely a Hebrew slang with an admixture of Polish and German words. But Yiddish is nothing of the kind. It is a German dialect with a sprinkling of Hebrew and Polish words. Every traveller in Poland can apply a very simple practical test. A Warsaw Pole cannot possibly understand a Polish Jew. On the other hand, a German would have no difficulty in understanding him, whether that German hails from Breslau, from Berlin or from Aix-la-Chapelle.

And not only do the Jews speak a German dialect, which they have a perfect right to do, but they claim that this dialect shall be used and recognised in the public schools of the Polish State. The Poles contend that such a claim is intolerable, and would not be admitted by any Government. What would the English people say if the Jews of Whitechapel insisted on eliminating English from the board schools of East London? What would the American people say if the Jews insisted that English should be eliminated from the public schools of the Bowery? And it is obvious that no English or American Jew would dream of urging such a demand. Why, then, should they urge it in Poland?

And last, but not least, there is the religious difficulty. For the last twenty years the powerful national sentiment and the religious ideals which are expressed in the word "Sionism" have gripped the majority of the Jewish people. Unfortunately if Sionism is a national and religious movement which is perfectly legitimate and perhaps inevitable, it is also a movement which runs

counter to other equally powerful religious and natural sentiments in the new-born states. And it yet remains to be proved whether the growth of Sionism will ultimately have served the interests of the Jewish people, or whether it will have added one more powerful cause of friction to all the other causes of enmity. The whole position can be summed up in one simple proposition. If the national and religious claims of the Jews are granted in Hungary, Poland and Roumania, then the Jews will not only constitute a State within a State which might create a possible although very difficult political situation, but they would constitute a thousand little republics within the Polish Commonwealth. One may have every sympathy with the Jews in their sufferings and in their grievances, but one can also understand the difficulty for two nations with different languages, different religions and different ideals, to live peacefully and harmoniously the one alongside the other.

No account of the Jewish Question in Eastern Europe would be complete which would ignore the distressing subject of Jewish pogroms. Ever since the Armistice public opinion in this country and in the United States has been periodically startled by the news of cruel Jewish pogroms in the new State of Poland. And all over the world there has been an outburst of indignation against those incorrigible Poles who are thus using their newly won freedom to oppress their fellow-citizens of Jewish persuasion. The extraordinary thing about those anti-Polish accusations, even as about the anti-Jewish accusations of ritual murders, is that whenever they have been examined they have proved themselves to be entirely unfounded. There have been numerous

anti-Jewish pogroms in Bolshevik Russia, although a large proportion of the Bolshevik leaders in the Russian Government happen to be Jews. But there have been no Jewish pogroms in Poland. There have been various encounters in Vilno, in Lemberg, and elsewhere between Polish troops and Jewish Bolsheviks, and rebels have actually been killed, an accident which occasionally happens in civil war. But those Jewish rebels have been killed, not because they were Jews, but because they were Bolsheviks. One recent incident illustrates the levity with which accusations are made against the Poles. When the *New York Herald* published some sensational revelations about Jewish pogroms in Poland and showed us gruesome pictures of massacres in Kishinef, it forgot that the city of Kishinef is situated in Bessarabia, now a province of Roumania, about two hundred and fifty kilometres from the nearest Polish frontier. It also forgot that those gruesome pictures referred to events which took place in 1905 under the old Tsarist régime.

A few months ago, at the request of the Polish Government, the United States Government, made an investigation into the condition of the Jews in Poland. The Commissioner sent by President Wilson was Mr. Morgenthau, late Ambassador of Turkey, and himself a Jew. Ambassador Morgenthau was specially qualified for the task. He is a man of outstanding ability, he is the author of one of the most interesting books of the war, and he had already conducted an investigation into the Armenian pogroms in Turkey. Mr. Morgenthau, in his inquiry, proved beyond the possibility of contestation the baseless nature of the accusation. He further gave the Polish Jews the wholesome advice to try to be

loyal citizens to the New State, warning them at the same time of the incalculable damage which was being done not only to the New State, but to the Jewish cause, by the irresponsible charges hurled by the Jewish papers against the Polish Government and the Polish people.

This is not the place to discuss the solution or solutions of the Jewish riddle as it presents itself in Eastern Europe. But even the most cursory examination is sufficient to prove that every one of the solutions proposed is fraught with formidable difficulties. In Russia the solution is likely to be a violent one. In the other parts of Europe, no solution thus far seems to be in sight. Assimilation cannot be a solution, because the orthodox and conservative Jewish Communities refuse to be assimilated. Sionism is not a solution, because there would not even be room in Palestine to accommodate the Jewish population of the single city of Warsaw. Wholesale emigration is not a solution, because the settlement of millions of Jews is only conceivable in the unoccupied parts of Siberia.

If my diagnosis is correct, the future of the Jewish race is indeed dark and uncertain. There never was a time when the spirit of good-will, of conciliation and compromise was more necessary on both sides. The Poles are naturally easy-going and tolerant. The Jews have occupied a privileged position in Poland when they were persecuted in every other country. But they must understand the awful difficulties which confront even the best-intentioned and the most enlightened Polish statesmen. And those who see most clearly those difficulties must not therefore be supposed to be enemies of the Jewish people. No doubt a friend of the Jews

might say that the Jews in Poland are a vital, a dynamic element, that they are the oxygen in the social organism. But even a friend of the Jews would have to admit that the presence and consumption of too much oxygen might prove fatal to the organism. No doubt a friend of the Jews might hold that the Jewish people in Poland are the salt of the earth. But even a friend of the Jews might have to admit that under present conditions there is too much salt in the body politic of the Eastern States, and that those new States may not be able to digest the six million alien peoples who are living in their midst and are threatening their national existence.

I have tried to submit as impartially, as judiciously and as sympathetically as is in my power, the various elements of the Jewish problem as it presents itself in Eastern Europe. I am well aware that my analysis of the problem will not commend itself to many of my Jewish readers. For their benefit, and speaking as a sincere friend of the Jews who has often pleaded on their behalf, I would like to make one concluding remark. The Jewish people are a very remarkable people, endowed with many wonderful gifts. They have never been surpassed for cleverness, tenacity, vitality, versatility, adaptability, dynamic energy. But no more than any other people can they claim to have a monopoly of all the private or public virtues. Like other nations, they contain to-day many undesirable elements. And granting that they have been unjustly persecuted, it is also unfortunately true that those very persecutions have left those taints which oppression and slavery always leave in their train.

To state unpalatable facts is not to proclaim oneself

an anti-Semite. Yet the Jewish Press has acquired the very unpleasant and very dangerous habit of starting the war-whoop of anti-Semitism whenever a writer, however friendly to the Jews, ventures to adduce any facts which may in any way reflect on the Chosen People.

Jewish writers have never hesitated to make ample use of their own highly developed critical faculties in order to expose the weaknesses and shortcomings of every community and of every class in the Gentile world. They ought to allow the same liberty to others, and they ought to allow the Gentile writers to apply their much less developed critical faculties to the scientific investigation of the Jewish Problem. Thus we shall not only best serve the cause of truth, but the cause of the Jewish people themselves.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE TRAGEDY OF THE RUSSIAN CHURCH

AT the conclusion of his monumental work on the Spirit of Russia, President Masaryk, the "Grand Old Man" of Central Europe, who may be considered as the greatest living authority upon all Slavonic problems, challenges, in relation to Russia, the current materialistic interpretation of history, and formulates the proposition that the history and character of the Russian people can only be understood in the light of their national religion. Bolshevik writers such as Professor Pokrowski may try to explain the vicissitudes of Russian history by the rise and fall in the prices of wheat. But the deeper meaning of Russian history is only to be revealed by the rise and fall of religious beliefs and religious institutions. According to President Masaryk, the primacy of the religious factor in the building up of Russian civilisation is only a particular application of a universal law. Sceptics like Gibbon may tell us that all religions are equally true to the believer and equally false to the unbeliever. But even Gibbon is obliged to add that all religions are equally necessary to the statesman. To say, however, that all religions are necessary to the statesman is simply to admit that an institutional Church is an indispensable organ for the moral and political education of the people. In proportion as a Church fulfils, or fails to fulfil, its

indispensable function, the State itself will succeed or fail.

Unfortunately it must be conceded that in modern times the Russian Church has been a dismal failure, and this failure largely accounts for the present Russian tragedy. Until the end of the Middle Ages the Russian Church did indeed discharge a great historical mission by acting as a bulwark against the Tartar invaders, by stopping the onward march of Mahommedanism in the East, and by saving the Russian people from extinction. In the tri-unity of the patriotic Slavophil creed the "narodnost," or nationality, is made identical with "pravoslavie," or orthodoxy. Even as late as the seventeenth century the influence of the national religion was such that the Church was able to place her own nominee on the throne of the Tsars. It is a significant fact that the founder of the Romanov Dynasty was the son of the Patriarch of Moscow. It is all the more strange that within less than a century of this political triumph the Russian Church had forfeited her proud position, and that in the struggle which ensued she was hopelessly beaten. Peter the Great assumed for himself the plenitude of temporal and spiritual power. He suppressed the Patriarchate and he replaced the personal rule of the spiritual Head of the Church by the anonymous rule of the Holy Synod. The Russian Church entered into an ignominious and immoral compact. She sold her soul for a mess of pottage. She surrendered her independence in return for the protection of the State and for the right to persecute all dissident religious communities—a right which, until six years ago, she impartially exercised against the

Protestant as well as the Catholic denominations. The Church became a mere department of the Tsarist Bureaucracy. Generals and courtiers were appointed to the august office of Procurators of the Holy Synod; and Orthodox Bishops were degraded to the position of subordinate State officials.

Together with her independence, the Russian Church lost all moral power and religious influence. Indeed no great Christian Church, unless it be the Mother Church of Byzantium, ever fell to lower depths than the Greek Orthodox Church. The Black Clergy of Monks, from which the higher hierarchy was exclusively recruited, and who were not allowed to marry, were sunk in political servility. The White Clergy of Parish Priests, who were compelled to marry, were sunk in abject poverty. The degradation of the shepherds inevitably led to the demoralisation of the flock. The Russian peasants surrendered to those "Powers of Darkness" which are so vividly described in Tolstoy's famous drama. In other Christian Churches, the priest, the clergyman, or the minister has been the natural leader of the people. In Russia we find no trace of such leadership, whether political or intellectual or moral. The Russian Church has produced no Wolsey or Richelieu, no Bossuet or Fenelon, no Newman or Manning, no Chalmers and no Robertson of Brighton. And even as they failed with the people, they failed even more completely with the educated classes. The Russian "intelligentsia" gradually came to be completely divorced from the religion of the nation, a fact which largely explains its political impotence. With the exception of Dostoievski, it may be said that all the

great writers of Russian literature have been antagonistic to the Church. Even Tolstoy was solemnly excommunicated. And the deepest religious thinker of the last generation, Vladimir Soloviov, was mainly concerned to bring about a reunion with the Roman Catholic Church.

The impotence of the Russian Church has been tragically revealed in the course of the Russian Revolution. In most European revolutions of the past the Churches played a conspicuous part. They either furthered or combated the revolutionary movements. The history of the English Revolution is inseparable from the Puritan movement. The history of the French Revolution is inseparable from the Civil Constitution of the Clergy and the religious insurrection of the Vendée. On the contrary, in the Russian Revolution, the Church has only been associated with the scandals of Father Gapon, of "Monk" Rasputin and Bishops Pitirim and Hermogenes. With the solitary exception of Archbishop Tikhon, the Russian Church has been strangely passive and silent. Almost without resistance, both the shepherds and the flock allowed themselves to be led to the Bolshevik shambles. A hundred million Christians were ruled over by an insignificant band of Jewish Atheists who proclaimed that the Christian religion is an opiate which poisons the minds of the people, and who, as I explained elsewhere, made it their policy to extinguish all the lights of Heaven.

What have been the deeper causes of this startling bankruptcy of the Russian Church in the greatest crisis of modern history? I believe that this bankruptcy,

especially if we read it in conjunction with the parallel failure of the Lutheran Churches in Germany, during the world war, provides a memorable object lesson to the student of religion, and reveals to him where he must look for the principle of life and death in the history of Christian Churches. Ecclesiastical annalists are too much inclined to dwell on dogma or ritual or ethical teaching, and to exaggerate their importance at the expense of the political aspect of institutional religions. They will bracket together Lutheranism and Calvinism, Russian Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism, simply because of the dogmatic and ritualistic affinities of those Churches. They fail to see that between those Churches the analogies are superficial, whereas the differences are vital. Both in the manifestations of their religious life and in their effect on human civilisation there have been far more analogies between German Lutheranism and Russian Orthodoxy on the one hand, and between Calvinism and Roman Catholicism on the other. The true principle of classification of modern Christian Churches is not dogma or ritual, or even ethical teaching, *but the nature of the relations between Church and State*. The true test is the measure in which each Church has remained loyal to the vital principle of Christianity, namely the independence of the spiritual power. The essentials of Christian ethical teaching are common to all denominations. What differentiates one Church from another is its freedom from or subjection to the State. Only in a Free Church can the life-giving principles of Christianity assert themselves.

The Russian Church and the Roman Catholic Church are certainly very similar in dogma and morals, so

similar indeed that one branch of the Russian Orthodox Church, namely the Uniat Church, has been merged in Roman Catholicism. Yet, notwithstanding this similarity, the spirit of the two Churches has been fundamentally different. Both Churches may profess the same dogmas, have a similar ritual, retain the monastic institutions and the celibacy of the Clergy. Yet there is one vital thing which separates them. In the one the Church is subordinate to the State, in the other the Church is independent and supreme.

In the same way Lutheranism and Calvinism may be almost identical in their historical origins, in their evangelical teaching, in their appeal to the Bible as the one supreme authority. Yet the two Churches have had very different destinies and exercised very different influences, simply because Lutheranism accepted the supremacy of the State, whereas Calvinism maintained the independence of the Church. Lutheranism has been, from the beginning, an Erastian Church, whereas Calvinism continued to believe in the theocratic principle.

Conversely, German Lutheranism and Russian Orthodoxy seem to be essentially different in respect of dogma and organisation. Yet both have had very much the same demoralising political influence. Both have furthered the cause of political despotism. Both have had comparatively little influence on the life of the nation. In both Churches the ruler has been the "Summus Episcopus." In both Churches there has been a fusion and confusion of the temporal and spiritual powers. Both Churches have adopted as their principle the "*Cujus regio, illius religio.*" In both Churches the

subject had to follow the religion of the Prince. (Hence the curious religious mosaic of modern Germany.)

Again, Calvinism and Roman Catholicism seem to be fundamentally different in their dogmas, in their discipline, in their institutions. And yet, strangely enough, they have had almost identical political fortunes, and their political influence in the larger perspective of history has been very similar. Politically and morally Calvinism certainly stands much nearer to Roman Catholicism than to Lutheranism. They both, on the whole, and notwithstanding many deflections, made for political freedom, because both Calvinism and Catholicism are based on the independence of the spiritual and the moral powers. In the Middle Ages the Papacy opposed the despotism of the Hohenstaufen. In modern times the Papacy alone opposed the tyranny of Napoleon and the despotism of the Hohenzollern. Similarly, the Calvinistic Churches almost invariably resulted in the establishment of democratic institutions. The affinity between Calvinism and Democracy, what I would call the democratic imperialism of Calvinism, is one of the most impressive phenomena of modern history, and may almost be said to have become an historical law. Within a century of its foundation the Church of Calvin produced in rapid succession the republic of Geneva, the Scottish revolution of John Knox, the Dutch Republic of William the Silent, the Huguenot Republics of Southern France, the Puritan Commonwealth of Cromwell, and the New England Republics of the Pilgrim Fathers.

CHAPTER XIX

THE FUTURE OF THE RUSSIAN CHURCH

THE Cæsaropapism and Erastianism of the Russian Church have not only been responsible for her own political and moral degradation, they have also been largely responsible for many of the shortcomings of the Russian character which have been so startlingly revealed in the present crisis. However much we may admire the varied endowments of the Russian people, they are afflicted with one fateful constitutional disease. The Russian seems to have no will-power, no moral backbone. He is the victim of his impulses. The Russian hero is never active, he is always passive. He does not react against temptation or disaster. That absence of self-control is perhaps the one trait which strikes the reader of Russian novels, whether he first gets acquainted with Turgenev or Tolstoy, with Gontcharov or Dostoevski or Tchecov.

That fatal shortcoming of the Russian character has been generally traced to physical or ethnic causes, to a so-called Asiatic origin or to the historical vicissitudes of the Russian people. It is supposed to be the inheritance of the Golden Horde. On the contrary, I believe that it is largely the inheritance of Cæsaropapism. The Roman Catholic and the Calvinistic Churches are able to discharge, in the plenitude of their independence, their necessary function of training the national character

both in private and public life. They are essentially militant Churches. On the contrary, the Byzantine Church, which is enslaved to the State, cannot afford to be a Church militant. She can only inculcate the passive virtues of obedience and resignation. She does not preach resistance to oppression. She preaches the contemplative life. She teaches the "way of Mary," and not the "way of Martha." And the "way of Mary" has not been, as Mr. Stephen Graham made us believe during the war, a source of strength either to the Russian Church or to the Russian people; rather has it been a source of weakness.

Even in the present crisis it is interesting to compare the attitude and mentality of Russian Churchmen with what would be the attitude or mentality in similar circumstances of an Englishman or Frenchman. One recent evening in Moscow an eminent Russian thinker was describing to me the terrible sufferings of his co-religionists. An Englishman would have concluded that the measure of the Bolshevist iniquities must be nearly full, that such an odious régime could not last, that sooner or later the Russian people must rebel against their tyrants. The conclusion of my pious Russian friend was entirely different. The Bolshevist régime, he assured me, will last, and it is necessary and desirable that it shall last. The Russian people had committed terrible sins. The Intellectuals had denied God. The predatory peasants had robbed and murdered their landowners. Bolshevism was only the Providential retribution for those sins. Therefore to oppose the Bolshevist régime was to rebel against the Will of God.

The obvious reply of an Englishman, speaking on

the human plane, would be that it is not the sins of the children of the Orthodox Church, nor the unbelief of the intellectual classes, which are responsible for the excesses and the continuance of Bolshevism. Rather is it the sins of the Orthodox Church herself, her servility and her degradation. Under the Bolshevist régime the Church is paying the penalty, and she is paying it in full. But good has come out of evil. The mischievous compact between the Church and the State has at last been broken. The Bolshevist Atheists thought that once for all they were destroying the Orthodox Church. Instead they only liberated her. With the fall of the Tsarist régime there also fell the sinister power which held the Church in bondage. Already in the summer of 1917, immediately after the first revolution, the Orthodox Church summoned a national Council whose first act was to restore the Patriarchate. After two hundred years the Sobor of 1917 ended the evil work of Peter the Great, and the Greek Orthodox Church recovered her spiritual freedom.

Together with her spiritual freedom the Orthodox Church will recover the moral influence which she had forfeited under the Tsars. Under that régime she exercised an illegitimate power through the humiliating protection of the State, and she inevitably shared in the discredit and in the hatred which the State inspired. To every Russian Liberal, the State and the Church were common enemies. The Church, however, did not trouble about the universal obloquy which she incurred. Being secure against the competition of all other religions, and being established she did not require to make any effort to maintain or to improve

her position. The protection of the States is now withdrawn. Henceforth the Russian Church will be compelled to fall back on her intrinsic worth. She will no longer be able to assert herself through excommunicating and persecuting her opponents. She will have to put her house in order. Her only strength will be in the support of the people.

To-day, notwithstanding, or perhaps because of, the diabolical policy of the Bolshevik Atheists, the Orthodox Church, as we proved in a series of articles recently published by the *Scotsman*, is already stronger than she was before the downfall of Tsarism. Already there is every indication of a religious revival. The vast and enthusiastic crowds attending every religious gathering, the changed attitude of the intellectual classes, prove that not only has the Church been purified by the fire of persecution, but that she is already deriving the full benefit of her newly recovered freedom. The Russian people are temperamentally a profoundly religious people. In other European countries it was often the mission of the Church to keep alive the sacred flame of religion. In Russia it is not the Church which has maintained the religion of the people, it is the people who have saved the Church. Those religious forces dormant in the Russian people henceforth will find full scope. The spiritual power of the Church, which hitherto was a factor making for evil, will be, in the future, a factor making for good.

All the Christian Churches will share in the revival of the Greek Orthodox Church. In the terrible struggle against the Powers of Darkness and against the forces of moral anarchy which have been let loose all over the

world, the Christian Churches have no reason to antagonise each other, rather have they all one common interest. Hitherto the non-orthodox Churches never had a chance in Russia. Religious disabilities which had been removed ages ago in every country still continued in Russia, until the outbreak of the first revolution. To distribute a copy of the New Testament, to be married in a Roman Catholic or in a Protestant Church, to break with the Establishment, was an offence against the law, and often entailed the loss of civil rights. Those disabilities are now removed. No doubt we may still witness a short transitional period of disturbance and anxiety. The political reaction which is sure to follow the collapse of Bolshevism, and which will probably be attended by appalling pogroms of the Jews, may be so irresistibly strong that the Orthodox Church may yet be tempted to secure special privileges for herself at the expense of the other Churches. She may still persist in her claim to be recognised as the only national Church. Like the French Catholic Church on the advent of Napoleon, she may still try to conclude a "Concordate" with the coming Dictator. Notwithstanding the solemn lessons of an evil past, she may still prefer the protection of the State to the integrity of spiritual freedom. But whatever happens, the old intolerance can never be revived. Religious freedom can never be revoked. The Greek Orthodox Church will have to submit to the rivalry of other Churches. Thus within the next few years a huge Continent will be opened to their proselytising activities. No such opportunity has ever come either to the Protestant or Roman Catholic Churches since the days

of the Reformation. There is little doubt that the Christian Churches will try to avail themselves of that magnificent opportunity. Rome, using the connecting link of the existing Uniat Churches, will make a systematic endeavour to achieve that reunion between East and West which has been the dream of a thousand years. Nor is it at all likely that the Roman Catholic Religion will be left in undisturbed possession of the field. The British and American Churches, both Anglican and Protestant, will enter the lists. Therefore whatever may be the outcome of the rival efforts of the various denominations, we may make the confident forecast that the new federation of Russian States will be, for many generations to come, the most interesting and the most promising sphere of missionary enterprise in the Christian world.

CHAPTER XX

BOLSHEVISM AND THE RUSSIAN NATIONAL CHARACTER

WE have to distinguish carefully between two aspects of Bolshevism. On the one hand, it is a world revolution with a universal creed and a universal mission. On the other hand, it is a specific national revolution, it is the outcome of peculiar Russian conditions and it raises a peculiar Russian problem. We have already repeatedly had to allude to the nature of that problem, because, as our argument proceeded, it has been forcing itself constantly upon our attention. The problem is this: how is it that a small minority of fanatics, madmen and criminals, who are not even Russian, but alien intruders, have been able to impose their tyranny almost without opposition upon one hundred and fifty million people? In France during the Terrorist crisis of the great revolution, popular insurrections were continually breaking out in the south, in the centre and in the west. In the centre Lyons had to be besieged. In the south Toulon had to be captured. In the Vendée the insurrection was only stamped out after a civil war lasting for years. In India a presumed challenge to a religious superstition, the introduction of greased cartridges, resulted in the Sepoy mutiny. Even in Tsarist Russia, although Tsarism was popular and was hallowed by tradition and by religion, nihilist plots were perpetually threatening the autoeracy. Yet to-day in Soviet Russia the Bolshevik

Dietators have been allowed for seven terrible years to trample underfoot the most cherished convictions of the people and to massacre them in hundreds of thousands.

The problem ought to be stated in terms somewhat different from those in which it is generally presented. In point of fact there have been insurrections and assassinations without number. One of the rulers of Petrograd, Wolodarski, and the Chief Inquisitor, Moses Uritski, were both murdered at the very beginning of the Revolution. There have been several attempts on the life of Lenin. Most of the Dietators only survived because they were safely guarded in the Kremlin by their Lettish and Chinese Janissaries.

The problem before us is not the absence of any organised opposition in Russia, the real problem is the impotence of that opposition. What we have to explain is how so many insurrections have invariably proved abortive, why they have not resulted in the downfall of the tyrants.

In the first place, the fact that Russia is ruled by a small minority is not a political anomaly; it is in accordance with historical law. All revolutions are the work of small but fanatical and resolute minorities.

In the second place, the Bolshevists, although numerically an insignificant minority, have brought under their control all the military and political organs of the Russian State.

In the third place, however terrible the Bolshevist régime may be, the Russian people are not affected by oppression in the same way as Western Europeans would be. They are accustomed to methods of terrorism.

Even under Tsarism they were kept down by the police, by the army and by the bureaucracy.

In the fourth place, although the Russian people are to-day governed by alien intruders, the fact is that the Russian has always been governed by foreigners. The old Russian chronicler, Nestor, tells us how even in the distant Middle Ages the Russian people called in the help of the Scandinavian Sea Rovers. Since the days of the Variags, the Russians have been in succession ruled by Tatars and Poles, by Swedes and Germans.

In the fifth place, the masses, that is to say the peasants, however much they may have felt their oppression, have been the reluctant and yet voluntary accomplices of the Bolshevists. They hate Bolshevism, but they have profited by the revolution. An insidious Bolshevik propaganda has succeeded in convincing them that if the counter-revolution were to succeed they would be deprived of the land which they have so recently appropriated. The peasants thus find themselves between "the devil and the deep sea." They are certainly afraid of the Bolshevik, but they dread even more the return of the landowner.

In the sixth place, however much the people may detest the Bolshevists, they have an uneasy feeling that there is nobody to take their places. Bolshevism may be dead or may be dying, but there is nobody to bury the corpse. You cannot make a successful counter-revolution without leaders. And there are no leaders left. They all either died of starvation or they died on the battlefields of the civil war. Or they have been massacred. Or, worst of all, they deserted their post in the hour of peril.

In the seventh place, after five years of the world war and after seven years of revolution, the masses of the people are tired of upheavals. Their spirit is broken.

In the eighth place, even if the people had still sufficient energy to rise against their tyrants, they realise that a counter-revolution might be the starting point of a new period of civil wars. They therefore prefer to bear the ills they have rather than fly to others which they know not of.

These are some of the reasons which may account for the survival of the Bolshevik régime. For the present I must content myself with stating them. I shall have an opportunity to discuss them more fully in the concluding chapter. But whilst stating them, one has an uneasy feeling that those reasons, however plausible they may look, do not touch the root of the problem. I am convinced that the ultimate explanation will only be found in certain very remarkable peculiarities of the Russian character. As President Masaryk reminds us in his great work on "The Spirit of Russia," the Russian himself believes that there is a fundamental distinction between Russia and Europe, and the Tchechoslovak statesman himself is careful to take that fundamental distinction as the starting point of his inquiry. The Russian does not react politically like the European. And he does not react like the European simply because he is not a European. Publicists may call the Russian people an Asiatic or semi-Asiatic people, or they may call them Greeks or Byzantines. This is not the place to investigate which is the more correct interpretation. The essential point to remember is that whether the Russian is called an Oriental or a Byzantine or a Greek,

there are strains in his temperament which are not Western, and which are a perpetual source of bewilderment to the Western observer.

The first difference in the Russian character which strikes the European is an almost uncanny atrophy and paralysis of the will. The Russian is the equal, if not the superior, of a European in the creative power of his imagination, in the intensity of his emotions, in the sincerity and courage of his convictions. But he is hopelessly inferior in what a Britisher would consider one of the essentials of character, namely the quality and strength of his will-power. The Russian is capable of savage energy and of sacrifice, but he is incapable of patient, systematic effort, of self-restraint and self-control. Like the houses in which the Russian lives, which are built of wood and not of stone, his temperament is made of softer and more inflammable material than the temperament of the Westerner. Like the savage or the child, he will yield to his impulses and instincts; he has no staying power. He is erratic and unstable and incalculable. With him it is the unexpected that always happens. A liberal like Protopopov will *suddenly* go over to reaction. The Pope Gapone will *suddenly* turn informer. A criminal will *suddenly* be converted, and an honest man will *suddenly* become a criminal. Raskolnikoff will suddenly commit murder.

That paralysis of the will is the key which unlocks mysteries of Russian character which otherwise would appear insoluble. It can be studied in almost every single masterpiece of Russian literature. We find it in "Eugène Oniegin" of Puhekine, in the "Hero of our Time" of Lermontoff. We find it in every novel of Gontcharov or

Turgenev, in every short story of Tchekhof. We find it in the chief character of Tolstoy's "War and Peace" and in the chief character of Dostoievski's "Crime and Punishment." The Russian hero is never a hero in the European sense of the word. He does not challenge destiny, he is generally its passive victim.

I do not believe that the explanation of the mystery is a racial or physical one, rather is it a moral and religious one. It is rooted in the very essence of the Greek Orthodox Church, as we have tried to prove in another chapter of this book. Christianity in the Catholic Church or in the Calvinistic Church is a stern discipline of the will, it is a constant training in self-government. On the contrary, Christianity in the Russian Church has only developed the negative, the passive and the contemplative virtues. Greek Orthodoxy teaches mainly obedience to authority, submission and resignation to the will of God and to the will of the Tsar, who is the representative of God. It preaches the "way of Mary" rather than the "way of Martha." The Russian knows how to die for his faith, he does not know how to live for it and still less how to live up to it. Greek Orthodoxy almost invariably breaks down in everyday life.

The second peculiar trait of the Russian character is the absence of a balanced judgment. That absence of judgment in the sphere of intellectual activity is very much the counterpart of the absence of self-control in the sphere of practical life. Even as the Russian is deficient in the one, so he is deficient in the other. And being deficient in balance and stability of judgment, he must inevitably be prone to extremes. He does not believe in the Aristotelian conception that virtue is a

golden mean. He has no sense of measure and proportion. The typical Russian is incapable of compromise. The Russian character is like the Russian climate, subject to the most abrupt and most violent variations. The Russian is either a drunkard or a total abstainer. He is either superstitious or atheist. He is either an ascetic or a sensualist. He is either greedy or disinterested, meek or violent, a loyal subject or a base traitor.

Those two differences which I have just emphasised seem to point to an even more fundamental difference, namely a quite peculiar conception of morality. To the European, morality means belief in a law and principle. It is not so with the Russian. Although Russian intellectuals for half a century have been worshipping German science and French philosophy, they have no notion of science and philosophy, because science and philosophy are based on the recognition of the supremacy of law. That is especially true of the science of ethics and theology. To a typical Russian, morality is something purely subjective and arbitrary. In the same way religion is mainly an emotional and devotional attitude, a surrender of personality to the mystical will of God. It is not based on immutable rules of conduct.

If we keep in mind those fundamental traits of the Russian character it may be less difficult for us to understand much that would otherwise be unintelligible in Russian history and in Russian politics. Here also we find the same absence of discipline, the same love of extremes, the same lack of principles. For the Russian politician the watchword is, Everything or Nothing. The choice is between despotism and anarchy. Abuses are not to be removed by fabian methods, by daily

labour, by cumulative efforts, by the co-operation of even the humblest citizens, they are not to be effected by peaceful evolution, but by violent revolution. There lies the final explanation of the repeated collapse of all Russian constitutional movements, of the invariable triumph of extremists and terrorists.

It is true that hitherto the very conditions of political training and responsibility were wanting in Russia. None of the elements was available out of which a representative government might have been formed, there was neither an independent Church nor a governing aristocratic class nor a middle class. There was nothing between the two extremes of a tyrannical bureaucracy and an inert peasantry.

The Revolution will have created after years of terrorism and anarchy those elements which were so conspicuously wanting in the old régime. On the ruins of the dead past there has arisen a new class of peasant proprietors who will have a stake in the welfare of the community, and who in their little village republics and in their co-operative societies will form the nuclei of self-government. There has arisen a new Church, liberated from State control, which will inculcate principles of moral responsibility. There is arising an independent middle class and a capitalist class which will provide the brain power of the future government. The economic, social, political and religious conditions of the new Russia will be so radically changed that we may reasonably expect a corresponding change in the national character. The old Russia was a continuation of Asia. The United States of the new Russia may acquire many of the features of the United States of America.

CHAPTER XXI

THE REVOLUTIONARY TRADITION IN RUSSIA

It is impossible to understand the Bolshevik Revolution without an accurate knowledge of the vicissitudes of the Russian State for the last hundred years. The Bolshevik Revolution is by no means a sudden nor even an unexpected catastrophe. It is the culminating point of a long series of crises and upheavals which began with the Decabrist conspiracy of 1825, led by members of the aristocracy, or even earlier, with the murder of the Tsar Paul I in the Ides of March 1801. The history of those revolutionary movements and the political ideals which inspired them has been exhaustively studied in the recent monumental work of President Masaryk: "The Spirit of Russia" (2 vols. George Allen and Unwin). Every student of the Bolshevik ideology will do well to make himself acquainted with that masterpiece of political literature.

It is not too much to say that ever since the death of Alexander I every liberal-minded Russian has been a potential revolutionist. No Liberal Russian could submit to a system of brute force and arbitrary caprice. No Russian who had travelled in Europe or who had been educated on European lines: no Russian who believed in the principles on which modern civilisation is built up, the reign of law, the co-operation of the people in the task of government, liberty of thought and

of conscience, the freedom of public meetings, the freedom of the Press: could honestly be reconciled to the Tsarist régime. For that régime was the negation of those fundamental principles and of those elemental liberties.

It is true that theoretically Tsarism had a moral and, even more, a religious basis. According to the prophets of Russian Conservatism, the so-called Slavophiles, Tsarism rested on the famous Tri-unity of Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality (*Samoderjavie, Pravoslavie, Narodnost*). Tsarism was a patriarchal system, in which the Tsar was both the "little father" of his people and the Anointed of the Lord. But this moral basis of Tsarism was a mere fiction. For the "little father" kept his people in abject ignorance and servitude, and the Church herself had neither influence nor power. Ever since Peter the Great abolished the Patriarchate, the Orthodox Church under the system of Cæsaropapism was only a subordinate department of State. The real Head of the Church, the Procurator of the Holy Synod, instead of being a Churchman, often happened to be a General or a Courtier.

In practice the Tsarist régime was based not on any moral foundation; it was not the reign of law, it was the tyranny of an arbitrary will supported by brute force. And that force was incarnated in the army, the police and the bureaucracy. And those three powers combined in suppressing every one of those franchises to which we referred and which in Western Europe were considered as the birthright of every citizen. A Protestant could not marry an Orthodox. A Bible Society was not allowed to circulate a copy of the Gospel. A Jew could

not reside outside the pale of settlement without the express permission of the police. A newspaper could not criticise the Government without submitting to the ruling of the censor. This infringement of the fundamental liberties of the Russian people existed until the very eve of the war.

As long as the Russian people lived a separate existence, as long as the Russian Empire was a semi-Asiatic Empire, the Tsarist régime did not meet with any systematic opposition. Indeed, until the beginning of the nineteenth century, even though Tsarism did not have a moral foundation, it had at least a popular foundation. When Alexander I rose against Napoleon he had the whole people behind him. Even the representatives of the great literary Renaissance, Lomonosov, the reformer of the Russian language, Karamzine, the National Historian, and Puchkine, the national poet, were loyal supporters of the throne. They realised that Tsarism had discharged a necessary and vital historical mission. The Tsars had defended the Russian people against the Tatar and the Turk, against the Swede and the Pole. They had gathered the scattered fragments of the Russian territory, they had evolved order out of chaos and they had evolved unity out of a conglomerate of heterogeneous national fragments. The Romanovs did for Russia what the Hohenzollerns and the Bourbons had done for Russia and France. Even at the beginning of the nineteenth century Tsarism still remained the government which was best adapted to the needs of the people. So far from being a reactionary régime, it might have been described as a progressive régime. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Tsarist

policy, instead of being behind the times, might rather be accused of being in advance of the times. Most of the rulers from Peter the Great to Catherine the Great, and even down to Alexander I, had to take the initiative in political reforms and had to impose them on their subjects. The people knew no better. They were living apart from Western civilisation.

But as political and social intercourse with Western Europe became closer, and as the educated classes imbued the philosophical and religious ideas of Germany and the political ideas of England and France, the non-moral, brutal and barbaric nature of the Tsarist régime became more apparent, and the chasm between the old Russia and the new widened. It became more and more the aspiration and the endeavour of every educated Russian to secure fundamental reforms in the State. In the 'forties and 'fifties of the nineteenth century, which is the golden age of Russian Literature, almost every writer was the systematic opponent of the established order.

It must be admitted that the champions of reform represented only a very small minority even of the educated class. The enormous majority of that class belonged to the Bureaucracy, and the Bureaucracy could not be expected to fight against a state of which they were the backbone. The bulk of the Bureaucracy was sympathetic to the Liberal movement, and the small minority of Liberals made up by the intensity of their enthusiasm for the smallness of their numbers. The Russian men of letters did for Russia in the nineteenth century what the French men of letters did for France in the eighteenth century. They were not only political

thinkers, they were apostles, and many of them were martyrs.

Russian literature is steeped in an heroic atmosphere. No other literature has raised to a higher level the dignity of a writer. The Russian writer is at the same time a thinker and a man of action. He has a cure of souls. The Russian printed book of the nineteenth century, like the French book of the eighteenth, has been the chief and almost the only instrument of political and social liberation. In Russia under Nicholas I the printed book had to take the place not only of the newspaper, but of the pulpit and the platform. For under this autocratic Government the Press was gagged, the Church had sold her birthright for a mess of pottage, and no Duma had yet arisen.

Nothing is more sad, more tragic, and more monotonous, and at the same time nothing is more moving and more inspiring, than the life-story of Russian writers of an earlier generation. Nearly all those lives resemble one another. What a lamentable martyrology! Well might Nekrassov exclaim in a famous book: "Who can live happy in Russia?" Radischef, one of the first who dared to expose the horrors of serfdom, exiled to Siberia by Catherine the Great and forced into committing suicide! Griboiedoff assassinated! Gogol falling a victim to religious melancholia! Puchkine and Lermontoff killed in a duel! Bielinski, the greatest of critics, Solovioff, the greatest of philosophers, and Tchekhof, the most celebrated of novelists, carried off prematurely by a pitiless climate! Herzen, Saltikoff, Tchernichevski, and Kropotkine condemned to exile. Turgeniev living away from the country he loved above everything.

Dostoievski, sentenced to the mines—*damnatus ad metalla*—and spending the best of his years in the "House of the Dead." Plesecheeff, Pisareff, put in prison! Tolstoy excommunicated by the Church! Each and every one of these writers suspected, hunted and condemned under a hostile Government to a life of sickness or misery or hopeless opposition.

In such an unequal struggle between the infinitesimal band of Liberals and the overwhelming forces of reaction, the issue must inevitably depend on the character of the autocrat. And Nicholas I was a model autocrat, not merely by the position which he inherited, but by the principles which he professed and by every trait of his character. Like so many of the Romanovs, he was a Prussian rather than a Russian. He had the mentality of a Potsdam martinet. For thirty years he succeeded in maintaining the autocratic dogma. But he was fighting against the spirit and the irresistible forces of the age. Even before he died his policy was bankrupt. He was the last of European despots. The Crimean War revealed what every Russian war has invariably revealed, what every Russian writer had exposed since Gogol's "Revizor," the weakness and corruption of the system. Russian despotism was found to be only a Colossus with feet of clay.

To the successor of Nicholas I fell the task of liquidating a heavily mortgaged estate. With Alexander II intellectual Liberalism and the so-called *Intelligentsia* achieved its first and greatest triumph. It was the "Era of Great Reforms," of the establishment of local self-government, of the reorganisation of public education. Alexander II achieved by a stroke of the pen

what it took the United States four years of civil war to achieve. He was the "Tsar Osvoboditel," "the liberator of his people," as well as the liberator of the Bulgarian people. He enfranchised thirty million peasant serfs. And he gave them not only their freedom, but he secured them in the possession of their land.

But even that liberation of the people and those far-reaching internal reforms did not satisfy public opinion. The tide of reform had been kept back for thirty years, and now the dam was broken and the flood carried everything before it. It was the old story, reaction leading up to an inevitable revolution. Public opinion continued to clamour for a constitution. And public opinion was all the stronger and felt all the more confident because once again Tsarism had revealed its inherent weakness and futile impotence in the Balkan War. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877, which culminated in the Treaty of Berlin, disappointed all national aspirations. Russia, which had poured out blood and treasure, did not obtain any tangible advantage except the emancipation of Bulgaria, which soon turned against her liberators. On the contrary, Austria, which had kept out of the war, received the free gift of Bosnia Herzegovina.

The failure both of Russian internal policy and of foreign policy gave an enormous impetus to the revolutionary movement. Nihilism was stronger under the Tsar liberator than under his autocratic father. And Alexander II, precisely because he was a well-meaning and sympathetic but feeble character, was the last man to stop its progress. Subterranean revolutionary

organisations spread all over the Empire, and Russia could justly be defined as a despotism tempered with assassination. Alexander II was the tragic victim of forces which he was powerless to control. Like his grandson, Nicholas II, he is a memorable object lesson of the eternal political truth that for a ruler it is only a venial sin to be bad, whereas it is a mortal sin to be weak.

The epidemic of nihilist outrages which culminated in the assassination of Alexander II produced a reaction. The nihilists had overreached themselves. Hitherto Russian educated opinion had been not on the side of the victims, but of the murderers. Without getting reconciled to the methods of Tsarism, it now began to realise that to encourage the terrorists any further meant to precipitate a revolution, and that a revolution would mean inevitable and universal chaos, as the people were not prepared for a constructive reform. Moreover, the successor of the murdered Tsar was a strong man. Alexander III was a bigot with a narrow creed which was ably expounded by his adviser, Pobedonostseff, the Procurator of the Holy Synod. But at least he consistently adhered to that creed. And although he may have been a stupid man, he was a wise ruler. He followed a policy of retrenchment at home and a policy of peace abroad. And even though he was careful not to embark on foreign adventures, he satisfied national feeling by liberating Russia from German influence and by entering into an alliance with France. This was a concession to democratic idealism which presented no danger for the autocratic principle.

Unfortunately the reign of the strong man was cut

short, and, as often happens in the history of dynasties, the strong man was succeeded by a weak man, even as Catherine the Great had been succeeded by Paul I, even as the autocrat Nicholas I had been succeeded by the feeble Alexander II. Nicholas II is one of the ill-starred rulers of modern history. He was unlucky from the day of his accession, when thousands of onlookers were trampled to death at the festivities of his coronation, until that ghastly end when his whole family was massacred by the Bolshevist butcher, the Jew Yourvshi. His reign, which extended for nearly a quarter of a century, was one uninterrupted succession of disasters. Indeed, I do not know of any other reign which gives one such a vivid impression of a tragic destiny overruling human will. The best intentions, the most carefully prepared plans of Nicholas II, seemed inevitably to lead on to catastrophe. Evil invariably seemed to come out of good. The Trans-Siberian Railway was a noble achievement, yet it brought Russia into close contact with Japan and led to the Russo-Japanese War. The encouragement of industry, on the advice of Witte, was a desirable policy, yet the premature and artificial fostering of industries made the big cities into hotbeds of Bolshevism. The millions of workers who were taken from the land and who, for the four summer months would return to the land, spread the epidemic of revolution to every part of the Empire. The granting of a Constitution in 1905 was a wise and necessary concession, but that concession unchained the forces of disorder in a country which was not prepared for self-government. The Franco-Russian Alliance seemed to be a guarantee of peace, but the French millions which were lent to

Russia only led to a race for armaments, to a regrouping of European Powers and to an unstable balance of political and military forces which were inevitably to end in a world war.

German publicists still continue to accuse Tsarism of having wilfully and deliberately precipitated that world war. The accusation, which is echoed in this country by Socialist publicists such as Mr. Morel, is an absurd one. It is the exact opposite which is the truth. For the Russian Tsar to engineer any kind of war would have meant to commit suicide. Nicholas II may indeed be called the Father of Modern Pacifism. He called together the Peace Conference of The Hague. At the very beginning of his reign Nicholas II seemed to have a premonition that the Russian State was unequal to the strain of a great modern war, and that any war, whether successful or unsuccessful, might be the end of his dynasty. The Russo-Japanese War of 1905 proved only too clearly that his pacifism was inspired by the instinct of self-preservation.

And yet there is an element of truth in the German contention. Although the Tsar did not desire war, and indeed did everything to avoid it, at the same time he made war inevitable because by his feeble and ambiguous policy he encouraged the aggressive designs of the Central Powers. If Tsarism had been strong, if it had known its own mind, the Central Powers would not have dared to affront Russian sentiment. Knowing that Tsarism was weak, the Central Powers flouted and insulted Russian sentiment. In 1909 Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia Herzegovina and followed up her forward policy in the Balkans. In 1914 Austria assumed once more

that she could challenge Russia, that once again Russia would give in, and that if she did not give in, she would not be equal to the ordeal of war. In a sense, the Central Powers were quite justified in their calculations. Tsarism was not equal to the ordeal of war. Unfortunately the Central Powers forgot that the gamble of war was as dangerous for themselves as for Russia and that it might destroy not only the Romanov Empire, but that it might also destroy the Empire of the Hohenzollern and the Empire of the Habsburg. And unfortunately for civilisation their desperate gamble let loose all the forces of chaos and paved the way for Bolshevik Terrorism.

CHAPTER XXII

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ROMANOV DYNASTY

THERE is a widespread and yet quite mistaken notion that the Bolshevik upheaval has meant a complete rupture with the past. In fact it has been no more a breach with the Russian past than the French Revolution was a breach with the French past. The French publicist Tocqueville pointed out, in his epoch-making work "L'Ancien Régime," that the French Revolution continued in most essentials the traditions and methods of the French monarchy. It developed the tyranny of the State, the influence of Paris, the excessive centralisation of the bureaucracy, the despotism and intolerance of the Government. The same generalisation holds true of the Bolshevik régime. In many essential respects the Bolshevik Dictators are merely the continuators of the Tsars. Lenin is the lineal successor of Ivan the Terrible. In the Bolshevik experiment, as under the Tsarist Government, we find the same methods of brute force, only more brutal; we find the same corrupt practices, only more corrupt; we find the same secret police and the same bureaucracy, only more numerous, more expensive and less efficient; we find the same censorship, only much more stupid; we find the same contempt of the law; we find the same German influences; we find the same militarism, the same reactionary spirit, only infinitely more reactionary, without even a trace of the enlightened and progressive

despotism of many of the Tsars. So striking is the solidarity between Tsarism at its worst and Bolshevism at its best, so far-reaching are the analogies, that an examination of the policy and characteristics of the Romanov dynasty seems to be the best introduction to a study of the policy and characteristics of the Soviet Dictators.

With Nicholas II there disappeared by far the most original and the most remarkable dynasty of modern times. No race of rulers, unless it be the Saxe-Coburg, has played so conspicuous and so dramatic a part on the world's stage. None will provide more copious and more instructive illustrations to the Machiavelli of the future. Everything is unexpected in the annals of the Romanovs. We have been staggered by the sudden collapse of an autocracy which seemed firmly rooted in the national history of three hundred years. But the beginning of the dynasty is no less startling than the end. It arose from comparative obscurity out of the "Smutnoe Vremia," out of the confusion and anarchy of a disastrous civil war. A family, which for the last hundred years has waged an obstinate fight with democracy, strangely enough owed its power to the choice of the people. It was an almost unanimous Russian Parliament which called to the Empire the son of the Archbishop of Moscow (1613). If he had submitted to the popular will instead of opposing it, the last of the Romanovs would only have reverted to the very principle which created his dynasty, and at the same time he would have saved his throne. But born of a revolution, it was written that the Romanovs were also to perish in a revolution.

The Romanovs are pre-eminently a race of Supermen. Little as we know of him, the founder of the family

greatness, the Boyar Philaret, must have been a very forcible personality. A distracted nation which was attacked by Turk and Tatar, by Swede and Pole, which had just ejected the enemy from the Kremlin, would not have selected the son of a mere nobleman and churchman to evolve order out of chaos, if he had not been equal to the task. For twenty years Russia was governed in comparative quiet by the patriarch of All the Russias in conjunction with his son Michael (1613-1645), who became Tsar of All the Russias. Most of their successors were worthy of their sires. The grandson of the first Romanov Tsar is the one political Titan in modern history, in many respects even more creative than Napoleon. Catherine the Great was the one authentic Superwoman. Alexander I was the "Liberator of Europe." Alexander II was the liberator of Bulgaria and of thirty million serfs. Nicholas I was the disinterested champion of reaction in Europe, and for thirty years stemmed the rising tide of democracy.

But not only were the Romanovs a strong race, they were also a violent race, recognising no argument but brute force, no law but their unbridled passion and their untrammelled will. They were a dynasty of Nietzschean immoralists beyond the range of Good and Evil. Their rule was not a policy, but a police, and it was a secret police. Their despotism was always tempered by assassination and revolution. We must go back to the annals of the Cæsars or to the reign of the Stuarts to witness so many domestic tragedies. The Tsarevitch Alexis was murdered by his father, Peter the Great. Tsar Ivan VI was murdered by his aunt. Peter III was murdered by his wife. Paul I was removed with the complicity of his son.

And when they did not exterminate themselves, they

were exterminated by a disloyal nobility or a rebellious people. Nicholas I on the outbreak of the Decabrist Conspiracy only escaped through a happy accident. Alexander II succumbed to a nihilist plot after numberless attempts had already been made on his life. Alexander III and Nicholas II all through their reigns were prisoners in their palaces, even as the Bolshevist Dictators have been kept prisoners in the Kremlin by their janissaries.

The history of the Romanovs proves once more that genius is closely allied to madness. Even more than the Habsburg and the Spanish Bourbons, they reveal the hereditary taint of insanity. Many of the race preserved a cool judgment on the giddy heights of power, but many gave way to the Neronian megalomania, to the Hohenzollern "Cæsarenwahnsinn." Many lost their head, as well as their heads. The Tsarevitch Alexis, the son of Peter the Great, was feeble-minded. Peter III and Paul I were hopeless lunatics.

It is of the essence of despotism that the most trivial and most ignoble causes may produce incalculable consequences, and the insanity of Peter III and Paul I (the great-great-grandfather of the Kaiser) was an enormous factor in European history. On the advent of Peter III Frederick the Great was at his last gasp. The Russian armies had achieved one victory after another, and had entered Berlin. They were in such secure possession of Prussia that the patriotic philosopher, Emmanuel Kant, abjectly applied to the Tsarina Elizabeth for the vacant Chair of Philosophy in Königsberg. But in a fit of mad enthusiasm, Peter III surrendered all the Russian conquests and became the champion of the Hohenzollern. Forty years after,

the same tragi-comedy was repeated by his son, Paul I. Russia had joined the European coalition and Suvorov had crossed the Alps. In a sudden transformation scene, Paul I concluded an alliance with the enemy, and for the second time the insanity of an autocrat changed the whole course of world history.

It is obvious that in the triumph of universal violence only a strong man could maintain himself. It was, therefore, the logical outcome of their position that the Romanovs were not even able to recognise any law regulating the transference of their power. In the history of the Romanovs there is no such law of succession as exists in the history of every other European dynasty. As we pointed out elsewhere, "the Tsar was a ruler not by Right Divine, not by hereditary transmission, but by what has been called 'occupative right.' That is to say, his right was only that of the strongest occupant, and that right was always precarious, as the present occupant was always threatened by one more energetic or more unscrupulous than himself." Each Tsar designated his own successor by a caprice of omnipotence. Peter the Great compelled his eldest son to abdicate. Elizabeth removed the Regent Anna. Catherine demanded the abdication of her son. In 1825 Russia for some time remained uncertain as to who was to succeed Alexander I. In a contest of generosity and self-denial Constantine had his brother Nicholas proclaimed at Warsaw, whilst Nicholas had Constantine proclaimed at Petrograd. It is only after the Decabrist Conspiracy that Nicholas adopted the civilised practice of enacting a dynastic law which he had been the first to obey, as he himself had waived his claim to the throne in favour of his brother.

Although the absence of any hereditary right was the logical outcome of the violent and arbitrary régime of the Romanovs, it was none the less paradoxical, because, whilst in fact yielding to brute force, the Romanovs insisted in principle on a religious sanction for their power. Their autocracy claimed to be a theocracy. Ever since the days of the Patriarch Philaret they had always appealed to religious sentiment. The Tsar proclaimed himself "God's own anointed," and he was Tsar only after he had been crowned at Moscow. He was the temporal Head and Protector of the Greek Church not only in Russia, but in every other Orthodox country. He claimed the succession to the Byzantine Empire; he even claimed the protectorate over Jerusalem, the Holy City of the Greek Orthodox Church. The claim led to one strange consequence. Since the suppression of an autonomous Church by Peter the Great the Tsar delegated his Divine prerogative to a mere official, the Procurator of the Holy Synod, who was always a civilian and sometimes a General. For many years under Nicholas I it was a courtier and a soldier, Count Protasov, who had the universal cure of souls.

The Russian autocracy has been described as a patriarchal régime. The Tsar was "the little Father of his people." And that patriarchal character is consonant with Russian national tradition. The most important and most typical political institution of Russia is the "Mir" or peasant community, ruled by the "Starost," or elder of the village.

But it is less generally known that this Romanov patriarchy could also be aptly described as a matriarchy. Until the present day the Queen-Mother

always in a measure shared supreme power with her son. Hence the co-existence of two courts, and those courts were often rival courts. During the Coalition Wars, Alexander I was in favour of Napoleon, but the Dowager Empress, a Princess of Würtemberg, was as resolutely against the Corsican. The Ambassador of the French Tyrant at St. Petersburg, General Savary, was overwhelmed with honours by the Tsar, and at the same time he was covered with insults by his mother (see opening scene in Tolstoy's "War and Peace.")


This influence of the Dowager Empress culminated in the eighteenth century in the establishment of a matriarchate which is probably unique in human history. For a hundred years Russia was under what John Knox would have called a "Regiment of Women." A succession of five Czarinas or Regents ruled the Empire, and it must be admitted that under their direction Russia was more vigorously ruled than she ever was before or after. There was first the reign of Catherine, a serf and a prostitute, the widow of Peter the Great. Her brief tenure was followed by the reign and regency of the two Annas until 1740. From 1741 to 1761 the ablest daughter of Peter the Great, Empress Elizabeth, wielded absolute power, and Europe witnessed the strange sight of a triumvirate of women, Madame de Pompadour, Maria Theresa, and Elizabeth, challenging and breaking the might of Frederick the Great. And they would have succeeded but for the accession of a lunatic. The Romanov matriarchate ended in the long reign of Catherine the Great, who raised Russian prestige to a pinnacle which it had never attained previously, and which it has never reached since.

The zenith of the Romanov autocracy is also the

beginning of its decline. For the royal marriages with the German princelings of Brunswick and Holstein which began with Peter the Great, and the mad deed of Peter III at the end of the Seven Years' War, had caused Russian policy to take a fatal turn. Catherine the Great maintained the alliance with Prussia. The Romanov, Hohenzollern and Habsburg rulers entered into a solemn compact; they celebrated the Black Mass and "partook of the Eucharistic Body of Poland." The policy of Russia henceforth became German. Henceforth it was not only Russian royalty which was "made in Germany," but the Russian Bureaucracy also were germanised. Whilst Catherine's innumerable lovers were all Russian and Polish, the German element more and more invaded the administration, because the German official was found to be more docile, more methodical, and more honest than the Russian. Under Catherine the Great, the foreign policy of the Empire was still controlled by the ruler, but under Alexander I it had become German and Austrian. A German nobleman, Count von Nesselrode, was for fifty years the Foreign Secretary of the Tsars. The Prussian Alliance came to full fruition under Nicholas I and Alexander II; Nicholas, who married a royal princess of Prussia, remained to the end a loyal ally of the Hohenzollern. Bismarck as Prussian Ambassador was supreme in St. Petersburg. He was invited to enter the Russian service. He preferred that Russia should enter the Prussian service. In 1870 Alexander II energetically supported the Hohenzollern supremacy against France and Britain. The Congress of Berlin had deprived Russia of the spoils of victory. No European Congress was to rob Prussia of the coveted prize.

The Russo-Prussian Alliance continued until the eve of the late war, notwithstanding the official Triple Entente. A secret dynastic Triple Entente maintained the Dreikaiserbund. That Triple Alliance which for one hundred and fifty years preserved the solidarity of despotism ultimately proved the undoing of the Romanovs. The Revolution of 1917 was, no doubt, a national reaction against Germany, quite as much as a reaction against despotism. The Romanovs found out too late what it cost them to work "pour le roi de Prusse."

GENEALOGICAL TABLE OF THE ROMANOV DYNASTY



CHAPTER XXIII

THE FIRST BLOODLESS REVOLUTION OF 1917¹

I

MY DEAR PRINCE,

During the memorable events of 1905 I had repeated opportunities of discussing with you and with your friends the aims and policy of that first revolution, which was destined to so abrupt and so tragic a termination. You did me the signal honour of convening a Round Table Conference with some of your colleagues of the Constitutional Democratic Party, which for all these trying years has remained unswervingly loyal to the cause of liberty, and of which you are still one of the trusted leaders. After such a long interruption, will you allow me to resume our political conversations, and to submit to you some of the thoughts and impressions which are suggested by the present crisis? They are the thoughts of one who, like yourself, has ever remained an impenitent Liberal, and who, not being engaged in the thick of the battle, may perhaps have a better chance of surveying the battlefield. They are also the thoughts of one who has studied your language and literature and history for twenty-five years, who has always striven to do justice to your noble nation when it was slandered in every country, who in the darkest hour never despaired of the future of Russia, who

¹ An open letter to Prince Paul Dolgorukov, President of the Party of Popular Freedom.

hailed the initial success of the Revolution as the dawn of a new and better Europe, and who is, therefore, all the more concerned that this glorious event shall not disappoint our hopes, and that the Russian Commonwealth may emerge triumphant from the perils which to-day are threatening it on all sides.

II

As far back as April 1917, in an open letter to Mr. Shingarev, then Minister of Agriculture, now Minister of Finance, after analysing the infinite possibilities of the Russian cataclysm, I ventured to sound the following note of warning :—

“ Russia has raised our expectations so high that Europe might easily be disappointed in the near future. The people have little knowledge of the tremendous strength of the Dark Forces in the Empire, and they fondly imagine that the Russian Revolution has already reached its triumphant conclusion. You know better. So far from being at the end of the drama, we are only at the beginning of the first act. The decisive struggles are still to come. You have defeated the Court. You have yet to organise the people. You have broken the police. You have not yet established a policy. Amongst your leaders I notice one prince, one university professor, and many lawyers. But the 175,000,000 people of Russia are not made up of princes, professors and lawyers. We have yet to wait until the people themselves have become articulate. Having proved their bravery in helping to pull down the rotten fabric, they have still to show their skill and wisdom in reconstruction. Let us,

therefore, be under no delusion, and clearly understand that there are still many imminent dangers ahead, and that the Russian Ship of State will still have to cross many cataracts before it gets into smooth waters. The German conspirators are dispersed, but they will rally again. The Court Camarilla is broken, but they will renew their intrigues. They will do exactly what Marie Antoinette did in 1789: they will excite the people to desperate measures, break up the Sacred Union, exploit the disappointments of the war, and its inevitable sufferings; and alas! they will find many people only too well prepared by long oppression and arbitrary rule to listen to traitors and to *agents provocateurs*. Verily it will not be so easy to introduce a state of law in a country which has been demoralised by hundreds of years of lawlessness and anarchy."

III

Only eight weeks have elapsed since the Ides of March, and already some of my anticipations are being realised. A portentous crisis has arisen in Petrograd, on the result of which the future of war and peace must necessarily depend. The Provisional Government, after defeating the forces of despotism, is now confronted by the forces of anarchy. Ten brave leaders, veterans in the struggles of freedom—men of unimpeachable integrity, of approved ability, who had the courage to challenge the Might and Majesty of Tsardom, to assume the awful responsibility of power, and to evolve order out of chaos—are trying to stem the rising tide of disorder. It is difficult for us at such distance to see all the issues, and it cannot be

said that either the Russian Press or the British Press are of much assistance in forming an accurate opinion. Rather do their contradictory statements add to our confusion. Even so well-informed a paper as the *Manchester Guardian* contained some time ago the amazing statement that the Petrograd Council of Workmen and Soldier Delegates, the C.W.S.D., corresponds to the British Parliament. I always thought that the British Parliament was representative of the whole British people, that, on the contrary, the C.W.S.D. of Petrograd only represents one small section of one Russian city, and that it is therefore reminiscent of the Jacobin Club of 1793 rather than of the House of Commons. The same influential organ—the *Manchester Guardian*—also told us that it is the C.W.S.D. and not the Provisional Government or the Duma who made the Revolution. This is very much like saying that it is the soldiers and not the officers who have been waging this world war. I always thought that it was the whole army—the officers as well as the soldiers—who are fighting our battles, and that similarly it was the whole Russian nation—the noblemen and the middle classes as well as the workmen—who made the Revolution. Any one who has studied the revolutionary movement since the Decabrist Conspiracy of 1825 knows the heroic part played by the Russian aristocracy, the Intelligentsia, and the middle classes, and that to transform the Russian Revolution into a mere class war is a grotesque travesty of history.

Dismissing then all political prejudice and partisanship, I would like to attempt an analysis of the Revolution as it impresses a distant and impartial observer.

And in doing so, I would hope to retain the cool judgment of the physician who is trying to diagnose a difficult clinical case, and whose opinions will not be influenced or deflected by the extreme gravity of the malady or by the sufferings of the patient.

IV

The present crisis seems to me, in the first place, a conflict of elemental political forces. The situation may give cause for considerable anxiety, but there is no reason why it should evoke surprise. What happens to-day in Russia is in accordance with the inexorable logic of all revolutions. The leaders won a decisive victory over despotism. But leaders alone cannot make a revolution. They require the assistance of an army—either of the regular army in the trenches or of the irregular army improvised behind the barricades. Statesmanship and sober reason defeated the conspiracy of a Court Camarilla and of German intrigues. But statesmanship and sober reason alone cannot win victory. They require the driving power of passion, enthusiasm and fanaticism.

But, having won their victory with the assistance of the revolutionary army and with the driving power of revolutionary passion, the leaders now find themselves face to face with the eternal dilemma which confronts all revolutionary leaders. How are they to disband the army which has helped them to victory? How will they allay the passions which they roused? The answer to this problem is that there is no answer. You cannot control the forces of Nature once they have been released.

You cannot appease a hurricane before it has spent its rage. You cannot prevent the excesses of mob rule until that rule has been discredited by its excesses.

Such is the law of all revolutions, and it applies with special cogency to the Russian Revolution. Government has abused its power so long that it has destroyed the very sense of law and order. Military discipline has been so tyrannical that it has become abhorrent. We must add that in a vast country like Russia, with so many different nationalities, the centrifugal forces are necessarily stronger than the centripetal forces; it is so much more difficult to rally the people around one centre of government. There is the traditional opposition between Petrograd and Moscow. There is the profound political ignorance of a peasantry who constitute eighty per cent. of the population. Nor must we forget that there are no ruling classes in Russia, as there are in Great Britain. The Church has been the ally, and the Bureaucracy has been the accomplice of autocracy. There is no political aristocracy. There is no middle class. And a considerable section of the educated classes, the so-called *Intelligentsia*, have fallen under the spell of Nietzsche and Karl Marx, of German materialism and Prussian socialism.

V

In the second place, the Revolution may be considered a conflict between the masses and the classes. It is not only a social revolution, it is also in the full sense of the word a Socialist Revolution. The British Labour Party, who are organising enthusiastic mass meetings in every city of the United Kingdom, in order to

celebrate the Russian Revolution, have a sound instinct of the far-reaching meaning of the catastrophe. The original Provisional Government numbered one prince, two professors and several noblemen and millionaires. But, as I have already said, the 175,000,000 of the Russian population are not made up of princes, professors and millionaires. With all their democratic sympathies, the members of the Government cannot help being somewhat out of touch with the people. Even those who are in touch with the workmen are not in touch with the peasants. They have a different political outlook. The working-man imagines that the Revolution is the inauguration of a Socialist millennium. The peasants are clamouring for land. And although the Provisional Government have already committed themselves to a gigantic policy of land expropriation, they cannot surrender to the demands of the agrarian communists. And although they have granted manhood suffrage and womanhood suffrage, although they have liberated fifty nationalities, they are not prepared to enter the path of Marxian collectivism or socialistic Kaisercism.

VI

In the third place, the Revolution is a conflict between two fundamentally different mentalities, two different political ideals : the ideal of the National and Imperial State and the ideal of Internationalism. And that ideal of Russian Internationalism is essentially non-aggressive and pacifist. The Russian people have suffered so much from the Imperialism of the past that a considerable section now repudiate the very notion of the use of force

in the pursuit of national aims. They have suffered so much from the results of secret diplomacy that they distrust any diplomatic agreements. This new democratic spirit, this international idealism, is strengthened in Russia by the essentially peaceful temper and by the fatalism of the Russian people. Tolstoy's doctrines of non-resistance are thoroughly representative of the Russian temperament, and there are large numbers of conscientious objectors amongst the nonconformist sects.

This new Russian mentality is strikingly illustrated by the dramatic surrender of Constantinople. For two hundred years the mastery of Constantinople and of the Near East had been the goal of Russian foreign policy. But the New Russia is to-day as passionate in repudiating that policy as the Old Russia was in furthering it. And we witness the paradoxical situation that Great Britain, which for several generations has striven to keep Russia out of Constantinople, is now almost embarrassed and bewildered by the spirit of renunciation of the Russian democracy, which calls for the same spirit of renunciation on the part of the other Allies.

VII

The Russian Revolution is, in the fourth place, a conflict of political aims and tendencies. Great Britain and the New Russia do not look at the present situation with the same eyes and in the same perspective. To us the prosecution of the war is everything; to the Russian the war is only an episode of the Revolution, even as the Wars of the Coalition and of the Empire were only an episode in the history of the French Revolution. To us

the one aim is victory; to the Russian the one aim is the consolidation of liberty. To us the vital question is how the Revolution is going to help the war; to the Russian the vital question is how the war is going to help the Revolution. And the answer to that question is to them by no means a foregone conclusion. It is by no means clear to them that victory must needs lead to the consolidation of liberty. On the contrary, many Russians are afraid, like Lenin, that a crushing victory might facilitate a counter-revolution, that it might mean the military dictatorship of a victorious general, that it might mean the rallying of the forces of reaction. They have got rid of "Monk" Rasputin, the spiritual adviser of the Romanovs. They do not want to replace him by a "Monk" of the Stuarts.

Many Russians believe that liberty cannot thrive in the atmosphere of war, and that the iron discipline and the concentration of authority, which are the condition of all military success, might soon be turned against democracy. Following, therefore, the instinctive logic of revolution, many Russians assume that their one safe policy is the conclusion of an early peace before the Dark Forces have had time to rally round the banner of a victorious general.

CHARLES SAROLEA.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION : A PARALLEL AND A CONTRAST

I

THERE is only one catastrophe in modern history which can compare in its magnitude and in its far-reaching results with the Russian catastrophe. And in considering what is happening to-day in Petrograd and Moscow, our thoughts must inevitably turn to what happened in Paris one hundred and thirty-four years ago. There exists, however, a class of writers, whose fashionable and superior scepticism, whose pessimistic diletantism refuses to admit that the past can have any lessons to teach us. In their view, humanity is an incorrigible dullard who will never learn from experience : as each individual, unenlightened and undeterred by the failures of his fathers, has to stand on his own feet, so each generation must start again from the beginning, and Sisyphus-like must roll up its own burden. History never repeats itself and circumstances are never the same. The struggles of man are only a stimulating comedy for the amusement of the Olympian gods, not a solemn tragedy for the discipline of mortals. There is no such thing as a capitalisation of human effort and human suffering, and history does not move in an ascending spiral, but only moves

in a circle. And that circle is always a vicious circle, and not infrequently it is a circle of a Dantesque Inferno.

II

I have always refused to accept this inverted form of pedantry. I have always looked upon history as the one inexhaustible storehouse of political experience. I have always believed that we ought to be guided in our conduct by permanent principles and by a definite creed. I have always believed that an accurate knowledge of the past authorises a forecast of the future. And generally I have been justified in my faith. Whilst in Russia in 1905, I was able to predict what was to happen in 1906. Whilst in the Balkans in 1907, I was able to predict what would happen in 1913. I was able to foretell in 1912 that Europe would be shortly involved in a universal war. I was able to foretell in 1915 and in 1916 that a convulsion was likely to take place in Russia and Germany before the end of the war.

I know full well how difficult it is to disentangle the confused skein of events. But surely two hundred years of political thinking and historical research ought to convince even the most sceptical that the annals of humanity are not always the triumph of unreason, that they are something more than the record of individual actions, something more than the anecdotage and dotage of royalty, and that underlying the variations there is always one "leitmotiv." They ought to convince us that there is such a thing as political and ethical law, *i. e.* a constant relation between cause and effect, that the same causes are bound to produce the same

results, that the same Nemesis must attend the same blunders and the same crimes; that therefore, history is bound to repeat itself, and that the science and philosophy of history is not a mere invention of academic doctrinaires; that we are quite right in trying to understand it; that it is the chief business of the statesman as distinguished from the time-serving opportunist to interpret its teaching and to act accordingly; that the politician is indeed free to ignore its warnings, but that he can only do so at the dire peril of the State.

III

And those general lessons of political science are especially revealed by the study of political revolutions. They bear to the study of the body politic the same relation which the study of disease bears to the science of the human body. For all revolutions proceed from the same causes, and their phases succeed each other with the same inexorable logic. The Revolution of 1789 is contained in the American Revolution of 1776. The Revolution of 1830 is but the continuation of 1789. The Revolution of 1848 is but the continuation of 1830.

Nor ought we to forget that as in the great crises of public life we witness the triumph of the unrestrained passions of love and hatred, of greed and ambition, so in the great crises of national life the collective activities are brought down to the level of the same primeval instincts, or exalted to the same pinnacles of fanaticism and enthusiasm. All revolutions are characterised by the same prevalence of credulous passion over argument, of emotion over reason. All revolutions equally disturb

that complex, delicate and unstable balance of forces which is of the essence of civilised Government. In times of revolution, society invariably resolves itself into its component elements, and nothing remains except the fundamental conflict between a few natural forces and a few éternal principles. Any social upheaval is a volcanic eruption which bursts through the thin crust of tradition and convention and prejudice. All revolutions are destructive before they are reconstructive. And all destruction is accomplished by the same processes, whatever the architecture of the building.

We are, therefore, not indulging a futile academic exercise, we are only obeying a sound instinct and a rational impulse, when we endeavour to disengage the analogies between the great French upheaval of 1789 and the still greater Russian upheaval of 1917. Only an illiterate mind, only an inveterate dilettantism will fail to perceive those analogies and refuse to draw from them the inferences they contain.

IV

I quite realise the many and far-reaching differences which exist between the two catastrophes. (1) There is a difference in the historical circumstances. The French Revolution preceded the Napoleonic Wars, and therefore the energy of the French people was still intact and was entirely directed on their political tasks. On the contrary, the Russian Revolution followed the world war, and therefore the Russian people were exhausted even before the Revolution began. (2) There are differences in the political conditions. The French

Revolution was an essentially national and patriotic revolution. The Russian Revolution was an essentially international and alien revolution, controlled by Jews, Poles, Germans and Frenchmen. One cannot imagine Trotsky or Radek refusing to seek safety in exile with the sublime words of Danton : " Can we take away with us our Mother Country under the soles of our boots ? "

(3) There are differences in the geographical conditions. France is a country of limited dimensions which can easily be controlled by a strong government from one centre. Russia is a vast continent where the political control of a centralised government is impossible. (4) There are differences in the moral conditions. The French people had already reached an advanced stage of culture. The vast majority of the Russian people have not got beyond the primitive state. (5) There are differences in the social conditions. The French people had a strong middle class. Russia has no middle class. France had a strong aristocracy and a strong clergy. Russia had neither. (6) There are differences in the temperament of the people. The French people are an energetic race. They have a fervid Celtic nature. On the contrary, the Russians are politically an inert and passive people. (7) And last, not least, there is the enormous accident of Napoleon. The French Revolution threw up a Superman such as only appears once in five hundred years. Alas ! hitherto no superman has appeared in Russia.

But all those differences, however important they may be, are far less important than the resemblances. For the analogies between the two catastrophes are elemental and fundamental. They are derived from the nature

of things. Both revolutions are due to the same causes. They have had the same beginnings. They have gone through the same phases. They have followed the same methods. They have been subjected to the same influences. They have resulted in the same end and they have produced the same consequences.

V

(1) A social upheaval generally starts from the foundations of society. A people rise in a mass when they are driven by the spectre of famine. The French Revolution began with peasant riots, with the burning down of the mansions of the absentee landlords. The Russian Revolution opened in 1905 with a procession of 200,000 strikers. The Revolution of 1917 arose from the disorganisation of food supplies and from the fabulous rise in prices. The war-cries of the two Revolutions are identical. The French not only clamoured for liberty or equality, they clamoured for liberty and land. Even so the watchword of the Russians was "*volia i zemlia.*" The common demand of Jacques Bonhomme and of the Mujik is the wholesale expropriation of landed proprietors. Even as the Constituent Assembly on the night of the 4th August, 1789, surrendered their feudal privileges, so the Congress of the Zemstovs, composed of landowners and presided over by Princes, surrendered their territorial rights. The net result of 1789 in France was the creation of a new class of 6,000,000 peasant proprietors. The net result of 1917 will be the appropriation of the Russian soil by those who work it.

(2) But although hunger is the prime mover of the upheaval, the Revolution is only possible when the people cease to be governed, when the executive has ceased to discharge its most essential functions, and is struck with paralysis of the will. Every revolution is primarily a political suicide. There could have been no revolution under Queen Elizabeth or Louis XIV, and there could have been no revolution under Alexander III. But there was a revolution under Charles I, under Louis XVI, and under Nicholas II, because as sovereigns they were hopelessly unequal to their task. They were possessed of many private virtues, but were deficient in the first quality of a ruler—firmness of purpose and resolute decision. They pursued the same vacillating and contradictory policy. Order, counter-order, disorder. The reign of Charles I was a constant alternation of reckless challenges to public opinion followed by ignominious retreats. Under Louis XVI, the Liberal Ministry of Turgot and Malesherbes alternated with the reactionary Ministry of Maurepas. Under Nicholas II the liberal rule of Prince Sviatopolk-Mirski and the business rule of Witte was succeeded by the reactionary rule of Plehve, of Stolypin and Stürmer.

(3) When the will of the ruler does not assert itself, he generally comes under the influence of a Court Camarilla, and of his domestic surroundings. It is not a mere casual coincidence that in the three great modern revolutions the rulers were henpecked husbands, the victims of their wives. Thus in the English Revolution Charles I was the victim of his French wife, Henrietta Maria. Thus in the French Revolution Louis XVI was the tool of his Austrian wife, Marie Antoinette. Thus

Nicholas II was the victim of his German wife. Even as Marie Antoinette intrigues with the Austrian Ambassador, Mercy Argenteau, and with the German legions gathered at Coblenz for an invasion of France, so Alexandra Feodorovna intrigues with Rasputine for a return to absolutism.

(4) All absolute Governments, when they are not based merely on terror—and no European or Christian monarchy has ever been based merely on it—must have a religious sanction. For all autocracy is more or less a theocracy. There can be no revolution as long as that spiritual foundation is secure, as long as the people believe that the ruler is “God’s own Anointed.” And both France, until the middle of the eighteenth century, and Russia, until the end of the twentieth century, firmly believed that the sovereign was the vicegerent of Providence. But in France since the advent of Louis XVI and in Russia since the advent of Nicholas II that belief had been continuously undermined. Louis XVI might still issue decrees against the Huguenots, Nicholas II might still persecute Catholic Uniats during the war and imprison Count Czeptycki, the Archbishop of Lemberg; the soul had gone out of the theocracy.

(5) But such is the need of man for a religious sanction that even when the soul has gone out of religion, theocracy instinctively seeks another substitute. Hence the apparently inexplicable prevalence of occultism and spiritualism in times of religious decay. Carlyle has made us familiar with the archquack, Cagliostro, and with the orgy of Illuminists and Martinists. And never was quackery more powerful than at the Court of

Nicholas II. In 1905 Tsardom was ruled by a Lyonese charlatan, Dr. Philippe; he was succeeded by a German charlatan, Morgenstern, and the rule of Morgenstern culminated in the dictatorship of Monk Rasputin and Madame Vyrubova.

(6) Whilst occultism and magnetism take the place of decadent religion in fashionable and court society, the newspaper Press takes its place in the middle classes and in the lower spheres. It is difficult to overrate the part played by the "fourth estate" in every revolutionary movement. The newspaper provides the revels with a platform and a pulpit and a central political organisation. In the French Revolutions of 1789 and 1848 journalists are politicians and politicians are journalists. And that is equally true of the Russian Revolution. It is publicists like Bielinski and Herzen, writers like Tolstoy and Gorki who have been the dictators of political opinion. The Bolshevik dictatorship to-day is a dictatorship of journalists.

(7) The first political incident of any revolution is the conflict between the absolute ruler and the representatives of the people, and that conflict always takes place under very much the same conditions. The Moderates may try to avoid the encounter until the eleventh hour; the Cadets may represent themselves as the opposition of his Majesty rather than the opposition to his Majesty, but sooner or later it must come to a trial of strength. The Master of Ceremonies at Versailles is deputed to the States-General and calls for their dissolution. Similarly, the Russian bureaucracy proclaims the dissolution of the Duma of 1905 and in 1917. In each case the answer is the same. The members

of the Duma reply, like Mirabeau, " Nous sommes ici par la volonté du peuple, et nous n'en sortirons que par la force des bayonnettes ": " We are here by the will of the people, and we shall not leave except at the point of the bayonet."

(8) This first act of opposition is invariably followed by a second. The representatives of the people, goaded to rebellion, enlist the support of the people and of the army, they turn their strength and their anger against the most visible symbol of despotism. They try to take possession of the stronghold of autocracy. In 1905 the Revolutionists did not proceed to an armed insurrection, and only called on the citizens to refuse taxation and military service. They failed, as they were bound to fail, because in times of revolution it is only deeds which are of any avail. In 1917 the Russians did exactly what the French did. The French Revolutionists stormed the Bastille. The Russian Revolutionists stormed the Fortress of Peter and Paul. Both fell like the walls of Jericho at the blast of trumpets.

(9) In the primary stages of the Revolution the Opposition finds its main support in the nobility, who are already, more or less, organised, who are nearest the throne, who are the first to suffer from arbitrary rule, and who, by virtue of their birth and of their wealth, claim a first share in the government. Thus in 1789 the Duke of Orleans, the Marquis de Lafayette, Mirabeau, Talleyrand are in the front rank of the insurrection. The same phenomenon is witnessed in the Petrograd and Moscow of 1917. The leading Revolutionary Party, the Cadets, now the National Liberal Party, are nearly all recruited from the upper strata of society. And we

witness the paradox of Prince Lvov, Prince Dolgorukov and Prince Trubetskoi initiating the greatest revolution of history, which must bring about the transference of hundreds of millions of acres from their legitimate owners to an insurrectionary peasantry.

(10) The wisest policy of the Government, of course, would be to come to terms and to detach those aristocratic leaders from the people and the peasantry. The leaders could be all the more easily won over, because they have everything to lose and little to gain from the Revolution. But the autocracy is as extreme and fanatic as the democracy. With them it is everything or nothing. They do not want compromise, and they do not want a peaceful solution. They want simply to revert to the old order. They want to crush the insurrection, and they assume that they will crush it more easily if the Revolution can be discredited by its own excesses. Their policy, therefore, is to engineer such excesses, to inaugurate the most violent measures. Thus Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette supported the ultra-Revolutionist Petion as Mayor of Paris, against the more moderate Lafayette. Thus Marie Antoinette called in the armed intervention of Prussia and Austria. Even so, the Russian autocracy called in the services of spies and traitors, such as Father Gapon, enlisted the Black Hundred, organised its own "Pogroms."

(11) The only result of this insane policy is that the Moderates, attacked on both sides, are reduced to impotence, and that the Extremists, so far from being discredited, are inspired with greater boldness. *De l'audace et encore de l'audace et toujours de l'audace!* In 1789 from week to week we can follow the crescendo

of violence. Power passed from the Constitutional Royalists to the Moderate Republicans, from the Moderate Republicans to the Anarchists, from the Assembly to the Clubs, from the Clubs to the Commune, from the Commune to the mob. The same degradation of power is repeated in 1917. Already in April the Duma is paralysed, already there are two Insurrectionary Governments in opposition, already power is slipping of the hands of the Cadets. Already the Committee of Working-men and Soldiers is enthroned night and day in the Taurida Palace.

(12) The continuation of anarchy necessarily and invariably results in the advent of a new military despotism. This is a universal law of revolutions, to which there is no exception in history. Marius is succeeded by Cæsar; the Roundheads are succeeded by Cromwell, Robespierre is succeeded by Bonaparte. A military reaction is equally inevitable in Russia. We shall not indeed witness merely a return to the old autocracy, for autocracy cannot retrace its steps, any more than anarchy, but from the cataclysm there will emerge a military democracy, led by a victorious general, who will be, like Napoleon, the testamentary executor and the armed champion of the triumphant Revolution.

CHAPTER XXV

PSYCHOLOGY OF THE BOLSHEVIST LEADERS

ON the death of Lenin, journalists and publicists in two continents vied with each other in an attempt to explain the vicissitudes of the Dictator's extraordinary career and to solve the riddle of his perplexing personality. I do not think that those journalists have been successful in their endeavours or that they have cleared up the mystery. When we happen to see a portrait of some great historical personality, say of Napoleon or Bismarck, whether the portrait is painted by an opponent or a supporter, we generally receive a definite impression, we see some clear-cut outlines. On the contrary, after we have read one hundred character sketches of Lenin, we only obtain a blurred and confused image, something like a composite photograph. The real man Vladimir Ulianov Lenin remains hidden from us, and he continues to be an enigma or a dummy.

To the Communist admirers of Lenin he appears as one of the supermen of modern times. He is one of the few great personalities which were thrown up by a world crisis otherwise so fertile in mediocrities. He is a great thinker who laid down the code of laws of a new political era. He is a great man of action who deflected the current of human history. He is a hero whose heart is equal to his brain—a man essentially honest and dis-

interested, ready to sacrifice himself even as he sacrificed others, leading the simple life in the midst of the splendours of the Kremlin. He is an idealist inspired by a noble vision. He is also a realist who knew how to adapt the means to the end. In a word, he is a political giant, and it is quite natural that he should have been worshipped by his followers and that this Atheist should have been raised even in his life-time to the rank of a Demi-God.

On the contrary, to all those to whom Russian Bolshevism and all its ways are repellent Lenin appears as a cruel, immoral, unscrupulous tyrant. He is a small man seated on the throne of Peter the Great, called upon by the chances of a political upheaval to play a big part to which he was ludicrously unequal. He worked like the mole in the darkness of subterranean conspiracies, and like the mole he lost the very capacity of seeing the light of day. He was not a leader—that is to say, he did not lead—but was led on or rather driven on. He was carried on by elemental forces which he did not attempt to resist. He was a cynical opportunist. A communist denouncing capitalism in 1918, he became an individualist and he welcomed capitalists in 1920. Everything about him except his destiny is mediocre. He is a mediocre thinker without originality or depth, a mediocre orator without inspiration, a mediocre journalist without wit or humour. Although for five years he was an absolute despot, more absolute than Ivan the Terrible, yet we cannot discover one single trait in his character which stamps itself upon our imagination. And although he made a thousand speeches, and wrote thousands of articles, there is not a single

word of his speeches nor a single line of his articles which posterity will remember. He came out of the night and will be swallowed up by the night. His name will only survive as a symbol of destruction. It will survive like the name of the madman Erostrates, the man who burnt the Temple of Diana. It will only survive as the name of Attila, the scourge of God.

We have given two entirely opposite views of the character of Lenin. Those views cannot both be true, as the one is in glaring contradiction with the other. I believe that the second is very much nearer the truth than the first. But the fact is that neither of them gives a lifelike picture of the man, because neither of the two views takes into account the essential realities. Both views disassociate Lenin from his surroundings. Both views ignore the conditions under which Lenin had to work. It is only if we start from those surroundings and those conditions that we can reach a just estimate of his character. A General who achieves a great victory cannot be judged without an exact survey of the battlefield where the victory was won, or without a knowledge of the army which was the instrument of his victory. It is by a study both of that battlefield and of that army that we shall be able, *à priori*, to deduce the character and measure the stature of the commander. Similarly, if a popular leader under given conditions in a given situation carries a revolutionary movement to a triumphant conclusion, we can only infer the qualities of that leader from the particular conditions under which he worked, and from the instruments which he used.

The first and main fact to remember with regard to

Lenin is that he is an incomparable demagogue, probably the most successful demagogue of modern history. And a demagogue is by definition the man of the crowd. In the crowd he lives and moves and has his being. He is like the Touareg tribesman of the Sahara or like the Centaur of the Fable, the mythical horseman who is incorporated with the animal which he rides. The demagogue can do nothing without the mob, just as the mob can do nothing without the demagogue. His greatness is merely a reflected greatness, his influence and power is a borrowed power.

The most successful demagogue is the man who best understands the passions and prejudices of the collective mind and who can best play upon its varying moods. Such knowledge can only be acquired by long experience. That is why successful demagogues must have lived all their lives amongst the people, or must have started very young as professional agitators, conspirators and organisers. That is also why the demagogue has no opinions or emotions which are not the opinions or the emotions of the crowd. What he thinks is of no earthly importance except in so far as, and as long as, his thoughts and feelings reflect the thoughts and aspirations of the masses. No demagogue can really think for himself or assert his personality or be a leader in the strict sense of the word. He is not leading, he is being led. Even in normal times he is frequently driven on, whereas in abnormal times he is invariably driven on by the more violent section of his party. If he marches too far in advance of his party he will not be followed. If he stops, he will be left behind. If he tries to resist, the crowd will march over

his prostrate body. The hero and idol of yesterday becomes the traitor of to-day.

If the above description of the demagogue be true, and I believe that the characteristics of the demagogue are eternal—for instance, the traits of the Athenian Cleon are exactly the same as those of the Russian Kerenski—then we are surely wasting our time in concentrating our attention on the personal psychology of the labour leader. The leader does not make the music. He is only an echo or a tinkling cymbal and a megaphone. What matters is not the psychology of the leader, but the psychology and psychosis of the crowd. It is this alone which we have to consider.

And that psychology of the crowd is even more simple and more invariable than the psychology of the demagogue. It obeys a few very simple laws. An eminent French philosopher, Dr. Le Bon, has shown that even in a crowd of highly educated men the intellectual level is always considerably lower than the level of each of the individuals who compose the crowd. That is why no important scientific invention has ever resulted from a Congress. That is why our countless diplomatic conferences since the war have been so sterile. What is true of the educated crowd is bound to be more true of the uneducated. The uneducated crowd is always characterised by the predominance of emotion over reasoning. It is always uncritical and credulous. It is always prone to violent extremes. It is often subject to contrary moods. It can be both generous and cruel, brave and cowardly. It always believes in miracles. It has always a mystical regard for formulas as sub-

stitutes for thinking. It delights in catchwords which are hammered in by continuous repetition.

In normal times and with a healthy political constitution, when the restraints of custom and religion and authority are operative, when trade is good, when employment is steady, the demagogue is comparatively harmless. The centripetal forces which hold society together are stronger than the centrifugal. The thunderbolts and the blackmail of the demagogue, his magic formulas and his catchwords fall on deaf ears. His opportunity comes in times of unrest, after a great war, in times of economic dislocation, of widespread suffering, in times of bad trade, in times of unemployment, when millions of hungry and angry labourers are stalking the street, when the restraints of custom and religion and authority are removed. Then indeed it may be said that both the Commonwealth and the workers themselves are at the mercy of the professional agitators who are exploiting their sufferings and grievances.

(1) If we keep in mind that Lenin is above all the demagogue incarnate, and if we further keep in mind the conditions under which a demagogue has to work, we shall realise that it is a contradiction in terms to call Lenin "a strong personality." Indeed he could not be a demagogue if he had a strong personality. There is a generic psychology of the Russian Revolutionist. And as all revolutionary terrorists are identical, that psychology of the Russian Bolshevik is closely allied to the psychology of the French Jacobin. He is not an individuality, he is a type. And the type was imposed by the fatalities of the Russian situation. In

this respect the demagogue is like the actor. The actor is merged in his audience and in the parts which he incarnates. There is only this difference between the actor on the stage and the demagogue at the street corner—that the actor can choose his own part and can therefore dissociate himself from it. But if an actor were compelled to play one and the same part all his life, there would arise the danger that in the long run he might identify himself with it. If he were always and everywhere to play the part of the villain of the piece, he might, in the end, acquire the mentality of a villain. Now the demagogue is the political actor who, from the beginning till the end of his career, is compelled eternally to play only the one part, and who ends by so identifying himself with it that he inevitably surrenders any personality which he may originally have possessed.

(2) In the same way, to assert that Lenin is a great thinker is a contradiction in terms. If he were a thinker he would have no influence on his followers. For the revolutionary crowd does not think. An appeal to argument would have no effect. The essence of a revolutionary crowd is that it is dominated not by reason, but by its moods and its passions. The demagogue only achieves his aims by constantly appealing to those passions by persistent flattery and by the constant repetition of the same sophisms and the same catchwords.

(3) To assert that Lenin is an honest and truthful man is equally a contradiction in terms. For a revolutionary demagogue cannot be honest and he cannot speak the truth. He must make statements which he

knows to be false. He must make promises which he cannot keep. He must humour the changing moods of the people. He must adapt himself to changed situations. In 1918 Lenin proclaims that the World Revolution is imminent, that the Kingdom of God is at hand. In 1920 he proclaims that the World Revolution is still very far off. Again in 1918 he tells the people that the capitalist must be suppressed off the face of the earth. In 1921 he says that capitalism is a necessary transition, and that only an appeal to the foreign capitalist can save the Russian Revolution.

(4) To say that Lenin was a good and virtuous man is a contradiction in terms. He had constantly to approve deeds which his conscience, if he had had any conscience, would have reproved. He lived in an atmosphere of brute force. He was obliged to co-operate with madmen and criminals. And he was himself half madman and half criminal. Like the madman, he is obsessed with one idea. Like the madman, he was a megalomaniac. He was indifferent to the sufferings of his fellow-beings. Like the criminal, he had no scruples. Like the superman of Nietzsche, he lived "beyond good and evil." He did not even trouble, like Nietzsche, to transvalue moral values, because he recognised no moral values. He marched to his end wading through a sea of blood.

(5) There is only one virtue which Lenin possessed to a supreme degree, and which all revolutionary demagogues are bound to possess, if they are to be successful: he was a man of inflexible will and indomitable courage. He was what the Germans call a "Willensmensch." But it has to be noted that mere will-power, apart from

the quality of the purpose to which the will-power is directed, has no relation whatsoever to morality, and is in itself no test of real greatness. Granting that Lenin was a man of formidable will-power, he possessed that characteristic in common with every burglar and murderer. If a burglar or murderer is to be a success in his profession, he is bound to possess the volitional energy. Lady Maebeth has a stronger will than Maebeth, and therefore she is the more successful murderess.

No man ever knew less than Lenin the meaning of hesitation. In January, 1918, he did not hesitate to disperse the elected revolutionary assembly after appealing to the will of the people. He did not hesitate to suppress the liberties of every Russian nationality after appealing to the principle of self-determination. And no gambler or murderer was ever less afraid to take risks or lived more dangerously. But whereas the ordinary gambler only risks a sum of money, and whereas even the murderer only risks his own life and that of his victim, Lenin was prepared to risk the lives of millions of people. Let the Russian people die provided the Communist Revolution lives.

If my argument is correct there is no mystery about Lenin, just as there is no mystery about Trotski or Radek or Djerdjinski or Zinoviev. They all possess the psychology of the Jacobin, as it has been described by Taine. And that type was determined by the conditions under which they worked, the atmosphere in which they lived, the end which they pursued and the means which they employed. No doubt even in times of revolution there is a necessary division of labour: Bukarin is the journalist, Radek is the agitator, Djer-

djinski is the judge and executioner, Scheinmann the financier. And there are also differences of disposition. The one man may be more of a fanatic, the mentality of the other may be more corrupt and cynical. But all the leaders are cast in the same mould. They all profess the same principle or lack of principle. They all profess the same aims. They are all equally unscrupulous as to the ends. They have all placed themselves "beyond the Pale of Humanity."

CHAPTER XXVI

HOW LONG ?

THE reader who has had the patience to follow me to the end is entitled to ask a definite answer to several practical questions which will vitally affect the immediate future of Europe. If this Bolshevik Government is really so bad, how is it possible that it could have remained in power for six years? And how long is this Bolshevik nightmare going to last? And, when the deliverance comes, what form is it likely to take? And what kind of Russian Government is likely to take the place of Bolshevism?

An over-cautious writer might refuse to commit himself, and object that in the present welter and confusion there are too many unknown factors and too many possible alternatives to permit of any accurate forecast. A religious writer might answer that the coming of the Day of Judgment is the secret of Providence. A cynical writer might reply that there is no reason why Bolshevism should necessarily come to an early end, and that, after all, in this devil's gamble it is the devil who may ultimately win. I have heard many diplomats in Moscow express their belief that the Bolshevik régime, if the Dictators follow up their new economic policy, and if they abstain from challenging the moral forces of civilisation, might maintain itself for an indefinite time. I believe that those diplomats are mistaken in their assumptions

and in their judgment. If our diagnosis of the Bolshevik régime is a correct interpretation of the facts, those facts give us a sufficient basis for a reasonable anticipation of the probable trend of events, and they justify us in predicting the early doom of the present régime. We may not be able to say exactly when the end will come, but we can foretell pretty exactly in what shape and form the end is likely to come.

The continued existence of the Soviet Government appears to many observers as an unanswerable argument in favour of Bolshevism. We are told that the Government cannot be so bad as it is described. A régime which for six years defeated all its enemies, which in Genoa and at Lausanne was able to challenge Europe, must possess hidden reserves of strength which our analysis must somehow have failed to disclose. After all, each nation has the Government it deserves, and deserves the Government it has. It may be that the Bolshevik Government is exactly the kind of Government which is best adapted to the Russian temperament. And if it is indeed adapted to the Russian temperament, is there any reason why it should not continue much longer? Has it not come to stay?

It may be difficult for the man in the street to understand the duration of Bolshevism, even as he could not understand the indefinite prolongation of German resistance against an almost unanimous world. Yet, in both cases, there were sufficient reasons to explain the temporary triumph of the policy of frightfulness. Four hundred years ago Machiavelli, the greatest master of statecraft, in the first modern scientific treatise of politics, tried to explain why the wicked despotisms of the Italian

Renaissance were able to maintain themselves in power. One need not be a believer in the principles of Machiavelli to realise that the survival of a despotic Government may have nothing to do with its intrinsic moral or political virtues. The study of history does not countenance the comforting doctrine that good rulers are always rewarded and that bad rulers are immediately punished. The eternal verities may assert themselves in the end. But for many years a wicked Government may continue to be a sore "trial of faith" for those who desire to justify the ways of Providence in the governance of man.

The one unpardonable sin of any Government is weakness. The last Stuart, the last Bourbon, and the last Romanov fell, not because they were bad, but because they were weak. Whatever may be the shortcomings of the Bolshevik Government, it cannot be accused of ever having erred on the side of weakness. It has been, in every sense of the word, a Government of strong men, possessed of an indomitable and unscrupulous energy, inspired by a fanatical creed. And it is probable that those strong men will continue strong until the end, because to remain in power is for them a question of life and death. It is one of the favourite maxims of Machiavelli that the ideal ruler must either win over his enemies or exterminate them without mercy. As the Bolsheviks could not possibly expect to win over their opponents, they have never hesitated to exterminate them. They have never shown any mercy, and they know that they cannot expect mercy.

In a sense it is quite true that the Bolshevik rulers are adapted to the Russian mentality. The Russians

are a passive and docile people. For centuries they have been accustomed to methods of terrorism. It is an interesting fact that all the successful Russian rulers—Ivan VI., Peter the Great, Catherine the Great, and Nicholas I.—adopted a policy and methods which were very similar to those of the present Dictators, and that Lenin may be described in a sense as the lineal successor of Ivan the Terrible. Their accession to power is a fascinating study in the arts of demagoguery. Two watchwords were sufficient to overthrow both Miliukoff and Kerenski. The Bolsheviks promised universal and immediate peace, and at once millions of peasants deserted the trenches. They promised immediate possession of the land, and at once millions of peasants proceeded to expropriate the landowner. In those two watchwords, which worked like magic, lies the whole secret of the sudden triumph of Bolshevism. Nor must we forget that in the Revolution of November 1917, and until November 1918, the Bolsheviks were effectively assisted by the Germans. The Russian pacifist was made the instrument of the Prussian militarist. To-day the peasants have had their eyes opened. They have discovered that they have not the means of cultivating the land which they robbed, and that they are infinitely worse off under Bolshevik rule than under the easy-going rule of the landowner. But even to-day, however bitter his despair, the peasant finds himself between the devil and the deep sea. Even to-day his opposition to Bolshevism is paralysed by the dread that when the landowner returns, he may not only be deprived of his land, but he may be visited with terrible retribution.

Moreover, the peasant knows that if he is to succeed

in overthrowing the Soviet he will have to fight, and he is tired of fighting. He is overcome by terrible war-weariness. He has been bleeding to death. He is starving. No Fascism is possible in Russia under present circumstances, even if Russia could produce a Mussolini. The spirit of the people is broken. Above all, they have no leaders left. And without leadership, no matter how good the cause nor how large the numbers, no war can be conducted to a successful issue.

We have to add that, like the French Terrorists in 1793, the Bolshevik Terrorists have been assisted by the blunders of the foreign Powers. The futile interventions of the Allies not only failed to destroy the Bolsheviks, but they strengthened them. They enabled them to build up a big army, and to improve its discipline. It is probable that if there had been any unity of purpose amongst the Allies, if they had attacked simultaneously and vigorously on every front, the Bolsheviks would have been defeated. But there was no co-ordination in the Allied efforts, and Trotsky was able, at his leisure, at his own chosen time and in his own way, to defeat his opponents one after another.

The most discouraging factor in the present Russian situation is the absence of even the elements of any ruling political class out of which a strong alternative Government could be formed. To-day Bolshevism is strong not mainly by virtue of its intrinsic strength, but rather through the weakness of its opponents. This is a very old characteristic feature of Russian politics. Even under Tsarism the political opposition never constituted more than a very small minority. That minority has been massacred or driven into exile. There are a

million Russian refugees living abroad. Miliukoff is in Paris, General Skoropatski is in Berlin, Wrangel is in Vienna, Savinkov is in Tehechoslovakia. Prague, which has been unexpectedly raised to the dignity of the political and intellectual capital of the whole Slavonic world, is alone able to maintain two Russian Universities with six thousand students. The miserable remnant of political brains that is left in Russia are serving in the Bolshevist bureaucracy in order to escape starvation. Under those circumstances, even if the Bolshevists were to disappear, there would be no organised opposition to take their places. The Bolshevists have succeeded only too well in creating a political vacuum around them.

If the reader will take all these factors into account he will cease to wonder why the Bolshevists so far have succeeded in maintaining themselves. But whilst a Government of frightfulness can survive for a long time under favourable circumstances, there is a time limit which cannot be exceeded, and the death sentence cannot be indefinitely delayed. The Bolshevists have been living a predatory life on the accumulated resources of many generations. Those uncompromising enemies of Capitalism have been the parasites of the Capitalism of the past. But although they succeeded in ruining their opponents, they are now involved in the universal ruin which they brought about. A Bolshevist Government is far more expensive as well as far more corrupt than a Capitalist Government, and it cannot be maintained on a basis of bankruptcy. The peasant has been bled white, and the Bolshevist financiers are at their wits' end as to where and how they can further raise

the taxation which is required to carry on. As long as they could feed and clothe the Red Bureaucracy and the Red Army they might continue in power. But so desperate is the fiscal situation that they have now to dismiss every week tens of thousands of soldiers and civil servants, with the result that those who hitherto supported the régime because it provided them with a livelihood are now swelling the ranks of the discontented. And once discontent becomes general in the Red Army, the judgment day can no longer be postponed.

At the same time it has to be borne in mind that, inasmuch as there is no outside opposition left, the end cannot come from outside. It will have to come from inside. At first it will not be a struggle between the Reactionaries and the Bolshevists; it will have to be an internecine strife between the Bolshevists themselves. Even before the Revolution there always was a struggle between the two wings of the Communist party. For ten years Trotski was the enemy of Lenin, even as Karl Marx was the bitter opponent of Proudhon and Bakunine. Lenin was able to act as a supreme arbiter. To-day Djerdjinski distrusts Trotski and Radek. Anti-Semitic feeling is spreading in the army. In self-defence the extremists have recently resumed their anti-religious crusade, and they are punishing any manifestation of anti-Semitism as counter-revolutionary high treason. But they have overreached themselves, and it is probable that both anti-Semitism and the outraged religious feelings of the masses will be the driving forces of the impending revolt against the Dictators. And when the revolt does come, the Dictators may discover that their Janisaries either will not be trustworthy or will not be strong

enough to save them from the vengeance of the people. Let two or three anti-Semitic Bolshevist regiments raise the banner of revolt and the Bolshevist régime, like the Tsarist régime, may collapse overnight. Like the French Revolution, the Bolshevist Revolution will end as it began, with a successful military rebellion.

But, unlike the French Counter-Revolution, it is very improbable that the Russian Counter-Revolution will throw up a Napoleon. Napoleon is a Latin type, and can have no counterpart in Russia; and even in Europe a Titan only appears once in five hundred years. In Russia the Red Terrorism will simply be succeeded by a White Terrorism, as happened in Hungary, in Bavaria and in Finland. There will be a wholesale massacre of all the active members of the Communist party, and an equally systematic pogrom of the Jews. After the brief rule of counter-revolutionary Bolshevist Generals, there probably will be an attempt to restore the Monarchy.

That new Monarchist Government will make for internal peace. It will produce an immediate revival of trade and industry. But it will not necessarily make for external peace, for the new Government will have to appeal to national sentiment. It will have to demand a return to the old frontiers. It will try to recover possession of the Border States and of the Baltic ports, which will give it the necessary access to the sea. Poland will be the enemy of the new Government as it was of the old. If, at the same time, a strong reactionary régime also succeeds in establishing itself in Germany, as seems very probable, the new Russian Government will seek an alliance with the German Government.

We shall then see, once more, the regrouping of the reactionary Powers in the East opposed as of old by the liberal Powers in the West. And that combination of reactionary Powers will be so irresistible that they will certainly demand, and they may be able to force, a drastic revision of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, which was imposed upon them without their consent.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE FUTURE OF RUSSIA

SHORTLY after the first Russian Revolution the late Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Roman Dmowski, paid me a brief visit in Edinburgh. Mr. Dmowski is one of the greatest authorities on Russian affairs; he was the Parnell of the united Polish *bloc* in the first Russian Duma, and he had held the balance of parties in that memorable assembly. I thought that there was no man living who was better qualified to express a trustworthy opinion on the probable consequences of the Russian upheaval, and I invited a representative audience of Edinburgh citizens to hear a statement of his views. Mr. Dmowski's pronouncement was that for generations to come Russia would be reduced to absolute impotence. It was his conviction that the collapse of Tsarism was equivalent to the collapse of the power of Russia, and to her elimination as an appreciable factor in the foreign policy of Europe.

That pronouncement of Mr. Dmowski is an extremely interesting one, not, indeed, because it seems to demonstrate the danger of attempting political prophecies, but because it demonstrates how entirely unreliable may be the opinion of even the most competent political leader when his judgment is thrown off its balance by the influence of prejudice and partisanship. Here was one of the ablest and one of the best-informed statesmen of

Europe, the one man who has been responsible, at the Congress of Versailles, for the reconstruction of the Polish Commonwealth. Yet the event proved that he completely misunderstood the Russian situation. He solemnly and repeatedly told us that for the next fifty years Russia is bound to be a negligible quantity. Yet, within three years of his prophecy, Bolshevik armies were advancing to the very gates of Warsaw. Within four years Cicerin was dictating terms to Lord Curzon, and the Treaty of Rapallo was conjuring up once more the spectre of a Russo-German alliance, which, before the war, was the nightmare of international politics. I had many a conversation with Mr. Roman Dmowski on the future of Russia, but I always refused to be converted. On the face of it, it was inconceivable that a nation which occupied one-sixth of the earth's surface could ever cease to be an important factor in international politics. If Russia was not to become a power for good, then she would be a power for evil. Merely to treat Russia as a *quantité négligeable* seemed, to my sober judgment, sheer political madness.

THE TWO PHASES OF THE REVOLUTION

If we are to understand the final results and distant consequences of the Russian Revolution, we shall have carefully to distinguish its two main phases. First, there has been a social revolution which, like the French Revolution, resulted in the complete expropriation and spoliation of the class of landowners. That revolution has been almost entirely the work of the peasants themselves. Second, there has been a political revolu-

tion, which, unlike the French Revolution, resulted in breaking up the Centralised Bureaucratic State, the imposing but fragile structure of Peter the Great. That revolution was started by the Provincial Government of Miliukoff, and was almost an accomplished fact when the Bolshevists came into power. Both revolutions are likely to be permanent. The expropriation of the land is not a passing incident; the soil will remain in the possession of the Mujik. The breaking up of the old Russian Empire will be equally permanent. The Russia of to-morrow will be a kind of United States of Eastern Europe, which will combine in a loose federation the fifty subject races of the Russian Continent. Never again will those races obey the rule of one centralised autocracy, whether it has its seat in Petrograd, in Moscow, or in Kiev. A new Russia will emerge, whose political configuration will bear no resemblance whatsoever to that of Tsarist Russia.

But however much this new Russia will differ from the old Tsarist Russia, it will differ even more radically from the new Bolshevist Russia. The French Revolution accomplished a great deal which survives in the France of to-day. On the contrary, Bolshevism will not have contributed one single stone to the reconstructed fabric of future Russia.

DISAPPEARANCE OF BOLSHEVISM

1. The Bolshevists tried to permeate the Russian people with the revolutionary spirit. But the new Russia will probably evolve the most conservative, if not the most reactionary, Government of Europe.

2. The Bolsheviks claimed to inaugurate the reign of Anti-Christ. The new Russia will witness a revival of the Christian religion and a strengthening of the Church liberated from the tyranny of the State.

3. The Bolsheviks tried to impose the rule of a Jewish minority. The new Russia will be passionately anti-Semitic.

4. The Bolsheviks tried to abolish for ever the Monarchist principle. The restoration of the Monarchy in some form or other is a very probable conclusion.

5. The Bolsheviks claimed to establish a Communist State. The new State will be a State of peasant proprietors, who in all times and in all countries represent the most individualistic of all social types.

6. The Bolsheviks tried to establish the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. The new Russia will be more than ever a peasant's country, an aggregate of thirty thousand agricultural co-operative communes.

7. The Bolsheviks aimed at abolishing Capitalism. The new Russia, dependent on foreign assistance, will reintroduce Capitalism on a much larger scale than before. She will be like the American continent—a country of large trusts, syndicates and chartered companies.

DEVASTATION TO-DAY

To-day, to outward view, Russia appears as one vast ruin, as one boundless "devastated area," a hundred times larger than the devastated areas of France. The accumulated wealth of generations has been annihilated. Tens of millions of acres have gone out of cultivation. There are whole provinces where not one mansion of

the aristocracy remains standing. Whilst in Moscow I would often hear a very characteristic anecdote. The peasants of a certain village, after destroying a historical manor house, had all come together in order to remove the loot. They distributed the heirlooms. They broke up the furniture for firewood. When everything had been properly distributed on the strictest Socialist principles, there still remained a huge old French mirror in the big ballroom of the castle. This proved a hopeless problem to the bewildered mujiks. They were at a loss what to do with it. They could not remove it. They could not divide it, and it would be no use burning it. In a flash of inspiration they decided to smash it up and to allot the fragments as far as possible in equal parts. The old mirror, an eighteenth-century masterpiece from a French glass factory, was broken into bits, and to-day each little fragment is presumably adorning the toilet table of the peasant women of the village.

This story of the broken mirror seems to me a perfect symbol of the stupid vandalism of the Revolution, and it also seems to explain the reason why it failed. Not only have the Bolsheviks proved unable to build, but even their destruction has been aimless. In one sense Russia seemed to be the ideal country for a Communist experiment. They had to deal with an illiterate, docile, semi-barbarous people, who were to be like clay in the potter's hands. But in another sense Russia was about the last country where the Marxian theories could have been successfully applied. For the primary object of Marxian Socialism is not to destroy mansions and mirrors, but to destroy Capitalism. Marxism does not aim at establishing agricultural Communism, but at

establishing industrial Communism. The Bolsheviks, in their attempt to engineer a world revolution, made exactly the same mistake as the Germans, in their attempt to achieve victory in the world war. Both had to wage a war on two fronts, in the East and in the West. Both thought that the war in the East would be the line of least resistance. Both saw too late that the war could only be won in the West. *To-day the Bolsheviks realise what Karl Marx did realise, that the world revolution cannot be won, until it is won in England.* They realise that an agrarian revolution is premature and precarious; the industrial revolution alone is final. You cannot destroy agricultural wealth, which is the perennial gift of Nature. You can destroy industrial wealth, which is the ephemeral work of man. The Bolsheviks now proclaim that, as England and Germany are the strongholds of Capitalism, the proper strategy is to concentrate all their efforts on capturing those strongholds. In the West alone they can deal a death-blow to the capitalist system.

So far as Russia is concerned their misgivings are justified. In Russia, the destruction which they achieved is only temporary and superficial. Lenin has often been compared to Attila, King of the Huns. The old chroniclers tell us of a popular mediæval saying: "Wherever the horse of Attila had passed, the grass ceased to grow." The popular saying was wrong. Immediately after the hordes of Attila had left, the green grass started to grow again. It will be with the villages of Russia as with the French villages of the devastated areas. In 1918 I motored from St. Quentin to Verdun through the "Chemin des Dames." The destruction

was so complete that for miles one did not detect a trace of human habitation. It looked as if this scene of desolation could never be reclaimed for human cultivation. But already to-day most of the villages have been reconstructed, and tracts which five years ago were a dreary desert have become smiling wheat fields. The recovery of Russian agriculture will be equally rapid. A few good harvests, a few years of strong government, and the influx of foreign capital will suffice to restore the former prosperity of the Russian Continent.

THE SOWING OF DRAGON'S TEETH

And thus it would almost seem as if our story of the ghastly Russian tragedy were unexpectedly to conclude on an optimistic note. Such a conclusion, however, would be premature. Even if we could forget the sufferings and the death by starvation of twenty millions of victims, optimism would be as misleading as pessimism. Even if the material ruins are to be repaired in a brief space of time, there is, alas ! another side of the picture. There are other values, intellectual and moral, which cannot be so easily replaced. Just before leaving Moscow I was asked one evening to meet a number of foreign residents. Every one of the guests had spent several years in the country, and was retailing some of his experiences. Every one was giving his opinion of the working of the Bolshevik régime, and calculating its prospects of duration. To bring the conversation to a point, I asked all the guests present whether they could think of any single achievement of the Bolshevik régime which might conceivably be put to its credit, and which

might be adduced in its defence. They all had to admit that no such achievement could be found; that there was no section of the Russian community which was not infinitely worse off to-day than it was before. A few days after this conversation I put the same question to some prominent Bolshevik officials. The reply was a challenge and a menace. "The reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries are short-sighted fools! They do not see further than their noses. Yes, we are destroyers. But so is the philanthropist who levels to the ground the noisome slums of a city. You must destroy before you can build up. Even if you could prove that we can claim no positive achievement to our credit, you forget that we have achieved one vital thing, which is more important than all our destructions. We have created a new 'human material.' We have transformed a people of slaves into a people of free men. Young Russia will never be the same as old Russia. Even if the present revolution is not immediately coming to a head, we have sown the seeds of future upheavals. Even after we are gone our work will not die with us."

There was an awful truth in this Bolshevik boast. The Dictators have indeed sown the dragon's teeth of future catastrophes. They have succeeded in poisoning the minds of a whole generation. That achievement is the real Devil's work which the Bolshevik régime has done, and whose consequences can only fully reveal themselves in the future. But even here their baneful influence ought not to be overrated. For, in the first place, that "Communist youth," the unhappy children who are brought up in Bolshevik schools, and who are tainted with the Bolshevik propaganda, will soon pass away.

They will be miserable and degenerate wrecks. They will be treated as outcasts. Such will be their demoralisation that they will be powerless even for mischief. It may no doubt take a long time before the Bolshevik poison is completely eliminated from the Russian soul. But, even allowing for this, a poison ceases to be dangerous as soon as its effects are known. Moreover, if the Bolsheviks have supplied the poison, they have also provided the counter-poison. In Russia, at least, there will be no longer occasion to dread the Bolshevik contagion for the coming generation. When a million Russian refugees return to their wrecked homes, there will not be one who will not repudiate the Bolshevik devilry. We, in Western Europe, may forget, and we are forgetting, the lessons of the Bolshevik experiments. But every Russian who has passed through the Bolshevik hell, their children, and the children of their children, are not likely to have such short memories. We may, therefore, quite confidently anticipate the probable direction of the political and moral currents of the new Russia. Even as in the material sense Russia will soon become once again the granary of the European continent, so in a political and moral sense Russia is likely to prove, in a not distant future, the mainstay of European law and order, and the most uncompromising enemy of all collectivist impostures.

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